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Editors’ Preface

With this issue the Yale Journal of Sociology enters a new era. Two volumes from its beginnings three years ago in Ivan Szelenyi’s initiative to promote the first rate work of the department’s undergraduates, we find ourselves extending that mission to include the work of intellectual community of the department at large: graduate students, faculty members, emeriti faculty, visiting fellows, Yale alumni and participants in the Yale workshops, colloquia, and conferences. Our aim is to showcase the work done by the plural and fertile group of sociologists working in and around the Yale Sociology Department. In trying to better achieve its mission as a window to the department, YJS will avoid a rigid content structure, opting instead for a flexible format that will better serve its aim is to reflect the work, preoccupations, discussions, in brief, the rich life of the department with its shifts and turns. We welcome unsolicited submissions from the whole community of the Sociology Department and are open to suggestions for special topics, issues and papers.

This issue is the first in a series of three organized around the department’s research centers, the pillars of the research structure of the department. The present issue features work done within the Yale Center for Cultural Sociology headed by Jeffrey Alexander and Ron Eyerman. The next issue will focus on the Center for the Study of Inequalities and the Life Course, headed by Uli Mayer. And the last topical issue on this series will be dedicated to the Comparative Research Center now adding Philip Gorski to its helm besides Ivan Szelenyi.

Starting with this issue, YJS will change format moving from a single issue to two issues per year. This new periodicity will allow us to display more of the intellectual life of the department that would otherwise be cut short in the procrustean bed of a single issue. The journal’s full content will now be available freely on the department’s website at www.yale.edu/socpet/yjs. This online avatar will allow YJS to expand its readership and better serve as a bridge with the department’s alumni and the greater sociologi-
cal community. YJS will still edit a limited edition of printed copies in traditional book format available from the Sociology Department.

IVAN SZELENYI
MARTIN DE SANTOS
Editors
I Live Here: Neighborhood Identity, Space and Control in Urban Centers*
Candace McKinley

Abstract: This paper examines the symbolic economies of Jackson Heights, NY and Fair Haven, CT to investigate how the various merchant and community groups compete in the symbolic rendering and marketing of their neighborhoods. It analyzes the importance of ethnicity as a tool for inclusion, exclusion and commodification of spaces and the role of merchants associations, historic preservation groups, and local community development corporations in this process.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how racial and/or ethnic difference shapes the formation and protection of identity in Jackson Heights, New York City and Fair Haven, New Haven, Connecticut, two ethnically diverse urban neighborhoods. My research focuses on neighborhood organizations and merchants associations as major players in how neighborhood identity is crafted. As the rate of immigration increases and the mobility of middle class populations rises, neighborhoods face a constant shift in ethnic and racial makeup. This shift in ethnic composition consequently leads to a redefinition of spaces that reflects the changing ethnic and socio-economic makeup of its residents. Culture solidifies and mani-

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fests itself in space, redefining or adding onto the history of places and shaping the identity of the spaces people inhabit. This manifestation of culture in space can take the form of signs in different languages, stores that cater to various ethnic groups, the emergence of various places of worship or public festivals.

However, this changing ethnic makeup of a neighborhood and its consequent adjustment in cultural identity is not always a smooth process. Rather than new expressions of different cultures coexisting in a space, new symbols of culture sometimes conflict with older identities. This conflict sometimes leads to the formation of reactionary community groups, such as beautification or preservationist organizations, which hope to maintain control of the identity of the space. Newer emerging cultures and their subsequent markers in physical space are met with resistance, treated as an invasive force that lacks an appreciation for the neighborhood’s older identity and history.

Understanding the way in which ethnicity affects space is of utmost importance to cities. Due to the shift from a Fordist to a post-Fordist globalized economy, cities are no longer major places of production, but ones of consumption. As urban neighborhoods decline due to high unemployment and a shrinking tax base, cities must find new sources of capital. Many cities have found that tourism is a profitable venture, capitalizing on the history of urban spaces and the uniqueness of urban life. City government officials have made cities places for suburbanites and tourists to visit and sample a presentation of “urban life”. Neighborhoods with immigrant populations and competing identities are especially important in this process, as they may offer cultural commodities such as ethnic foods and shops to attract tourists and suburban day trippers. A better understanding of the manner in which neighborhood organizations and ethnic merchants interact in the formation of a neighborhood’s identity, is key to the proper implementation of urban redevelopment policies.

There have been several ways of imagining urban space in Sociology. Chicago School’s, Robert Park introduced the idea of urban ecology that would dominate the field of urban sociology for many years. According to Park, urban society could be described in ecological terms, as a series of natural areas (Park 1952). These natural areas included slums, downtown business districts, and entertainment districts. These areas related to each other in a series of symbiosis and competition. Park and the Chicago School, working from the idea of Chicago as their ideal type, conceived of these natural areas forming concentric zones, the center and first zone
being the business district, followed by the slums, working class neighborhoods, middle class neighborhoods, and the suburbs. As the business district grew and encroached upon the slums, the entire series of rings was pushed further out spatially with each ring encroaching upon and subsuming the following ring. This turnover of zones was termed invasion and succession. For Park, this process of invasion and succession provided a base for explaining the mobility and assimilation of incoming immigrants. According to this model, immigrants enter the second zone, the slums, as a zone of transition. As they assimilate and achieve financial success, they move from the slum zone to working class neighborhoods, then to middle class neighborhoods, and the suburbs.

There are several problems with Park’s theory that led it to lose favor with the sociological world and which are problematic for my inquiry. Mainly, most cities are not arranged in neatly laid out zones divided by socio-economic classes. Many cities have pockets of slums, middle class and working class neighborhoods that are scattered throughout the city, often being so close together that the crossing of one street will lead from an economically depressed ghetto to a chic upper middle class enclave. Furthermore, many neighborhoods, such as my Jackson Heights site, are economically diverse as well as multi-ethnic. First generation immigrant families and their businesses occupy the same space as more established white residents and their exclusive garden apartments.

Also of concern is the theory of invasion and succession that suggests that the transition of immigrants into one zone will cause older occupants of that zone to move outward. While this is the case with the Fair Haven site, which was once predominately middle class and white but experienced a rapid turnover to an African American and now Latino working class community, the Jackson Heights site does not show evidence of such a rapid turnover. There still exists a substantial, although smaller, middle class white population that shows little signs of being uprooted, but as I suspect to discover in my inquiry, are resisting change and reaffirming their status through community organizing. Moreover, Park’s theories, like much of the Chicago School, relies heavily on the assumption that cities are areas where assimilation of immigrant populations occurs and that such assimilation is necessary in order to succeed financially and move spatially to more desirable neighborhoods in the city. As scholars such as Charles Hirschman and C. Matthew Snipp argue, assimilation is no longer necessary to fulfill the “American Dream” (Hirschman and Snipp 1999).
However, I do find some of the Chicago schools assertions useful, namely Park’s conception of urban society as a mosaic of social worlds in which social areas take spatial form (Pork 1967). This spatialization of the social arena produces such phenomena as ethnic enclaves and bohemian and artistic neighborhoods. For my inquiry, I intend to make the statement that such physical manifestations of the social or cultural world are both inherent to the nature of culture or life having to occur in space and a pre-meditated creation by a subset of people who inhabit those spaces.

Louis Wirth, another member of the Chicago School, moved from describing the physical aspect of life in urban areas to an attempt at analyzing urban life in his famous essay “Urbanism as a Way of Life”. Here, Wirth seeks to analyze and differentiate urbanism as a particular mode of life. Wirth defines the city as a “relatively large, dense and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals” (Wirth 1968). The larger and more densely populated the city becomes, Wirth argues, the characteristics associated with urbanism become more accentuated. Wirth advances the argument of the city as the great melting pot of different races and cultures. For Wirth, this diversity is the backbone of the city. The city not only tolerates, but also encourages individual difference, attracting people of all backgrounds because of their difference rather than their homogeneity. People of all races, age groups and ethnicities live close together in urban areas yet still maintain sharp contrasts and divisions among themselves. Communication across these boundaries is infrequent and superficial. However, Wirth maintains that the multitude of social interactions between different groups of people that is characteristic of the city would “break down the rigidity of caste lines and ... complicate the class structure”. (Wirth 1968: 56) This would lead to a more diversified structure of social stratification than seen in societies that are more unified. Nonetheless, Wirth feels that although these caste lines have been broken down, they reemerge sharpened and more differentiated.

Wirth also argues that there are negative effects of urban living. The most interesting for the purpose of this research is his view on the formation of voluntary associations in urban settings. Wirth argues that the turnover in group membership is high since people are in a state of transition. The rate of homeownership is low and the place of residence for the individual changes often. This makes for residents who are “rarely neighbors” and who are not fully invested in the life of the community. The individual, alienated and isolated due to the diversity and large size of the population, is impotent to act or affect change on their own and must
form networks of reliance with others. This leads to the formation of associations.

Herbert Gans wrote a compelling essay in response to Wirth’s work nearly thirty years later in 1962. Gans argues that Wirth’s analysis is no longer adequate, as cities had changed dramatically since the time of his essay. World War II brought with it a boom in the suburban housing market as the federal government encouraged homeownership through generous lending programs. White flight also made the city substantially less diverse, as middle class whites moved to the suburbs. Furthermore, Gans maintains that Wirth fails to distinguish urban life from other modes of living when Wirth concludes that all of modern society is urban. Gans essay, then, has three main contentions. First, Wirth’s essay applies to the inner city alone and cannot be generalized to the entire urban area. Second, Wirth does not present enough evidence to prove or deny that number, density and heterogeneity result in the social consequences of isolation that Wirth contends. Third, even if one could prove a causal relationship, “a large proportion of city inhabitants were and are isolated from these consequences by social structures and cultural patterns” that they developed in the city or brought with them (Gans 1968).

Gans sets out to outline and differentiate an urban way of life, a task he contends that Wirth fails to do. Gans breaks down inner city residents into five distinct groups. Gans’ first group is the cosmopolites, which includes students, artists, writers, entertainers, intellectuals and professionals who live in the city to be close to cultural facilities (Gans 1968: 66). The second group is the unmarried or childless, which are either temporarily unmarried or childless and reside in the city for a limited amount of time or permanently unmarried. Third are the ethnic villagers, ethnic immigrant groups whose isolated emotionally or physically handicapped members. The fifth and final group is the trapped communities mirror those in their countries of origin. Fourth is the group Gans calls the deprived; this population is very poor, non-white, characterized by broken families and and downward mobile, those who remain in the neighborhood after it has “been invaded by non-residential land uses or lower status immigrants” due to their financial situation.

These people are usually the retired elderly. Despite living in close proximity to one another, Gans contends that the five resident groups have little social interaction with each other. This is a direct challenge to Wirth, who claims that the proximity in residency will break down separations between different races, ethnicities and classes. Gans argues:
When people who live together have social ties based on criteria other than mere common occupancy, they can set up social barriers regardless of the physical closeness or the heterogeneity of their neighbors. (Gans 67)

Furthermore, rather than reflecting neighborhood stability, Gans argues that neighborhood heterogeneity reflects residential instability in the neighborhood. Heterogeneity only occurs, he argues, when a neighborhood is in a state of transition and landlords and realtors stop acting as “gatekeepers, that is, wardens of neighborhood homogeneity”. (Gans 1968: 69)

Gans’ critique of Wirth’s essay is helpful in providing a fuller examination of the lifestyle of urban residents. While Gans’ classification of residents into five categories is helpful in understanding the types of people in ethnically and socio-economically diverse urban neighborhoods, his assumptions that such heterogeneity implies instability is questionable. Toward the end of his essay, Gans admits that his analysis of urban and suburban life is just as likely as Wirth’s to become obsolete with time. Hopefully, this study of Jackson Heights will be evidence that Gans theory on heterogeneity and instability will soon no longer be applicable. Yet, it is evident from other studies, such as Massey and Denton’s *American Apartheid* that housing segregation is still a major problem in the United States and that landlords and realtors are partly responsible for the continued existence of high levels of housing segregation despite the outlawing of racially restrictive covenants and unfair housing practices (Massey and Denton 1993). Landlords and realtors are thus continuing to function as gatekeepers. I disagree with Gans in the assumption that only realtors and landlords can serve this function for communities. As in the case of Jackson Heights, which will be discussed later, sometimes beautification and preservation groups serve as gatekeepers.

Overall, the Chicago School analysis of urban process and neighborhood change is inadequate to form the underlying basis for my inquiry. Park’s analysis lacks an understanding of the economic forces that shape the structure of cities as well as the marketed identities of neighborhoods. John Logan and Harvey Molotch and Sharon Zukin all present political and economic understandings of the shaping of urban space as it relates to culture and identity.

John Logan and Harvey Molotch move from Park’s ecological view of neighborhood change to one of political economy in their landmark work *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place*. In this book, Logan and Molotch argue that neighborhood change and urban growth is less of a natural process of expansion, but one of the commodification of space as
controlled by a group of actors which they term “the growth machine” (Logan and Molotch 1981: 32). The growth machine is composed of several actors. The main actors of the growth machine include structural entrepreneurs, developers, landowners, media, retail businesses, utility industries, transportation industries, and local government politicians. Less influential subsidiary actors include universities, non-profit institutions, sports teams, cultural institutions such as museums and theatres, union leaders and small retailers and professionals. Absent from the official process are local residents. Growth in their thesis is not based on the upward mobility of immigrants, but on real estate and market forces that push for growth and development based on exchange values. Exchange value is the market price of land based on rent. What drives the market price are changes in the future usage of land and locational advantage.

The exchange value of land is defined in contrast to use value. Use values are particular to places and contingent on a places’ relationship to all other places. This collective consumption of land is based on social and material interests. The social contacts and interactions that give a place use value build community. Logan and Molotch call this the “daily round”. (Logan and Molotch 1981: 20) The different uses of places, according to Logan and Molotch, give places unique flavors, and lead to stratification of places. This idea is similar to Park’s concept of different social worlds within the city. The use of a space gives it a certain character or identity, be it an ethnic neighborhood, an upscale shopping area, or a manufacturing zone. Logan and Molotch identify several use values that neighborhoods provide other than the daily round. These uses include informal support networks, security and trust and identity. Often these use values overlap, producing an agglomeration of benefits and come to define what a neighborhood is: a support system, or as Park would describe it, a social world.

In their analysis, Logan and Molotch make a note of the importance of local neighborhood businesses to the protection of neighborhoods from the harm that could come from growth machine driven development. According to Logan and Molotch, local businesses, especially those that cater to a particular ethnic group or niche “become symbols of belonging and control, enhancing the feeling of turf security, which reinforces the base on which the ethnic businesses depend”. In this way, they argue ethnic indigenous businesses, as opposed to brand name stores or chain stores, “play a supporting role in defending the neighborhood against external threats”.

Community organizations serve a similar role in Logan and Molotch’s argument. Just as indigenous businesses serve as protective forces against
the growth machine, community organizations also act as protective forces of neighborhood interests. However, this protection is not always against development and growth, but sometimes against those seen as a threat to the neighborhood. “Even if most urban movements are ‘liberal’ in that they frequently oppose entrepreneur’s schemes”, Logan and Molotch argue, “some are racist and reactionary, but they do not cease to be urban” (Logan and Molotch 1981: 38). Working with local government authorities such as planning commissions and zoning boards, community organizations use legal entities to advance their goals of neighborhood protection.

Ethnicity also serves as an important use value for Logan and Molotch as it personifies itself in space. Whether this personification is in the form of ethnic oriented stores or public festivals, ethnicity serves as a securing force in a neighborhood and an interpersonal support system. Ethnicity is a “powerful force” in neighborhood politics as it motivates and is the resolution to many problems in neighborhood urban life. (Logan and Molotch 1981: 109) Rather than occurring naturally, Logan and Molotch argue that ethnicity, as a securing force for the identity of a neighborhood is “constructed and activated”. (Logan and Molotch 1981: 109) Although ethnicity can be a securing agent for neighborhoods, it can also serve as a marker to conflict and hostility in multi-ethnic settings.

Despite the use values gained from ethnicity, the daily round, and local businesses, each of these benefits are dependent on the status of the neighborhood as a commodity. In order to reap exchange values in the form of higher rents or real estate sales, the growth machine can and does manipulate these benefits, especially ethnicity and culture. Not only is place made a commodity, but also the activities that happen in that place.

Sharon Zukin also offers a reading of urban spaces as commodified places in her book *The Cultures of Cities*. According to Zukin, culture is a powerful means of controlling cities; a source of images and memories it serves as both an inclusive and exclusive force. Just as the city depends on how people manipulate land, labor and capital, the manipulation of culture and symbolic languages is also of importance to Zukin. Zukin calls the manipulation of this symbolic language and the “continual production of symbols and spaces that frame and give meaning to ethnic competition, racial change, and environmental renewal and decay” the symbolic economy (Zukin 1995: 7). This economy has three levels: exclusion and inclusion, as discussed above, place entrepreneurs, and the traditional level of civic and business elites.
Similar to Logan and Molotch’s growth machine, the symbolic econo-
my is also controlled by place entrepreneurs whose manipulations of “sym-
bols of growth” yield monetary results such as real estate development, jobs
and new businesses. The symbolic economy also lends itself to manipulation
by city officials, and, I will argue, community organizations and merchants
groups who also manipulate cities in their attempt to present an image of
the city or their neighborhood as a marketable commodity. Whether it is
the gentrification that comes from historic preservation efforts or the con-
struction of ethnic shopping districts that specialize in-selling cultural com-
modities, local community groups also manipulate the symbolic economy
to exclude and include groups and produce monetary results.

The symbolic economy is also manipulable by the traditional means of
civic and business organizations. According to Zukin, culture and symbolism
takes physical form in cities in architecture and the creation of picturesque
urban scenes. Latino street peddlers, Mexican restaurants, and signs in Span-
ish mark parts of the city as distinct and foreign, providing tourists and other
urban dwellers with a taste of being a foreigner in their home town. Historic
preservation, Zukin notes, is a prime example of the symbolic economy’s
manipulation of urban space. Preserving old building and neighborhoods
represents “the monopoly of the city’s visible past” and translates into
tourist dollars and higher property values. Zukin does not limit the use of
design guidelines, but merchants associations and business improvement
districts also manipulate symbols and urban space for profit with ethnicity
and culture often being the vehicle for this manipulation.

For my inquiry, I will meld the analysis of Logan and Molotch and
Zukin to examine the symbolic economies of my two sites and to investigate
how the various merchant and community groups compete in the symbolic
rendering and marketing of their neighborhoods. Both Zukin and Logan
and Molotch argue for the importance of ethnicity as a tool for inclusion,
exclusion and commodification of spaces. Merchants associations, historic
preservation groups, and local community development corporations form
what I will term the neighborhood development machine. Each group has
overlapping and conflicting interests that drive their approach to communi-
ty development. In my research, I intend to flesh out what these particular
interests are and how these various groups conflict and or cooperate in
putting forth an identity or image of their neighborhood.

Philip Kasinitz, in his case study of the “Boerum Hill” neighborhood of
Brooklyn, New York, applied the ideas of Zukin’s symbolic economy and
Logan and Molotch’s discussion of gentrification and community defense
against urban growth. In the “Gentrification of ‘Boerum Hill’: neighborhood change and conflicts over definitions”, Kasinitz analyzes the battle over space between pro- and anti-gentrification community organizations (Kasinitz 1988). For Kasinitz, pro- and anti-gentrification organization construct histories or “myths” of the spaces they seek to control and protect, a process he dubs “definition-making” (Kasinitz 1988:179). This process is an outward looking one that seeks to project and image of the neighborhood to those outside of it, often in hopes of improving the economic lot of the group stakeholders who are usually white and homeowners. Beautification and homeowner organizations in his study use historic landmark designation, walking tours, and house tours to put forth a myth to the public of their neighborhood’s history and identity. Kasinitz claims that historic landmark designation serves several functions such as displacing poorer residents who do not own property, raising property taxes, protecting architecture, and, most importantly, proclaiming “an area to be the type of place where history is valued” (Kasinitz 1988: 171). Often in the process of landmarking, the groups pushing for the status increasingly focuses on architecture and public symbols to the point were the community becomes one defined by its architecture.

I also intend to discover if the competition and conflict over control of the symbolic economy is a result of the ethnic diversity of these areas or if the animosity created by ethnic difference simply serves to distract from the real issues at hand, a process Robert Sanjek calls “misdefinitions” (Sanjek 2000: 764). What surfaces as interethnic struggle and racism, according to Sanjek, often masks more tangible urban problems such as overcrowding, poor public services, or population implosions. In his case study of neighborhood politics in Queens, New York, Sanjek find that during the initial stages of racial change of the neighborhoods he studied, there existed a great amount of racial hostility and conflict. Overtime, interethnic political alliances were formed as residents overcame prejudices and misdefinitions that proved divisive and counterproductive.

Leland Saito in his study of the Los Angeles suburb Monterrey Park observed similar occurrences (Saito 1998). An influx of Chinese immigrants and Chinese owned and oriented businesses led to conflict with longer established white and Latino residents. Beautification groups were formed and political alliances were made to control the symbolic manifestations of ethnicity in ordinances forbidding foreign language signs on businesses and efforts to exclude Chinese owned businesses and developers from city funded redevelopment projects. Saito terms more established
white resident’s claims to space and search for control over the architecture of Monterey Park as a reassertion of whiteness. (Saito 1998: 39) Chinese businesses and restaurants replaced older white owned and oriented establishments motivating a nativist response from white resident who felt economically and politically threatened by the emerging Chinese community. Residents claimed that new Chinese owned business raised the rents in the area forcing older white owned establishments out of business. (Saito 1998: 45) Latino and Japanese residents were also largely in league with white residents and seen as having more of an investment in the community due to their many years of residency. Yet, overtime, Latino and Japanese residents found common ground with Chinese-American residents on shared issues, and new alliances were formed.

**Research Question, Hypothesis and Variables**

My research seeks to answer the following questions: How does race and ethnicity shape the dynamics of identity formation and control of urban spaces? Is it ethnic difference that leads to conflict in the process of neighborhood identity formation or are other factors such as residency, congestion or blight that are the source of conflict? Can and how do conflicting community interests approach consensus in creating or supporting a marketable image for their neighborhood?

My hypothesis is that ethnicity does play a major role in producing conflict among various community groups. However, it is not ethnic difference alone that produced conflict, but the feelings of alienation and foreignness that it produces among established community interest groups which triggers a territorial response. I disagree with Sanjek’s contention that what seems as inter-ethnic hostility is merely the result of misdefining the points of conflict as concerning race rather than quality of life issues such as overcrowding or inadequate parking. Conflicts surrounding public symbols are struggles over meaning and identity. It is an issue of control and of which culture or mythology will characterize the neighborhood.

I also hypothesize that over time, ethnicity or the labeling of a space as belonging to one ethnic group over another, will over time cease to produce the strong territorial feelings that produce conflict, but will be prized as a marketable asset for the community and lead to the cooperation of different interests groups.
Variables:

Independent Variables:
Level of ethnic diversity

Dependent Variables:
Feelings of foreignness, alienation and territoriality
Conflict, Cooperation

Concepts and Terms

Neighborhood identity formation: the process by which an image or identity of a neighborhood is formed. Such an identity can be framed in terms of ethnicity or immigrant cultures. Examples of such images are the proliferation of areas deemed “Little India”, “Little Italy” or “Chinatown”. Such ethnic definitions of neighborhood identity may be of official city government labeling, such as Little Italy in New York City or unofficial. Neighborhood identity may also be based or manifested in other areas such as socio-economic status, cultural or artistic expression such as artist enclaves, etc.

Ethnicity: Ethnicity for this inquiry is distinct from race. While members of an ethnic group may be of the same racial identification, ethnicity reaches beyond the limits of race or socio-economic status. Members of an ethnic group may share a common religion, language, occupation, set of core values, or common national heritage. For the purposes of my research, ethnicity will refer mainly to people of a common national or area heritage. For instance, I regard South Asians as one broad ethnic group in my study while also regarding Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Indians as distinct ethnic groups based on nationality. Much of what determines ethnicity or an ethnic group in this study will be a matter of degree of perspective. A broad view, for instance, may see all Latinos in Fair Haven as composing an ethnicity while a more precise view realizes the ethnic difference among various Latino nationalities.

Neighborhood: For my inquiry I will follow Kent Schwirian’s conception of neighborhood. For Schwirian, the basic elements that constitute a neighborhood are people, place, interaction system, shared identification, and public symbols. Schwirian defines a neighborhood “as a population residing in an identifiable section of a city whose members are organized into a general interaction network of formal and informal ties and express common identification with the area in public symbols”. (Schwirian 1983)
For my analysis, neighborhood will not be tied down to an area which is occupied by a particular socio-economic group or ethnic group, as both of the sites which I am doing my research are multi-ethnic areas with a somewhat diverse socio-economic makeup. The various aspects of neighborhood such as place, symbols and interaction may overlap each other for different groups of people, but do not necessarily all have to be the same between various groups for a neighborhood to exist. For example, the Bangladeshi jewelry store owner and the white middle class garden apartment dweller are still part of the same neighborhood even though they do not necessarily move in the same circles of social interaction or have common public symbols with which they identify. The fact that they share a common physical space groups them into the same neighborhood.

Conflict: Conflict is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as a state of opposition of hostilities. Conflict can manifest itself in the form of disension, contention, clashes or disputes. Such hostilities, for the purpose of this inquiry, can be seen in public protests, boycott drives, verbal or physical altercations, and political contention. Political contention will be the hardest indicator of conflict to gauge since such disputes are often not in public. However, I intend to be able to gauge such conflict though my in-depth interviews and observations from attending meetings of various community and merchant organizations.

Methodology

I conducted fifteen to twenty in-depth interviews with members of merchant associations, beautification and preservationist groups, community development corporations, community activists and city officials. These interviews were recorded. I also conducted archival research, finding newspaper articles and the organizations I am investigating. I researched the publications of the groups I drew my interviews from such as newsletters and bulletins. Observation during my trips to these two sites also informed my research as well as information gleaned from attending meetings of the various groups. I used snowballing techniques to obtain interview subjects from the organizations I was targeting.

Due to the promise of anonymity, all quotations from interviews are identified through a letter and number system that corresponds to the neighborhood from which respondents were drawn. Quotations from newspaper articles of statements by people I interviewed retain the identi-
fying information listed in the newspaper article. However, I was careful not to suggest any affinity between excerpts from interviews I conducted and quotations from newspaper articles to respect the wishes of my interview subjects. The numbering system is arbitrary and does not reflect the order in which the interview was conducted. The numbering system is merely used to track when an interview is cited.

**Site Selection and Subject Population**

I focused on two sites: the neighborhood of Jackson Heights, Queens, NY and the Fair Haven neighborhood of New Haven, CT. My research was mostly done through a series of in-depth interviews conducted with members of various community groups within each neighborhood. I drew interviewees for Jackson Heights from residents and merchants who were affiliated with the Jackson Heights Beautification Group, the Jackson Heights Merchants Association, Jackson Heights Action Group. For my interviews from the Fair Haven neighborhood, I contacted residents and merchants who were affiliated with the Grand Avenue Village Association, the Fair Haven Development Corporation, and Junta for Progressive Action. I sought to interview the leaders of these organizations as well as members without any leadership role. My interview subjects were from varied ethnic and political affiliations, which reflected the ethnic and socio-economic specific organizations from which I drew interview subjects. The diversity of the groups from which I drew my interview afforded me a wider perspective on the nature of the ethnic contestation of space that is taking place in these neighborhoods.

**Jackson Heights, Queens**

In 1900, the area known as Jackson Heights was undeveloped farmland (Murphy 1992: 34). A few barns, wheat fields and carriage houses composed the area. The development of the area was spurred by the construction of the Queensboro Bridge in 1909 and the extension of the subway to Flushing, Queens. The Queensboro Corporation, headed by Edward A. MacDougall, purchased much of the area now known as Jackson Heights (Karatzas 1990). Inspired by the garden-city movement in Europe, MacDougall transplanted the concept to Queens. Seeking to build a refuge from the city for middle class families, MacDougall built single-family homes and luxurious garden apartments to be sold at modest prices. The development was the first garden and cooperative apartment community in the United States and includ-
ed commercial, recreational, transportation and institutional facilities that were integrated into the residential buildings (Research Department, Jackson Heights Historic District 1993: 3). Among the amenities the community offered were tennis courts and a skating rink. Its central location in New York City and location near key public transportation venues made Jackson Heights an attractive community for middle class families who worked in Manhattan. Planners advertised Jackson Heights as a “restricted residential community”, which many white middle-class New Yorker’s found attractive in light of Manhattan’s growing ethnic population.

Until the 1960’s, restrictive covenants kept the population of Jackson Heights mainly white. However, with the legal banning of restrictive covenants and more liberal immigration policies in the mid to late 1960’s, Jackson Heights underwent a rapid change in population. When Indian business began establishing themselves in the 1970’s, Jackson Heights was home to residents of over 100 countries. The rapid change in the population of Jackson Heights can be seen in Table 1 (Kasinitz 1998: 165). In 1960, Jackson Heights was 98.5% white with a tiny minority population. By 1990, the white population had dropped to just under 40%, with the Hispanic population rising to 41.3%, the Asian population to 16% and the Black population to just over 2%. Longer established white residents remain in Jackson Heights, although most whites left Jackson Heights in the late 1960’s.

### Population Figures and Race in Jackson Heights, 1960-90

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<td>5.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>8.4</td>
<td>13,579</td>
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**For 1960 and 1970, Other represents a residual category of all non-White, non-Black, and non-Hispanic cases, and includes those who declined to state their ethnicity.
Although the South Asian population of Jackson Heights remains small, they do account for a significant proportion of Jackson Height’s Asian population. The South Asian presence is strong in Jackson Heights particularly because of the 74Th Street shopping district. 74th Street has quickly become the center of the Queens South Asian community. While the vast majority of South Asians who frequent 74th Street do not live in Jackson Heights, the neighborhood is home to a large concentration of South Asian businesses such as grocery stores, garment vendors, appliance stores, video stores and restaurants. Sam & Raj an electronics store founded by Sam Kappadi, was the first South Asian store to open on 74th Street in 1973 (Anand 1995: 44). India Sari palace, Sina Appliances, and Gita Jewelers soon followed the opening of Sam & Raj. By 1980, 74th Street of Jackson Heights had evolved into a thriving South Asian business district. In the two-block area around 74th Street, there now exist over 200 South Asian owned and oriented stores. Despite the small size of the shopping district, the heavy concentration of South Asian stores makes Jackson Heights a landmark in the borough of Queens and a definite stop for any South Asian visiting the New Jersey-New York-Connecticut area.

Jackson Heights is also home to a Latino oriented shopping district along Roosevelt Avenue. Stretching through most of the borough of Queens, Roosevelt Avenue remained commercially stagnant until the early 1970’s when Colombian and Cuban immigrants began to settle in various parts of Queens. Today, businesses owned by and catering to immigrants from a wide variety of Latin American countries fill Roosevelt Avenue. No longer dominated by Colombian or Cuban stores, Roosevelt Avenue is home to shops catering to Peruvians, Dominicans, Ecuadorians, Mexicans, and Guatemalans to create a diverse Latino shopping district (Ojito 1997). However, Roosevelt Avenue has battled a different sort of quality of life issue than 74th Street. Drugs, money laundering, prostitution and the violent crime that accompanies them, plagued Roosevelt Avenue into the late 1990’s. Mixed in with legitimate businesses, brothels and fraudulent money-writing institutions operated without much police resistance until police began to crack down in the late 1990’s (Kocieniewski 1996). The crime problem on Roosevelt Avenue made Jackson Heights famous as a cocaine district in local media where it earned the title “Cocaine Corral” (Schorr 1978). Although Roosevelt Avenue is only a few short blocks from some of Jackson Heights’ nicest garden apartments, some residents began to distance themselves from Roosevelt Avenue, denying that avenue was even a part of the neighborhood. This came to a head in 1992 after the slay-
ing of journalist Manuel de Dios by a drug cartel (Kasinitz 1998: 165). After the New York Times wrote an article stating the slaying occurred in Jackson Heights, several residents wrote letters to the editor claiming that where de Dios was killed was not in Jackson Heights because it occurred on the south side of the street. Even though residents were rarely affected by the actions of the drug cartels that operated on Roosevelt Avenue, residents began pointing to Latino owned bars, restaurants and clubs on Roosevelt Avenue as locations of illegal or questionable activity (Kassinitz 1998: 166).

Establishing 74th Street as a South Asian space has not been without its challenges either. Community members began to complain about the negative affects of the increase in business with the explosion of the business district in the 1980’s. The increase in business on this once stagnant stretch of 74th Street brought with it problems such as litter, poor parking options, heavy traffic and noise. A residential area surrounds the business district and is largely composed of white Americans, primarily Irish, Italian and Jewish (Khandelwal 1994). With the rapid growth of Indian business, some residents began to experience feelings of displacement as they began to compete with South Asians for space. As mentioned above, many concerns about the influx of South Asian immigrants and business has materialized in concerns over quality of life issues. Local residents began to demand that Indian business owners who lived outside of the community take more interest in community issues. Some residents labeled the merchants and shoppers as outsiders, even “invaders” (Kassinitz 1998: 167). This lead to the formation of the Jackson Heights Merchant’s Association in 1990 to represent business owner’s interests to neighborhood associations and government authorities (Khandelwal 1994: 192). Business owners realized that resident’s concerns over litter, traffic, and noise coincided with their concerns over thefts and muggings of foreign customers.

In November of 1990, the Jackson Heights Beautification Group planned a rally to protest what they felt was the increasing uncleanness of 74th Street. Over 200 residents attended the march up and down 74th Street. This rally represented a peak in tensions between older white residents and new South Asian merchants. The rally was supposed to focus on issues concerning cleanliness, but the anti-Indian sentiment was so pervasive that the New York City Human Rights Division’s Crisis Prevention Unit had to intervene to tone down the slogans before the rally could even occur (Khandelwal 1994: 193). Such instances of overt conflict and hostility are rare in Jackson Heights, but shed light on the underlying tensions in the neighborhood. Although concern over litter may have been the impetus for
the above-mentioned protest, ethnic difference cannot be dismissed as a contribution to the ire of local residents.

Yet tensions still remain as South Asians make claims on Jackson Heights. One tension that surfaced in the 1990’s was over the desire to rename the 74th Street area “Little India”. Merchants such as Vasantrai Gandhi, former president of the Jackson Heights Merchants Association, are pushing for the renaming “because it illustrates a kind of cohesion, sovereignty, and identity forged by Indian immigrants trying to carve their niche in New York City” (Ramaswami 1994: 51)\(^1\) According to Gandhi, this request is not unreasonable in that “in the USA they have borrowed names of streets from all over the world. So why can’t we have a street named Little India?”

Unsurprisingly, the initiative received little support from the local non-Indian residents. Although a large percentage of the business and customers of the business district are Indian or South Asian owned, the population is not majority Indian. Many merchants like Gandhi equate the resistance by residents as racist:

\[W\]e should not be under the wrong notion that there is no discrimination. It is likely to be there. If this street was to be named London Street, it would have been different. If this street was known as Rome Street or “Little Italy”, there would have been little or no opposition.

Gandhi’s comments show a distinction between the acceptability of European names as opposed to Asian place names to designate an area. Perhaps residents would react differently if the merchants were Irish and the street was dubbed “Little Dublin”. During the celebration of the Diwali festival in Jackson Heights, Mayor David Dinkins, an African American, referred to the plan to rename the street. During the celebration organized by the Jackson Heights Merchants Association, a white resident carried a sign through the crowd in protest that said “Mayor Dinkins: Wrong. I live here. This is my American home. Not ‘Little India’” (Khanedwal 1994: 193).

However, although race is a significant factor, race cannot be the only explanation for resident opposition to the name change. As stated above,

South Asian merchants are mostly non-residents of Jackson Heights. Furthermore, the businesses do most of their business on the weekend attracting over 15,000 customers a day (Archana 1992: 34). Quality of life issues are a legitimate concern for residents of Jackson Heights, but as the example of the protester above shows, ethnic difference and the claiming of spaces as belonging to one group or another is also an important part of the debate.

The Jackson Heights Interviews

My interest in Jackson Heights began after reading articles surrounding three major points of conflict in the neighborhood: the quality of life issues surrounding the booming 74th Street business district, the process of making Jackson Heights a historic landmark district and efforts to rename 74th Street “Little India”. These issues garnered much media attention, especially in area newspapers and gave voice to some other interethnic and social tensions in the neighborhood and between various community organizations, the Jackson Heights Beautification Group and Jackson Heights Merchants Association in particular. My interview questions focused on these three topics as well as quality of life issues concerning Roosevelt Avenue. The responses revealed a wide range of concerns on the question of the importance of ethnic difference over quality of life concerns in conflicts among community associations. I grouped these responses into four categories: assimilation and conformity, alienation, residency and symbolic control.

In my interviews with key members and officers of the Jackson Heights Beautification Group (JHBG), assimilation and conformity was a theme that was common through all of my interviews. When asked questions concerning the 74th Street the need for merchants to learn the “American way” or the proper Way of conducting shopping district and Roosevelt Avenue, interview participants spoke frequently about business. One member of the JHBG, who is a long time resident of the neighborhood and is known as the “Mayor of Jackson Heights”, made the following statement regarding South Asian merchants along 74th Street:

When my grandfather came to this country from Italy, his object was to learn the American Way. He wanted to learn how to do everything the American way. But, there wasn’t that many Italians. There was Italians, Irish, Jewish, you know. Now, I think, because everyone is in one little group, they all do what they did back in their country. They haven’t gotten educated. I think if
they got mingled with everybody, maybe they would learn quicker, I don’t know.2

In this statement, a need for an accelerated assimilation process is expressed. Several members of the JHBG either related their experience as immigrants or children of immigrants as a way of promoting what they felt was the correct way to “become American”.3 Rooting their displeasure with immigrant merchants’ way of conducting business with their personal or familial experience served as a way of legitimizing their opinion, reducing its ethnocentric undertones. It was the refusal to assimilate and conform to aesthetic standards set by the beautification group that caused conflict rather than ethnic difference alone. In fact, many members felt that the level of diversity in the neighborhood was an asset for the community and one of the reasons they either moved to Jackson Heights or remained there. However, they also felt that immigrants should assimilate or conform to what they identified as an American way of life, or more locally, “the Jackson Heights way” of conducting themselves. Members related how they were upset by merchants and their employees calling out to passersby in languages other than English to come into their stores, passing out flyers, or even selling things on the street be it food by means of food carts or newspapers in newspaper stands (Moran 2003: 6). These practices were identified as foreign modes of doing business that merchants brought with them from their countries of origin.

Another member of the JHBG said that the reason for conflict in the area, particularly in relation to 74th Street and Roosevelt Avenue, is not one of ethnic difference, but “immigrantness”.4 A prominent member of the beautification group and a key person in the drive for landmark status, this respondent felt that classifying the conflict in the neighborhood as one of ethnic difference was too simplistic. He felt that the issue was that many of the shopkeepers were “first generation immigrants” who were not from the “upper crust” of their countries of origin. For this respondent, assimilating or adjusting to “American customs” was not sufficient. Such assimilation had to be done over a few generations. Like the above respondent, he prefaced his remarks by connecting his family’s experience with his family’s

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2 Interview JH4d, Jackson Heights, March 26, 2003.
3 Interview JH4d, Jackson Heights, March 26, 2003.
immigrant experience, noting how his grandfather emigrated from Sweden. He then went on to speak about a number of immigrant communities and their process of assimilation. Italians, he argued, were “dirty and greasy” as in their home country “people did not bathe regularly”. After a few generations, Italians became acceptable. Jews were not allowed to purchase or rent homes in Jackson Heights in the first 50 years of Jackson Heights existence because they “were too on edge” and “angry about discrimination”. Once “they calmed down” they were allowed to move into the neighborhood. He also felt that South Asian merchants tolerated litter-ridden streets because “in their country it is very dirty and they live on top of one another”.

While this respondent’s views cannot be generalized to be representative of all members of the Jackson Heights Beautification Group, they are still important when considering the importance of ethnicity in conflicts over the control of space in Jackson Heights. Every person I interviewed from the JHBG revealed that they felt South Asian shopkeepers along 74th Street and Latino merchants on Roosevelt Avenue needed to be educated in the appropriate way of doing business in America and especially in Jackson Heights. The need for education and the JHBG’s role as an educator was a sentiment commonly expressed in all my interviews and reflected in the literature and website of the group.

The belief that merchants needed to assimilate is also connected to the concern many JHBG members felt over the attempted renaming of 74th Street to “Little India”. While several JHBG members referred to 74th Street as Little India, they were all opposed to the renaming for one reason or another. Some felt that the name of the street should not be changed because “this is America”. Others felt that renaming the street would cause confusion with traffic. The most common objection to the renaming, however, was that it would divide the neighborhood unnecessarily:

We have Latinos, and we have Asians and we have just about everybody. So the question would become one of, well; is that sort of Balkanizing... It is nice that people want to claim Jackson Heights as their own, because the opposite of that is abandoned stores and people who don’t care. So on one hand people want to take a stake and be here. The question becomes we can then have each street renamed, because there are so many people. I think the

5 Jackson Heights Beautification Group. 2 January 2003 http://www.preserve.org/ihbg
group’s concern is what happens to the rest of the neighborhood, do we become Balkanized.6

One JHBG member who has lived in the neighborhood for over 40 years expressed similar concerns:

I don’t think that we should cut up the neighborhood. I think we should be one happy family. I personally wouldn’t want to have one area ‘Little India’ or ‘Little Colombia’ or ‘Little Mexico’. Years ago, I’m Italian, we didn’t say ‘Oh you’re going to the Jewish neighborhood,’ or’ you’re going to the Italian neighborhood’, or ‘you’re going to the Irish bar’. We were one group. We never split it up years ago. We never even thought of something like that. They’re part of Jackson Heights. That’s it. I don’t think they should call it ‘Little India’. Since I live here, I would like to see it all just ‘Jackson Heights’.7

Again the respondent links the current situation in Jackson Heights to his own experience as a resident of Jackson Heights in the 1950’s, before Jackson Heights attained the level of diversity that it has today. Apprehension is expressed that renaming the street will lead to a series of renaming in which various sections of the neighborhood begin to divide over racial and ethnic lines. However, when members of the Jackson Heights Merchants Association were questioned regarding the renaming drive, the effort had less to do with separating 74th Street from the rest of Jackson Heights and more to do with promoting business on the avenue:

Mayor Dinkins was very kind to us Indians. And we were very good to him. When we told him we were going to have a Diwali celebration here, he was very receptive. In fact, he himself made it that he would come and mix with us. We put up a big stage and he was here for half an hour. He even had Indian food over here. And we wanted here to put a small sign “Little India”. But we couldn’t do that, because at that time, about five or six years back, at that time the residents, people didn’t want it. Local people. But now I think the time has changed. This is 99% Indian market; at that time it was 80% or 60%, now it is 99%. But I do not think we will have any problems.8

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6 Interview JH3c, Jackson Heights, February 26, 2003.
7 Interview JH4d, Jackson Heights, February 26, 2003.
8 Interview JH6f, Jackson Heights, February 26, 2003.
For the Jackson Heights Merchant’s Association, the renaming effort was also an effort to recognize what 74th Street added to Jackson Heights, mainly fame. Merchants I interviewed stated that Jackson Heights was known by people all over the world because of 74th Street and the strong South Asian presence there. In fact, many members of the JHBG were cognizant and understanding to the need to promote the shopping district and could understand the renaming drive as being driven by businesses concerns. One former president of the JHBG summed up this point of view neatly:

So in creating that shopping district, they want to market it. I mean, they are business people; they are not doing this because they have nothing better to do. So to any degree that they can brand it and they can put that in the mind of people, that is a rational business goal. So, I do not have any problem with that. Anyone when you have a large enough concentration would think about that and say well why don’t we put that on the map and become a destination not just for South Asians but for anyone interested in South Asian products.9

Every JHBG member that I interviewed spoke on how the vast majority of merchants on 74th Street and their customers do not live in Jackson Heights, but reside in other parts of Queens, New York City and the tri-state area. The issue of residency major factor in sentiments regarding the renaming of 74th Street to “Little India” and to general sentiments towards South Asian merchants in particular. The residency issue is comprised of two main points. First, the fact that most merchants and customers of 74th Street do not live in Jackson Heights and are therefore not invested in the neighborhood. Second, that the shops on 74th Street do not cater to residents of Jackson Heights and residents feel alienated. Both sides of the residency issue are also deeply connected to the public identity of Jackson Heights. Respondents expressed resentment that 74th Street made Jackson Heights famous and that it was being labeled as a South Asian space:

Well you have to view it from, they have created a shopping Mecca. And this is sort of one of the issues; it is really not aimed at residents. Yes, there are residents of South Asian extraction who live in Jackson Heights and the surrounding areas, but if you look at the proportion of South Asian shops on 74th Avenue, you would think that it would be 95% South Asian because 95% of

9 Interview JH3c, Jackson Heights, February 26, 2003.
the stores cater to that audience. It can be off putting to the local residents saying there is nothing I can buy on 74th Street unless I want certain types of jewelry, a sari, certain types of food products, etc. And so there are people who are concerned that it doesn’t offer much. So that’s one thing.\textsuperscript{10}

For many respondents, 74th Street’s presence as a South Asian space was of putting. Since merchants and customers did not live in the neighborhood, the shopping district is even more unwelcome and merchant’s claims to the neighborhood are further undermined. 74th Street merchants are not residents nor do they cater to resident of Jackson Heights. More importantly, as the above quote demonstrates, the preponderance of South Asian oriented shops gives the impression that Jackson Heights is a South Asian neighborhood.

Other than their feelings toward the 74th Street merchants and shops, I also asked JHBG members about the historic landmark designation of most of Jackson Heights. As expected, members of JHBG were overwhelmingly in support of the drive. Many felt that the designation saved their neighborhood from pro-growth forces that were tearing down single-family homes to be replaced with modern office buildings and apartment buildings, which they described as “modern day tenements”.\textsuperscript{11} Without the designation, some felt that the neighborhood was “helpless to unscrupulous development”. Landmarking not only preserved the garden apartments and single family homes that characterized Jackson Heights, it also helped solidify an alternative identity for the neighborhood and served as a mechanism for the control of this identity. As Kasinitz argues, architecture becomes the basis of neighborhood identity. All members of the JHBG that I interviewed highly valued the architecture of the neighborhood, noting that it was the neighborhoods greatest strength. The JHBG organizes a yearly historic garden tour in June to highlight the gardens of the apartment buildings and organizes walking tours of the neighborhood. In an effort to promote a history of Jackson Heights that is architecture of the neighborhood. deeply connected to its architecture, the JHBG published two books on the history and architecture of the neighborhood. One book is a children’s book that features school children’s drawings of neighborhood buildings. The other, an official history written by the group’s former

\textsuperscript{10} Interview JH2b, Jackson Heights, March 13, 2003.

\textsuperscript{11} Interview JH2b, Jackson Heights, March 13, 2003.
president, Daniel Karatzas features a foreword written by the dean of the Yale School of Architecture. Both books serve to advance a public image of the neighborhood as one that is architecturally cohesive and diverse.

The historic landmark designation also serves as a mechanism through which the JHBG is able to exert control over the neighborhood. This control has social and aesthetic implications. Not only are members able to prevent the pro-growth forces from redeveloping sections of the neighborhood, but it also give the group the ability to impose aesthetic conformity on shop keepers whose stores are located within the district boundaries. 74th Street lies just outside the boundaries. The JHBG originally petitioned for this section to be included in the designation but landmark officials denied the request, as the Queensboro Corporation did not originally own the buildings. The laws do apply to South Asian and Latino businesses on 37th Street, restricting the use of awnings, lights and other exterior additions to the buildings. Members of the JHBG who I interviewed expressed concern over “crazy lights” and “gaudy colors” used by merchants:

> What they don’t realize that what we are trying to do. In the future, this will make our area look more uniform, more better looking. I see it in other areas around here with the canopies and lights, and everything. And we try to keep everything uniform. And plus the homes. Some people they build a ramp, and they put fences and big fences. And over here, whatever it was in the past has to be that way now. The only thing I feel is that we should educate people moving into these stores. They don’t know [the rules].

Other than visual conformity, the landmark status also gave JHBG legitimacy in other areas, especially when dealing with politicians and government officials. One officer who was heavily involved in the historic preservation process said that the landmarking affected every area of life in Jackson Heights. Landmark designation increased community pride and “cohesion”, led to an increase police presence in the area and improved the general quality of life in the area. He also felt that landmark designation helped to enforce and raise certain “expectations” of residents, an idea repeated by other officers in the JHBG. The respondent felt that people with similar expectations would desire to live in Jackson Heights. People expect to live in a quiet neighborhood free from loud music and excessive

13 Interview JH5e, Jackson Heights, March 13, 2003
horn honking. People expected to live in a clean neighborhood where their children were educated and prepared for the best colleges and universities. People with “different expectations” do not “feel comfortable in Jackson Heights”. Those people “move to Corona or Elmhurst”, neighborhoods that border Jackson Heights. Accordingly, he felt that landmark designation helped maintain the “ethnic balance” of the neighborhood ensuring that no one group grew so numerous as to upset the balance.

Landmark designation serves as a means of drawing social boundaries, excluding and including people based on socio-economic status and ethnicity. Although respondents were careful to use the term “expectations” and differentiate their idea of proper expectations from racism, it was evident to me that “expectations” was an euphemism for racial and socio-economic exclusion. The same respondent who said that landmark designation helped preserve the “ethnic balance” also explained what he meant by expectations. The proper set of expectations for Jackson Heights residents not only included keeping the streets clean and quiet but “using air conditioning in the summer”. He expressed a disdain for neighborhoods where residents spend their summers outside having cookouts or parties, as this was an unacceptable mode of life. He later connected the use of air conditioning to African-American and Latino communities, stating that Jackson Heights low African-American population was due to most African-Americans having “different expectations”. Jackson Heights has a very small African-American population, 2.1% of the population, despite bordering Corona, a predominantly African-American neighborhood.

**Fair Haven, New Haven, CT**

At the outset of my research, the neighborhood of Fair Haven was meant to serve as a comparison to Jackson Heights. Fair Haven and Jackson Heights are both ethnically diverse urban neighborhoods that are home to community organizations competing for control of the identity of the neighborhood. Yet, that is where the overt similarities end. Fair Haven is the site for similar, yet very different, contestations for control. In my research on Fair Haven, I relied heavily on newspaper articles from local media sources, my own experiences as a New Haven resident active in Fair Haven and personal interviews with members of community organizations. Regrettably, key

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14 Interview JH5e, Jackson Heights, March 13, 2003
members’ of a few important community organizations refusal to participate hindered my research. Offered here is the research I was able to complete. Rather than draw a conclusion as to the correctness of my hypothesis in this site, what is written here is meant to serve as an introduction to the issues facing Fair Haven and will hopefully encourage further research on the Fair Haven neighborhood.

Fair Haven Background

The Fair Haven neighborhood of New Haven has long been the point of entry for immigrants to the city and state. First settled by Europeans in the early 1640’s, Fair Haven was for many years a small oystering village (City of New Haven 1982: 23). The construction of the Dragon Bridge, now known as the Grand Avenue Bridge, over the Quinnipiac River in 1793, and the subsequent development of Grand Avenue, further fueled the development of the neighborhood (Fair Haven RZ Committee 2001). In the late 1800’s, Fair Haven’s economy shifted from oystering to manufacturing as factories making everything from boxes to toys began to locate to the area (City of New Haven 1982: 24). Fair Haven’s manufacturing industry made the neighborhood attractive to Irish, German, Polish, and Italian immigrants to the area. The neighborhood remained predominately Italian up until the late 1950’s when more African Americans began to migrate to the area followed by an influx of Puerto Rican immigrants in the 1960’s. The area also saw a steady economic downturn in the 1960’s with the closing of factories, the flight of middle class families to New Haven’s suburbs, and the emptying of Grand Avenue, Fair Haven’s main commercial corridor.

Today Fair Haven is a diverse community that is home to New Haven’s largest Latino community. The period from 1980 to 2000 saw a 90% rise in the Latino population and a 51% increase in the African American population (Fair Haven RZ Committee 2001: 9). In contrast the white population dropped 21.9%. The Latino community in Fair Haven is now estimated to comprise over 50% of the population (Swerdloff 2003). The Latino community is highly diverse. While Puerto Ricans are still the largest Latino group in the community, Fair Haven is also home to a substantial Mexican population. Residents also include immigrants from Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru, Argentina and various other Latin American countries.

Grand Avenue is Fair Haven’s main economic corridor. Prior to the 1960’s downturn, Grand Avenue was home to various Italian owned business. Today, Grand Avenue is known as a Latino shopping district. A few
Italian owned businesses remain, however, such as Appicella’s Bakery, a Grand Avenue fixture for nearly 80 years, and D’Amato’s Seafood (Brunsgard 2001). Most of the Grand Avenue businesses are now organized under the umbrella of the Grand Avenue Village Association (GAVA), a merchant’s association that also extends membership to property owners and non-profit agencies located on Grand Avenue and surrounding streets. Grand Avenue’s mission and purpose covers a wide range of issues, not just those related to business:

To improve the quality of life of the merchants, institutions, property owners and residents of Fair Haven’s Grand Avenue community by promoting economic development, commercial revitalization, by improving economic conditions and opportunities and strengthening Fair Haven’s pride and dignity.\(^{15}\)

Although predominately Latino in membership, GAVA is a diverse organization with white, African-American, and South Asian members. The diversity of the group poses unique challenges, such as language barriers and the occasional inter-ethnic group hostilities. One particular challenge to group cohesion was a move to split the group along ethnic lines. A few Puerto Rican members of GAVA lead an effort to secede and form a separate Puerto Rican merchants association. However, the attempt proved unsuccessful. When questioned about this event, members were quick to point out that the people who led the movement to secede were no longer active in the organization and were not merchants, but local politicians.\(^{16}\)

In addition to the conflict over Puerto Rican separateness, there is also dissension in the group over the role of South Asian merchants in the community and the organization. Grand Avenue businesses are predominately Latino owned and oriented, but there are four South Asian stores. Two of them are liquor and convenience stores, one is a dollar store and the other is a rental store. One interview subject noted that many members of the group felt that South Asian merchants were outsiders who cared little for the Fair Haven community. Rather than having a vested interest in the welfare of the community, some felt that they “took away from the community”.\(^{17}\) Other members I spoke with acknowledged this sentiment among members of GAVA while affirming that the South Asian merchants who

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15 Interview FH3c, New Haven, March 5 2003.
16 Interview FH2b, New Haven, March 5, 2003.
were part of GAVA were active participants who contributed to the group’s efforts toward the community. When I questioned members as to if the perception of South Asian merchants as detractors from the community was due to their living outside of Fair Haven, they admitted that the ethnicity of the merchants was at the heart of the issue. Most of the business owners along Grand Avenue do not live in Fair Haven, so residency is not the underlying reason for the animosity shown towards South Asian merchants. One member of GAVA explained that since the neighborhood was predominantly Latino, that it was better to have Latino merchants in Grand Avenue stores.

The diverse membership of businessmen and non-profit agencies extends the reach of GAVA beyond matters merely relating to business. Representatives of Junta for Progressive Action, a Latino social services organization, and Fair Haven Community Health Center are active members of GAVA, which lends the organization to actively support efforts of these two groups. GAVA is also closely linked to city government. Although the organization was formed by Grand Avenue merchants in response to issues such as crime, litter and parking, the city of New Haven paid for an organizer to help set up the fledgling group. Now independent of the city with their own board of directors, GAVA still maintains close contact with city government as a partner in their redevelopment initiatives. The close relationship with city government is especially essential to GAVA’s efforts at countering problems of crime and neglect. Known for gang activities and shootings that graced the front pages of local newspapers, GAVA struggles to overcome images of Fair Haven as a neighborhood marred by drugs, violence and crime. This drive has lead to several merchants’ participation in a facade improvement program and to closer ties with the local police substation.

Although GAVA is a young organization, formally organized just over two years ago, its members have accomplished a lot. Their first major action as a group was the prevention of the development of a proposed 24-hour Laundromat in the neighborhood.

Already home to five mom-and-pop coin operated laundries, members of GAVA felt that the edition of a new Laundromat would hurt Grand Avenue businesses and hinder the economic renewal of the shopping dis-

18 Interview FH2b, New Haven, March 5, 2003
trict (Lee Rock 2001). Furthermore, the state’s largest Laundromat developer owned the proposed Laundromat. Merchants feared that the lack of manager ownership and the 24-hour nature of the Laundromat would attract crime. Merchants and community members organized and pressured the owner of the site to look for a different type of business to occupy the space. This was a major victory for GAVA as it galvanized merchants around the issue of community control. For GAVA, having control of what kinds of businesses open on Grand Avenue is essential to the strip’s economic development and the creation of a marketable image for Fair Haven.

GAVA is one of many community organizations involved in the neighborhood efforts of community revitalization. The other major entity is the Fair Haven Development Corporation (FHDC), a local non-profit whose directors are also members of GAVA. Although there exists ties of communication between the two groups, the organizations are sometimes in direct competition over city dollars for development projects. Two of the alderman that represent the Fair Haven neighborhood, Raul Avila and Kevin Diaz, are also on the board of directors for the FHDC along with other politically active Puerto Rican residents of Fair Haven. The alderman and the administration of Mayor DeStefano have often been at odds over control of the neighborhood (Austin 2002). This feud often takes the form of ethnic strife within the neighborhood.

In regards to the FHDC’s work with GAVA, Puerto Rican FHDC board members lead the move for a separate business association that was discussed above. The political feud has also resulted in GAVA losing the active support of the alderman that represent them. Wary of government control, Avila and Diaz are known to delay funding for projects and organizations that they do not support or control.

These political tensions add another level to the question of the role of ethnic difference in conflicts between community organizations. In Jackson Heights, the role of local politicians in the conflict between the Jackson Heights Beautification Group and the Jackson Heights Merchants Association did not surface in interviews. Yet, it is clear that city government officials have a vested interest in the economic development of neighborhoods and that one common means of obtaining power and control over the identity of a space is through official legal means. In Jackson Heights, several politicians were past members of the Jackson Heights Beautification Group and members of the both the beautification group and the merchants association held seats on the community board. The question of the role of politicians and government officials in contests for the control of
neighborhood identity is beyond the reach of this paper, but is an important one nonetheless. In Fair Haven, the role of politicians in perpetuating ethnic strife and employing ethnicity as a tool for claiming legitimacy is very central to the relationship between community organizations in urban neighborhoods.

Conclusions

The discussion of the relationship between the Jackson Heights Beautification Group and the Jackson Heights Merchants Association suggest that ethnic difference is an important aspect of the struggle for control over this particular urban space. The merchant association uses ethnicity to make claims on a space and to sell a marketable commodity to their own ethnic community as well as to those outside of it. Similarly, the beautification group uses ethnicity, as well as class, to determine the boundaries of their neighborhood and who is included or excluded from membership in the community. Rather than being subordinate to quality of life issues, ethnic difference and its physical manifestation in space is at the heart of the conflict. It is too presumptuous to assume that the second part of my hypothesis, that such conflicts will cease to occur over time, is correct. However, the first part of my hypothesis, that ethnic difference is an essential part of the conflict over control of neighborhood identity, is correct.

As the discussion of the interviews and background of Jackson Heights and Fair Haven demonstrate, locating the source of interethnic conflict is not a simple task. Community organizations do not exist in a vacuum, but are heavily influenced, and act as influences upon, government agencies and politicians. This aspect of community organizations as it relates to inter-ethnic hostilities over the control of space is a matter worthy of further study.

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FEATURE: YALE CENTER FOR CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY
The Center for Cultural Sociology
Jeffrey Alexander
Ron Eyerman

The Center for Cultural Sociology (CCS) provides a focus for meaning-centered analysis in the social science tradition, with openings to normative themes such as democracy, justice, tolerance and civility. Drawing on classical and contemporary social and cultural theory, CCS students and researchers develop concepts and methods that illuminate the cultural texture of social life at both individual collective levels. They apply these to understanding the full range of activities and processes from local to global levels. Because culture is always closely intertwined with the patterning of social organization, the CCS is centrally concerned with institutional life and the intersection of culture with social structure.

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The following papers were part of the first CCS Mini-Conference. They provide an excellent perspective of the great variety of interests, topics and research approaches within the CCS.
Towards a New, Macro-Sociological Theory of Performance
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Abstract: This essay provides an outline and a history of the theory of performance. This new macro-sociological theory reconfigures the concept of ritual into a more complex model of social action as lying in the continuum between the analytic poles of successful and failed performances. I argue that the more complex and segmented social and cultural structures become, the more the elements of performance become defused, and the harder it is for individual and collective actors to refuse them and achieve successful performances.

Over the last two years, an overlapping group of professors and graduate students has been developing and debating a new, macro-sociological theory of performance. During a telephone conversation with Bernhard Giesen in summer 2001, after I had completed the first draft of a paper on performance, “Cultural Pragmatics” (Alexander 2003), my friend and colleague mentioned that “performance represents the next frontier”, or something to that effect. I was delighted and more than a little intrigued, since I had just completed the first draft of a lengthy paper on exactly that topic.

Giesen and his German research group had been working on topics related to rituals and performances for many years. So had my students and myself. Our subsequent communication not only helped to establish the worthiness of the topic but clarified the different approaches that we were taking to it. What follows is, then, “one man’s” approach to a theory of performance, and a history of that theory.

My own interest in performance as a theoretical topic began with an effort to account for the findings and arguments that Jason Mast generated in his 1999 UCLA Masters Thesis, “National Rituals in Democratic Societies: Monicagate as Failed Ritual”. Building upon the stated and unstated implications of my earlier account of how Watergate became a purging ritual in American democratic politics (Alexander 1988), Mast had asked why
a similarly powerful and unifying civic ritual had failed to unfold during the “Monicagate” impeachment crisis focusing on U.S. President Bill Clinton.

In my effort to respond to Mast’s discussion of what he called a “failed ritual”, I reluctantly concluded that it is necessary to discard “ritual” as a foundational concept, even in the kind of late-Durkheimian or “strong program” cultural sociology to which I have for so long been dedicated. Instead of focusing on ritual, sociological theory must develop a complex theory of the elements and dimensions of macrosociological performance.

Depending on how these elements come together in particular empirical instances, one can say that an individual or collective actor’s performance is more or less successful. Insofar as the goal of a social action depends on affecting the perceptions of other actors, it involves to that degree a performative action. Cultural performance is the social process by which actors, individually or in concert, display for others the meaning of their social situation. This meaning may or may not be one to which they themselves subjectively adhere; it is the meaning which they, as social actors, consciously or unconsciously wish to have others believe.

Rather than declaring that an action is or is not a ritual, it seems better to use the language of variation: the more successful a social performance is, the more likely it is to achieve ritual status. Ritual status means, first, that the ontological reality of the performance is taken for granted. Second, it means that the audience observing the performance identifies strongly with the goals and values of the performative actor, and that, at the same time, the members of the audience experience solidarity with one another.

Such success represents the boundary conditions, or the outer limits, of social performance. It is a condition that actors rarely achieve but one that they continually hope for. Because he took his cues from early, simplified forms of social organization in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim succeeded in bringing symbolic action back into the center of sociological theorizing but he failed to appreciate the fact that symbolic action in complex societies only rarely achieves a ritual form.

In contrast to Durkheim’s nostalgia for the ritual-like processes that centered earlier societies, it is necessary to develop a purely analytical conception of social performance. We can conceptualize empirical social performance as moving between two hypothesized conditions, or poles—complete failure and complete success. Social performances move back and forth along this continuum. It is the dynamic movements that comprise the focus for performance theory.
Such a purely analytical model of social performance constitutes yet another effort to crystallize the dialectic of subjectivity and objectivity. It emphasizes both cultural logics (texts) and socio-logics (contexts). It brings together idealism and pragmatism, semiotics and action theory, creating a new beast called “cultural pragmatics”. In specifying cultural pragmatics, my model of social performance explores six dimensions, each of which can be conceived of as a cause: (1) Collective representations, which can be subdivided between background symbols and foregrounded scripts; (2) Actors; (3) The means of symbolic production; (4) Mis-en-Scene; (5) Social power; (6) Audiences.

Each of these elements can be investigated without respect to historical time, for each is contained in, or implied by, social performance from the beginning of human societies. Yet this analytically differentiated model can also be discussed in an historical manner. For it seems obvious – and this has often been remarked upon in different vocabularies and in partial ways – that the analytical components of social performance have become empirically differentiated over time. In the earliest and more homogeneous forms of human societies, which Elman R. Service called bands (1962), collective representations were not thought of as having been invented but were imagined as just being there, as having always existed. People from everyday life played out the roles defined in these religious myths, never thinking of themselves as actors. The means to project these performances were not difficult to find, and their staging was more or less the same from one time to the next. Audiences were not separate, but participated in the performances. Critics representing the ideological evaluations of independent powers did not exist.

This cultural and structural fusion of performative elements explains why rituals were so frequently achieved in earlier forms of societies, and why Durkheim could get away with equating beliefs and practices and how he could define early religious society as a church.

All this changed in good time. As social structure become more differentiated, segmented, stratified, and large-scale, and as culture became more abstracted and autonomous from elites and social organization, scripts became written down, theatre emerged, and religious, aesthetic, and ideological specialists began to argue about the authenticity and effectiveness of texts and performances. The means of symbolic production became difficult to gain control over, and the efforts to do so increasingly provoked major conflicts among social powers. The staging of social performances, whether religious, artistic, or social-dramatic became complex and
demanding of specialized skills. Audiences became differentiated into “publics” and fragmented by class, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, and region. Performances were increasingly “misunderstood” by those to whom they were directed. Power came to be mediated by social movements whose aim was to rivet social attention by producing persuasive social dramatic force. Authenticity emerged as an existential and philosophical challenge, and the notion that social performances were fraudulent symbolic manipulation became the order of the day.

Whether performative success is a desirable moral outcome is a different question entirely. Does failure or success conform to the expectations and demands of normative theory? This depends on the particular normative theory, on the one hand, and the particular performance, on the other. Antidemocratic theories sometimes embrace rituals tout court, as a means of maintaining vitalism, organic integration, authenticity, perfection, salvation, or enlightenment. Nietzsche is a good example of such a moral embrace, especially in *The Birth of Tragedy*, which tragically decries the end of Dionysian festivals and rues the day when myth and ritual gave up their hegemonic place to reason and artifice. Democratic normative theory, by contrast, has tended to be suspicious of rituals, as the notion of social contract and the emphasis on rationality and reflexivity suggested. Yet there are times when even democratic theorists have recognized the importance that successful social performance can play. Even Rousseau believed that republican principles need to be sustained by civil religion.

WORKS CITED


Critics as Mediators of Authenticity: Eichmann in Jerusalem
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Abstract: In this paper, I seek to investigate the way critics attribute authenticity and artifice to actors in social performances. Critics occupy a crucial yet ambiguous position within the structure of social performances. They share characteristics with the audience in that they are targets of social performances and with the actors in that they have to stage their own interpretive performances. Hannah Arendt’s report on the 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem and Shoshana Felman’s reinterpretation of the same trial in The Juridical Unconscious offer typical examples of critics’ advocacy of refusion with and defusion from social performances. As a comparative analysis of Arendt’s and Felman’s interpretive strategies shows, critics often have a similar conception of properties that signify the authenticity of actors, even as they may associate different actors with these properties.

In his model of social action as cultural performance, Jeffrey C. Alexander (forthcoming) states that in order to succeed, social performances must achieve the cultural extension of the displayed meaning from performance to audience, as well as produce the psychological identification of the audience with the actors. In other words, a successful performance requires that the audience consider the symbolic content of the performance valid and perceive the actors’ intentions as authentic. Critics who mediate between performance and audience play a significant role in promoting or hindering the effect of authenticity in the audience. In the following, I will seek to investigate in two critics’ works some properties which are shown as proof and widely perceived as signs of actors’ authenticity. The two critics, Hannah Arendt and Shoshana Felman, offer opposing interpretations concerning major actors’ authenticity in the trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961. However, as will be seen, they refer to the same kind of characteristics as markers of authenticity and artifice.
In the first section I will briefly consider the position of the critic in the structure of contemporary social performances. The second section introduces the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel as a set of social performances. The third section discusses Hannah Arendt’s attribution of authenticity and artifice to some major actors in the trial of Eichmann. The fourth section examines Arendt’s and Felman’s opposing interpretations of a key episode in the trial in order to investigate further the properties that are widely seen as signs of authenticity and artifice. Conclusions will be briefly drawn in the last section.

1. Critics as Mediators of Social Performances

In most contemporary social performances, the relatively autonomous group of critics play a key role. Critics comment on the validity of the content displayed and on actors’ authenticity and thus mediate between performance and audience. On the one hand, they are part of the audience: like other members of the audience, they observe the performance and judge it in terms of its authenticity and the validity of its content. They differ from regular members of the audience, however, in that they hold distinct cultural power. They display their interpretation of the social performance and judgment on the actors to wide groups of audience and thus considerably affect the latter’s perception. They constitute yet another factor which the producers of the performance must take into account. Their attribution of authenticity to the performance might convince groups in the audience that are otherwise indifferent, whereas their attribution of artifice might distance segments of audience which could otherwise tend to identify with the actors in question. As such, critics play a crucial role in determining the outcome of social performances.

In fact, the ambiguity of the critics’ position within the structure of social performance is multiplied at many levels. Not only are the critics like the audience in that they are observers of social performances that aim at projecting a social meaning and creating their identification with the actors. Critics are also like actors in that they must perform successfully in order to project their own interpretation to the audience. It would be naive to assume that audiences in contemporary societies readily adopt the particular interpretation of performances advocated by the critics. Quite to the contrary, critics must construct effective scripts and enact them skillfully, using the available means of symbolic production. The audience must be convinced that the critics are authentic actors and that the content of their
critique is normatively and factually valid. Moreover, critics do not remain unchallenged themselves. Not only do other critics offer alternative interpretations of the same social performance commented upon by a critic; a critic is also often subject to the “critics of the critic” who may challenge the validity of her interpretation or her authenticity.

Thus, we find that critics occupy an ambiguous position among the elements of social performance. They do not simply mediate between the performance and the audience: They are part of the audience themselves, at the same time as they are actors of “interpretive performances” subject to similar criteria of performative success as those that they apply to their objects of critique.

Few cases disclose this ambiguous yet powerful role of the critics of social performances as distinctly as that of Hannah Arendt and her controversial account of the 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel. In this account, originally written for the *New Yorker* magazine and later published as a book under the title *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, Arendt [1963] (1994) found the performance of the Israeli attorney general and of some key witnesses calculated and artificial, while attributing authenticity to certain other actors, most notably the judges. Arendt’s *Eichmann in Jerusalem* was a controversial interpretation of the trial, which has influenced many people’s understanding of the trial across decades, while itself being often criticized and answered with counter-interpretations. Addressing Arendt’s account directly, Shoshana Felman’s (2002) *The Juridicial Unconscious* offers such a counter-interpretation of the trial.

In the following sections, I will seek to explore some interpretive strategies used by these two critics in their “interpretive performances”, i.e., the symbolic processes through which the critics attribute authenticity or artifice to the actors and thus promote or discourage the refusion of the audience with a set of social performances.

2. Trial as Performance

The trial of Adolf Eichmann took place in 1961 in the House of Justice in Jerusalem. It was made possible through the controversial kidnapping of Adolf Eichmann, the high Nazi officer responsible of the transportation of the European Jews to the concentration camps, from Argentine by the Israeli Secret Service. Even prior to its beginning, the trial generated a major controversy over the breach of Argentine’s national sovereignty and
over the question whether it was legitimate for a national court of Israel to judge and punish Eichmann. The trial itself took four months, from April 11 to August 14, 1961. The guilty verdict and the punishment, death penalty, were announced four months after the last session, on December 11-12, 1961. It was the first trial ever to be televised in its entirety and was a center of attention for both the Israeli and world audience while the proceedings continued. The Eichmann trial was a crucial turning point in the construction of the collective representations of Holocaust that are widely held today, both in and outside of Israel (see Alexander 2002). It had major cultural and political consequences that last up to this day, which might explain the contemporary persistence of the discussions concerning this trial.

Looking at trials as analogous to theatrical dramas is not a novel idea. Richard Harbinger (1971) has written that two dramas take place in each criminal trial. The courtroom drama is a legal combat that takes place between the prosecuting attorney and defense attorney. Framed within the courtroom drama as a play within the play is the crime drama. It concerns the story of the crime in question, constructed in different ways by the defendant, witnesses, and the attorneys, and involves the defendant and sometimes witnesses as actors. In the Eichmann trial, the crime drama involved the whole picture of Holocaust as a Jewish trauma, and as such was not primarily concerned with Eichmann’s individual crimes. The judges, who were to come out with the decision concerning Eichmann’s guilt and punishment were not the primary audience of the prosecution. The social performance was rather directed to the different publics who watched the trial in the courtroom and through the mass media.

The two critics whose interpretive strategies I will examine below both compared the Eichmann trial to theater. In her influential—and equally controversial—account of the trial, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, Hannah Arendt interpreted the trial partly as a “show” crafted by the Israeli government of the time. More recently, Shoshana Felman, in *The Juridical Unconscious*, discussed the Eichmann trial as a “theater of justice”.

While Hannah Arendt criticized the production of the trial as a space of performance and characterized the Israeli attorney Gideon Hausner’s performance as artificial and contrived, Shoshana Felman, writing 39 years after Arendt, sought to rearticulate the emotional and existential truth revealed in the trial. Arendt held that Ben-Gurion pursued in the trial specific political goals for the state of Israel through the construction of a col-
lective representation of Holocaust. For her, this orientation of the trial constituted the distortion of the institution of justice by political power. The design of the trial as a drama, rather than a strictly legal procedure concentrating on Eichmann’s case alone, was a deviation from the ideals of justice. Thus, her characterization of the trial as a show has a primarily critical intent.

While Shoshana Felman does not want to undermine Arendt’s “dissident legal perspective” (Felman 2002:110), she offers a more positive reading which sees the dramatic features of the trial as reflecting and reenacting the traumatic experience of the Holocaust. According to Felman, the centering of the trial on the survivors’ testimony was important in that it allowed the articulation of the victims’ narrative and made the private and secret stories of Holocaust public (Felman 2002:113). Felman’s conceptualization of the trial as a theater of justice aims at underlining the resistance of traumatic experience to conscious and direct expression. The dramatic moments of the trial, including the famous breakdown of K-Zetnik, were instances that challenged and redrew the boundaries of the legal discourse and institution.

The comparative analysis of the two opposing interpretive performances that follows will reveal the categories and interpretive strategies that critics use in promoting or criticizing actors in social performances. It will be seen that the properties that are shown as signs of authenticity by these two critics vary little, while their association of specific actors with these categories is different. The development of Felman’s interpretation of the trial in direct reference to Arendt’s *Eichmann in Jerusalem* positions Felman also as a “critic of the critic”. Arendt thus perfectly exemplifies the multiple dimensions of the critic’s position as a key element in the structure of social performance. She was part of the audience in the trial performance, engaged herself in an interpretive performance with her influential account of the trial, and is herself subject to critique by other critics.

3. Authenticity versus Artifice: Refusion and Defusion in Arendt’s Account

In *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, Arendt characterizes the trial as an artificial show produced by the Israeli government:

[T]he trial never became a play, but the show Ben-Gurion had had in mind to begin with did take place, or, rather, the “lessons” he thought should
be taught to Jews and Gentiles, to Israelis and Arabs, in short, to the whole world. These lessons to be drawn from an identical show were meant to be different for the different recipients. Ben-Gurion had outlined them before the trial started, in a number of articles designed to explain why Israel had kidnapped the accused (Arendt [1963] 1994:9).

The major actor of the state within this trial performance was the Israeli attorney general Gideon Hausner. Throughout her account, Arendt characterizes Hausner as an epitome of artifice by presenting several properties as irrefutable signs of his lack of authenticity. The first of these is the dependence of Hausner on an actor behind the scenes and ultimately to political power. In her account, Arendt presents Hausner as a puppet whose strings are held by the Israeli prime minister Ben-Gurion:

Ben-Gurion, rightly called the “architect of the state”, remains the invisible stage manager of the proceedings. Not once does he attend a session; in the courtroom he speaks with the voice of Gideon Hausner, the Attorney General, who, representing the government, does his best, his very best, to obey his master (Arendt [1963] 1994:5).

According to this interpretation, Hausner is not who he claims he is. He claims that he represents the six million Jewish victims of the Holocaust, but he actually represents political power. Political motivations, rather than a historic search for justice, lies behind the contrived discourse used by the Israeli prosecutor in court. Hausner’s words are not the sincere expression of his thoughts and feelings; they are carefully chosen words calculated to achieve a certain effect in the audience towards the political goals of the Israeli government.2

1 In his opening argument, chief prosecutor Hausner identified himself as the voice of six million Holocaust victims: “When I stand before you here, judges of Israel, in this court, to accuse Adolph Eichmann, I do not stand alone. With me at this moment stand six million prosecutors. But alas, they cannot rise to level the finger of accusation in the direction of the glass dock and cry out J’accuse against the man who sits there. For their ashes are piled in the hills of Auschwitz and the fields of Treblinka … Their graves are scattered throughout the length and breadth of Europe. Their blood cries to Heaven, but their voice cannot be heard. Thus it falls to me to be their mouthpiece and to deliver the awesome indictment in their name (quoted in Felman 2002:114)”.

2 As Shoshana Felman has pointed out acutely, for Arendt the courtroom drama took place between the judges and Hausner, rather than between the prosecution and the defense.
A second sign of artifice Arendt reads in Hausner’s performance is an excessive *willingness to perform*. Her presentation of this property as a sign of the lack of authenticity is best seen in the contrast Arendt draws between the judges and the attorney general. Arendt characterizes the judges as natural actors, while she identifies Hausner as a “showman”:

At no time is there anything theatrical in the conduct of the judges. Their walk is unstudied, their sober and intense attention, visibly stiffening under the impact of grief as they listen to the tales of suffering, is natural; their impatience with the prosecutor’s attempt to drag out those hearings forever is spontaneous and refreshing, … their manner toward the accused always beyond reproach. They are so obviously three good and honest men that one is not surprised that none of them yields to the greatest temptation to playact in this setting –that of pretending that they, all three born and educated in Germany, must wait for the Hebrew translation. Moshe Landau, the presiding judge, hardly ever withholds his answer until the translator has done his work … Months later, during the cross-examination of the accused, he will even lead his colleagues to use their German mother tongue in the dialogue with Eichmann– a proof, if proof were still needed, of his remarkable independence of current public opinion in Israel (Arendt [1963] 1994:4).

This long excerpt is a clear illustration of the attribution of authenticity to actors that seem to lack a concern for performing. Arendt presents the judges as authentic actors, whose gestures are natural expressions of their feelings, whose acts are spontaneous and lack self-awareness, and who perform their duty without a concern for pleasing the audience. In other words, Arendt holds that the judges are *not performing*, but are being who they are.

To these epitomes of authenticity, Arendt juxtaposes the artifice of the Israeli attorney general. Hausner is constantly *performing*: He tries to create a dramatic effect through his exaggerated rhetoric. His actions are calculated to produce a certain effect on the audience and take place under constant awareness of and a desire to please the audience.

From the very beginning of her account on, Arendt identifies Hausner with political power, while she identifies the judges, especially the presiding judge Landau, with justice. “Gideon Hausner, … representing the government, does his best, his very best, to obey his master. And if, fortunately, his best often turns out not to be good enough, the reason is that the trial is presided over by someone who serves Justice as faithfully as Mr. Hausner serves the State of Israel (Arendt: [1963] 1994:5)”.

Arendt’s descriptive categories are typical expressions of refusion with and defusion from actors in performances. Lack of concern for the audience, spontaneity, independence, and naturalness are seen as properties of authentic actors. Theatricality, calculation, and excessive concern for the sympathy of the audience, on the other hand, are perceived as characteristics of actors whose performances are artificial and contrived.3

The lack of the willingness to perform serves even more explicitly as a criterion of actors’ authenticity in Arendt and Felman’s different interpretations of K-Zetnik’s testimony.


Testimony by Holocaust survivors was at the center of the Eichmann trial. Adolf Eichmann talked in 34 sessions, while 62 sessions were devoted to the testimony of 90 survivors of concentration camps and of 10 other witnesses, selected by the prosecution from the hundreds that volunteered. The public telling of the individual stories of suffering was crucial in order to generate the psychological identification of the audience. An interview with Gavriel Bach, an assistant prosecutor in the trial, shows that the prosecution had made a deliberate effort to enable psychological identification of the audience through the testimony of survivors:

We decided to present at least one live witness from every country, to describe, and bring home, and to show people really what happens at the human level. Because, you know, documents and figures, and even heaps of corpses … there comes a moment when these things don’t signify anything anymore (The Trial of Adolf Eichmann 1997).

The dramatic climax of the trial, if one may point to one, was the testimony of the Israeli writer K-Zetnik. K-Zetnik was a survivor of Auschwitz and had established himself as a well-known author with his books on life

3 “Action will be viewed as real if it appears … the product of a self-generating actor who is not pulled like a puppet by the strings of society. An authentic person acts without artifice, without self-consciousness, without reference to some laboriously thought out plan or text, without concern for manipulating the context of her actions, and without worries about that action’s effects (Alexander, forthcoming).”
in Auschwitz. When the prosecutor asked him the reason he took the pen name K-Zetnik, K-Zetnik answered the following:

It is not a pen name. I do not regard myself as a writer who writes literature. This is a chronicle from the planet of Auschwitz. I was there for about two years. Time there was different from what is here on earth. Every split second ran on a different cycle of time. And the inhabitants of that planet had no names. They had neither parents nor children … They did not live, nor did they die, in accordance with the laws of this world. Their names were the numbers ‘Kzetnik so and so’ … They left me, they kept leaving me, left … for close to two years they left me and always left me behind … I see them, they are watching me, I see them− (quoted in Felman 2002:136).

When the prosecutor intervened and inquired whether he could ask some questions, K-Zetnik continued speaking “in a hollow and tense voice, oblivious to the courtroom setting, as a man plunged in hallucination or in a hypnotic trance (Felman 2002:136)”. Judge Landau interrupted him again: “Mr. Dinoor, please, please listen to Mr. Hausner; wait a minute, now you listen to me!” K-Zetnik stood up from his chair and “collapsed into a faint, slumping to the floor besides the witness stand (Felman 2002:136)”.

Tom Segev wrote about this scene: “It was the most dramatic moment of the trial, one of the most dramatic moments in the country’s history (quoted in Felman 2002:232)”. Following its occurrence, this scene was repeatedly shown on television. K-Zetnik’s fainting and collapse constitute perhaps the most widely remembered images from the Eichmann trial.

Hannah Arendt and Shoshana Felman offer opposing readings of this episode in terms of K-Zetnik’s authenticity. However, the two critics refer to the same signs of authenticity and artifice in their different interpretations. Felman’s post-performance construction of the script assumes that the time and place of the courtroom merged with that of Auschwitz in K-Zetnik’s imagination. K-Zetnik’s testimony was based on the theme of two radically different planets: Auschwitz and the world where the courtroom is located. Once K-Zetnik started to say repeatedly that he sees those leaving to their death, he seemed to enter a state of trance, not responding to the chief prosecutor or the judge. Felman read his trance as his imaginary transfer to Auschwitz where he saw those inmates in front of his eyes leaving for the gas chambers. The setting of the trial, with its formal structure and strict rules, was reminiscent of the rule-boundedness of the concentration camp in particular and of the bureaucratic Nazi organization in gener-
The witness was interrupted first by the prosecutor and then by the ordering voice of the judge. His collapse, in this script, results from K-Zetnik’s inability to take to be in the planet of Auschwitz once again.4

K-Zetnik’s sudden collapse and loss of consciousness also enacted for Felman the dead body that had been described many times in the stories of other witnesses. This time, death was not only discursively described, but bodily enacted before the audience who watched K-Zetnik’s collapse in the courtroom or in front of their television:

... the dramatic, Benjamin says, is a beyond of words. It is a physical gesture by which language points to a meaning it cannot articulate. Such is K-Zetnik’s fall outside the witness stand. It makes a corpse out of the living witness who has sworn to remain anonymous and undifferentiated from the dead ... The witness’s body has become within the trial what Pierre Nora would call “a site of memory”. ... The site materializes in the courtroom memory of death both as a physical reality and as a limit of consciousness in history (Felman 2002:162-3).

This script constructed by Felman describes her refusion with the performance and promotes the refusion of her readers with it. Felman interprets K-Zetnik’s testimony and collapse as the genuine expression of his experience as a survivor and sees in it a condensation of existential and historical meaning. Arendt’s “counternarrative”, however, expresses and promotes defusion from the performance. Her reading of K-Zetnik’s testimony and collapse constitutes perhaps the most cynical moment in her whole account:

How much wiser it would have been to resist these pressures altogether ... and to seek out those who had not volunteered! As though to prove the point, the prosecution called upon a writer, well known on both sides of the Atlantic under the name of K-Zetnik—a slang word for a concentration camp-inmate—as the author of several books of Auschwitz that dealt with brothels, homosexuals, and other “human interest stories”. He started off, as in many of his public appearances, with an explanation of his adopted name. ... He continued with a little excursion into astrology: the star “influencing our fate in the same

4 The transfer to Auschwitz was not only the theme of Felman’s post-performance construction of the script, but also that of the Israeli poet and journalist Haim Gouri’s, who covered the trial for the Israeli daily newspaper Lamerhav: “What happened here was the inevitable. [K-Zetnik’s] desperate attempt to transgress the legal channel and to return to the planet of the ashes in order to bring it to us was too terrifying an experience for him. He broke down (quoted in Felman 2002:137)”.


way as the star of ashes at Auschwitz is there facing our planet, radiating toward our planet”. And when he had arrived at “the unnatural power above Nature” which had sustained him thus far, and now, paused for the first time to catch his breath, even Mr. Hausner felt that something had to be done about this “testimony”, and, very timidly, very politely, interrupted … Whereupon the presiding judge saw his chance as well: “Mr. Dinoor, please, please, listen to Mr. Hausner and to me”. In response, the disappointed witness, probably deeply wounded, fainted and answered no more questions (Arendt [1963] 1994:224).

Arendt’s last sentence clearly exhibits a disbelief in the authenticity of K-Zetnik’s performance, including his fainting. Arendt presents K-Zetnik as a person after public attention—he writes “human interest stories” and is used to perform in public appearances. Thus, once more she refers to the willingness to perform as a sign of artifice.

Arendt further holds that K-Zetnik does not have the capacity “for distinguishing between things that had happened to the storyteller more than sixteen, and sometimes twenty, years ago, and what he had read and heard and imagined in the meantime (Arendt [1963] 1994:224)”. Thus, the meaning he displays, in Arendt’s view, is not the genuine expression of his experience at Auschwitz. By refusing to see his performance as a genuine expression of his experience in Auschwitz and characterizing him as “too willing to perform”, Arendt presents K-Zetnik as an inauthentic actor.

In the last chapter of *The Juridicial Unconscious*, Shoshana Felman seeks to counter Arendt’s promotion of defusion from the performance. Her arguments against Arendt only reconfirm the findings of the last section on the attribution of authenticity and artifice. The first point on which Felman challenges Arendt’s interpretation concerns the voluntariness of K-Zetnik’s testimony. For Arendt, the fact that K-Zetnik himself volunteered to appear in the court is a sign that he has an excessive desire to perform before an audience.

Rather than challenging Arendt’s logic, Felman offers evidence to the contrary:

Contrary to what Arendt presumes, Dinoor did not volunteer to share his “tale of horror” on the witness stand but, on the contrary, was an involuntary and reluctant witness. As a writer, he had always shunned of public appearances. In consequence, he had at first refused to testify. He had to be pressured by the chief prosecutor to consent (reluctantly) to appear before the court (Felman 2002:143).
Felman emphasizes the “involuntary and reluctant” nature of K-Zetnik’s testimony in order to demonstrate his lack of willingness to perform and lack of concern for the audience. Thus, according to Arendt and Felman’s common understanding, those who are too willing to perform are not authentic.

Against Arendt’s refusal to attribute authenticity to K-Zetnik’s performance, Felman presents a second irrefutable sign of authenticity in the form of medical proof. Whereas Arendt quickly dismisses K-Zetnik’s collapse as a theatrical act (“[i]n response, the disappointed witness, probably deeply wounded, fainted and answered no more questions”), Felman follows the aftermath of the collapse: “An ambulance was called and rushed the witness to the hospital, where he spent two weeks between life and death in a paralytic stroke (Felman 2002:137)”.

The paralytic stroke serves as proof that K-Zetnik’s collapse was the result of his deeply felt emotions. As a breakdown accompanied by loss of consciousness and followed by paralytic stroke is viewed as beyond one’s conscious control of his expressive tools, it is seen as the undeniably true expression of K-Zetnik’s inner state. The collapse, the genuineness of which is proved medically, is a corporeal sign of the correspondence of K-Zetnik’s inner feelings and the outer signs that he generates. Thus, K-Zetnik’s breakdown comes to prove him as an authentic actor.

5. Conclusion

In his exposition of the model of cultural performance, Jeffrey Alexander suggests that the success of a social performance depends on the audience’s belief in the validity of the displayed symbolic content and in the authenticity of the actors’ intentions. As Arendt and Felman’s opposing interpretations of the Eichmann trial demonstrate, the debate on the authenticity of actors is often of as great import as the debate on the descriptive and normative validity of the content of the communication. Critics often refer to certain properties in the performance of the actors as proof of their authenticity or artifice. The interpretive act of the critics consists not in inventing these signs of authenticity and artifice –they are in fact culturally given– but in detecting these signs in the performance of actors and judging their authenticity accordingly.

I sought to show above that the two critics who interpreted the trial in opposing ways nevertheless referred to the same properties as irrefutable signs of authenticity. Both critics assume that authenticity requires a corre-
spondence between inside and outside, i.e., between the feelings, thoughts, intentions and experiences of the actor on the one hand, and his words and expressions on the other. For Felman and Arendt alike, an actor that is dependent on another power is not authentic. An authentic actor is driven by his own sentiments and not by that of another power. Furthermore, a strong willingness to perform, the calculation of the performance’s effect, and the desire to capture the audience are seen as signs of artifice. Authentic actors are not concerned with performing; they are natural, spontaneous, and committed to their cause.

WORKS CITED

Performances in search for an author: 
the symbolic life of an economic indicator

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Abstract: This article constitutes an exploration of the theory of performance, focusing on a neglected type of event: non intentional performances. These are symbolic phenomena devoid of intention or script. The argument has two parts. The first presents a typology that explores performances in relation to intention and social interpretations. The second develops a case study of the trajectory of an economic indicator, “country risk”, in the public sphere during the political and economic debacle in Argentina in 2001 as an example of a performance in search of an author.

This paper represents an exploration of the theoretical space opened up by the “performative turn”. It takes the model of cultural performance developed Jeffrey Alexander (Alexander, unpublished manuscript) as a constant reference and theoretical horizon. The theory of cultural performance takes its cues from theater. It attempts to think beyond the semiotic aspects of action towards its pragmatic dimensions. Here is where the metaphor of theater as “literature that walks and talks before our eyes” (to quote Boulton1) does its greatest symbolic work. It provides a model to think the surplus of pragmatics over textual hermeneutics. If semiotics takes action as texts, then pragmatics looks at them as performances, as scripts that talk and walk. The metaphor, then, provides a starting point for thinking the “elements” of performance: actors and audiences, systems of representations and scripts; means of symbolic production; and mis-en-scene (Alexander: 18-22). They provide a blueprint for theoretical reflections on the pragmatics of symbolic action that produce a richer understanding of social processes and meaning making in complex societies.

1 Boulton, p. 3, cited in Alexander, p. 18.
But like all great metaphors, the action as theater model comes bundled up with a series of images and presuppositions which are difficult to exorcize from theoretical analyses. Even after conscious efforts they have a tendency to creep up unexpectedly. One of these implicit dimensions of performance is intentionality. To perform is an eminently active verb; the paradigmatic images that come to mind are those of actors displaying a performance on stage, of directors staging plays, and of performances that follow scripts, where scripts are the crystallization of the intentions and choices of playwrights and directors. The same type of incarnation of intention is found in the idea of mis-en-scene as the non-textual yet meaningful elements of the performance deployed by the director and other artistic authors to generate flow and project meaning to audiences.

As the title of this paper indicates, I will try to explore types of performances that go against the grain of these implicit images of intentional performance, looking instead at symbolic phenomena devoid of intention or script. This paper has two parts. The first embarks in an investigation of meaning and intention seeking to clarify the types of social phenomena under the heading of performances without authors. The second part develops a case, taken from the recent Argentine crisis, of what I call a performance in search of an author.

I. Intention and social interpretations

This section develops a brief analytical experiment. For convenience’s sake, I will call \( p \) any performance, event, or occurrence in the social world. This convention has the advantage of preventing us from narrowing down prematurely the class of events and actions under consideration. I will map a \( p \) in two I can look for actual social interpretations that circulate in a social space around \( p \). For instance, if \( p \) is a visit of a cabinet member to a factory, I can search for its intention in the words she spoke –her declarations-, in the actions she carried out –who she shook hands with-, in any meaningful sign that we can read of her– who she was accompanied by, what she wore, her facial expressions or the mis-en-scene. It could be that she wanted to show herself pro-labor or wanted to show herself near to the common worker. But beyond the intentions she might have, there are also a set of interpretations that circulate around that specific event, the visit. Some journalists or critics might consider it a demagogic or populist act, yet other might see it was a mere photo-op, even others might see it as the return of left-wing politics in American life. For any \( p \) a number of these...
interpretations, from the indefinite number of possible ones, will acquire circulation in the public sphere. These can be the product of different audiences, actors, critics or institutions. Once these interpretations enter the social space, they have independent existences from audiences and actors. They are social facts with which all actors must come to terms with, accepting some and trying to challenge others. At any given moment, there are a finite number of interpretations around $p$ in circulation through the many communicative channels and institutions of modern societies, from gossip to mass media; these are always less numerous than all the possible interpretations within the code or system of representations.

From the analytic distinction between intention and social interpretations, we can build the following two by two table setting up four ideo-typical cases by varying whether a certain $p$ has or doesn’t have intention or social interpretations (See Table 1.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Interpretations</th>
<th>Intention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two clarifications: first, this diagram does not exhausts the complexity of performance, especially since it does not take different audiences into account; and second, social interpretations are plural, but this does not mean that they cover ALL the possible interpretations $p$ can receive within a certain system of representations; instead we are taking them to be only those that have acquired circulation in a the social space under consideration.$^2$

$P$’s in cell 1 have both intention and social interpretations. Cases that fit this description include social movements, press releases, most theater and a good part of social action. Some social movements, for instance, have clear objectives (i.e. intentions) sometimes implicit, sometimes formally

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$^2$ This means that for any particular phenomenon under investigation, we can determine what the relevant level of circulation is for it to become a “social” interpretation.
expressed in documents, texts or speeches i.e. securing equal rights for a
minority or stopping an unjust war. The action of a movement generates a
series of social interpretations both around it as social movements and
around particular actions they “perform”. This cell holds the paradigmatic
and intuitive cases of performance, those that clearly bears the intentional
stamp. These are also the cases that receive the clearest treatment in Jeffrey
Alexander’s paper, since it fits the theater metaphor most squarely. Engag-
ing in communicative action, actors vie in the public sphere over interpre-
tations trying to further their own agenda (i.e. their intentions).

The second cell represents more of a puzzle. What p’s have social inter-
pretations even though there is no intention that could be attributed to
them? The first things that come to mind are natural events. Most of us liv-
ing in a disenchanted world do not attribute intent to nature. Natural
events, though, generate social interpretations. Think of earthquakes, hur-
rricanes or the seasons. All are rich in symbolism and associated meanings.
All these intentionless phenomena enter the social world and in their
entrance produce a series of social interpretations refracted by media, audi-
ences and discourses.

But natural events are not the only p’s that fit into this cell. We can
locate two other types of phenomena, both crucial for sociologists: 1) eco-
nomic and social indicators and 2) social phenomena. Economic and social
indicators are symbolic representations of social-structural phenomena.
These figures, authoritatively produced by social scientists, such as GDP,
unemployment rates, stock market indexes, poverty rates, and approval
ratings, enter the social world as facts, some even claiming to be objective
and transparent pointing to quasi natural realities. As indicators, they long
to be mere indexical signs that “point to” something in “nature” or the
social world. But once in the social “stage” they are refracted through pub-
lic spheres and discourses producing a number of social interpretations.

Social phenomena, such as currency collapses, refugee movements,
demographic shocks, riots, and one of Alexander’s main examples, social
dramas, are the other type of p’s in this cell. They are events, the product of
complex causal mechanisms without intention, but which immediately
bring on a host of social interpretations. These phenomena have long been
under the classic tutelage of Sociology, making this class of events particu-
larly relevant to our profession. This invites reflection on the complex
articulation between social structures, cultural structures and meanings.

The third cell is difficult to interpret. What kind of phenomena have
no intention and no social interpretations? This category, I want to suggest,
can help us think of crucial aspects of cultural sociology. Without entering into a long and twisted development of negativity and non-events, something akin to silence belongs in this cell. Not meaningful silence, like a rhetorical pause, but the constitutive “holes” of symbolic forms. In other words, the elements excluded by the grammar of discourses, significations which are impossible, do not make sense, are unthought or unthinkable within the particular discursive universe. This reminds us that symbolic forms structure a universe of possibility that is narrower than the one limited by the natural laws of physics or biology. It also invites us to look for those untapped possibilities and utopias within our complex symbolic systems. The contents of this cell are similar to the type of research to Foucault’s explorations in works such as the Archeology of Knowledge.

The fourth cell is also problematic. What type of phenomena have intentions but not social interpretations? It is indeed hard to come to some sort of understanding of this cell. I believe possible candidates for this cell are some examples of avant-garde art, such performance art. These clearly have intention, but an intention that aims at shattering codes and interpretations. They can be seen as an attempt to short-circuit the grammar of discourses, to generate something new, to subvert current social interpretations. We can see this in art such as Duchamp’s ready-mades which by elevating common objects to the status of art shattered most of our basic categories of what are art and everyday objects. The same is true for certain forms of performance art that work through shock or disgust. Both defy social interpretations even though in some cases the intention is present and strong.

The last two cells push the limits of the schema. They are meant in a polemical mode to help achieve greater clarity in exploring the types of performance and symbolic action.

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3 I am not saying that this is the function of avant-garde art; rather, I am only pointing out that as a phenomenon it might be classified in that cell. Also, it is possible for this type of art to have the opposite effect, that is, to generate a plurality of social interpretations, given that there is no one, clear interpretation or intention that can be attributed to the p. In this model, we have not taken into account audiences and publics. Once we do, we can see that a p can be in cell 3 for a certain audience the general public while in cell 1 for another, for example, an elite avant-garde. This type of symbolic phenomenon also varies by historic period. Repetition tends to undo shocking effects, making the same p mundane after a while.
The table consists of four ideal types. As such, they might never be found in pure form in reality. A certain p might be placed in one cell according one audiences and in another in a different social spaces. For instance, the objects or events produced by performance art might shift from cell 4 to cell 1 for certain groups –enlightened audiences– or after repetition if they lose their effect. This movement reinforces the idea found in performance theory that it is crucial to distinguish between audiences, since this distinction implies greater complexity and plurality of meaning. Nevertheless, the analytics distinctions brought into play allow us to analyze research objects and latent possibilities.

II. *Riesgo país*

This section presents a concrete research example in order to look at the complexity of empirical reality in relation to this diagram and cell #2. I will trace the symbolic displacement of an indicator which played a role in the economic collapse of Argentina at the end of 2001, a phenomenon which shows no signs of intention, in other words, my title, a performance in search of an author. My topic is the curious trajectory of what in Spanish is called the “riesgo país”, literally “country risk”, an economic indicator –known as ‘bond spread’ or “sovereign bond spread” in English– which came “to dominate” the public imagination and discourse in 2001. I will not enter into a discussion of what transpired during the crisis and the ensuing economic collapse, default and devaluation. Suffice it to remind the reader
that by the end of 2001 Argentina had frozen bank accounts, defaulted on its debt and its president had resigned. The year 2002 saw the devaluation of the peso, which lost 70% of its value against the US dollar, poverty rates over 50% and unemployment rates of over 20%. I can’t nor do I hope to show either that this index holds the key to reading the argentine crisis; however, I do want to suggest that the prominence of the “riesgo país” played a role on the financial panic that led to the crisis. That is, my interest in this indicator is not related to the insights it can provide on the economic logic of the collapse. Rather, I want to show that the riesgo país became a social representation capable of captivating the public imagination and of condensing complex meanings not directly related to its strictly technical and economic interpretation. This condensation of meanings and its prominence in public discourse did play a role in the social and cultural causality of the financial panic and the social crisis that exploded at the end of 2001. In this sense, this sections aims to be a contribution to the study of the cultural logics of panic and crisis which did have devastating economic consequences.

So what is the “riesgo país”? The bond spread is an index that measures the gap between the interest rate of a country’s bonds and the rate paid by the US treasury bonds. If the average interest rate paid by argentine bonds was 9% and the U.S. was paying 4%, then the spread was 5% or 500 base points. This bond spread circulates with the name “riesgo país” in Spanish, which literally means “country risk”. On April 2001 through May the riesgo país oscillated between 900 and 1000 points; by July it was at 1600 and by December it had reached 2000.

To show the importance of this index in public discourse, I rely on an analysis of newspaper reports. The lack of survey or ethnographic research on the uses and circulation of the riesgo país and the lack of measures of the public effervescence around it forced me to rely on media analysis. I use an analysis of the coverage of the riesgo país in Clarín, the main argentine daily with a circulation of half a million to a million daily copies depending on the day of the week.

How widespread was the use of the term “riesgo país”? The following frequency chart shows the results of an online search in Clarín’s headlines

4 I am implying neither direct causation nor that the crisis would not have happened without the riesgo país. What I do want to suggest is that it did play an important role in the particular way the crisis unfolded.

5 I am working on extending the analysis to other media sources in the future, especially TV newscasts and weekly news magazines.
and leads for the phrase “riesgo país”. I did separate searches for each year to see the relative importance of the index in the newspaper’s reporting and to get a sense of the historic baseline use of the term. During 2001 the mentions of the index grow eight-fold supporting the claim of widespread media attention given to the riesgo país.

RESULTS IN SEARCH ENGINE

By 2000, this term was gaining ground, but it was still used mainly in the business pages. By the end of 2000 and in particular during 2001 it makes its way into the headlines and front page of newspapers.

In spite of the impressive jump in mentions, this graph does not capture fully the importance of the riesgo país, since it counts a mention buried in the business pages the same way as a front page mention. To get a sense of this importance, I looked at the front page mentions of the index in Clarín. The results show the centrality given to the index by the media. The following chart shows the number of mentions of the riesgo país together with a weighed index of the mentions. This index assigns different values depending on whether a mention was in a main headline, receiving a score of 5 or in the news text receiving a score of 1 with other headline types and leads receiving intermediate scores. The bar graph shows that the mentions oscillate approximately between 4-6 mentions per month and stay approximately constant throughout 2001. The weighed score, though, sees dramatic increases after June. The fact that there are zero mentions in
September is mainly due to the coverage of the 9/11 attack which hoarded cover space during most of the month.\(^6\) If there is a slight decrease in total mentions in the second half of 2001, that decrease is offset by the increase in the importance of the headlines, going from a mention in the textbox to main headlines.

The relevance of the appearance of the riesgo país in the front page of Clarín is amplified by certain urban and journalistic practices. Newspaper headlines are read and commented in morning radio and TV shows. Pedestrians all over Argentina stop at kiosks spread out all over the cities to read the headlines, even if they do not buy the newspapers. Headlines are also, by convention, the site were reader decode what is “most important” in a newspaper articles and where the “topic” is established.

These media analyses cannot capture the degree to which the riesgo país index acquired oracular qualities, obsessing everyone from the cab driver to the Congressman, from housewives to lawyers. TV news would daily recap the changes in riesgo país, some coverage became as routine as the temperature forecasts. The term, previously reserved for connoisseurs

\(^6\) This phenomenon reminds us how sensitive covers are to media events. The entrance of a new item can radically alter the topics that enter the cover.
and the province of financial analysts, slowly became a household word, a topic of everyday conversation, and a reflection of the Argentine economy and even more.

The crucial fact in this story is that by July of 2001, the government came to the conclusion, and announced, that debt markets were closed to Argentina and that the state would make do with what it had. It instituted a zero deficit policy and stopped issuing bonds. For our analysis, this means that after July the index loses its main policy and economic implications. Argentina is not borrowing anymore; therefore, the ups and downs above a certain threshold, the rate at which it theoretically could borrow becomes of lesser practical interest. But since secondary bonds markets continued trading and there were billions in bonds in portfolios all over the world, the calculation of the index was still possible. What makes the case of the trajectory of the riesgo país particularly interesting, therefore, is not only that it acquires such prominence in public discourse, but rather that it continued captivating the public imagination and the media, even after it had lost its main raison d’etre as an economic indicator.

So if after July Argentina wasn’t issuing any more bonds and the strictly technical meaning had lost relevance, why was the riesgo país still making headlines and a topic of everyday conversation? I believe the answer lies in a displacement of the meaning of the riesgo país we can detect in the media discourse from its technical sense towards a symbol of the general health of the economy and of Argentina as a nation. There are three elements to highlight in reading this displacement. First, the name of the index: its particular signifiers make reference to a country and to risk. The presence of these signifiers, not always used in the English name, is crucial. Their everyday semantic fields open up a social interpretation of the index well beyond the narrow technical meaning of “sovereign spread”. Second, the index included a national point of comparison: the US. In that sense, Argentines came to see the index as measure of the distance between the US and Argentina. It thus became a quantitative measure of an ethereal and vague qualitative essence of progress or development. Third, since the

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7 Once this index crosses a certain threshold financial markets become closed for a country’s bonds. A country risk of 1600 meant that the country is paying close to 20% interest rates for borrowing money.

8 The index is calculated by J.P. Morgan under the title EMBI +.

9 As Giesen points out, following a long line of linguistic and philosophical reflection, symbols make visible the invisible (Giesen: 5). They make concrete something more diffuse.
index was elaborated by foreign analysts, by an “other”, its rise and fall also became an act of “recognition” by an other, in the strong sense of recognition, with the crucial aspect this takes for an Argentina obsessed with its place in the world.

Furthermore, the index provided an entity which crystallized these meanings into a symbolic whole capable of increasing and decreasing. This allowed for reporting that fits better the daily news cycles. The daily rise and fall of the riesgo país provided for daily reporting, interpretations and forecasting. The closing of debt markets, in contrast, was a one shot news event difficult to “recycle”. The condensation of all these meanings into an entity created a powerful social phenomenon.10

This displacement is evident in two front page articles that appeared in Clarín, one in April and the other in October (See Illustration 1).11 Both centered on the national rankings according to the riesgo país. The April article was about the unsavory privilege of surpassing other nations in the riesgo país chart. Argentina was third only topped by Ecuador and Nigeria. The October article was about Argentina reaching the #1 spot on the rankings above the previous champions. The fact of highlighting the ranking and the argentine climb to the top came to symbolize our slow descent from the heights of “el primer mundo”, the “first world”, as people half-jokingly, half-seriously said during the first half of the 90’s, to a country below an African nation, the last rung in national hierarchy in the (racist) local imaginary. In the argentine scale of national status hierarchy these events punctured an already wounded national ego.12 In these articles, we can see the emergence of the displaced meaning from a technical economic indicator towards a more diffuse sense of decline, economic but more generally in national hierarchy too.

Few wondered whether the riesgo país was still relevant and should continue to be reported in such a fashion. I do not believe it was manipulated by

10 We might even speculate that it became articulated into the sports genres with their daily or weekly shifts in rankings and the consequent attitudes and associations with team memberships and identity.

11 Clarin April 24th and October 11th 2001

12 Without entering into the details of this complex topic, the reader should be aware that Argentina has always lived through a symbolic battle between civilization and barbarism as the two poles of its identity. A manifestation of this has been its imaginary of being a European country, not a Latin American one. This is also part of the background culture that reinforced the riesgo país phenomenon.
powerful actors, national or foreign. Neither can we blame it on mediocre journalism. The riesgo país mutated from an index to a symbol suffering a displacement of meanings from the technical economic and financial realm to a more diffuse understanding of the riesgo país as a symbol of the decline of Argentina. It is this displacement which needs to be thought as a “performance without an author”. What makes it particularly important is that it played a role in triggering the general economic panic that led, together with other causes, to the bank and currency runs during the end of 2001. It is not difficult to connect the dots from the sense of national decline and “national risk” condensed in a financial indicator to a feeling of insecurity and panic, particularly economic insecurity and panic. In this sense, it is not far-fetched to claim that this displacement and the feelings of risk involved played a role in the actual development of the collapse.

Returning to table 2, displacements such as that of the riesgo país fit most clearly in cell 2, as symbolic phenomena that generate social meanings without intentions behind them. This location, though, depends on holding the model static. Once a more dynamic approach is attempted, it becomes evident that there is a tendency for p’s in cells 2 and 4 to move towards cell 1. The interpretation we can give of this shift is that as symbolic phenomena crystallize in the public spheres of complex societies, be they natural events and their reflections, indexes or socio-structural events, they tend to be absorbed in intention matrixes (and interests) and into agonistic processes of performance and contestation. As they are refracted through discourses, public spheres and institutions, actors begin to take sides in the agonistic processes of the public spheres. In our example, once the argentine government realized that the riesgo país as a phenomenon was being blown out of proportion, it tried to play it down, not very effectively
though; meanwhile certain financial actors, who were betting on options and futures on the collapse of the peso, where not only pushing interpretations, but manipulating the bond market to generate a rise in the riesgo país. But beyond these agonistic performative dynamics, the original displacement and condensations of the riesgo país were not the result of any strategic plan or intention by any actors, institutional or otherwise.

**Conclusion**

The aim of this analytical experiment and the analysis of the case of the “riesgo país” was to clarify the non-intentional dimensions of the performative turn. As Evelyn Fox Keller showed in her book on the history of 20th century biology (Keller 1995), metaphors can be extremely productive, having a great effect not only on theories, but more importantly, on research agendas, making some projects more visible than others and sometimes repressing whole lines of research. My intention with this paper was to make conscious the biases and possibilities of the performance metaphor and to invite thinking on performances in cell 2, in those performances in search for authors, and researchers too.

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Setting the Stage: A Cultural Approach to the South African Truth & Reconciliation Commission

Tanya Goodman

Abstract: Over the last twenty-five years, truth commissions have increasingly been used as a tool to facilitate transitions to democracy in countries attempting to deal with a history of collective violence. In 1996, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South Africa was launched as part of the negotiated political settlement that led to the dismantling of apartheid. While many analysts have focused on the political aspects of the TRC, I suggest that the TRC should be considered as a cultural process that helps reconstruct notions of who belongs in the “new” nation. To set the stage for my larger project, this paper outlines the history and structure of the South African TRC, raises some of the critical questions that a study of the TRC can begin to answer, and proposes the type of sociological lens that should be applied. I argue that although the demand for individuals to testify before the TRC about their role in or suffering from apartheid violence was originally shaped by legal principles, the result was that the TRC became a public ritual space where individual and collective narratives about the past were performed. By applying a neo-Durkheimian lens that takes seriously the role of ritual, narrative, and the social drama of cultural trauma, I lay a framework for explaining the significance of testimonies in the TRC and propose that these stories, and the ways in which they were told and retold, carried the transformative potential of the TRC.

Although many had feared that the end of apartheid would come only as the product of a bloody revolution, the “miracle” of the relatively peaceful South African political transition began with the announcement by then-President F.W. de Klerk that Nelson Mandela would be released from prison in 1990. The subsequent dismantling of apartheid meant that laws dating back to the early 1900’s which had denied the black majority of their political, social and economic rights and equal participation were revoked. In 1994, the next steps in the transition to democracy were taken when the
first universal franchise elections overwhelmingly voted the African National Congress (ANC) lead by Nelson Mandela into power. A new Constitution and a very progressive Bill of Rights further consolidated the “new” South Africa’s stated commitment to the principles of democracy and a respect for human rights.

But for many years, people under apartheid had been physically and conceptually segregated along racial and political lines, and state-sanctioned violence had been used to maintain these divisions. Now the new government was faced with the challenge of what to do with this brutal past and how to structure a transition from a history of conflict to a future of peace. A novel institution, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established by an act of parliament—the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation (Act 34, 1995)—and positioned as a primary solution.

The TRC was composed of three committees: a Committee on Amnesty, a Committee on Human Rights Violations, and a Committee on Reparations & Rehabilitation. Each committee was convened by a panel of commissioners, with the TRC as a whole comprising a total of seventeen commissioners. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a long-time anti-apartheid activist, served as the Chairperson of the TRC, and the backgrounds of those who served as commissioners included law, religion, psychology, politics, social work, and health. The Amnesty Committee heard testimony from those who had committed gross violations of human rights under apartheid (defined narrowly in Act 34 as killing, torture, abduction, and grievous bodily harm). If amnesty applicants met certain criteria, such as providing full disclosure and demonstrating that their acts were committed with a political motive, then these individuals were granted amnesty from prosecution. The Human Rights Violations Committee took statements and heard testimony from victims and survivors of such acts. The Reparations & Rehabilitation Committee was responsible for crafting policies and payments for those who had been named as victims. In the end, the TRC took over 20,000 statements from victims, and received more than 7,000 amnesty applications from people who participated in apartheid-era crimes (TRC Final Report, 1998). The TRC started hearings in April 1996 and

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1 The term “new” was used in South Africa almost as soon as the end of apartheid became palpable. I will argue that for most South Africans, describing the country as a “new” nation is premised not only the principles of becoming a real democracy in all its legal specificity but also refers to a general recognition that “we all belong”. This notion of belonging, and the expansion of boundaries of who belongs, forms a central part of my analysis of the TRC.
delivered a preliminary five volume 2,500-page report on its findings and recommendations to then-President Mandela in October 1998.² In March 2003, the remainder of the report was delivered to parliament and included the findings from the Amnesty Committee and a chapter devoted to victims’ stories.³

Although the demand for individuals to appear before the TRC and to give a personal description of their role in or suffering from apartheid violence was originally shaped by legal principles, the result was that the TRC became a public space where individual and collective narratives about the past were performed. In particular, the creation of the Human Rights Violations hearings, a specific innovation of the South African TRC, became a forum for the voices of victims and thereby expanded the scope for a detailed, personal, and often deeply emotional accounting of apartheid violence.

This paper lays the framework for explaining why I believe these voices hold the key to understanding what has been so captivating about the TRC. For it is these stories, and the stories about these stories, which carried the powerful capacity for redefining the past, re-imagining the future, and affecting change in South Africa. I will argue that the performative, public nature of the hearings provided moments for interaction and interpretation –moments which were often used by the TRC commissioners, the media, and the nation to enact or define an inclusive moral community not only inside the TRC but in the broader society as well. To set the stage for my larger project, this paper outlines the history and structure of the South African TRC, raises some of the critical questions that a study of the TRC can begin to answer, and proposes the type of sociological lens that should be applied.

Dealing with the Past

South Africa had a number of options available when it came to formulating a solution to the question of how to deal with the apartheid past. The nation could have chosen the path of forgetting by officially ignoring past

² According to the drafting legislation, the TRC was only supposed to last two years. An amendment was made to increase its mandate for an additional nine months for the completion of the Human Rights Violations hearings and the drafting of the preliminary final report. The Amnesty hearings were extended until mid-2001.
³ The Reparations and Rehabilitation process has been most disappointing to date with a failure to adequately compensate, as promised, the many victims who came forward.
atrocities, as has been the case in Cambodia. Or, like Czechoslovakia or Poland, South Africa could have opted for lustration and the disqualification from office of those who held powerful positions during apartheid. A third path could have been the institution of Nuremberg-type criminal tribunals. However, by crafting the TRC as a quasi-legal institution, what South Africa effectively did was to forge a compromise between criminal trials and historical amnesia (Minow 1998); a compromise which resulted in a remarkable new form for dealing with the past.

In part, the choice of the TRC must be explained as an outcome of the delicate negotiations that took place between the old and new political regime in the final hours of drafting the Interim Constitution (see, for e.g., Asmal, Asmal and Roberts 1996; Sparks 1994, Jung and Shapiro 1995). Designers of the TRC looked primarily to examples of prior truth commissions and tribunals that had taken place following the overthrow of authoritarian regimes, mainly in Latin America. But rather than agreeing to blanket amnesty for apartheid-era crimes as had been the case in places such as Chile and Argentina, a unique balance was spawned between offering individual amnesty for perpetrators and providing opportunities for victims to participate in the process by telling their stories.4

It is also important to note at the outset that the South African TRC was unique in a few specific ways in comparison to earlier truth commissions. The critical elements to keep in mind are that it was the first truth commission to introduce a segment devoted specifically to the testimonies of survivors of human rights violations. It also required amnesty applicants to appear on an individual basis and to account for their actions. Finally, the TRC held special hearings on different sectors of society, including the media, organized religion, health, military conscription, violence against women, and children. I believe that these innovations, along with extensive media coverage of (mostly)5 open hearings, played a role in the way that a notion of reconciliation seemed to filter through society.

4 Many proponents of the compromise TRC have argued that even if criminal trials had been feasible, the traditional rules of evidence, focus on the perpetrator, and adversarial nature of such procedures would have limited the discovery of truth and marginalized the experiences of the victims (du Toit 1996, Minow 1998, Asmal et al 1997, but see Woods 1998).

5 There was a vigorous debate early in the planning stages of the TRC regarding the degree of media coverage that would be allowed. In the end, the primary reason for not only allowing but encouraging live and consistent coverage was framed as being an integral part of what it meant to be a “new” democracy, much of which was defined as requiring openness and transparency. Others who pushed for open media coverage argued that it would serve a
It was an intensely, and deliberately, public process. Open hearings were held across the country in small towns and large cities between 1996 and 1998. Those who testified were able to speak in their home language and simultaneous direct translation for the audience was provided. The TRC received considerable national and international media coverage. Newspapers carried front-page stories, radio stations reported live, and television news often opened with a headline from the TRC. The South African national television broadcasting company (SABC) commissioned a weekly thirty-minute summary report that played during prime time, and replayed during the week.

In public discussions, the emphasis of the TRC was framed as a process which would nurture reconciliation by building “bridges of understanding” through “truth-telling” and “healing”. In speeches, interviews, and workshops, high ranking politicians and public intellectuals suggested that the TRC could help produce the “moral climate” (Omar 1996, then-South African Minister of Justice) for a new national identity by “healing the wounds” of the past (Boraine 1996, then-Vice-Chairperson of TRC) and creating a “rainbow nation” (Tutu 1995, then-Chairperson of TRC). Repeated references were made to the peace that would be established and the culture of human rights that would emerge. Yet, no one asked how this “moral climate” would be generated.

**What Do Truth Commissions Do?**

Over the last twenty-five years, truth commissions have been used increasingly as a tool for transitions to democracy in countries attempting to deal with a history of collective violence. Since 1974, at least 20 such initiatives have been established in Latin America, Europe, Asia, and Africa with varying degrees of success (Hayner 1994, 2002). The South African TRC has been heralded as the most ambitious and innovative commission to date and many countries such as Bosnia, Cambodia, Northern Ireland, and Kenya that are struggling to deal with an authoritarian and violent past are not only considering the implementation of a truth commission but are being encouraged to use the South African model. Since the hear-
ings of the South African TRC, at least six more truth commissions have been instituted.\textsuperscript{6}

Debates have flourished among legal and political theorists regarding purposes and structures of truth commissions (see, for e.g., Ensalaco 1994; Lemarchand 1994; Klosterman 1998), the tension between reconciliation and justice (Dyzenhaus 1999; Allen 1999; Mamdani 1996), and the moral implications of granting amnesty (Minow 1998; Neier 1998; Markel 1999). Efforts like the South African TRC which aim to uncover the “truth”\textsuperscript{7} of violent activities committed during repressive political regimes have been described as serving a range of functions: as catharsis for victims, as a mechanism for structuring a clear break between past and present, as a means of revising history from the perspective of those who were excluded, as a way of instituting accountability and the rule of law, and as an instrument for creating a new national identity. Some political theorists have specifically advocated the importance of revealing “truth” as a way to create a collective memory which can in turn serve as the foundation for democratic nation-building (Zalaquett 1992: 1425, 1433).

Despite these multiple, and sometimes conflicting, claims about reasons why a truth commission should be implemented and the objectives a truth commission might fulfill, few theorists have really explored what precise mechanisms work to accomplish such tasks, how these tasks are related, or how such tasks are performed. José Zalaquett, a Chilean human rights lawyer and former commissioner of the Chilean Truth Commission, probably comes closest to proposing what I believe a TRC offers a “new” society in his theoretical statement on the purposes of a truth commission:

The commission’s purpose is \textit{political} in the broad sense that it helps to lay foundations for a new political system or to reconstruct a broken one. Such \textit{foundational moments} recall John Rawl’s notion of an original position. That is not an actual historical moment but a conceptual one when people come together and ask themselves, “Why are we together? What values do we believe

\textsuperscript{6} For an excellent summary and brief description of all truth commissions to date, see the United States Institute for Peace internet library of digital links to truth commissions, available at \texttt{http://www.usip.org/library/truth.html} (access9/1/2003).

\textsuperscript{7} The notion of “truth” is a complex one and the TRC itself in the interim final report acknowledged that it had to consider many types of truths. The report delineated four kinds of truths—“factual or forensic truth, personal and narrative truth, social truth, and healing and restorative truth” (TRC Report, Vol 1). Of course, questions such as “whose truth”, “how much truth” and “truth for what purposes” should be asked and will be dealt with in my larger project.
in? What is the best arrangement for justice?” In such foundational moments, which may involve “refounding” a broken political order, nations must strive for establishing or reestablishing commonly shared values. (Zalaquett 1996, emphasis added)

As Zalaquett suggests, the foundational moment in a new nation rests on establishing some baseline of commonality. But to push Zalaquett’s (and Rawl’s) analysis of this foundational moment further, I want to propose that the character of this moment involves not only political work, but also cultural processes. Moreover, I find the emphasis on “commonly shared values” and the notion of “refounding” misleading since it assumes that there was or is an existing baseline of harmony. In the case of South Africa, however, where the country has always been divided, there is little in its past for which to hearken back; so any sense of “commonly shared values” must be constructed. Secondly, in the founding moments of a “new” nation like South Africa where members do not share a common view of the past, let alone recognize each other as equal members, much work must be focused on forging a common bond before attention can be directed to the establishment of a common good.

It is from this perspective that I believe the testimonies in the TRC are significant, and I seek to show how the narratives which emerged from these hearings were constructed in such a way that they invoked a new sense of solidarity, both despite and because of the horror of the apartheid past. Thus, as much as the TRC may have been a tool for granting amnesty and designating victims, I will argue that the TRC was a public ritual which relied on narratives (and their interpretations) to connect the past and future trajectories of individual and collective lives, an endeavor which subsequently shifted the definitions of who belongs.

The TRC as a Cultural Project

My work seeks to locate the TRC in a global master narrative about dealing with the past. It also considers the ways in which concepts, symbols, and goals of the national level TRC were adapted at more local levels in South African society. But most importantly, I aim to show how the stories told to the TRC were woven into a narrative for the new nation that rested in a dramatic process which successfully designated the past as traumatic and simultaneously articulated the notion of a newly constituted democratic civil society. Take, for example, Archbishop Tutu’s opening address to the first meeting of the TRC commissioners where he declared:
We have seen a miracle unfold before our very eyes and the world has marveled as South Africans, all South Africans, have won this spectacular victory over injustice, oppression and evil. The miracle must endure. Freedom and justice must become realities for all our people and we have the privilege of helping to heal the hurts of the past, to transcend the alienations and the hostilities of that past so that we can close the door on that past and concentrate in the present and our glorious future. (Tutu 1996)

In many ways, the work of the TRC was shaped by Tutu’s call and the overarching narrative produced cast the past as evil and the future as sacred. Suffering and brutality, in this story, became the midwives to the birth of the new democracy which promised a “home for all”. To explain just how such a process unfolded, we must turn to sociological modes of inquiry that help focus on the critical processes at play. By drawing on concepts such as ritual, narrative, and social drama as cultural trauma, and by locating the TRC in the context of the South African democratic nation-building project, we can best explain the ways in which the TRC helped to shape social change.

At base, I believe the TRC must be analyzed as a process that engaged people in a project to refashion boundaries of exclusion. I argue that through the testimonies, and the interpretation of these narratives, the TRC facilitated a (re)definition of the boundaries between those included and those excluded, and subtly outlined the new contours of a basic moral universe. This accomplishment in turn contributed to the building of a national or collective identity which was shaped in particular ways by South Africa’s conscious effort to move towards democracy. The way in which democratic aspirations frame this dynamic is hinted at by Richard Rorty’s (1996: 334) suggestion that:

To ask for a foundation of democracy is, typically, to ask for a reason why we should be inclusive in our moral and political concerns rather than exclusive—why for example, we should try to broaden our moral and political community so as to include the nonlandowners, nonwhites, nonmales, nonstraights, and so on.

The testimonies given to the TRC and the ways in which these stories were framed by “empathic interlocutors”, such as the TRC commissioners and the national media who retold the stories for wider and wider audiences, effectively filled out the details of this type of boundary extension and redefinition. To understand how this process was enacted we need to con-
sider not only the content of the testimonies which were given by victims but also how these stories were told and what values were attached to them.

Much of the testimony, especially those that gave accounts of brutality, showed graphically the historical impact of exclusion. For many South Africans, these stories were heard and acknowledged for the first time in a publicly sanctioned space. Knowing this kind of truth was a huge leap forward given the strict censorship and secrecy that had dominated during the apartheid years. But more than simply serving as data for setting the record straight, many of these stories, especially those of suffering and sacrifice, were used by empathic interlocutors to construct a larger narrative which was crafted in such a way that it offered a vision of reconciliation. Such a narrative was both backward-looking and forward looking. In part, the testimonies were used to inscribe lessons learned about the past and to issue proclamations of “never again”. At the same time, the testimonies which offered examples of the evil of the past were juxtaposed with an ideal of an imagined community coded as the “new” South Africa. To move between the past and future, however, required a revision in the way in which people viewed each other and a reconstitution of the boundaries of who belongs. The narratives derived from the TRC testimonies encouraged previously segregated people to recognize each other, at a most basic level, as equally worthy human beings, and at a more general level, as equal members in a new society-in-formation. I argue that this process rested in how the past was constructed as a cultural trauma and how the narratives which were produced evoked a sense of solidarity and thereby helped to establish a new conceptual framework of belonging.

Ritual, Narrative, and Cultural Trauma

Using a neo-Durkheimian perspective (Alexander 1998, Hunt 1998, Collins 1998), we can view the TRC as a ritualized effort to build solidarity and institute a new “civil religion” (Bellah and Hammond 1980). I propose that the TRC should be characterized as a forum where people participate in a public ritual that has the potential to resolve past conflicts and create new, shared meanings. Taking such a theoretical approach alerts us to elements of the TRC such as the emphasis on story-telling through testimony, the attention to ceremony, and the production of a type of group effervescence. Keying in on the narratives themselves as well as the interactions between TRC commissioners and victims, the role of the audience as witness and participant, the coding of good and evil, and the lessons that are
conveyed helps to place the TRC in a frame that highlights its cultural aspects and impacts. One eyewitness account describing the procedures at the TRC hearings captures these many dimensions:

Each hearing is opened with a prayer—sometimes Christian, sometimes Muslim, sometimes Jewish—and a large, white candle representing truth is solemnly lit. The audience is then asked to rise out of respect for the victims and their families when they file in. In typical court settings, spectators would rise when the judge comes in; here we rose for the victims. The seven commissioners in attendance then came down from their white linen-clad tables to welcome the victims—by shaking hands, embracing kissing. Many of the victims were already sobbing, overcome by the mere fact that an official government representative was showing them respect. When each victim finished [their testimony], one of the commissioners responded with a formal statement, summing up the story that had been told, affirming and thanking the witness, pronouncing on the evil that had been done. (Gallagher 1998: 23)

Casting the TRC theoretically as a ritual performance enables us to see its possibility for generating new definitions in social relations. My explanation of the TRC as ritual performance relies in part on Victor Turner’s (1977) understanding of ritual and his delineation of a phase of liminality in which participants perceive a general sense of “communitas”. The TRC indeed occurred in a liminal space and therefore carried the potential to be transformative. The space was liminal in that it was, as Turner describes, “betwixt and between” (1977: 95); something that occurred both in and out of the normal trajectories of cultural space and time. The founding legislation for the TRC was in fact a post-script to an Interim Constitution which operated in a transitional political period. The TRC was also given a bounded time-frame in which to operate. And the TRC was presented as part of a “bridge” between the former apartheid regime and the new universal democracy not only in formal legislation (Act 200, 1993), but also in symbolic ways. For example, commenting on the formation of the TRC, Archbishop Tutu claimed:

The commission was put in place as part of the tender bridge to help us make the transition from repression, from evil, from ghastliness to democracy and freedom. (Tutu 2000, emphasis added)

The TRC also operated in a liminal space set against the backdrop of great effervescence. Once the new ANC government came to power, Nelson Mandela’s personal charisma and lack of bitterness combined with
Tutu’s vision of the “rainbow nation” all contributed to the general optimism and willingness to engage in a particular kind of nation-building exercise. It was a unique opportunity for South Africans to embark on the TRC project which promised social reconciliation. Economic claims and hardships were temporarily put on hold while the business of building a new nation, socially and culturally, was put into play. In this way, both the legalistic structure and the time frame set the potential for the liminal and transformative character of the TRC. What later emerged in this space was the compelling power of the testimonies and an emotional intensity that surprised almost everyone.

The testimonies themselves were an important part of the ritual bridge-building that the TRC became because the people who offered personal accounts and the stories they came to represent in the grander narrative helped not only to construct a coherent view of the past as evil but also to paint a vision of an imagined community. Benedict Anderson’s (1983) central concept of imagining a community is useful in this analysis because through it, we can begin to consider the TRC as a case of a modern structure in which people engaged in imagining a new community and re-imagining the old. Just as language and common forms of communication have typically been seen as the primary integrative mechanisms for imagining community, I suggest that these narratives of the TRC provided a common language which offered a means by which “pasts [could be] restored, fellowships [ ] imagined, and futures dreamed” (Anderson 1983: 154). As such, the South African case can be analyzed as a society inventing itself as it struggled to build an inclusive notion of who belongs to this “new” nation. After the experience of apartheid, such a goal could be achieved in part only by (re)constructing social bonds on the basis of some kind of horizontal relationship. I suggest that the TRC functions as one such forum in which these kinds of relationships are generated by means of the content and communication of testimonials. For Antjie Krog, a white Afrikaans poet and journalist who reported weekly on the proceedings of the TRC, the intensity of the hearings clearly generated a new sense of human connection:

> It’s not about skin color, culture, language, but about people. The personal pain puts an end to all stereotypes. Where we connect now has nothing to do with group or color, we connect with our humanity (Krog 1998: 45)

For those South Africans caught up in the moment of democratic transition, the TRC offered one of the crucial channels through which people could begin to see themselves as co-members of a community. This cha-
neling helped to designate a kind of common frame where people could come together and agree that the past was horrible and the future is promising. While they may not have agreed on the specifics, the fact that they could come to such consensus was at least a critical step forward if they were to co-exist peacefully within a single nation’s borders. In my argument, what fuels this process is the testimonies told to the TRC.

Precisely how these testimonies were woven together to create an overarching narrative can be illuminated by applying a model of social drama and delineating the process by which particular events are designated as a cultural trauma (and accepted as such). Such a model (Alexander 2002; forthcoming) encourages us to pay attention to the mechanisms by which events are coded, weighted and narrated and the way in which the claims that are made shape a particular view of social reality, designate the causes of trauma, highlight the consequences, and point to certain remedies for such claims. When dealing with cultural trauma, the sociological project becomes one which is concerned with how and under what conditions such claims are made, how traumatic status is attributed to events, and how these events come to be believed as having torn at the social fabric. Significantly for this project, Alexander (2002) suggests that those events that are successfully designated as trauma are framed as having violated moral universals. The importance of studying the degree of participation or rejection of groups in cultural trauma also points to the way in which shared suffering, or at least the acknowledgment of others’ suffering (or refusal to) may affect the degree of solidarity in human relationships and therefore provide a better understanding of the elements which contribute to political and moral action. Rather than seeing events in themselves as the source of collective trauma, this approach calls attention to the way in which people respond to and reflect on events as the mode through which a trauma is claimed. Moreover, the effects of such traumatic events and the ways in which new definitions are crafted is not viewed as an outcome of the event itself. Rather, such re-classifications are seen as the product of social interaction and interpretation which is mediated through a ritual form.

Alexander’s new work on cultural trauma (2002, forthcoming: 16) outlines the social construction of cultural trauma as a process that begins with “a claim to some fundamental injury”, moves to “an exclamation of the terrifying profanation of some sacred value” which rests on “a narrative about a horribly destructive process”, and is followed by “a demand for emotional, institutional, and symbolic reparation and reconstitution”.

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With its reliance on testimony and the subsequent reverberations of these stories in various media, we can trace how the TRC process followed this path and enabled the designation of the apartheid past as a cultural trauma. The TRC gave victims and perpetrators the space to offer accounts about what happened in the past and why, and by so doing to narrate and weight these past atrocities. However, the testimonies and their interpretations were not merely restricted to the past, nor were they limited to the individual speaker. How the past was represented and how explanations were framed in the present about why certain attitudes or actions had been tolerated, simultaneously invoked notions of future possibilities for a new, inclusive mode of society. By providing a space in which apartheid could be coded as a cultural trauma, the TRC helped facilitate the recognition of particular individuals’ suffering. At the same time, the way in which people responded to and reported on this suffering universalized the trauma and began to break down prior categories of exclusion.

**Telling Tales for the New South Africa**

As I have argued, the testimonies in the TRC can be seen as operating at multiple levels. First, the individual testimony of victims provided details of very personal experiences and details of historical events that had never been publicly acknowledged. The content of these narratives and the ways in which they were inserted by the TRC commissioners and the media into a new official history involved a reframing of the past and a coding of apartheid as profane. Each cycle of translation engaged in a recasting of heroes and villains, and called for a society-wide acknowledgment of those who had suffered. Here, a second level of the significance of testimonies emerges. By making their statements in a public forum, victims and survivors gained legitimacy for their story. But more than this, the TRC offered an opportunity for victims and survivors to assert their voice, dignity, and moral worth. And the way in which their stories were heard and interpreted set the stage for examining and insinuating a new common understanding of the value of human dignity in general, and a moral baseline for the “new” collective. As such, the testimonies offered and the transformative capacity they carried were not moments in and of themselves. TRC Commissioners, politicians, and the media used these testimonies to help build the story of the “new” South Africa. By first recognizing and recording this past, and then designating a new founding moment, the nation was seen as being poised for a rebirth.
Thus, the TRC must be considered first and foremost as a public ritual that was deployed not only to deal with the injustices of the past but also to foster the development of a new collective identity for the future. While many viewed the TRC’s search for historical truth as an end in itself and framed the lessons learned as ways to prevent such brutality from occurring in the future, I view these two purposes as intimately connected, and enacted, through the TRC.

In a deeply divided society such as South Africa, I propose that the forum of the TRC provided a ritual space where the process and content of testimonials may have helped people to discover or create common bonds where consensus had not previously existed. This cohesive quality operated on both a material and symbolic level. The individuals, the groups they represented, and their narratives shared the same space within the walls of the TRC—a place where a variety of face-to-face interactions from handshakes to tears occurred. But these people and their stories also shared the same space on the front page of the daily newspaper, inside the living rooms of a television audience, and in the everyday conversations of the broader society. Forced into a realm of co-existence and simultaneity, these narratives became the threads that were woven into a tapestry of shared meanings in the “new” South Africa.

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Discourse and Practice in a World of Strangers
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Abstract: This paper elaborates processes of identity construction among aspiring street performers in public spaces. The paper establishes how aspiring performers, referred to as “players”, are semiotically situated between homelessness and street performer status in their own interpretations as well as in area visitors’ preconceived expectations. The paper details the creative practices players engage in to shape passersby’s interpretations of them in order to receive tips. The paper concludes that symbolic interactionist accounts of interactions between strangers in public spaces must be supplemented with robust investigations into the culture structural influences that shape the constitution of social spaces and actors.

Introduction

The Venice Walkway is a recreational beach area and marketplace that lies on the edge of a major metropolis. On a typical summer day, the area attracts locals and visitors from multiple races and ethnicities, classes and occupational statuses, age groups, and family structures. A photo of the area taken on such a day could easily capture in one frame wealthy people lounging on condominium patios, homeless people sitting half asleep under pagodas, shirtless adolescents play fighting, and entrepreneurs marketing their wares and services on both sides of the walkway. The area’s social diversity, recreational and mercantile processes, and evidence of physical disorder (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999) foster a social environment that renders identities and statuses exaggeratedly ambiguous.

The intent of this paper is to advance our understanding of the practices of identity construction used by individuals at the lower reaches of the status systems to gain enough money from excursionists in public spaces to avoid homelessness (Snow and Anderson 1987; Lankenau 1999). To unpack this process I draw on data I gathered from a field study of street
performers in Venice Beach, California. Earning income through entreaties to passersbys in public spaces requires performing symbolic transformations of objects’ meaning constellations. Performance does not inhere in the act, and performer status does not inhere in the west-side “player” in the walkway’s public spaces. Rather, stages must be carved out of public space, and performer status must be achieved, often in the face of multiple sources of interruption and distraction. To represent the contingency involved in constructing and maintaining these shifts, I use the term “players” to refer to west-side entrepreneurs who seek to become “performers” to gain tips from excursionists in exchange for performative services.

Interpretation and interaction in public spaces

As a narrative space (Simpson 2000), Venice Beach is constituted as both a “mecca for free expression” and a “freak show” populated by bohemians, travelers, vendors, and homeless people. Status ambiguity peaks during the warmer months when large numbers of Los Angelians and international excursionists venture into the area for recreation. The five years prior to my fieldwork were characterized by a perceived increase in gang related violence in the area, Philippe, a local street performer and resident, told me. During these years the Strand’s public presentation (Goffman 1963) was marked by visual signs of social and physical disorder including the prevalence of obviously drunken men, “rowdy groups of young males”, graffiti, broken pavement, and garbage debris. These visual signs “reflect powerfully on our inferences” about this urban community (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999).

As a narrative space that attracts people from across the social spectrum, the Strand’s built environment amplifies the range of excursionists’ and locals’ interactional possibilities (Lofland 1998:181; Simpson 2000), and increases the potential for interpretive dissonance. Players read each other, and are read by excursionists, as occupying a social status semiotically situated between panhandlers and creative indigents on the one hand, and as working street performers on the other. Both statuses are located at the bottom of the social order (Snow and Anderson 1987), yet the distinction between the two is consequential.

In Stigma, Goffman (1963) elaborates the strategies the stigmatized employ to “pass”, or conceal discreditable characteristics in order to minimize the social and emotional consequences of their potential outing. For most homeless people and panhandlers, “passing is largely impossible”
(Snow and Anderson 1987). Their disheveled, tattered appearances (Gardner 1990), and at times forward requests for money, serve as signifiers that provoke “indifference, fear, mistrust and anger” amongst those they solicit (Lankenau 1999).

Identity and status interpretation determines the potential for an exchange-based relationship between player and excursionist, and defines the social character of their interactions (Schwartz 1967). In this particular narrative space – “the home of the homeless” – players’ symbolically distance themselves from the “non-deserving poor” (Wright 1989) through performance to communicate to excursionists that a cash tip represents “money properly spent” (Lankenau 1999: 309). A player successfully achieves “performer status” when he turns any money exchanged into a tip instead of a handout, and the relationship between the tipper and himself into one of reciprocation. Both understandings increase the likelihood of an exchange taking place (Lankenau 1998: 309; Schwartz 1967).

An ethnographic case study

The first step to achieving performer status is distinguishing oneself from area excursionists, on the one hand, and from such local statuses as panhandler, hustler, and crazy person, on the other. The area’s diverse social environment forces street performers to walk a tightrope of contradiction. One’s performative actions and solicitations must cultivate a sense of “otherness” unusual enough to warrant the curious attention of area visitors. However, one’s performative actions cannot be so “other” that they produce anxious ambivalence in one’s sought after audience members. In Goffman’s (1963) terms, to varying degrees of success, area players creatively tease and stylistically enact the normative boundaries of stigmatization.

Consider the following fieldnote excerpts written early in my fieldwork:

Today I saw the guy who stands behind a large grocery bag, talks, and kind of bobs around a little, presumably for tips. I can’t figure him out. He had on the same green, army-like pants and jacket that I’ve always seen him wearing. Today, however, he also had a yellow pair of women’s underwear pulled over his head, their elastic waistband stretched tightly across his forehead. He had a recorder in his hands on which he played unfamiliar tunes. He said things like, “Can I have a dollar from everyone? I need a dollar from everyone, please. The reason I need a dollar is because I am trying to buy a house”. I found this outrageously funny: the panties, the paper bag, the recorder – and a dollar to buy a
house. Funny, but unsettling. I find the guy almost incomprehensible, and in a way, as representing a sort of chaos. In terms of my work I have no idea how I would begin to try to interact with him. Actually, I have a difficult time simply standing and watching in his full view. I feel compelled to hide myself and observe him surreptitiously to avoid initiating an exchange. Is he a performer at all? Is he a homeless person doing a sort of creative form of begging, sort of ranting for handouts? Does he actually expect people to tip him?

Players’ experiences confirmed the commonness of my early reaction to the player described above, and their comments about one another also tended to reproduce this kind of guarded, interpretive ambivalence and skepticism. Sheik Jammin’, a Strand veteran and icon, evidenced both processes of interpretive dissonance:

“People don’t come up and talk to me. They try to fit me into a box, call me names. There’s all this, there are all these people out here you got to deal with. All these people out here, you got the cops, the performers, the crooks, the kooks, all the crazies. These people”, he nods to excursionists passing by, “look at me like I’m a homeless guy. ‘He just wants some money, just give him a dollar and he’ll go away.’ You know, I’ve got friends that are CEO’s. They used to think I was just some sideshow down here, some freak, and now they take me for what I am. People think I’m a crack addict. People don’t want me here, they don’t like my attention, they want me to go away.”

One technique players adopt to situate themselves strategically to the Strand’s built environment and pedestrian flow (Lofland 1973) in attempt to construct performer status is to stand on one side of the walkway and “cast” out punch-lines to excursionists as they pass by. The Caster stands in one spot adjacent to the walkway’s pedestrian flow, and calls out to passers-by in order to get one or two persons to stop and engage him.

Consider the case of Ashutu, a 45-year-old African man that came to the United States from Liberia roughly 10 years ago. On the Strand he is the Bushman. He wears a Fred Flintstone inspired dress made of leopard print cloth that drapes rigidly from his shoulders to the garb’s jagged bottom that stops just above mid-thigh. Bushman adorns himself with a necklace made of wooden pegs and colorful, parrot-like figurines, and wears nothing else but a pair of thin brown flip-flops. As a signifier, his dark black skin, small frame, prominent cheekbones and inch-long nappy hair contribute a strong sense of authenticity. His costume, however, appears gimmicky, parodying the signified of his body’s authenticity. He also holds a 3+ foot long plastic spear that he usually clinches in both hands in a man-
ner that suggests that he is stalking prey, for instance. He stands behind a green tip bucket and next to a 2’x2.5’ plywood sign that he props up with a duffle bag. The barely legible sign reads “Comedian from Africa; my name is Bushman; will tell a joke; gratuities appreciated”.

Ashutu casts out to people with the first lines of jokes he has developed for his walkway performance. He calls out: “hey folks, I’m from the African Peace corps”; “my father used to deal elephants”; or, “over here you have Playboy, in Africa we have National Geographic”.

Like Bushman, many walkway players work to construct an appearance of “otherness” to gain excursionists’ attention and lure passersby over to them. Otherness helps “break through the blur” effect on passersby, and helps players differentiate themselves from excursionists, west side merchants, homeless people, and from one another. Commenting to me on a slow day, Bushman explains:

“You see, people walk along here, they go up and down and soon they don’t see any one person over here. It becomes a blur. Yes. These people over here become a blurry, ah, we blur together. I have to break through that blur. You see?”

Despite his constructive efforts, Bushman proves difficult for people to situate. The ambiguity of his Strand status and identity contributes to an array of excursionist reactions, from alarm and fear, to guarded curiosity, to forward inquisitiveness. Consider this reaction to Bushman’s emergence on the Strand earlier this year, related to me twice by Ashutu during separate casual conversations:

“One day, out of the blue, I’m doing my act, two police officers pull up over there and they come right up to me and talk to me. They said to me ‘someone called us up on our radio and said there was an African man yelling, and he’s going to harm himself or he’s going to hurt somebody’.”

As a new, inexperienced player to the area, Ashutu failed to effectively communicate that he intended to relate to walkway entrepreneurs, visitors, and neighboring residents as a street performer. In this instance, Bushman was not interpreted as a performer but rather as an authentic danger to himself and those around him.

Like other walkway Casters, Ashutu’s visual presentation of his character gains most excursionists’ attention if at least momentarily. His image and actions startle people at times, causing some to stumble and blanch.
A girl about 14 or 15 years old was walking south on the Strand with a friend on her left. She was looking back over her right shoulder as though searching for someone she knows. The two were about 15 feet from Ashutu when the girl turned her head back around and appeared as though she was going to say something to her friend. Her head turned past Ashutu and then quickly snapped back so that she was looking directly at him, her mouth slightly agape. Simultaneously she stumbled and lightly knocked into her friend. She smiled an alert smile and her and her friend’s eyes never left Ashutu as they passed.

Still other excursionists acknowledge Ashutu’s vocal casts as entreating, read him as approachable, and understand that he is seeking to construct an ephemeral relationship with them. The vast majority of verbal communication between Ashutu and such passersby begins with the latter asking questions like “what are you” and “what do you do?” These excursionists attribute a performer-like status to Ashutu and move to construct a momentary relationship with him, yet they remain uncertain about the relationship’s exact nature. The question “what do you do” indicates that they understand that he is standing there to “do something” and that he seeks their audience and, perhaps, a tip. The question also indicates, however, that Ashutu has failed to fully construct the situation and the relationship. These people still do not understand what Ashutu does, what or who he is, and exactly how to relate to him.

Consider a typical instance of interaction between Ashutu and excursionists:

Ashutu calls out across the walkway, “hey folks, I’m tryyyiing. At least I’m tryyiing.” A young woman who has been standing nearby with a friend takes a couple of steps toward Ashutu, shades her eyes with her hand, and asks him, “what do you do?”

Ashutu’s performance presents to curious onlookers an excuse for his appearance and actions; through it he offers a socially approved vocabulary for mitigating and relieving each parties’ responsibility to intuitively know how to interact in this situation in which his conduct is read as questionable and transgressive (Scott and Lyman 1968: 47). Here he casts out and the young woman reads his actions as a situationally reasonable entreaty. Through acknowledging and approaching him she indicates that she understands him as a legitimate type of west side entrepreneur. Her question, however, indicates that she is unable to fully situate him through his
posturing in relation to the Strand and to her. It suggests that she is unable to fully decipher how he intends to relate to her and how she should relate to him. The question, “what do you do’s” subtext is “what should I do?” It suggests: I see that you fit in here, but I am not sure exactly how. How do you fit in here, and how do I make sense of what you are doing? Give me more clues.

Ashutu replies “what do I do?” in an exaggerated tone that suggests he is joking that he cannot believe she does not know what he does.

Like other area Casters, Ashutu plays on this ambiguity, and affects his tone to suggest a mocking, playful kind of shock. He acknowledges the ambiguity, and uses the question to segue into performance. His tone suggests that her inability to fully decipher his performance reflects less on his technique than on her ignorance or naiveté. His response plays on deflecting the responsibility for the situation’s lack of clarity from him onto her. The joke is that he understands her uncertainty yet he pretends not to. His response indicates that he wants to play with her by inciting her to take, in a weak sense, a stand on the reasonableness of her limited confusion.

His show’s beginning:

He starts his reply, “I”, and then hesitates as though considering his answer. He starts again, but this time he opens his arms and leans toward a small group of people over the woman’s left shoulder: “so folks, the rest of you, if the rest of you want to know what I do here, I don’t do shit”. He speaks the last three words distinctly, with slight hesitations between each to lend each word emphasis. There’s light laughter. The young woman glances over her shoulder and backs up a pace.

Ashutu tries through this opportunity to construct what is, for him, as much of a structured show as he ever achieves. He works to transform nearby, momentary onlookers into a loose audience by suggesting that they might also have the same question as the young woman. He asserts through his supposition that they want to know the answer too and then immediately delivers the punch line, “I don’t do shit”. The group produces some laughter, indicating that they are receptive to Ashutu’s solicitation of their attention. The questioning young woman responds to their laughter by stepping back from Ashutu. She contributes to constructing a show by removing herself from the “stage” and assuming the position of an audience member in relation to the performer; she steps back into what
becomes a very loose semicircle of other observers and faces Ashutu from this short distance. Ashutu’s show has begun.

His show’s middle:

“I am just here standing here with this freakin’ spear.” He holds the spear up in one hand as though displaying it to himself and the others. “And people give me dollars. And they look at me, ‘what do you do?’ I don’t jump on fire. I don’t eat bark. I don’t spit fire out of my mouth. All I do is stand here and do nothing.” I alone laugh.

At its most general level, Ashutu’s show is an explanation creatively tailored to release him from tacit, discursively constitutive frameworks that suggest in all likelihood, given the social environment, he is a homeless crazy person or creative indigent (c.f. Snow et al. 1991: 433). He explains what he is and what he does through situating himself in relation to excursionists and other Strand performers. He states, “I am just... standing here with this freakin’ spear”. Ashutu minimizes his otherness through this statement by adopting his audience’s perspective. His statement suggests that he is like his audience in two ways. First, it conveys that he too realizes that “just standing here” does not constitute much of a show. Second, the statement narrows the symbolic distance between Ashutu and his audience by increasing the distance between him and his prop, the “freakin’ spear”. His emphasis on “freakin” –slang for “fucking”– juxtaposes himself to the spear, and indicates that even he sees it as weird and other –as freakish– which, by implication, normalizes Ashutu. The statement suggests that Ashutu is like his onlookers because he too is just standing there, in a way, much as they are just standing there. This statement signals to the audience both that Ashutu is able to see himself as they see him, and that he understands their confusion about his Strand identity.

Ashutu further situates himself in relation to this audience and the Strand more generally by introducing the fact that similarly perplexed excursionists tip him dollars to look at him. He introduces money as a medium of exchange and suggests that his role in their relationship is to stand there in his costume “and do nothing”. He further suggests to his audience that he is a performer by highlighting the differences between him and other Strand performers. Situating himself in relation to their acts —fire-walking, bark eating, and fire spitting— implicitly places himself in their genre of work. This is critical because these people do not know what to make of him or how to situate him. Through affiliating himself with
other performers with more easily recognizable statuses on the Strand, if even through difference, Ashutu distances himself from other possible associations and grouping, such as representing an enterprising homeless person.

“I ain’t doing shit!” he says in a high voice. Two people laugh and there are a few chuckles.

Ashutu repeats his punch-line with inflection.

Ashutu continues, “You are the, you guys are the ones looking at me, you guys are the ones standing here looking at me”.

Some passersby have stopped and others have slowed their pace in order to listen to him. A loose cluster of roughly 20 people, peppered throughout the area, has formed in his vicinity.

“I’m just standing here looking at you guys. You guys tripping on me, I’m tripping on you too”, his tone rises as his sentence tapers. “Can’t believe I’ve got my clothes off too. ‘And he’s from Africa’”, he says, acting like he is one of the onlookers. He continues, “‘hey this mother fucker must have some balls. That guy must have a lot of guts to come here’ and take my clothes off. I do have some balls. Little, but hey they’re good”. There is some light laughter. “Just a joke folks, just a joke. I don’t entertain; I want to be funny, alright? I’m trying to be funny okay?” A lady starts to take a bill out of her purse to put in his tip bucket. Ashutu continues, “This is the best I can do. I’m trying. I can’t please all you guys. You don’t know me, I’m just trying”. His tone rises as he raises and stretches his arms out, palms toward the sky. “I don’t know what you think is funny. I thought my clothes off was funny”, he says as he begins to laugh.

Ashutu again takes the audience’s perspective and attempts to reduce the symbolic distance that separates them. He demonstrates that he sees himself similar to the way they see him. He states matter-of-factly that they are tripping on him, which suggests that he knows concretely how they feel about him—that his image is quasi-hallucinatory or otherworldly. He further demonstrates that he shares their perspective by stating that he too cannot believe that he is standing there in this costume. He even begins to speak as though he was an audience member looking back on himself, referring to himself in the third person: “and he’s from Africa, hey this motherfucker must have some balls. That guy must have a lot of guts to come out here”. Through this third person self-commentary, Ashutu encourages audience members to put themselves in his shoes and appreci-
ate the “balls” and “guts” it takes to stand out in public in his costume. In this sense, Ashutu’s performance works through a combination of his costume creating an image of otherness and gaining passersby’s attention on the one hand, and his verbal material working to resituate and normalize him on the other.

In this way, Ashutu alternates between “role embracing” (Snow and Anderson 1987), avowing a street performer, “otherness” status on the one hand, and “role distancing” (Goffman 1961), by verbally working to normalize himself, on the other.

His show’s end:

Ashutu goes for another laugh telling a joke about having little balls and gets some light laughter. He ends this show explaining himself yet again, declaring that the balls comments were just jokes and that he is trying to be funny. He distances himself from appearing vulgar for the sheer sake of it. He offers an account for not being hilariously funny, stating that he does not know them or what they think is funny but that he tried his best to entertain them. He also states that “you don’t know me”, which suggests that he is trying to distance himself from how he appears before them and from the more off-color comments in his act. His statement “I’m just trying”, appears to bring back up the question of his Strand identity and status by begging the question of what he is trying at. Considering that he is difficult to make sense of on the Strand, it seems reasonable that the subtext of his “just trying” comment has more to do with just trying to make a living and stay off the streets than referring solely to trying to succeed at entertaining them. Of course the former is dependent on the latter.

Conclusion

Otherness is what makes each player a unique character in the area’s carnival-like atmosphere. However, while signs of unusualness and extraordinariness can advertise performer status and identity, too much otherness can disarm and alarm area visitors. Otherness is a double-edged sword, and players must situate their presentations somewhere between tweaking the familiar and expanding the boundaries of the outlandish. This study indicates symbolic interactionist approaches to interactions in public spaces will benefit to the extent they incorporate a robust accounting for the cultural and discursive structures that shape the interpretive frameworks (Butler 1997) through which strangers make sense of one another in passing.
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Structural Hermeneutics and the Possibility of a Cultural Science*

Isaac Reed

The epistemological questions that have to be answered by a truly cultural sociology are reopened via a critical reading of the Habermas-Gadamer debates. Gadamer’s critique of Dilthey move social study away from science and towards moral discussion of the interpretation of tradition, and the answer to his relativism came in the same form—Habermas’ universalism is, when it comes to hermeneutics, a fundamentally normative one. This shift has avoided questions of empirical or scientific validity in interpretation. Two themes in Dilthey’s work point in the direction of a theory of knowledge adequate to cultural sociology: First, the role of theory, and second, the concept of structure. These enable us to begin to think depth interpretation in a scientific and sociological way.

Almost all social science is confronted with the “problem of interpretation” in one form or another. When sociology takes culture as its subject-object, and thus overtly implicates meaning in its account of the social world, the hermeneutic imperative becomes even stronger, since the efficacy of explanation hinges directly on the compelling reconstruction of meanings in a valid way. Yet, short of a few shrug-of-the-shoulders references to the subjectivity of the interpreter and its frequent, if equally problematic, opposite the real world, it is hard to think this problem in a way that rigorously fits together theory, methodology, and epistemology with the empirical research goals of cultural sociologies. This is not entirely the fault of overly empiricist sociologists.

For, the manifold epistemologies that, manifestly or latently, inform contemporary social theory evidence two general tendencies or sensibili-
ties, neither of which speak directly or intelligibly to the concerns of interpretive sociology. For the debate, in social theory, between the move to the concrete (Gadamer, Rorty) and the recovery of universalist, or at least moral, confidence, by the turn to critique as the arbiter of interpretations, often takes the normative implications of the discourses of the humanities as its primary referents, thus leaving an entire generations worth of empirical, explanatory social science conducted along the lines of the cultural turn out in the epistemological cold. If the use of interpretive methods to reconstruct the culture structures that account for human actions qualifies as valid in some sense other than the normative, then the move, in what is now post-epistemology, from constructivism to an anti-science social science that recreates philosophy, social theory, and social research as a primarily normative qua critical discourse, can be seen as overly hasty; it is not necessary, in other words, to throw the reasonable problems of validity out with the pathological dogmas of positivism.

To regain the hermeneutic imperative in theory, as well as in practice, however, we must begin by tracing how it was lost. One way in which this happened was in the debate over “hermeneutics proper”, that is, the readings of Dilthey that held sway in the Habermas-Gadamer debates. If we can elucidate the moves, in these overlapping discourses, that led theory away from scientific hermeneutics and towards a debate that concerned the fate of humanism as a moral discourse, we should be able reopen the epistemological questions that have to be answered by a truly cultural sociology.

If we examine the relativist gauntlet thrown down for social science by Gadamer’s investigations in *Truth and Method* and Habermas’ response to Gadamer’s challenge with the original concerns of Dilthey in mind, we can construct an argument showing the need to reopen some of the key epistemological questions that have been taken off the table, and their relationship to an explicitly cultural sociology.

To begin with, we can take Dilthey’s epistemological work to concern three interrelated problems. First, the possibility of and conditions for a rigorous human science that is centered around social meaning—that is, the cultural historian’s response to the positivism of British empiricism. Second, the relation of individual lived experience (and also, of “historical individuals”, or the ideographic) to rigorous knowledge—both scientific and philosophic-reflective—that is, the resolution of an outstanding tension between *lebensphilosophie* and analytic social theory. Third, the problem of historical consciousness—that is the consequences for social thought of historically contingent limits of knowledge bequeathed and enforced by tradi-
tions and social circumstance, in other words the problem of relativism in the form of historicism.

Gadamer’s reading of Dilthey is fundamentally skeptical one that, in the end, rejects Dilthey’s attempts to lay the groundwork for social science with a “Critique of Historical Reason”. Gadamer reaches his infamous conclusion that we are unable to know culture except as we are thrown into it as lived tradition by exposing the ambiguities inherent in Dilthey’s hopes for the scope of “historical consciousness”. For, Gadamer argues, Dilthey’s faith in the ability of the historical investigator to understand another age, merely through the deciphering of texts, parallels all too closely the speculative Hegelian approach to knowledge that Dilthey, in grounding himself in empirical history, claimed to avoid (Gadamer 1989 [1960]: 228). In other words, how is it that without the grand speculative grasp of Geist as a teleological principle of history, the historian can reach across epochs to comprehend the historical other? In Gadamer’s reading, Dilthey’s confidence in the historian derives from a hidden Cartesian bias in his philosophy by which consciousness is, in principle, capable of infinite reflection and transcendence of empirical finitude. Gadamer supports this reading by arguing that the charge of relativism would not have haunted Dilthey so mercilessly if he had followed the precepts of life-philosophy in a rigorous and consistent matter, since in that case “relativism” would be just another “intellectualist” problem (Gadamer 1989 [1960]: 237).

In his reading, then, the deep tensions in Dilthey’s philosophy result from its inconsistencies, and its dedicated resolve to solve to a problem that, if looked at correctly, reveals itself as unsolvable: reconciling the goals of science with the study of “life”. Only a pathological mix of Cartesianism and romanticism could allow the culmination, for Dilthey, of enlightenment in historical enlightenment (Gadamer 1989 [1960]: 239).

The move, for Gadamer, is to a radical reconsideration of the role and goals of social study, as moral and practical discourse in the sense of Aristotle’s phronesis. To social scientists, of course, this rings of “relativism”, and, more to the point, robs interpretive theory of any scientific relevance in asserting for social thought a “different kind of truth”. It is a serious recasting of social science that renders illegitimate the empirico-analytic forms of explanation and theory-building that have been associated with both non-positivist and positivist sociologies alike. It is “Gadamer’s challenge” to social science.

Gadamer’s challenge was not, however, answered by an interpretive theory that takes as its goal the development of a cultural sociology.
Instead, it was answered by another political—if not epistemological—radical, whose sensibility concerning systems rationality in the modern world parallels in many ways Gadamer’s desire to separate truth from method. For Habermas, and his colleague Apel, answered Gadamer on the grounds established by Gadamer’s work, wherein hermeneutics is a medium of political communication and moral debate.

In broad strokes, this took place via a critique of “Hermeneutics’ Claim to Universality” (Habermas 1994) by which Habermas connected natural science, on the one hand, to the human interest in prediction and control of nature, and limited hermeneutics to the discussion of what constitutes the good life, construed as the interest in communication. Underpinning this would be Marxist social science, which would reveal the socio-economic structures which systematically distort communication.

As Marxism waned, a certain inversion of the debate took wherein Gadamer became less important, Habermas came to defend universal (if empirical) rationality, and various post-structuralisms took on the tone of critical theory and the mantra of “culture” in the form of “difference” for their own theoretical programs. But lost in the mix was the original imbus behind Dilthey’s social hermeneutics: a science of culture founded in hermeneutic understanding. How did this happen?

Habermas also reads Dilthey closely, and also pushes on certain ambiguities in his theory so as to force hermeneutics towards linguistic analysis of ordinary language. While he agrees, to begin with, that hermeneutics takes as its field of study the world of communication presupposed by the natural sciences (Habermas 1971: 140), he does not really extend this observation to its clear and necessary conclusion—that all fields of human action presuppose certain sets of background understandings, best understood as culture structures or “systems of interaction”, that have to be studied in an of themselves, as they sit behind everyday speech, action, and artifactual interpretation. Habermas reduces the observation that, in a broad sense, the hermeneutic interpreter (historian, anthropologist, cultural sociologist…) performs the same operations that the people she is studying perform in everyday life, to the observation that ordinary language is its own metalanguage (Habermas 1971:170-173). This has the advantage of freeing hermeneutics from its romantic, individualistic, and psychologistic impediments. But it also has the more strategically positioned advantage of detaching hermeneutics from the analysis of depth, which then requires him to turn to Freud to recover interpretation beyond the veneer of the everyday, to recover the “hermeneutics of suspicion”. This of course allows
the very same shift from scientific to normative hermeneutics that Gadamer accomplished by other means, since the Freudian imperative that the right interpretation is the one that heals the patient can, via Marxist critique, be reconstituted on the social level, so that the talking cure becomes, in sequence, ideology critique, the hypothetical reconstruction of the ideal speech situation, and finally, a normative theory of deliberative democracy.

The resulting complex of normative theory, deeply entwined with certain, very specific analytic and empirical commitments, relies upon the careful, simultaneous development of praxis and pragmatism, something I cannot address here. But the effect is clear for cultural sociology: the study of discourse as relatively autonomous structure that speech acts presuppose is peremptorily disbarred from theory and research, and thus the questions of scientific validity concerning the interpretation of cultures avoided. Normatively, of course, such a realm is indeed fearsome, since it is manifestly non-rational. Empirically, it is why so many of us are anthropologists and sociologists, rather than economists or political scientists.

It is this focus on the non-rational discursive context of action that leads us back to the science of the social that centers itself on meaning, and to Dilthey’s original purpose. Despite his struggles with the individualist and anti-analytic strands in romanticism, he arrived, in the end, at an account of how hermeneutics, in the hands of the social scientist, could take on several particular qualities that lend themselves to the construction of valid interpretations and compelling accounts of action, even though “fundamentally” the operation of understanding is the same for the social scientist as it is for all human agents. There are two central ideas that enable this measured differentiation of Geisteswissenschaften from normative debate, everyday life, and natural science. Both of these can be approached through Dilthey’s manifold discussions of the part-whole relationship.

First: theory. It is through the development of concepts, like “meaning, purpose, development and ideal” (Dilthey 1976: 235), and more generally, the development of abstract theoretical “wholes” or models of meaning that makes the hermeneutic circle a method, according to which the model, and the understanding of content, modify each other step-by-step in the process of reconstruction. Though as Dilthey writes, “the fact that we abstract these relationships [from life] as categories implies that we cannot delimit the number of these categories or formalize their relationship logically”, we can, in approaching meaning, outline the theory-in-development concerning the project at hand, and thus make explicit the rules of evi-
dence by which interpretations are arbitrated. Now, because in the \textit{Geisteswissenschaften} we have not only (1) competing scientific paradigms of interpretation but also (2) varying contexts of interpretation, varying ‘life contexts’, it may often seem that interpretations follow no method or no rules of evidence. But in fact, in each paradigm, the rules of evidence, though different, can be made explicit, even if there is no meta-paradigm by which they can be arbitrated. Likewise, each context, which supplies a vast amount of “data” to be interpreted, can, through the rigorous articulation of the comparative process already implicit in the hermeneutics of life, be delimited as a certain type based upon the meanings already implicit there. The interaction between these two aspects of the interpretative enterprise can, I hypothesize, delimit the number of possible interpretations rather than multiply them, at least if the specific goals of scientific accounting or explanation are also made clear.

Second, there is, in Dilthey, a move towards the concept of “structure” as a foundational concept for the study of meaning. It is through the idea of structures of meaning that we can develop from the observation of life’s regularities an account for conduct. The import structures for social science, for Dilthey, sound very much like those upon which cultural sociology, and to a certain extent, structural anthropology, focus. He writes,

\begin{quote}
Thus we learn to comprehend the mind constructed-world as a system of interactions or as an inter-relationship contained in its enduring creations. The system of interactions and its creations are the subject matter of the human studies. They analyze either that system of interactions or the logical, aesthetic or religious characteristic of a sub-system, or that of a constitution of a code (which points back to the system of interactions from which it originated). (Dilthey 1976: 196)
\end{quote}

In this investigation of systems and codes, social hermeneutics recovers the depth of interpretation on the level of collective structures of meaning. In other words, the work of interpretation by the hermeneutic investigator pushes beyond the immediate everyday meanings of speech and writing to investigate the subterranean discursive structures that inform and constrain meaningful action outside of the immediate consciousnesses of the actor. To say this in a quick and dirty way, their his a hidden social text after all, though we have to pay close attention to its observable manifestations to detect it.

This quotation points clearly to the fact that, in embracing understanding and the study of “life”, Dilthey had in mind neither a sheer trans-
position of the methods and specific goals of natural science to social science (something which Gadamer accused him of) or a redirecting of cultural studies into normative reflection, original interpretation, and the negotiation of tradition. Rather, he intended the development of specific set of procedures and sensibilities within social science, centered around the interpretation of meaning, which maintained in a broad sense the norms of science: attention to evidence, the development of theories in dialogue with (though not at the mercy of) empirical investigation, and a particular attention to collective structures or wholes within which particular texts, utterances, or actions, make sense via their relationship to the rest of the “system of interactions”.

Such a reading of Dilthey, against those of Habermas and Gadamer, can serve as one prolegomenon among many to the development of the epistemological commitments central to a cultural sociology. As such, it points specifically to three key questions such an epistemology has to answer

1) What are the standards of evidence in cultural sociology, and other approaches to social meaning?
2) To what extent are correct interpretations, which clearly “account” for action or “conduct” in some sense, actually scientific explanations of behavior.
3) What, given our move back to scientific hermeneutics, is the precise and delimited role of the moral imagination in social science?

WORKS CITED


On Television, and the Death of News
(and why I am not in mourning)*
Ronald N. Jacobs**

Abstract: This article examines television’s role in the contemporary public sphere. Because print journalism has been idealized in theoretical accounts of civil society, important facts about television and entertainment media have been obscured from view. Examining the historical and contemporary relationship between print and television, I make four central arguments: (1) that print culture has had important ideological effects on our idealized image of the public sphere; (2) that the hegemonic position of the "mainstream" newspaper has been effectively challenged by television, in a way that actually benefits the "quality press", properly understood; (3) that television has helped to create an important new "counter-factual public sphere" that is becoming increasingly powerful in American political culture; and (4) that television has greatly expanded the size and the inclusiveness of the mass audience, in a way that is generally beneficial for civil society.

Throughout all of my studies of mass media and civil society, I have always had the feeling that I was missing an important part of the story: television—and, in particular, television entertainment. As media critics bemoaned the creeping of entertainment values into the news, I could not help but wonder, given my own research on race and the media (Jacobs 2000), whether the news that was supposedly being lost was really worth saving. Furthermore, most criticisms of television seemed simply to assume that situation

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comedies, talk shows, legal dramas, and other forms of television entertain-
ment were mindless diversions, which distracted people from more serious
matters. What was missing in these criticisms was a more careful, balanced,
and empirically grounded account of the ways in which television entertain-
ment influences public sphere discussions. Certainly, it is easy enough to
complain about television. But I have become increasingly doubtful about
the degree to which these kinds of cheap criticisms really advance our
understanding of actually existing civil societies.

This article, then, is a polemic in defense of television and against its
critics. My main goals are (1) to provide an alternative argument about
television and democracy, (2) to challenge some of the assumptions about
newspapers and “serious journalism”, and (3) to identify important areas
where more empirical scholarship is needed. As will become apparent, I do
not really believe that news has died just yet. I do believe, however, that the
“death of news” trope has obscured from view important facts about televi-
sion and the public sphere. It has also submerged important features con-
cerning the historical relationship between the mass-circulation newspaper
and the “quality” press. And all of this has an important effect on the way
we think (or fail to think) about media and democracy.

Media and the public sphere

As Habermas and others have argued, one of the key events in the history
of democracy was the development of the modern public sphere—a com-
municative space in which private people came together as a public,
claimed the space of public discourse from state regulation, and demanded
that the state engage them in debate about matters of political legitimacy
and common concern. As an important part of this historical develop-
ment, mass media helped to organize these communicative spaces almost
from the very beginning. Print technology transformed the practice of peti-
tioning in the seventeenth century, allowing voluntary associations to cir-
cumvent elites and bring their issues directly to the public, in the form of
broadsides, pamphlets, and newspapers (Zaret 1998, 2000). The technolo-
gy of print was central to the public life of the English pub and coffee house
by the beginning of the eighteenth century; news articles and literary jour-

1 On democracy and the public sphere, see Habermas (1989), Cohen and Arato (1992),
nals were made the object of coffee house discussions, and the discussions in the coffee houses often resulted in letters that were published in the journals the following week (Habermas 1989: 42). Indeed, some scholars have argued that, without this interdependent relationship between print media and public gathering places, the ideal of a rational, debating public might never have been imagined.

As the political public sphere developed, mass media continued to be at the center of the battle for a more democratic, agonistic, and transparent political culture. In the early 1700s Bolingbroke developed a new practice of political opposition, whereby the opposition party sought to influence policy from outside of government, by mobilizing public opinion through political journalism (Cohen and Arato 1992: 658). By the early 1800s, journalists had secured an official place in the House of Parliament (Habermas 1989: 62). And mass media continue to be central to the public sphere today. In the pages of the newspaper and on the digital images of television, real individuals engage in description, discussion, and commentary about important public matters. In press conferences, politicians as well as representatives of voluntary associations make statements, challenge public statements that have been made by others, and respond to questions. On television programs like ABC News’s Nightline and CNN’s Larry King Live, media personalities, politicians, and other experts debate the meaning of current events. In all of these instances, mass media provide a forum for “private” individuals and representatives of the state to discuss matters of common concern, and broadcast these discussions to between ten and twenty million viewers (Jacobs 2000). Indeed, in a world increasingly

2 It may seem odd to refer to media personalities and experts as “private individuals”. What I have in mind here is Habermas’s understanding of the public sphere, as a communicative space where private individuals demand a public audience with representatives of the state, in order (1) to discuss matters of common concern and (2) to demand that the state justify its actions and public policies. In this sense, the media personalities and experts represent “the people” and “the public interest” against the potential abuses of political power. In other words, these media personalities act as symbols of the private individuals who appeared in the pubs and coffee houses of Habermas’s historical narrative. Nevertheless, I maintain that the symbolic role they play is a critical one in the contemporary public sphere, for two reasons. First, the political authorities who appear on these shows tend to orient to their media hosts as individuals who are objects of persuasion. This type of orientation produces a form of dialogue that the private viewer can treat metonymically, substituting her voice for the voice of the media host. And second, the media hosts are encouraged by their symbolic role to cultivate their own individual celebrity, and to maintain the appearance of independence. Indeed,
defined by large-scale social integration through markets, bureaucracies, and other indirect relationships, mass media may be the only communicative spaces in which a viable, coherent, and politically inclusive public life is still possible (Calhoun 1991; Keane 1995; Thompson 1995).

In addition to organizing many of the discursive spaces that constitute the political public sphere, mass media also shape civil society in other, more subtle ways. Among communication scholars, there is general agreement that the news is one of the most important sources of information that people use when talking about matters of common concern (Entman and Rojecki 2000; Gamson 1992; Neuman, Just and Crigler 1992). The research establishing this relationship has pointed to the ways in which the press provides a flow of cultural material from producers to audiences, who in turn use the media texts to construct a meaningful world and to maintain a common cultural framework through which intersubjectivity becomes possible. News media do not provide a one-way flow from text to putatively passive audience but, rather, a “two-step flow” where individuals incorporate news texts into their existing social networks and social environment (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; Mendelberg 1997). And while the press may not be successful in dictating what people think, it has been remarkably successful in shaping the kinds of topics people talk about (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Valentino 1999). Thus, whenever people gather together to discuss important public matters, there is a good chance that their conversation will already have been influenced—and indeed, enabled—by their involvement with news media.

While we know a lot about the relationship between civil society and news media, however, we know much less about the influence of fictional or entertainment media. This is surprising, given the importance Habermas attributed to the world of literature in the historical formation of the public sphere. And if anything, Habermas’s account under-emphasized the importance of music, sport, theater, and other entertainment-based cultural forms (Keane 1984; Eley 1992). These types of culture are certainly as important today as they were in the past, and, as Keane (1995: 18) has argued, there is little besides intellectual prejudice that explains their absence from contemporary accounts of civil society and public life.

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the worst thing that can happen to a media host of a political talk show is to be seen as part of a political movement or an advocacy group. When this appearance happens—for example, in CNN’s Crossfire or Fox News’s Hannity and Colmes—a second media host is inevitably present, in order to provide “balance”.
Indeed, while today’s largest American newspapers have a daily circulation just over one million, the most popular television dramas and situation comedies have audiences of between fifteen and thirty million. Blockbuster films regularly attract audiences well in excess of twenty million. Novels by authors such as John Grisham, Danielle Steele, Stephen King, and Mary Higgins Clark regularly sell more than one million copies. The audiences for these media are just as active as the audiences for news, using the fictional texts to talk about gender, class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, national identity, and a host of other important public matters. Thus, there is every reason to think that these fictional and entertainment media have their own agenda-setting influence on public sphere discussions. The pioneering study of the television show Dallas, by Liebes and Katz (1993), provides a good account of how this works—as does more recent work by cultural sociologists such as Lembo (2000), Long (2003), and Press and Cole (2000). It makes little sense, then, to ignore the relationship between entertainment media and the public sphere.

**News and entertainment: sources of distinction in the media field**

So, why is news privileged over entertainment in our discussions about civil society and the public sphere? I think a large part of the answer has to do with the organization of mass media as a cultural field, in Bourdieu’s (1985, 1990) sense. As a field, I would submit that the dominant principle of division that organizes mass media is the distinction between news and entertainment. Furthermore, insofar as the media field is linked to normative and evaluative claims about the public sphere, I would submit that the “rules of the game” have been tipped in favor of news—although I will suggest that this is changing.

Let us examine briefly the claims to distinction that get made from the news side of the media industry. For those engaged in the “profession” of journalism (and here there is already an important distinction made against those in the “entertainment business”)—journalistic authority comes from the putatively factual status of the accounts they provide to the public. This cultural significance of facticity helps to explain why news and editorial are formally separated in contemporary newspapers (Schudson 1978). It also helps to explain why the most serious sanctions in journalism are levied against those who commit the sin of fabrication.3 Finally, it helps

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3 Notable examples of journalists who have scandalized the profession in this manner
to explain the unease that so many journalists feel as entertainment values creep further and further into the news divisions of television stations and newspapers (Curran and Sparks 1992; Postman and Powers 1992). After all, as Barbie Zelizer (1992, 1998) has shown so convincingly, journalists claim to derive their legitimacy primarily from being eyewitnesses and chroniclers of history, not from telling good stories.

While it appears natural to us today, the distinction between factual news and fictional entertainment was actually an historical achievement. In the sixteenth century, the main defining characteristic of news was that it was new, a feature it shared with novels as a way of asserting a distinction against ancient stories and myths; the idea that news should be factual did not develop until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as journalists attempted to distinguish themselves from novelists (Davis 1983). By the nineteenth century, journalists—together with historians (see White 1978)—had successfully managed to identify truth with fact. As the opposite of truth, fiction came to be criticized as a trivial diversion that got in the way of a more sober, serious understanding of the world.

For their part, those working from within the fictional, entertainment-based genres have also oriented and positioned themselves with respect to the distinction between news and entertainment. Indeed, the creators of fiction and other forms of entertainment laid claim to their own special and distinctive role in civil society, by asserting that they did a more effective job capturing the emotion and the drama of real life. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, while news, history, and science were becoming linked to fact-based truth, “the arts” were increasingly coming to signify an alternative “imaginative” truth that offered a superior, transcendent reality to its audience (Williams 1958). Rather than trying to reflect actual worlds that were constrained by “mere facts”, those in the arts instead created compelling, cathartic, and emancipatory worlds that could mobilize people to change themselves and the world around them (Benjamin 1968; Alexander 2002). And these “possible worlds” of fictional media have had a tremendous world-historical significance. Indeed, to the extent that the nation has formed as an “imagined community”, it has relied just as much on literature, music, and film as it has on newspapers and history books (Anderson 1983; Smith 1979; Turner 1993).

include Patricia Smith (formerly of the Boston Globe), Stephen Glass (formerly of the New Republic), Janet Cooke (formerly of the Washington Post), and Jason Blair (formerly of the New York Times).
Fiction and entertainment have entered the “serious” world of news and politics in more indirect ways as well. For example, during ritual events such as crisis and coronation, news media make extensive use of the more elevated genres of fiction, such as romance, tragedy, and epic (Jacobs 2000; Smith 1994). During the more mundane and quotidian moments of public life, politicians and other speakers employ literary flourishes in order to enhance the rhetorical force of their statements, drawing on the art history, theater, literature, and other forms of cultural capital they learned in school. The same is true of journalists, many of whom have literary ambitions, and equate “good writing” with the literary canon. As Barthes (1953: 26-28) has argued, these journalists, politicians, and intellectuals remain unable to free themselves from literature, which confronts them as a cultural horizon commanding respect. In addition, as Alexander has argued, fictional media institutionalize the discourse of civil society into broad narratives, mythic characters, and exaggerated plots that enable readers to develop a better mastery of cultural structure and a greater subtlety of speech, precisely because they are “not real” (Alexander and Jacobs 1998). To ignore these fictional and entertainment media, then, is to miss a great deal of discursive effervescence and creativity in civil society.

Entertainment media and the decline of news: the standard interpretation

While civil society scholars should have been paying more attention to entertainment media from the very beginning, I want to suggest that ignoring them is a more serious problem now than it has ever been. The reason for this has to do with changes that have taken place in the media industry during the last twenty or thirty years. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the federal laws regulating the media industry were increasingly ignored, relaxed, or repealed (Aufderheide 1999; Croteau and Hoynes 2001). The result has been a substantial concentration of ownership, with the creation of huge media conglomerates, all motivated by the holy grail of multi-media synergy –key examples here would include AOL-Time Warner, ABC-Disney, CBS-Viacom, and Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation.

The consequence of these media mergers, for the journalism profession, has been the imposition of higher profit expectations. Indeed, where newspapers have historically operated with profit margins of 10-15%, many editors are now being told that rates of 25% are barely adequate, given that television is able to operate with consistent profits in the 30-50%
range. And the effects of these new expectations have been profound. I discuss some of the more significant effects, below:

1. In order to increase profits, newspapers have focused on reducing costs, by mainstreaming their operations and reducing the amount of duplication among papers owned by the same chain. This has meant that there are fewer journalists working in a smaller number of news bureaus, as newspaper chains concentrate on pooling their personnel resources (Bagdikian 2000). It has also meant a loss of local control, a reduction of local content, and, generally, a more homogenized product. The example that comes most readily to mind here is the Gannett Group, which in 2000 owned 76 daily newspapers, including *USA Today*, in addition to 21 television stations, an internet provider, and an electronic publishing company. But Gannett is by no means exceptional; other large and influential newspaper groups include Hearst Newspapers, Knight-Ridder, the New York Times Company, and the Tribune Company. And all of these groups, I should add, have substantial multi-media holdings.

2. The second thing that has happened is that, as newspapers become swallowed up by multi-media conglomerates, they experience a strong pressure to increase the size of their audience, by publishing papers that bear a closer resemblance to the product one might see on television news. Again, the Gannett Group provides the best example of what this looks like, with its flagship paper *USA Today*. Ironically, though, the effect of this pressure is to weaken the newspaper industry, by diluting its historical differences from television and forcing it onto a terrain where it is unlikely to win. Bourdieu’s (2000) analysis is very insightful on this point, and I think it can extend beyond his French case to serve as a general description of some of the forces shaping the contemporary journalistic field.

3. Along similar lines, for television news, there is a strong pressure to increase audience size by producing broadcasts that more closely resemble the products one might see on entertainment programs (Croteau and Hoynes 2001: 157-164; Glynn 2000). So far, daytime talk shows have probably been the most influential entertainment genres. So CNN programs such as Larry King Live and Talk Back Live borrow from the Oprah Winfrey model, while programs such as CNN’s Crossfire or Fox News’s Hannity and Colmes borrow more from the Jerry Springer formula. And it is only a matter of time before the new “reali-
ty TV” genre begins to make its influence felt. Indeed, audiences got a glimpse of this during the recent American invasion of Iraq, with the decision by news organizations to “embed” their reporters among the American troops.

Described in this way, which I think is pretty consistent with the standard tragic narrative about the triumph of entertainment over serious news, the situation appears rather bleak indeed. The so-called quality press finds it increasingly difficult to produce a quality product, squeezed as it is by management’s pressures to streamline its operation, to avoid duplication, and to produce ever-higher profit margins that are set not by the historical standards of the newspaper industry, but, rather, by television. At the same time, serious television news finds itself crowded out by new formats, in which journalists are replaced by pundits, who scream at each other in a staged display designed to reproduce an effect of spectacle. This is not news as public information; it is news as performance. And, as Bourdieu (2000: 28-30) argues, it rewards “fast-thinkers” who transmit predigested and pre-thought cliches, rather than nuanced ideas that are the product of deep reflection and consideration.

I do not wish to challenge this interpretation, because I find it to be compelling, for what it is: a description of the field of journalism. But I do not think that this is all that needs to be said on the matter. For one thing, it tends to romanticize what journalism used to be like. It is unreasonable to compare television’s “fast-thinking” with Plato’s ideas about philosophical reflection or with Descartes’s arguments about scientific demonstration, as Bourdieu does in his book on television; certainly, these kinds of comparisons tell us little about how journalism has changed. And Bourdieu is by no means alone in making these kinds of unfair comparisons; as Calhoun (1992) has pointed out, Habermas does the same kind of thing in his evaluation of the modern public sphere and its putative transformation. The problem with these kinds of criticisms is that they take as their sole interest the effect that entertainment media have on the news. They assume that entertainment media influence the public sphere only indirectly, by ruining journalism. But they never really consider the possibility that there is a more direct relationship between entertainment media and civil society; and, as a result, they are forced to ignore or dismiss most of what is actually on TV.

So what I want to do in the remainder of this article is to make some alternative suggestions about television and the public sphere. Two of my arguments are primarily about news, and two of them deal more with
entertainment. All four arguments point to areas where more careful empirical scholarship is sorely needed.

**Argument #1: print’s ideological effect on the public sphere**

My first argument is that the triumph of television over print has helped to unmask some of the most troubling ideologies that have shaped the modern public sphere. This is an argument about the material forms of cultural transmission, and their ideological effects. There are many other ideological biases which have coursed through the modern newspaper during the last 150 years, which have tended to reproduce race, class, and gender privileges, and which have generally tended to reinforce the status quo. But I want to focus on how the technology of print has influenced the dominant image of the public sphere ideal. As Michael Warner (1990, 1993) has pointed out in this regard, the normative development of the “people’s public use of their reason” bears the distinctive mark of print technology. The idea that political actions should be supervised in civil society by the practice of criticism and according to standards of disinterested public virtue implied the existence of an impersonal mass audience, put into place precisely by the anonymity of print technology (Lee 1992: 409-411; Warner 1993: 34-35). In newspapers, pamphlets, and literary journals, individuals developed the techniques of reasoned argumentation to a mass audience; they also established the expectation that their autonomy and their citizenship was to be pursued primarily through the practices of reading and publishing.

If print technology helped to constitute the anonymous, rational citizen as the agent of democracy, however, it also helped to establish a hierarchy of citizenship and a firm basis for exclusion. The ideal of a disembodied, rational public debating matters of common concern already presupposed an intellectual mode of communication constituted through writing, and opposed to the communicative modes of riot, revelry, and music that were more characteristic of plebeian culture (Eley 1992: 326-330; Negt and Kluge 1990). In this respect, print privileged the agency of a rather narrow intellectual and political elite, who discussed the public good among themselves while limiting their contact with the masses to words on a page (Debray 1996; Pfeiffer 1994). The “civilized man” knew how to write, and took upon himself the responsibility of representing those who could not write for themselves. Indeed, in this respect, as Henry Louis Gates (1985) has argued, the cultural importance of the nineteenth-centu-
ry slave narratives was the way they demonstrated the African-American capacity for writing, for self-representation, and, hence, for citizenship.

With television, however, the ideal of the disembodied, anonymous critic is becoming an anachronism. Today, we know what our journalists, politicians, and commentators look like, because we see them regularly on television. Indeed, the victory of the embodied over the disembodied critic has been carried over into print itself, where newspapers rely increasingly on color photographs to establish the identity (and hence, the authority) of public speakers, and where newspaper columnists augment their authoritative standing by appearing on television news talk shows. Habermas and Bourdieu complain about these developments, arguing that television has distorted the deliberative function of the public sphere by turning public debate into a stylized, staged display. Warner (1992), on the other hand, argues that the rise of television has had a more progressive effect; by uncovering the white, male, heterosexual body of the putatively disembodied public subject, it provides motivation and symbolic ammunition for identity politics movements. To the extent that Warner is correct, and the tele-visual public sphere is enacted largely through visible subjects and embodied performances, then I would argue that this represents a real advance over the invisible subjects and the disembodied performances of the print-mediated public sphere. Of course, it goes without saying that the embodied performance comes with problems and biases of its own. But a more balanced account of media and democracy should pinpoint precisely what these problems are, and should compare them with the old biases of print culture. The result would be a historical sociology of public voice and public visibility, which would contribute immeasurably to current debates about hegemony and the public sphere.

**Argument #2: segmented markets and the “quality press”**

My second argument is that the recent growth and transformation of television news has the potential to push newspapers toward a segmented market model, which might actually improve the quality press. Some historical context will prove useful here. In the United States, the newspaper industry became commercially successful roughly during the period 1860-1910 -- by emphasizing information over opinion, impartiality over political partisanship, and a diversification of story types to include all aspects of everyday life, instead of just politics. In response to this development, and as a way of providing a more “enlightened” alternative to the mass-circulation
newspaper, journals of opinion and serious analysis also began to appear during this period: notable examples include Atlantic Monthly (1857), The Nation (1865), The Crisis (1910), and New Republic (1914). These journals were all reasonably successful, and three of them still have a significant audience today. But they have not exerted much influence on journalism, which has been dominated by the model of the general-interest, nonpartisan paper written for a mass audience. Indeed, with the creation Time Magazine (1923), followed shortly thereafter by Newsweek (1933) and US News and World Report (1948), even the market for news magazines became dominated by the model of the general interest publication. My point here is that we cannot really blame television for the invisibility of serious journalism, since that process was set into motion with the very invention of the modern newspaper.

So, the growth of the modern newspaper has eroded the visibility and the market for “serious journalism”. But what of television news? The interesting thing about television is that it is such a late entrant as a serious competitor in the field of journalism. From its inception, television was organized and conceived as an entertainment-based industry, focusing on dramas, music, comedies, and games. News was an afterthought, provided as a public service, but limited to fifteen minutes every evening. CBS was the first to increase its evening news broadcast to thirty minutes, in 1963. NBC followed suit later in the year, but ABC waited until 1967 to adopt the 30-minute format. It was not really until the mid- to late-1970s that television began to think about news as a potentially-successful genre: first with the success of CBS’s 60 Minutes, then with the creation of ABC’s Nightline during the Iranian hostage crisis; and finally with the creation of CNN in 1980. Because the full effect of these changes only began to felt by the newspaper industry during the mid- to late-1990s, it is probably too early to know exactly how things will develop. We can get some clues, though, by looking at the magazine market, which felt the effects of television at least twenty years earlier than newspapers. In the first half of the twentieth century, there was a lot of room in the world of entertainment media for general-interest magazines targeted to a mass audience. Magazines such as Life, Look, and the Saturday Evening Post flourished, consistently attracting an audience numbering in the millions. But television took away most of this audience during the 1950s and 1960s; in fact, all three of these magazines folded between 1969 and 1972 (Croteau and Hoynes 2001). In response, the magazine industry became a more segmented market. On the one hand, there still was room for general-interest magazines that took as their
subject matter the world of television entertainment—an important example here would be *TV Guide* (1953) and *People Magazine* (1974). But the rest of the industry moved toward more specialized, particular-interest publications designed for a specific market segment—examples here would include publications such as *Wine Spectator, Runner’s World,* or *Field and Stream,* in addition to countless others.

What would a more segmented market look like in the news business? On the one hand, the big general-interest newspapers—the flagship brands of the big chains—would look more and more like the television product, with shorter stories, with fewer stories on the front page, and with greater attention paid to the entertainment and lifestyle sections of their paper. They would probably also spend a lot of time working on the layout of their websites, displaying just a few stories, which are continuously updated with new items of instant news—just like TV. In fact, these changes are already taking place. On the other hand, I think there could also be significant growth potential in this scenario for specialized, particular-interest news publications—including journals of opinion and serious analysis. Indeed, we are already beginning to see some of this growth; the *Atlantic Monthly,* which was nearly shut down in the early 1970s, saw its circulation increase by more than 30% during the 1980s, and it currently has a monthly readership approaching 500,000. The *New Republic* and *The Nation* each have a circulation in excess of 100,000. In fact, *The Nation* is probably in a stronger financial condition now than at any time in its history. Personally, I find the quality of journalism in these publications far superior to what I read in the *New York Times.* I often suspect that if I canceled my subscription to the *New York Times,* replaced it with a morning and evening scan of the CNN and the *New York Times* websites, and added subscriptions to an additional two or three specialized journals of opinion, that I would have gained a lot more than I would have lost. And while I certainly would not want to generalize from my own personal reading habits, I think it is reasonable to suggest that if a sizable number of people made this kind of choice, the result could be the flowering of a new, more “serious” journalism. I recognize that this is a tenuous argument, and that forecasting the future is always risky business; but I think it is worth considering the possibility, in any event. At the very least, media scholars need to broaden their understanding of the “quality press”, and to incorporate this broader understanding in their empirical investigations. Serious journalism does not begin and end with the *New York Times.*
Argument #3: television entertainment and the rise of a counterfactual public sphere

My third argument takes the blurring of news and entertainment, but considers it from the side of entertainment. In the near future I will be undertaking a more thorough content analysis of television entertainment, but for now my comments are drawn from a preliminary investigation of the prime-time schedule from 1950 to the present. A brief overview of this history: During the 1950s, evening television entertainment consisted primarily of game shows, variety shows, and live television theater. Domestic sitcoms and Westerns started to appear during the late-1950s, and became increasingly popular throughout the 1960s. Legal, Police, Detective, and Medical dramas became more popular in the 1970s, though each genre had an earlier exemplar that served as a model for the formula. The interesting thing about this early history, though, is the fact that the worlds of news and politics were almost completely ignored as appropriate settings for television entertainment. “Mr. Smith Goes to Washington” was introduced on ABC in 1962, but it was a complete failure and was pulled after only one season. The only exception was the Mary Tyler Moore Show, which was a standard domestic sitcom that happened to be set at a local television news station, and it barely dealt with the world of news media, at least until its final episode in 1977.

Toward the late-1970s and 1980s, however, the “serious” world of news and politics became increasingly present in the fictional worlds of prime-time television. The idea that entertainment programs could deal successfully and popularly with “serious” issues of the day had been demonstrated with the runaway success of “All in the Family”, which was the most popular show on television from 1971-1976. Set in a working-class neighborhood of Queens, the dramatic tension of the show was built around political and cultural conflict: on one side was the conservative and bigoted Archie Bunker, a dock foreman for the Pendergrast Tool and Die Company; on the other side was his “egghead” liberal son-in-law, Mike Stivic, an unemployed Polish-American studying for a degree in sociology. The critical consensus about this show is that it changed what was possible in television comedy. I would argue that it did so by presenting a “counterfactual public sphere”, in which fictional individuals gathered together to

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4 In my historical research on television entertainment I have relied on two excellent references: McNeil (1996), and Brooks and Marsh (1999).
discuss matters of politics and common concern. And ever since that moment, the “real” and the “fictional” public spheres have been in an ever-closer and more complicated dialogue.

Indeed, since the late-1970s we can see the growing presence of this counterfactual public sphere in the prime-time lineup. I could point to dozens of examples, but I want to mention a few cases that I find particularly interesting:

“Murphy Brown”, a comedy set in a Washington, DC television news station, which ran between 1988-1998
“West Wing”, a dramatic series set in the White House, which has been broadcast since 1999

One of the interesting things about these programs, besides the fact that they all have won multiple Emmy awards, is that their fictional television characters have had a powerful presence in the “real” political public sphere. In the early 1980s, it was common for news stories about media ethics to wonder “what Lou Grant would do”. In the early 1990s, debates about family values and single mothers were carried out in large part as a debate between Vice President Dan Quayle and Murphy Brown. And during the 2000 election, opinion polls compared the favorability ratings of the presidential candidates with those of Jed Bartlett, the fictional president of the “West Wing”, who apparently would have won the election in a landslide. These are only meant as illustrative examples for an argument that, obviously, requires a lot more empirical research. But my suspicion is that this “counter-factual” public sphere I am describing has had a profound impact on public debate, which could never be duplicated in the world of news media. And the impact is only likely to increase, as we move ever further toward a fully postmodern political culture.

**Argument #4: television, entertainment and the growth of the mass audience**

This brings me to my fourth and final argument, which has to do with the issue of civic inclusion. As I suggested earlier, one of the most important contributions of mass media has been the circulation of a common flow of cultural material, which provides the intersubjective infrastructure that supports the public sphere. I have also argued that mass media were largely
responsible for producing the abstract, idealized image of the mass audience, which in turn has contributed to the creation of more universalistic idioms of citizenship. Importantly, though, while the image of the mass audience was initially mediated through print technology, its practical realization has come much more effectively from television. Thus, the rise of television has been generally beneficial for civil society. Television news, by adopting more entertaining formats, has increased the audience for politics. Television entertainment, by creating a counter-factual public sphere, has helped to engage its audience’s identity as citizens. To the extent that this tele-visual public sphere engages people, then they are more likely to participate in discussions about matters of common concern; they may even become motivated to seek out additional information, from various sources. In other words, television is an important resource for (re)producing civic engagement.

This argument is in direct conflict with Putnam (2000), who identified a convenient conjuncture between the rise of television and declining rates of membership in voluntary associations. Indeed, Putnam (2000: 283) estimates that television accounts for about 25 percent of the decline in membership rates. But Putnam never considers the possibility that the turn to television is related to the fact that so many associations are too demanding, too narrow-minded, too parochial, too segregated, and too exclusive. In contrast, members of the television audience do not have to come from the “right” kinds of families. They do not have to participate in arcane initiation rituals. They do not have to organize their lives (and the lives of their families) around a series of mandatory meetings and conferences. In short, participation in the world of television is more inclusive than participation in the world of civic associations, while coming at a substantially lower cost. And lowering the cost of participation is precisely what is needed, according to Fiorina (1999), in order to recover civil society from the polarizing voices of extremists. The central question, it seems to me, is what people do with their television participation, and how they connect

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5 Norris (2000) provides some evidence for this point, at least for the case of television news.

6 It is worth pointing out that Putnam does not actually measure civic engagement, but simply allows association membership to stand in for civic engagement.

television to their other civic practices. This is an empirical question, which has not been given enough scholarly attention. And it is not a question that can be answered in advance, with cultural criticism.

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Constructing Culture: Women Patrons and the Concert Halls of Los Angeles
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Abstract: Architecture is more than a neutral shell surrounding the cultural practices of its inhabitants; by structuring space, it reflects and reinforces rituals. The concert hall therefore lends itself to interpretation through cultural analysis. This paper also investigates the role women patrons have played in the construction of public concert halls in the second half of the twentieth century. Through “cultural work” —voluntary labour promoting high culture—elite women were able to enter the public sphere and contribute to the cultural welfare and built environment of the city. Two empirical examples from Los Angeles are explored in depth: Dorothy Chandler and the Pavilion at the Music Center that bears her name, as well as Lillian Disney and the Walt Disney Concert Hall. The gendered geography of the bourgeois public sphere, the historical legacy of the concert hall, and the discourse of high art as public good provide the frameworks through which each building is considered.

Like the museum, the public library, and other icons of bourgeois kultur and cultivation (Elias 1978), the purpose-built concert hall is an invention of the late eighteenth century. The period of the industrial revolution witnessed a radical transformation in musical practice. Previously, music was tied to either church or state; the composer in these realms was a sort of musical servant, composing music regularly for specific occasions, like masses or coronations. Music was, in this sense, “functional”; its purpose was to express, amplify, and enhance the ceremony in question, whether it be the worship of God, or the symbolic representation of political power and cultural superiority. Of course there was music amongst the lower-classes outside of church and court settings, but here too it was predominantly “functional”. It accompanied the dance, organised the rhythm of manual labour, served as historical record, or provided background entertainment at the tavern. In all of these cases, however, music was performed
in buildings designed for other purposes, and its occurrence did not call for any special modification in the behaviours of listeners.

The idea of a “functionless” music was introduced in the late eighteenth century when composers began to free themselves from their ancient patrons by composing music for a new sort of occasion—the public concert—and a new patron—the middle class. As Norbert Elias explains, “the development of the musical concert clearly happened in three stages: concerts for an invited audience, then by subscription and finally for an unknown paying public. At Mozart’s time the last stage had not been reached, at least in Vienna”. (Elias 1993[1991]) Indeed, according to William Weber (1975), the modern concert as we know it did not establish itself firmly until 1850. At this event, members of the bourgeois public would pay the price of admission to sit amongst strangers for the sole purpose of listening to music. This sort of gathering was truly unprecedented, and it was not long before structures were erected that were exclusively devoted to the purpose of housing these new “public” events. In addition to further establishing the autonomy of music, the invention of this social occasion also commodified music; it carved an existence for music outside the realm of the aristocracy and the church, but necessarily exposed it to the whims of the market and public criticism (cf. Habermas 1962[1989]). The success of the bourgeois musical revolution should not be underestimated. Despite the historical distance, the bourgeois musical ensemble par excellence—the symphony—is still considered a vital part of a city’s cultural life, and the repertoire of the bourgeois era—works written between 1750 to 1918 in sonata form—remain highly treasured and regularly performed. And the structure in which that ensemble performs, the concert hall, has become so commonplace that we have come to take it for granted. Where else would a professional symphony perform its regular season?

But what is the meaning of the concert hall? What assumptions about the social practice of music can be interpreted from the organisation of space inside its walls? How is this structure related to broader cultural changes taking place in society during its emergence? To what extent has the design evolved? These questions will be explored in the following section. I will then turn to two case studies in order to trace the long and complicated process leading to the construction of a particular concert hall, and identify the role of the female patron in this process.
Structuring space in the concert hall

While elements of classical architecture are commonly used, the concert hall more strongly resembles Christian religious spaces, not only in the organisation of space, but in the structure of the ritual performed as well. (See Figure 1, below.) Like cathedrals, concert halls are distinguished by a grand entrance, often with columns, to emphasise the building’s importance. A grand staircase, either leading up to the building or immediately inside, literally and symbolically elevates the activity that takes place in the structure. The public entrance does not, however, lead directly to the most important space; one does not open a door and find oneself in the performance hall or the place of worship. Instead, there is a transitional space, the lobby or antechapel, that acts as a buffer between the mundane outside world and the sacred space. As Durkheim (1995[1912]) described in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, every religious belief system maintains a gulf between the sacred and profane, not only spatially, but also through action in the performance of rites and prohibitions. In the case of the concert hall, the entire building is usually set apart from neighbouring build-

**FIGURE 1:**
The spatial organization of the modern concert hall
ings, either in being situated alone on a prominent hill or through the construction of a plaza, often decorated with landscaping and sometimes accented with a fountain. But there is also a liminal space within the boundaries of the structure itself. It is in the reception area that members of the public, already appropriately dressed for the heightened occasion, engage in the rites that separate them from the mundane world and grant them access to the sacred performing space: buying tickets, removing coats, and being granted access by the final gatekeeper, the usher.

The diagram shows the symmetry of this spatial arrangement; the stages of the public’s entrance are carried out in parallel by the performers from the other side of the building, with some differences. Using a less distinguished entrance that is unseen to the public, they too pass through a liminal space, the backstage, where they engage in their own rites and prohibitions in preparation for the performance. At the heart of the structure is performance space itself, which is kept apart from the outside world both acoustically and visually; there are no windows that let in the light of day, and the sound of traffic or passers-by is entirely blocked out. Like the traditional church, the seats in the concert hall are arranged so that all members of the public face in the direction of the stage, thus emphasising the importance of the activity taking place on the raised platform by restricting the gaze to this direction only.1 (See Figure 1.)

The concert ritual also resembles the church in the entrance order of ritual participants into the sacred (performance) space. Each successive entrant is more important, leading up to the central figure of the ceremony. In the church, the congregation enters first, followed by the altar boys, the lower clergy, and then finally the priest. While in the concert hall, the audience enters first, followed by the orchestral musicians, the concert master, and then finally the conductor. Each entrance demands an increasing degree of attention from the audience, signalling in stages that the core of the ritual is about to begin. And again, there is a symmetry. At the conclusion of the ceremony, the exit order is exactly the same, but in reverse.

The other principle ordering space in the concert hall is the barrier separating the public from the performers. (See Figure 2) The early church employed a screen to divide the congregation from the clergy. The 19th-

1 Indeed, the seats in early concert halls were benches much like pews. It has been remarked that the turn toward individual seating underlines the transition to the musical experience being an intensely personal and individual one.
century concert hall, however, adopted the convention of the theatre, the proscenium arch, to create the same effect, although without the use of the curtain. This is in marked contrast to the spatial arrangement of musical performance in the court, the salon, and the bourgeois home where there was no raised platform and the audience surrounded the musicians. Many twentieth-century concert halls abandoned the arch, but the spatial separation between audience and performers remains. The physical separation is respected in interaction as well. Not only do the musicians enter the building from a separate entrance; even as they occupy the stage before the conductor enters the stage, they carry on as though unaware of the audience’s presence. Indeed, orchestral musicians are trained never to look at the audience, before, during, or after the performance. Audience members also respect this boundary, never crossing it during performance. Only a few members of the audience venture backstage after the performance, usually if they have some personal connection to some of the performers, and if they know the way; the passage to “the other side” is generally architecturally obscured from the public.

This “shoebox” design concert hall has obviously proven to be effective both in terms of acoustics and ritual. Thousands of concert halls have been built around the world according to this model, and it is interesting to note that most of them have been constructed since World War II. But while the musical practice and the design of the concert hall may have
changed little over time, its status has been transformed. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the concert hall, along with the museum and public library, became both product and process of a city’s coming of age, symbolising the transition from growing township to a thriving modern city. Over the last fifty years, they have evolved from icons of progress and modernity to icons of a city’s character and vibrant cultural scene. Now that every major urban centre has a symphony, a ballet company, a theatre, a museum and an art gallery, it is the shape of these public buildings, and their placement in the city landscape, that have become hallmarks of the city’s individuality. The architecture of the performing arts centre can even become a symbol of the city itself, as it has in Sydney, Australia. No longer simply a building to house artistic practice, cultural institutions are now expected to be tourist attractions, providing a global profile for the city and bringing in tourist dollars, as Frank Gehry accomplished with the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao.

The great irony, of course, is that these public institutions, purportedly open and accessible to all, have rarely lived up to these ideals in practice. This is only a symptom of a more fundamental contradiction at the heart of the bourgeois public sphere. According to Habermas (1962:39-40), once music became freed from the service of social representation, it became a subject of discussion and a question of “taste”. In the bourgeois public sphere, any layperson had the right to judge a musical work, and their opinion would be evaluated according to the strength of their argument. Commodified art thus became the subject of public conversation and criticism. But as Mary Ryan, Joan Landes, and Nancy Fraser have argued, the bourgeois public sphere did not live up to its own ideals of universalism and accessibility, but was exclusionary on the basis of class, race, and gender. This was as much the case in art as it was in politics. Historically, the symphony orchestra was an ensemble of male professional musicians, conducted by a man, performing music written by a man. The performance would be critiqued by a man in the newspaper owned by a man, and this review would then be discussed in the coffee shops from which women were barred. As Joan Landes has argued, it is hardly a coincidence that these institutions were the territory of men because the bourgeois public is inherently and necessarily masculinist; “central categories of bourgeois thought—universal reason, law, and nature— are embedded in ideologically sanctioned order of gender differences and public-private spheres which [ground] the institutional and cultural geography of the new public sphere”. (1988:11)
As in other spheres of social life, the institutionalisation of music was achieved through specialisation and professionalisation, producing the predictable division between public (male) and domestic (female) musical spheres. Musical performance became more than a craft practised by all in varying degrees of ability; it evolved into a secular vocation that demanded training and accreditation. Women continued to play a vital part in musical life, but in roles that were hidden from public view; they were the amateurs who played well enough to entertain guests in the home, provide elementary instruction to the children, and appreciate music performed in the concert hall. As the lives of Nannerl Mozart, Fanny Mendelssohn, Clara Schumann, and Alma Mahler illustrate, it was simply not proper for women to become a public musical voice, whether as performer or composer, no matter how talented. Opera singers were the rare exception to the ban of women at the altar of high art.

This is not to suggest, however, that the art music repertoire is inherently misogynist or that the music profession is hopelessly masculinist. As Alexander has shown (forthcoming), the civil sphere and its institutions can be expanded through the re-coding of previously-excluded groups. The all-male orchestra used to be the norm but is now the exception; even the Vienna Philharmonic, the last bastion of chauvinism, appointed its first female musician this year. But there is still ample room for improvement. While women are more frequently occupying the more sacred roles of composer and conductor, they remain the exception and have yet to receive the fame and recognition of their male colleagues.

**Patronage: a public role for women**

There is another role that women have often occupied in the history of music: the patron. While the patrons of composers and musicians are well-known figures in the music world (cf. DeNora 1995), it is a more unusual patron – that of the concert hall – that I would like to investigate. As Daphne Spain (2001) has argued, women are rarely included as active agents in the construction of a city, mainly because they have rarely been allowed to occupy the positions that feature prominently in architectural and urban histories. Suspecting that women had played a central role that had simply gone unnoticed, Spain began a “scavenger hunt” for women’s contributions to the American urban landscape. She found that women had indeed created avenues for participation in the shaping the public sphere; through volunteer work, women had contributed both to the social
welfare and the built environment of the city. Following Spain’s example, I would like to bring to light two women who were active agents in shaping the urban and cultural landscape of downtown Los Angeles in the second half of the twentieth century: Dorothy Buffum Chandler and Lillian Bounds Disney. While neither of these women were architects or urban planners, it is nevertheless true that major civic landmarks in the core of the city exist only because of their volunteer fundraising work and philanthropic contributions.

As Spain and other feminist scholars have repeatedly found, the impact that women have had on society in the 20th century has tended to be undervalued, whether it be domestic labour done in the home or volunteer labour done outside the home. But even feminist scholarship has tended to marginalise or even ignore “cultural work”, that is, voluntary labour undertaken to promote the arts in society. (Locke and Barr 1997) There are many reasons why cultural work continues to be undervalued or misrepresented. Firstly, it has been tainted by its association with the upper-class and elitism; in sociological circles, the work of Dimaggio, Bourdieu, and others, has effectively reduced high culture to calculated status-accumulation by the rich. Secondly, the sort of work undertaken by cultural activists and patrons does not conform to feminist ideals of professionalism; cultural workers were rarely creators of the art forms they promoted, and the finances they used to support the arts were obtained not through their own efforts but through inheritance or marriage. And finally, even notions of social justice have become overpowered by the dominant utilitarian philosophy that reduces aesthetics to mere luxuries that are not essential to the quality of life; a contribution to a museum or symphony orchestra is no longer seen as a public service as important and equal to contributions to soup kitchens and children’s hospitals. But to dismiss cultural work is to fail to recognise one of the major avenues that women have created in order to participate in public life, and to ignore the contribution of aesthetics to the quality of life.

In the case of Lillian Disney and Dorothy Chandler, the impact of these two women has been further obscured due to their connection with powerful and wealthy husbands. Dorothy’s husband was Norman Chandler, son of the publisher of the Los Angeles Times. I believe it is safe to assume the reader is familiar with Lillian Disney’s husband, Walt. In the biographies and public documents on these men, there are only fragments and glimpses of their wives. The challenge for the scholar is to look past their famous husbands, add up the available fragments, and find the strong women who
struggled to find a way to step out into the public and to put their mark on the cultural and urban landscape.

The Dorothy Chandler Pavilion

The idea of building an opera house in the downtown Bunker Hill area had been circulating amongst Los Angeles elite since the 1930’s. It was part of an initiative to “revive” the old Victorian district of Bunker Hill, believed to have decayed as a result of suburb development. The business elites strongly believed that the downtown needed an opera house and a convention centre to regain its previous status. The public, however, was not convinced. The idea was proposed in local elections three times, but failed ever to gain the necessary majority, even when a sports arena was added to sweeten the proposal. It was at this point that Dorothy Chandler took matters into her own hands. Abandoning the convention centre and sports arena, she focussed solely on a building for the performing arts. She shared the prevailing view within Los Angeles elites that the city was growing both economically and in its population, but its cultural development had failed to keep pace. It was an embarrassment that Los Angeles audiences had to depend on touring companies like the San Francisco opera for local music presentations; this dependence was certainly unbecoming a city with pretensions of being a globally-recognised city on par with New York. Determined to create a suitable home for the philharmonic, Dorothy Chandler decided to champion the cause for a Music Center on Bunker Hill, using whatever means necessary to make it happen.

Chandler’s fund-raising strategies took many forms. For the kickoff event for the Music Center campaign, she used one of the most standard fund-raising strategies, an extravagant evening featuring popular entertainers at the Ambassador Hotel. It raised $400,000 in a single evening. But soon the campaign began to falter; the generosity of the old Los Angeles elite was limited, and Chandler realised she would have to go further afield and solicit support from people with whom she had no personal connection. Next, she began surveying the papers to determine who was giving big parties to make sure she was invited. She was described in a Town and Country article as “ruthless in her approach” for calling hosts away repeatedly from the dinner table to ask if they had successfully obtained the contribution she desired from their wealthy guests. (Gottleif and Wolt 1977:310)

One of her more famous (and unorthodox) strategies was the Amazing Blue Ribbon 400 Committee, a battalion of society ladies whose mission
she made it to gather donations from a thousand people for $1,000. She also ventured into the Hollywood elite for support, organising a first screening of *Cleopatra* for $250 a ticket. Her most controversial strategy was the soliciting of support from outside the usual Los Angeles elite. Crossing political and religious lines, she approached the wealthy Jewish Hillcrest Country Club set and managed to gain not only their support, but active participation. She also ventured into the realm of the nouveau-riche, often playing to the competitive nature of wealthy businessmen on the fringes of Los Angeles society. Her last $300,000 for the campaign was collected by interrupting two oilmen she spotted on the other side of a restaurant at lunch and embarrassing each of them into handing her a cheque for $125,000. She used a similar strategy to procure the support and participation of savings and loan rivals Mark Taper and Howard Ahmonson (after whom the other theatres at the Music Center were named.) If it took two years of luncheons, she would invest the time. Chandler’s fund-raising efforts, however, were not confined to the elite. With the assistance of Walt Disney, she launched her final campaign, a shopping bag used to solicit $1 contributions from Angelenos.

Dorothy Chandler’s aggressive manner in fund-raising was aptly described by Charlton Heston who recalled an incident when “a very wealthy man gave her a check for $20,000 [for the Music Center], and she tore it up, said it was ridiculous, that she needed more than that”.2 Composer Johnny Green called her the greatest fund-raiser since Al Capone. (Halberstam 1979:268) Her methods were unusually aggressive not just for a woman, but a woman of her social position. But she obviously thought a great deal about how best to accomplish her activist goals, describing her philosophy of fundraising thus: “A fund-raiser should be at various times a psychiatrist, a psychologist, a marriage counsellor, and even a sort of family doctor. You have to know the family situation at all times. Divorce, illness, death –or just a routine change in the family situation– can inhibit contribution”. (Gottlieb and Wolt 1977:310) Appealing variously to Los Angeles chauvinism, social duty, civic pride or nationalism, she knew what would inspire people to open their chequebooks. In the nine years of her Music Center campaign, she single-handedly man-

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3 Ibid.
aged to raise $19 million in private donations. Through this fundraising work, she had become “the most important Chandler of modern times, her mark was everywhere in downtown Los Angeles, the cultural world of the city would not exist without her...The Dorothy Chandler Pavilion was an idea accomplished, culture brought instantly to the western wasteland”.

(Halberstam 1979:268)

Construction of the Music Centre began in 1962, and the 3,086-seat concert hall was fully completed for opening night in December 1964. In an appropriately extravagant ceremony, it was revealed that the symphony concert hall would not be named “Memorial Hall” as anticipated, but “the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion” in honour of Chandler’s role in the creation of the Music Center. A full-size portrait of her was put on display in the reception area. Articles praising her achievements appeared in not just in the local papers, but also in the New York Times, and the cover story of Time Magazine hailed her as a fund-raising virtuoso. But Dorothy Chandler’s involvement with the symphony was not confined to raising funds for the building; she was also vice-chairman of the Los Angeles Symphony board through the 1950s. In this capacity, she played a leading role the decision to hire Ernest Fleishmann and his successor, Zubin Mehta. Clearly, she had a strong commitment to the orchestra and the music.

Ironically, however, Dorothy Chandler had little interest in the actual design of the building for which she raised all the funds. She did have her heart set on a particular site for the building, having convinced the relevant parties when necessary that the new Department of Water and Power building should be pushed over a block. Not only did this improve the value of her family’s property in the downtown area, it also situated the Music Centre where her husband would see it everyday from his downtown office. While she had fiercely promoted the Music Centre as symbolic of the city’s cultural maturity, the idea that the architecture should live up to this symbolic importance never seemed to enter the equation. As architecture critic Nicolai Ouroussoff described, “Dorothy Chandler, for one, seemed relatively indifferent to who would design her beloved Music Center; that decision was left to the county Board of Supervisors, which picked Welton Becket, a competent local firm, but one that proved unable to create a visionary design”.

4 Nicolai Ouroussoff. “Postcards From a City in Progress; Major architectural works suggest a vital new vision of L.A. But how committed are Angelenos?” Los Angeles Times. 19 August 2001, Calendar page 5.
While it might not be visionary, their design features high-modernist conventions that symbolise the concert hall as cultural temple. First of all, the entire Music Center and the central plaza is raised from the street level, like an Acropolis. The Dorothy Chandler Pavilion itself is a concrete block accented by columns separated from the structure itself, suggesting the grandeur and elegance of classical architecture. (See Figure 3.) The resemblance to the Symphony Hall of New York’s Lincoln Center, constructed in 1962, is uncanny. (See Figure 4.) If the similarities were unintentional, this building could be interpreted as just another instance of modernist semiotic conventions. If, on the other hand, the similarity was intentional, it would be a tremendous irony that the Dorothy Chandler Hall, symbol of LA’s cultural arrival, was merely an echo of the monuments of its greatest rival city.

In addition to the less-than-imaginative design, the building was also an acoustical compromise. Meant to house presentations as varied as the opera, the symphony, the chorus, ballet, and even spoken theatre, it was unlikely that an architect could produce a design that would please everyone—performers or audience—for every one of these performing arts. The interior is also square, employing the traditional “shoe-box” arrangement with proscenium arch separating stage from audience and the seats are arranged in tiered balconies directly across from the stage. (See Figure 5.) Acoustically, however, the design works best for smaller halls with under 2,000 seats. Phenomenologically, the formal presentation of the orchestra

FIGURE 3
was believed to be formal and elegant, but was eventually seen to be alienating and old-fashioned. As far as Dorothy Chandler was concerned, however, it was not the form of the hall that mattered, but the fact that the hall existed at all. She expressed this sentiment plainly in her speech on the opening night: “What is important here tonight is not the fund-raising or the building that we are in. The only really important thing here tonight is the music we heard performed...That will go on forever”.

Although Dorothy Chandler framed her vision for the Music Center in terms of social duty and civic pride, in retrospect, the negative consequences of the Center’s construction are now painfully evident. The Bunker Hill area had indeed seen better times. While the district had been a wealthy neighbourhood in the 1800s, by World War I it had become a slum. Victorian mansions were converted to rooming houses for the socially less-desirable classes of “transients, pensioners, and derelicts”. (Gottlieb and Wolt 1977:266) By the 1930s, however, the majority of inhabitants were lower-class Mexicans and whites. According to the elite, this was not a desirable state for the neighboured, but further evidence of the decay of the downtown core. Therefore, they set out to “restore” Bunker Hill to its former

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glory, which essentially meant making it more palatable again for the upper-class. The Music Center, in theory a civic monument for all Angelenos, was really just the first phase of an urban planning initiative that ultimately created what Nicolai Ouroussoff describes as a “spatial apartheid” of two parallel worlds in downtown LA. “At the top was a barely functioning business and cultural district that stood as a cliché of urban alienation. At the bottom, across Hope Street to the east, the historic fabric of downtown was abandoned to a mix of immigrant communities and homeless people”.7 This arrangement remained until the 1980s, when a new wave of urban renewal, including the plans for a new concert hall, was initiated.

**Lillian Disney and the Walt Disney Concert Hall**

On May 13, 1987, Lillian Disney announced the memorial she had in mind for her late husband: a world-class concert hall bearing his name that would be built across the street from the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion. In the announcement of her $50 million gift to the Music Center of Los Angeles County, she described her motivation for this act as much in terms of public good as monument to her husband: “I have always had a deep love and admiration for my husband, and I wanted to find a way to honour him, as

7 Nicolai Ouroussoff. “Postcards From a City in Progress; Major architectural works suggest a vital new vision of L.A. But how committed are Angelenos?” *Los Angeles Times*. 19 August 2001, Calendar page 5.
well as give something to Los Angeles which would have lasting qualities. [...] The thought that a concert hall would be built that would entertain the public with the finest musical offerings would be enormously gratifying to him".8

At first glance, it seems strange that Lillian would find it appropriate to commemorate her husband, most famous for his work in animation and theme parks, in the construction of a high art performing arts centre. But the connection might not be so far-fetched. As mentioned above, Walt did participate in Dorothy Chandler’s campaign to raise funds for the first Music Center. He also collaborated with other patrons to save the Chouinard Art Institute and the Los Angeles Conservatory of Music through the creation of the California Institute of the Arts, for which he donated thirty-eight acres of land.(Watts 1997:419) And then, of course, there is Fantasia. While often criticised, Fantasia did introduce a mass audience to classical music, and Walt cared enough to approach leading musicians of the day, Stokowski and Stravinsky, to participate in this project. When working on Fantasia, he attempted to remedy his lack of knowledge of classical music by subscribing to a box at the Hollywood Bowl concerts.(Schikel 1968:127) He also regularly took his daughters to the symphony and the opera throughout their childhood, although he admitted once to having hated it.(Watts 1997:400) Of course, only Lillian can ever know the degree to which Walt would really have wanted a concert hall built in his honour, or how much he cared about art music. What is interesting for my purpose is the fact that she chose a concert hall rather than any other kind of building, or any other kind of philanthropic donation, to commemorate her husband. It is also significant that even in the late 20th century, the concert hall as a structure remains framed in a discourse of public good; as mentioned above, this was a gift not just in her husband’s memory, but for all of Los Angeles so that the public could have access to the finest of high culture.

Following Lillian Disney’s announcement, a high-profile competition was held in 1988 to select a design for the new hall, and local architect Frank O. Gehry’s undulating (and incomplete) drawings were selected as the winner with high critical acclaim. But by 1995, the building was still not complete. In addition to construction delays, the estimated cost of construction had spiralled upward to $265 million from the original estimate

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8 Myrna Oliver and Diane Haithman. “Lillian Disney Dies at 98; Began Concert Hall Project”, Los Angeles Times. 18 December 1997, A1. (Emphasis added.)
of about $110 million due in part to the change in building codes following the 1994 earthquake. When it appeared that Lillian’s gift was no longer going to carry the majority of the cost, the county threatened to terminate the project. But with a flurry of fund-raising activity headed by Eli Broad, local business tycoon and philanthropist, the problem seemed to be solved. Sixty million dollars in donations had come through, and it looked as though the project could be set in motion again.

But between 1995 and 1997, three critical events combined to derail the project yet again. First, Frank Gehry completed the Guggenheim museum in Bilbao. In addition to receiving rave reviews from the critics, this building singlehandedly transformed a gritty, industrial city into a tourist destination so popular that the city had to expand the airport.9 Through Bilbao, Gehry became without question the most famous architect in the world. The second critical event that took place was that Lillian Disney passed away. The third critical event was that Eli Broad, along with the Disney Hall leaders, proposed using the design-build method in order to guarantee a maximum price for construction of the Walt Disney Concert Hall. This method gives the builder of the hall the authority to select the architecture firm to complete Gehry’s winning sketches; given Gehry’s fame, it was expected that this would keep costs under control, allowing for the building to finally be completed. As one would expect, however, Gehry did not approve, and the founding patron could no longer be consulted on the course of action to be pursued.

A scandal resulted that filled the pages of the *Los Angeles Times* for months. Gehry, now supremely justified in playing the role of star architect, threatened to withdraw from the project, taking with him the prestige any city would gain from having one of his buildings immediately after Bilbao. As architect Michael Rotondi was quoted as saying the Los Angeles Times, “it would be unbelievable to not have Frank Gehry involved in this project; it’s not a question of building a building as much as it is building a building that is considered a masterpiece of the most important architect currently living”.10 From Gehry’s point of view, he had already risked his

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9 “When the Guggenheim opened in Bilbao, it was hoped 300,000 people might attend in the first year. Over a million came”. Susan Marling, quoted in “The Listener: Frank’s Fantasia in Steel”, *The Independent on Sunday*, 8 April 2001, 10.

reputation with the delays and near cancellation of the project. Further, he argued that his drawings were only 75% complete, and that his vision and the integrity of the design would be compromised if they were completed by another architectural firm; he compared the situation to handing a French novel to someone to translate when they do not even speak French. He also argued that he had a moral obligation not only to himself, but also the Disney family that did not allow him to agree to using the design-build method. In the end, Gehry was given the role of executive architect, and he redesigned the exterior limestone cladding to shimmering stainless steel. Scheduled for opening night in September 2003, Disney Hall is already receiving international attention and critical acclaim. Like the Bilbao Guggenheim, which appeared in a number of luxury car advertisements, the Walt Disney Concert Hall is also gaining publicity through popular culture. Even though it is still incomplete, Jennifer Lopez selected it as a backdrop for one of her music videos.

If still alive today, Lillian Disney would most likely be delighted with the building’s appearance in popular culture. From the beginning, her requirements for the building were very simple: she wanted this to be a hall for the masses, not just the elite. And unlike her predecessor and friend, Dorothy Chandler, Lillian took an active interest in the design of the building, articulating her priorities to the architect. According to Gehry, Lillian “was very outspoken about what she wanted, and why she wanted to do it. [...] She wanted very much for [the hall] to be a wonderful public space that had the kinds of feelings of warmth that [Walt Disney] tried to accomplish in his work”. She cared a great deal about the interior of the building, so much so that he created a special model of it for her. The exterior, on the other hand, was up to him. As a patron, it seems that Lillian Disney knew how to interact with the artist-genius, knowing how to insist on what was important to her without encroaching on the artist’s vision. Gehry recalled that “both she and her daughter Diane kept saying that somehow I had some of the same kind of ‘crazy’ that Walt had. She was married to a very creative person, so she was open to it, so it was very comfortable for me”.


13 Myrna Oliver and Diane Haithman, “Lillian Disney Dies at 98”.

Unlike the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion design, no one could accuse the Walt Disney Concert Hall of being unoriginal. (See Figure 6.) With its dramatic, unfolding sail-like shapes, this is not the kind of building one could mistake for another; there is already ample evidence that this building will become an architectural icon of Los Angeles, immediately recognisable and referring only to itself. While it is the innovative and photogenic design of the exterior that is catching the eye of the public, it is in the interior that Gehry has done the more significant rule-breaking. Indeed, he has effectively erased every spatial barrier that ordered the traditional concert hall. Firstly, the liminal space of the reception hall is no longer enclosed; in Gehry’s design, the reception area is an atrium with large glass panels that open onto Grand Avenue. (See figure 7.) As a result, the mundane and the liminal are not as clearly defined, the transparency of the division allowing the casual passer-by to observe the entrance ritual without actually participating. Neither does the sacred concert space separate itself from the outside world as effectively; Gehry installed a 36-foot-high rear window and skylights to let in natural light to enhance day-time performances. Even more radical, the barrier between audience and performers in the concert space has been erased. Dispensing with the proscenium arch and balconies that defined the traditional “shoe-box” model of countless concert halls around the world, Gehry has wrapped the audience seating around the orchestra platform, allowing for a more intimate and interactive experience. (See figure 8.) Unlike the traditional arrangement where the audience could only see the conductor’s back, the audience now has the option to view the concert from behind the orchestra, allowing them to observe the interaction between the conductor and the musicians. But most radical of all, Gehry’s design encourages interaction between performers and audience beyond the performance ritual. This is most apparent in the space called the “Green Room”, accessible from both backstage and patron areas, that was “designed to encourage interaction between audience members, guest artists, conductors, and Philharmonic musicians”.14

We can never know how many of these innovations are a result of Lilian Disney’s insistence on a non-elitist hall since the relationship between patron and architect remains largely invisible from public accounts and architectural histories. What is more intriguing is the role that Lilian as patron continued to play in the process, even from beyond the grave. The

fact that Gehry himself emphasised her ideas for the design of a pre-Bilbao building raises some interesting questions, and underscores the role of the patron in the shape and meaning of the buildings they helped create. Always one to address the context and culture of the sites of his buildings, Gehry clearly shared the founding patron’s and the Philharmonic’s commitment to public accessibility when it came to the concert hall. In April 2001, he commented to the BBC:

“This will be the music room of the city. Everybody doesn’t go to concerts and they’re expensive. The Latino population that lives around here probably won’t be able to afford to come. In Bilbao, the architecture created an invitation to the community that was greater than was expected. The
Philharmonic wants that to happen. During some of the concerts there will be projections on the metal of what’s going on inside, so people passing by will hear the music and see the conductor”.15

**Conclusion**

While the female patrons of these two concert halls were only marginally involved in the designing process, I have tried to demonstrate that they still play a significant role in the construction of public institutions which are central to civic identity and urban planning. These women were not blindly handing out cheques; in their philanthropic activity, they were creating a meaningful position for themselves in society and performing labour that they believed was important and beneficial to the community. It was through cultural work that these women found a way to contribute to their communities as well as the built environment of the city. Were it not for the vision and the contributions of these two women, these two buildings would not exist in their current form and might not exist at all.

Through these two case studies we have not only seen two forms of patronage—the traditional philanthropist and the professional fund-raiser—but two forms of concert hall as well—the traditional and the progressive.

But it should also be noted that Gehry’s circular seating plan has an important precedent. The Philharmonic Hall in Berlin, designed by Hans Scharoun and completed in 1963, employs a “vineyard design” of terraced balconies that encircle the stage. What remains to be seen is whether these innovations will be considered exceptions merely of architectural interest or a reflection of deeper changes in the cultural practice of concert-going. Architecture cannot accomplish social engineering, but it can suggest uses to its occupants. Gehry’s design goes beyond its German predecessor in significant ways, not just removing the boundary within the performance space, but literally opening up the concert hall. This could help transcend tradition and transform the social interaction of the art music world so that the boundary between performers and audience is as casually crossed as it is in other musical traditions. The implications for the future of classical music are considerable. It could be through architectural design that the alienation of audiences and the accused irrelevance of the symphony orchestra can begin to be addressed.

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Ouroussoff, Nicolai. “Postcards From a City in Progress; Major architectural works suggest a vital new vision of L.A. But how committed are Angelenos?” Los Angeles Times. 19 August 2001, Calendar page 5.
Abstract: A consensus has emerged that Pierre Bourdieu’s framework accords too much weight to structural determinants of human action. Despite its omnipresence such critique has failed to generate more constructive work indicating how we might refashion his theory. The paper draws on the French writer Marcel Proust to indicate one path this activity might take. His core themes of status, memory, habit and reflexivity provide a resource for bringing agency back into Bourdieu’s model.

Over recent years the critical literature on Bourdieu’s theory of practice has arrived at a broad consensus. His explanation of behavior is widely held to be too mechanistic, his model of the self rather over-socialized and the consequences for social reproduction rather too neat, perhaps even fatalistic. Habitus, as we all know, plays a central role in this theoretical system. It operates as the internalized structure through which objective social locations and inequalities are translated into those very actions and preferences that reproduce these structures. There is improvisation, but only within limits and without reference to more general cultural schemas that can lead to reflexivity and truly autonomous action. Practical action is really determined practical action and there is no real effort to theorize the ways in which subjects can leverage any epistemological or ontological distance between their mental life and their objective social being (Alexander 1995, Sewell 1992).

If we are able to put aside the objections of those who see this as an unfair reading, the problem is where to go to from here. Critique has rarely been balanced out by the affirmation of viable alternatives. Indeed an entire sub-genre of writing has contrasted the failures of alternative, more ac-

tor-driven understandings of structure/agency—such as that of Giddens—with those of Bourdieu’s project. The resulting literature offers a discourse that is not so much about the “duality of structure and agency” but rather the “ubiquity of failure”. The problem with contending, more phenomenological formulations, it seems, is excessive voluntarism. Considerations of system reproduction and habituated action are subordinated to idealism and a heroic understanding of the agent as co-conspirator in the fabrication of a radically contingent social order. So it is that a synthesis has been deferred that can retain what is best about Bourdieu’s symphonic structuralism whilst creating those enchanting leitmotifs of contingency and reflexivity. The discourse on the ubiquity of failure relentlessly documents problems rather than builds solutions.

We can account for this dynamic, perhaps, through the fact that contending offerings are proposed from alien language games and cultural horizons. Potential substitutes are simply too divorced from Bourdieu’s model to permit any form of marriage other than an enforced and unnatural shotgun wedding—a union that would most likely result in the kind of hybrid hillbilly theory within which nobody would wish to be associated. Rather than press the issue theoretical activity defaults to critique and fatalism. This movement is premature. The existing literature has been profoundly unimaginative in looking for Bourdieu’s partner, with the discourse of the ubiquity of invariably failure penning a limited pool of social theorists onto Bourdieu’s dance card, only to see them leave in separate carriages at the end of the dance. What is needed is a more imaginative search for that elusive phenomenological accompaniment to Bourdieu. Perhaps by casting our net a little more widely we can encounter a perspective that has a more appropriate intellectual spirit and, shall we say it, habitus. It is with this context in mind that I propose that Marcel Proust should be understood as both the precursor and successor to Pierre Bourdieu.

The proposition, of course, seems deeply problematic. Consider the possible nature of the precursor/successor tie. Posited in its least interesting but most obvious form this suggests that there must be a line of positive intellectual influence moving through texts and generations in accord with the direction of time. Yet to the best of my knowledge there is no direct evidence that Proust, the novelist, exerted any impact on Bourdieu’s social theory. To the contrary, Bourdieu is dismissive of Proust, exhibiting him in Distinction as the emblem of an abstract bourgeois aestheticism. This is only to be expected. Proust, after all, was a novelist and not a social theorist, and a conservative one to boot. Why, then, would we expect Bourdieu
to be positively influenced by him? Expressed in the other direction the tie becomes absurd. It is far from clear how Proust, who died before Bourdieu was born, can be his successor. And expressed simultaneously we are faced with the logical contradiction of the precursor being at once the successor. Aren’t these mutually exclusive categories? Perhaps not.

The argument I put here rests not on matters of objective chronology but rather on an understanding of influence as part of a recursive hermeneutics. Acts of reading and writing, located in present horizons of understanding establish their own lineage *a posteriori*. Consider the following paradox. Borges (1964: 201) notes in one of his critical essays that “… every writer creates his own precursors”. Thus, he argues, after reading Kafka we can detect Kafkaesque qualities in such unlikely places as Browning’s poem “Fears and Scruples” or Leon Bloy’s “Histoires desobligeantes”. Yet, Borges acutely observes, “…if Kafka had never written a line, we would not perceive this quality”. In a similar way I will suggest that the readings that we, social theorists, can make of Marcel Proust can be reconfigured by Pierre Bourdieu. The reader sensitive to social theory will detect in Proust’s work not only the prototype for Bourdieu’s inquiry, but also a more subtle understanding of practice that allows Proust to be proposed as his successor. This idea finds a mandate in Proust’s own thoughts on the leakage of motifs through history. In the *Remembrance* he famously speaks of “the Dostoyevski side of Mme de Sevigne”, pointing to a common set of stylistic traits which enabled an unlikely connection to be drawn between the aristocratic French diarist and the Russian novelist. But are we not moving too fast? As Paul Valery mentions somewhere, ultimately everything can be connected to everything else given enough mental gymnastics. Hence some preliminaries are needed on the conditions for legitimate intercourse before we move forward to look at the contribution of Proust to Bourdieu’s project.

If Proust can be read as a precursor and successor to Bourdieu the question has to be asked: on what grounds? In other words what makes the reading possible rather than wild, irresponsible or scholastic. We can begin by positioning both scholars as products of a distinctively Parisian experience separated by a few decades. It should not be surprising that they experienced and also wrote about a world where distinction, cliques and cultural capital have a distinctive role in the organization of social life among elites. We can add to this list of qualifications the style of Proust’s writing. Contrary to the popular perception that he is an unruly stream of consciousness writer, literary critics are united in holding Proust up as a philosophical novelist of unusual discipline and abstraction. His work elaborates
a systematic phenomenology of human action and mental life as well as an implicit cosmology of class in so far as this influences behavior (Descombes 1992). This theoretical bent accounts for the extensive use of aphorism and epigrammatic statement following the pattern of Montaigne, Pascal and above all La Rochefoucauld (O’Brien 1948). Aphorisms tend to be declarative statements of limited ambiguity. Hence they enable the philosophy of the novelist to become manifest rather than latent and facilitate the translation of aesthetic vision into social theory. On top of questions of style and theme we can mention a similarity of outlook. Notwithstanding wistful moments of romance and nostalgia, Proust is above all a cynic and an ironist. Social life is broadly understood to be a self-interested struggle for status replete with bad faith and dissimulation—a vision that may well have influenced Sartre (Gordon 1992) and through him Bourdieu. Such commonalities provide the assurance that innovations can be transplanted from novelist to social theorist without doing undue violence to either Proust.

What can Proust teach us in our efforts to improve Bourdieu? We have perhaps the least to learn from Proust’s model of social elites which generally parallels the image conveyed in The Field of Cultural Production and Distinction. Looked at superficially we find an ironic vision of contending but overlapping social circles among aristocratic, military, artistic, intellectual and bourgeois elites. These are arranged hierarchically and are maintained by systems of difference and distinction, taste and refinement as these operate through salons and marriages. There are struggles between these circles for influence, with characters engaging in strategic action to increase their power and social capital. The overall picture is of a Veblen-esque struggle, although one marked by a genuine but blind and snobbish nobility of purpose as much as by calculated strategies for gaining inclusion and maintaining exclusion. The class dynamic is hardly elaborated, but the image is one that is consistent with Bourdieu’s understanding of cultural practice as it takes place among elites of French society. With more care, however, we see that Proust’s universe is one where change, rather than system reproduction is emphasized. During the course of the novel there is a changing of the guard with older, aristocratic forms of power being replaced by those of the bourgeoisie. The latter trade upon their wealth for title, in effect swapping economic for social capital. Bourdieu’s insistence throughout his career, by contrast, has been on reversing this equation. In other words, he wants to emphasize how social and cultural barriers prevent economic/class mobility, not how the empirical fact of economic mobility has broken these down under the condition of modernity. A more funda-
mental point of divergence is that for Proust social cliques are organized not simply in terms of access to earthly power, but also to sacred centers in Edward Shils’s sense. The Guermantes family enjoys a traditional authority that offers a mythical continuity with the heroic past; the salon of the Verdurins is a place where encounters with poetic transcendence and artistic charisma become possible. For the narrator of *Remembrance of Things Past*, at least, it is these immaterial rewards that motivate efforts towards inclusion—not status, not money, not power. Proust, then, opens up the door to a model of stratification closer to that of Durkheim, Bougle and Dumont than to Marx with culture liberated to motivate and structure hierarchical social systems in its own meaningful ways.

Perhaps more telling for the structure/agency question are Proust’s understandings of the mental life of the subject. On the one hand we can identify remarkably strong Bourdieuvian themes in his text. Proust has extensive discussions on the self as imprisoned by habit and engaging in repetitive tasks and mental routines. This self, habituated and embodied is also shaped by class. Hence much of his most insightful writing is on the ways that servants, bourgeoisie and aristocrats alike exhibit differing uses of the body, language and tastes. Yet Proust’s model of the self goes far beyond that of Bourdieu in important ways, these being linked to a more thoughtful theorization of contingency and change. Crucially Proust builds reflexivity into his model of the subject in powerful and innovative ways. Perhaps his most significant contribution to Bourdieu’s project lies in pointing to the specific junctures at which this takes place. The result is a more balanced picture of life, with oscillations between habituated action and reflexive self-awareness. This latter trait comes to the fore when characters looking for social ascendancy engage in a studied cultivation of the self that enables them to transcend their social origins. The narrator, for example, undertakes a careful study of M. Swann and eventually succeeds in reproducing his refinement to the extent that he gains access to aristocratic salons beyond those of his class location. Escaping from conscious manipulation, but perhaps more significant, are those chance collisions in time and space that provide a shock and with it some distance from the routine, the habituated. Unanticipated encounters with people and objects, time, the mechanical memories of the body and even geographical mobility from city to country play a role in enabling distance to be attained between the current and the previous self. Pivotal here is the idea of dislocation and the fact that the self will inevitably become dis-embedded from habit not as the result of conscious effort (Husserl) or privileged structural location (Bour-
dieu) or liberated by theoretical orientation (Mannheim) but rather thanks to the myriad conjunctures and accidents of daily life as these impact upon the self. Reflexivity arrives not with the onset of a reflexive modernity, but rather is built into the fabric of everyday life as this intersects with life narrative. The passage of time, the structure of memory and the unpredictability of chance make this gift inevitable and available to all as a component of human experience.

The result is a layering of selves—often habituated but also situational, fragmented and prone to interruption. The self in Bourdieu’s writings is, roughly speaking modernist, integrated, and engages in social life as a broadly dispassionate cognitive and rational process. Proust’s model of the “multiplicity of the ego” (Riva 1965: 59) seems altogether more contemporary. In his universe there are multiple identities within each individual, some coexisting, some buried and others replacing each other over time. These cross each other in chaotic and unpredictable ways, and, in the act of colliding draw attention to their plurality and contingency and to the fictive imagination that has configured them into a hypostasized unity. Hence stray words led the narrator in the Remembrance to recall a former lover and then to reflect upon how he was now a different person.

When Proust writes: “…my life appeared to me … as something utterly devoid of the support of an individual, identical and permanent self” this is not a statement of despair but rather a vision of how systems of desire (principally love and jealousy) work through the multiple selves that are arranged in time. Although these can act to imprison the will rather than doing its bidding, their very power and centrality to the psyche leads them to serve as spurs to the interrogation of the self. Being reminded of their changing cathexis and intensity reminds us that we are not who we once were and that we need not remain who we are now. Although time leads to a reduction of the passions, they can also be revived through “intermittences du coeur” (Riva 1965) when previous emotions and memories are retrieved. Emotion reveals former and present selves in chiaroscuro and, in the process, practical awareness comes to be replaced by a more reflexive understanding of the self as a succession of stages of being in time culminating in death.

For Proust this awareness of death gives rise to the understanding of life as a project and stimulates, at least in the narrator of his novel, the artistic vocation (Riva 1965). This position, which has similarities to those of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre, is not shared by Bourdieu. In Outline of a Theory of Practice there is no discussion of the existential challenge of bio-
graphical time, but rather of time as strategy and time as an environment in the eternal return of the daily round. Bourdieu’s writings on theory and method were more concerned with structural location (as researcher, as outsider, as academic) as a potential driver of reflexivity than with being in time. However, as Marcel Fournier (2002) informs us Bourdieu’s last talks took a more biographical form, this being autosocial analysis. Perhaps, then, Bourdieu was following his successor and moving towards a Proustian understanding of time and memory as the key to a reflexive sociology of the self.

WORKS CITED


Yale Sociology Department
Activities
Fall 2003

Sociology Colloquium Series
Fall 2003

Meetings are Thursdays, 4 - 5:30 pm
107 Williams Hall, 80 Sachem Street
(unless otherwise noted)

September 11 - William Gibson (California State University at Long Beach)
“Bring’em on’: George Bush and the Limits of War Culture”

September 18 - Julia Adams (University of Michigan)
“Fathers, Families and State Formation in Early Modern Europe”

Sept. 25 - Said Arjomand (SUNY - Stony Brook)
“Islam and Modernity: Toward a Historical Sociology of the Islamicate Civilization”

October 4 - Roger Gould and Sociology: A Memorial Conference

October 9 - Barry Schwartz (University of Georgia)
“Lincoln at Gettysburg: Essentialism, Constructionism, and Collective Memory”

October 16 - Hauke Brunkhorst (Universität Flensburg)
“A Polity Without a State? - European Constitutionalism between Evolution and Revolution”

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October 24 (Friday) - The Hollingshead Lecture
Alain Touraine (Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales)
4:00 p.m. in Room 211 (HGS) Hall of Graduate Studies, 320 York Street
Reception immediately following in HGS 401

October 30 Mike Shanahan (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
“The Life Course and Gene-Environment Interactions”

November 6 - Jeylan Mortimer (University of Minnesota)
“Working and Growing Up In America”

November 13 - Mary C. Brinton (Harvard)
“Networks of Competition: Hidden Stratification in the Japanese Youth Labor Market”

November 20 - Randy Collins (University of Pennsylvania)
“The Sociology of Thinking: a Theory of Internal Interactional Rituals”

December 4 (Wednesday) - Steven Seidman (SUNY Albany)
“Identity and Politics after the Closet”
Co-sponsored by The Larry Kramer Initiative for Lesbian and Gay Studies at Yale
4:00 p.m. in Room 309, (WLH) Williams L. Harkness Hall, 100 Wall Street

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Roger Gould Memorial Conference

Graduate Club
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Saturday, October 4, 2003

Jeffrey Alexander, Introduction

Ronald Breiger, University of Arizona
“The Spinozan Problem of Order”

Joel Podolny, Harvard University
“Drawing Out Some Implications of Gould’s Formal Model of Status Hierarchies”

Andrew Abbott, University of Chicago
“Temporality of Individuals and Structures”

Bonnie Erickson, University of Toronto

Charles Tilly, Columbia University
“Violent Conflict, Social Relations, and Explanation of Social Processes”

Peter Bearman, Commentator

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