Max Weber's *Economy and Society*

*A Critical Companion*

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The Rule of the Father

Patriarchy and Patrimonialism in Early Modern Europe


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The totem is above all a symbol, a tangible expression of something else. But of what? ... From one point of view, it is the outward and visible form of what I have called the totemic principle or god; and from another, it is also the symbol of a particular society that is called the clan. It is the flag of the clan, the sign by which each clan is distinguished from the others, the visible mark of its distinctiveness, and a mark that is borne by everything that in any way belongs to the clan: men, animals, and things.

Emile Durkheim, Elementary Forms

Puzzling over early-modern European political development has become a tradition, even a minor sport, in sociological theory. Critical transitions are supposed to have transpired in the early-modern moment (which conventionally spans the years between 1500 and 1800), and those transitions to have shaped our conceptual and theoretical orientations. So for modernization theorists the early modern signals the shift between tradition and modernity; Marxists locate the transition from the feudal to the capitalist mode of production in this period, along with the transformation of their attendant political forms. For devotees of the world-systems approach, the early-modern era enshrines the end of empire and the big-bang birth of the world system and modern states. Feminist theorists see the end of classical patriarchy and the invention of a new political form, fraternal liberalism. And so on. Grand dichotomies do tell us something, but they have a way of immobilizing history, rendering the past as "a picture or tableau vivant of a bygone culture,"1 and becoming quick and dirty substitutes for more flexible concepts that can register diachronic change in relationships or systems.
On the face of it, Max Weber is as guilty as any other social theorist of joining, or leading, the parade of grand dichotomies. He authored many influential ideal types that are used to divide European and even world history into neat categories signaling an epochal before and after, including the vexed contrast between "traditional" and modern "rational-legal" types of legitimate domination. But he also helped bridge the yawning conceptual gap his own ideal-typical concepts created. The concept of "patrimonialism," which Weber applied inter alia to statist and absolutist politics of early-modern Europe, is one concept that I for one could not do without, and I hope to convince readers of its broader possibilities. Nevertheless I think it needs to be reconstructed if it is to be useful to today's students of state formation and revolution. This chapter, focused on the high patrimonial politics of early-modern Europe, brings to bear poststructuralist and antifoundationalist thinking to reshape the concept into a usable tool of analysis. I show how there could be simultaneously "no there there" and a sturdy symbolic basis for centuries, even thousands of years of rule.

In Weber's *Economy and Society*, patrimonialism refers mainly to forms of government that are based on rulers' family households. The ruler's authority is personal-familial, and the mechanics of the household are the model for political administration. The concept of patrimonialism captures a distinctive style of regulation and administration that contrasts with Weber's ideal-typical rational-legal bureaucracy, a better-known concept that has made its way into the popular lexicon. Rational-legal bureaucracies are manned by impersonal rulers and substitutable actors; they boast clear-cut spheres of competence, ordered hierarchies of personnel and procedures, and an institutional separation of the "private" and the "official." "Bureaucracy is the means of transforming social action into rationally organized action." Technical specialization and rule-governed hierarchical control are its watchwords, and Weber likens it to a "machine," a "precision instrument," a "ceaselessly moving mechanism," an apparatus of cogs and gears. Patrimonialism is more like a manor house with, one would suppose, particularly extensive grounds. Patrimonial rulers cite "age-old rules and powers"—sacred tradition—as the basis of their political authority. Their power is discretionary, and the line between persons and offices notional. This at least is Weber's analytical point of departure, and it's a good first cut at patterns of early-modern European governance.

For Weber, furthermore, patriarchy is at the heart of patrimonialism. Their linguistic connection—"patrimony" derives from the Latin *patrimonium* for paternal estate—is also conceptual and sociological. "Patrimonial domination is thus a special case of patriarchal domination," Weber writes, "domestic authority decentralized through assignment of land and sometimes of equipment to sons of the house or other dependents." And further:
"We shall speak of a patrimonial state when the prince organizes his political power over extrapatriotional areas and political subjects—which is not discretionary and not enforced by physical coercion—just like the exercise of his patriarchal power." Patriarchal domination comes to the fore in Weber's account for two connected reasons. It is the purest logical form of traditional authority, the one in which the conceptual skeleton is most starkly revealed.10 And patriarchy is the historical seed of patrimonialism, which Weber believes is a genetic extension of the patterns of governance in a ruler's or a chief's family-household. We see this historically when dependents are granted fiefs or other politico-economic privileges and immunities and become clients and agents of their ruler and now patron, separating themselves from his family-household to form their own households.11 In this defining and reiterated moment, rulers' agents become potential rulers and patriarchal principals themselves.

While the concept of "patrimonialism" has been widely influential, and its tendencies of development spotted in just about everything from ancient Rome to the Chicago mafia to current Middle Eastern and Asian politics, the patriarchal core of Weber's definition tends to drop out of these appropriations. That lapse, if it is a lapse, can in part be laid at Weber's door. Patriarchy tended to be naturalized in Economy and Society. In one throwaway line, for example, Weber asserts that "[t]he woman is dependent because of the normal superiority of the physical and intellectual energies of the male..."12 This is especially interesting because Weber produced an array of nonnaturalized reasons for the relative position of other categories of patriarchal dependents, like grown children and servants.13 If Weber had wanted to make a sex-based case for the primacy of the biological in patrimonialism, he might have argued that certain features of biological maleness, such as greater capacity to engage in armed single combat—given the sort of weapons prevalent at the time—made men's claim to rule more credible. Such an argument might only apply to brawny, coordinated, and well-schooled men, and it would in any case have limited applicability to the formal structures of rule in early-modern Europe. But it might well pan out for other historical eras and sites.14 Gender has been an Achilles' heel for all the major classical social theorists, in any case, so it is no surprise that Weber biologizes the relative position of women and men in the context of an explanation that is otherwise social. Today's scholars of Economy and Society, who habitually distinguish gender from biological sex, simply ignore these interpretively awkward passages. As Weber's naturalized arguments have fallen by the wayside, however, so has his insight that patriarchy, father-rule, is somehow fundamental to patrimonial politics.15

There are a few stray exceptions to this rule. In his comparison of Weber's writings on imperial China and Western Europe, for example, Gary..."
Hamilton persuasively argues that patriarchalism is fundamental to Weber's concept of patrimonial domination as Weber links it to the organization of the state. In its pure form this meant that "... the patriarch—the person—in the form of family heads and rulers held discretionary power over rites, over legal judgments, and over the administration of households as well as the state." Hamilton shows that imperial China emphasized roles rather than persons and their personal power. Filial piety (xiao) was institutionalized in Chinese politics, he notes, but did not necessarily empower the concrete person of the father, as he takes it to have done in Western Europe, in the ur-example, ancient Rome: "With patria potestas, a person obeys his father; with xiao a person acts like a son." Hamilton builds on this distinction (in the best Weberian manner) to suggest genetic explanations of forms of political order and developmental patterns specific to imperial China. Hamilton draws this stark contrast between China and Western Europe, however, and quarrels with Weber's claim that imperial China can be understood as a patriarchal patrimonial system only because he accepts Weber's vision of the taken-for-granted natural authority of the father in the European historical landscape. In this Hamilton is faithful—I think too faithful—to Weber's text.

Weber lacked the conceptual equipment that would have enabled him to recognize the constructed basis of all authorizations of political authority: constructed not out of whole cloth, as it were, or of random snippets, but of materials ready to hand. These materials include actors' early childhood experiences of historically specific forms of parental, and especially paternal, authority. All this is less a criticism than a comment on the present need to restructure the concepts of patriarchalism and patrimonialism—and by extension all ideal types of domination: traditional; rational-legal; charismatic; and any plausible new ideal types that we might decide to coin. Instead of seeing biological maleness and fatherhood as the politically productive force, as Weber did, we should identify the shifting meanings with which maleness is freighted as the key to understanding how it is deployed in politics. When prevailing assumptions about more or less valued interpretations of masculinity—particularly paternity—are italicized as part of the patrimonial ideal type, we can get a better sense of how patrimonial systems work, and why they crumble. I also focus here on the elite, not that elite mechanisms are the only important part of the story, but they are both the piece of the historical narrative on which I am currently working and one of Weber's perennial objects of sociological analysis.

The symbolics of political fatherhood were (and are!) crucial in European monarchies. The court was a major theater of power in medieval and early-modern states, and royal families figured prominently, indeed centrally, in the courtly drama. Monarchs and their pet ideologists were themselves quick to
point this out. James I of England, who was also James VI of Scotland, was not the first or last monarch to write on this topic, but he was particularly prolific in print and passionate about his paternal ruling role. Sometimes he held up kings as nurturant fathers: “And as the Father of his fatherly duty is bound to care for the nourishing, education and vertuous governmment of his children; euen so is the king bound to care for all his subjects.” At other moments he stressed the strictures of paternal power: “Now a Father may dispose of his Inheritance to his children, at his pleasure: yea, euen disinherit the eldest vpon iust occasions, and preferre the youngest, according to his liking: make them beggers, or rich at his pleasure; restraine, or banish out of his presence, as hee finds them give cause of offence, or restore them in fauour againe with the penitent sinner: So may the King deal with Subjects.” At times he did both in the space of a single text.²⁰

The analogy between father and king has also been a theme of recent feminist political theory. The overthrow of early-modern states and decapitation (or worse!) of monarchs fascinates feminist theorists because of what these events exemplify: the destruction and reconstruction of a patriarchal gender order, and the genesis of a politics of equality and citizenship, including among other things the discourse and practices of feminism itself. As Lynn Hunt observes about the French Revolution, but might as well have said about the English Revolution, or any other thoroughgoing early-modern European political upheaval, “male control of the world never went without saying after the father had been killed.”²¹ Not just the small-f father, she means, but the king himself. Why should this have made such a difference? In early-modern Europe, the basic argument goes, there was a mimetic or fractal relationship between ruling family and kingdom. The continuity and legitimacy of the royal family formed the bedrock of power relations and underwrote the stability of rule itself. For a monarch, sustaining these images and relations of rule entailed being seen to subsume and control the royal family-household and, by metaphorical extension, the entire kingdom or empire.²²

Now I would like to press this line of thought further, beginning from the supposition that the category of “patriarch” itself can be seen as an ongoing cultural and social achievement. The people who first soldered together separate signs like “father” and “ruler” had real political imagination.²³ Later propagandists who sought to defend the value of their conjunction—especially in the face of others’ efforts to tear them apart—were often astute analysts of the categories of everyday practice and good political tacticians. Some, like Willem I, Vader Vaderlands of the Dutch Republic, agitated on behalf of the oppressed by trying to substitute one father-ruler for another (in Willem’s case, himself as the representative of the republic against the Spanish overlord).²⁴ Others fought a rearguard battle against national or interna-
tional challenges to patriarchy. For example, the opening chapter of Sir Robert Filmer’s *Patriarcha*—"That the first kings were fathers of families"—sets the tone for his ringing defense of patriarchal patrimonialism in an England beleaguered by arguments for "liberty" by "usurpers of the right of such fathers." Whatever their politics, and their enthusiasm for patriarchal privilege (which will doubtless displease most of my readers), these early-modern elites were capable of real cultural creativity, of signification as action. The less influential folk who made everyday use of these same homely familial signs and images—whether attracted or repelled by the specific connection between paternity and rule—introduced and embroidered variations of their own. They were all inventors of tradition, paradoxically recreating what Weber called "the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them," but not by referring them either to capital-N nature or to some rock of "established belief," as Weber supposed. Here I depart both from Weber and Weberianism and from contemporary materialist theorists who see the "father-ruler" as a simple reflection or production of "male power" or dominance. And note that these tropes of father-rule are with us today, trumpeted by the dynastic rulers of Middle Eastern monarchies, now more defiantly than of old. They are certainly not just a thing of the European or American past.

The meanings that these actors invoked and produced rested on other meanings, signs upon signs. By "signs" I mean, following Saussure, arrays of signifiers that get linked to concepts/meanings (signifieds) in more or less stable formations. Signifiers are primarily sounds and written patterns in Saussurean linguistics, but anything can stand in as a signifier and a vehicle for signification. "The soldier who falls defending his flag certainly does not believe he has sacrificed himself to a piece of cloth," as Emile Durkheim succinctly put it. The weightiest signifier in medieval and early-modern European politics was the king’s mortal body, which came to represent many connected concepts in political theology—the Crown; the collective assemblage of corporate bodies; the body politic—but only after a long and tortuous historical path. It was not until the early sixteenth century that the English maxim “the king as King never dies” and France’s “Le roi est mort! Vive le roi!” made their debut as the defining public aphorisms of royal funerary ceremonies. This relationship of representation was repeatedly dramatized across Europe, most brilliantly at court.

What linked the monarch’s own body and the series of bodies it represented, culminating in the whole body politic, was the signifier of the patrilineage, which encoded, in the repeated father-son relationship, heredity, masculinity, and the transcendent promise of immortality. These representations extended far beyond the nodal point of the “collective ruler”—the monarch, the royal family and its agents, and lesser but still privileged
rulers—reaching up to a vision of God-the-Father and down to the lowly subjects who would be ordered and mobilized as heads of family-households with authority over their dependents. What interests me here about this representation of the great (patriarchal) chain of being are the patriarchal rulers and their agents or staffs—the specific network node that is Weber’s favorite point of analytical leverage on systems of legitimate domination. Highlighting the “patriarchy” in patrimonialism means flagging the representation of two kinds of relations that traverse this nodal point: (1) that between fathers and sons as dominant and subordinate masculinities ordered around images of fatherhood and filiality, and (2) that of the political relation among father-rulers, conducted on the basis of their socially recognized paternal status.34 This is the symbolic code of interest. These representations could be folded into the single, concentrated sign of the king’s body, and like an accordion, unfolded and extended.

Signs are not a part of Weber’s sociology of patrimonial domination, or a broader sociology of domination and freedom, but they should be. Kings, princes, and lesser rulers in patrimonial politics invoked the vision of patrilineage—a line extending back into the past and forward to the future, and composed of their ancestors and desired descendants—to appeal for allegiance. Ruling elites purchased property and made investments under the sign of fatherhood, stood in judgment on their communities, proclaimed war, schooled their children, and so on. They called upon their children to act on behalf of the family line, with a modicum of success. Signs of political fatherhood and the vertical genealogies of office that they helped organize created a basis for both the intergenerational continuity in rule and the stable relationship between princes and lesser rulers in both absolutist monarchies and estatist republican regimes. The sign of patrilineage knotted horizontal ties as well, not just among monarchs, but also among ruling elites of lesser stature. These men directed appeals at others who were seen as equivalents, opposite numbers in the formation of a ruling group—a set of elites who could come to recognize themselves as having shared identities, characteristics, and goals. The formation and cohesion of any ruling group depends on members’ self-recognitions.35 The lateral recognitions of family head to family head—both within what we have come to think of as local and national contexts and apparatuses and over great geographic distances, via international princely marriages—made possible the pervasive elite pacts that undergirded early-modern state formation, of which more anon. What is more, the vertical and horizontal dimensions were interdependent. An individual man could not gain entry to a ruling group without having made an effective claim to honorable lineal descent. Would the members of that group let their daughters marry his sons—or their sons marry his daughters? Conversely, however fictive his family lineage, it would be workable if
backed up by others’ willingness to incorporate him into the circuits of exchange.

Did this pervasive masculinism reduce women to ciphers? I don’t think so, although this is a complicated issue, worth lingering on for a bit.36 It is true that women functioned as objects of exchange and signs of relationships among men—particularly among the elite. This was not their sole role, but it was a constitutive one, without which the interlocked systems of marriage and inheritance would have tottered and collapsed. Of course women also pursued independent projects, just as men did, and they were eminently capable of “the mystification of manipulation as disinterested empathy,” which Stephen Greenblatt calls the characteristic Renaissance mode of courtly action, elaborated in and definitive of courtly life.37 For every real-life Iago there was a would-be Marquise de Merteuil.38 Women were also authorized to perform crucial roles that were defined as both feminine and central in the courtly or manorial theater of power. They gave birth to heirs, and their scripted parts extended to vital supporting performances that dramatized and conferred familial political power. But elite women clearly commanded the largest sphere of action when they operated from the symbolic place of the patriarch. When there was a hiccup in the male line, women were called in as the agents or representatives of men, to act on the behalf of the lineage, the ruling group, and their mimetic extensions, including the nation. In these moments—extraordinary and rule-bound—women assumed the mantle of the patriarchs themselves.

Women rulers in patriarchal patrimonialism were anomalies, and as such likely to be coded as polluting or actively threatening, as sources of unwelcome ambiguity and instability in the categories of rule.39 Most struggled or foundered in the ensuing contradictions, but a few, a very few, surmounted them with discursive elan. Here is Queen Elizabeth I at Tilbury, famously rallying her troops against the invasion of the Spanish Armada:

I know I have the body but of a weak and feeble woman; but I have the heart and stomach of a king, and of a king of England, too, and think foul scorn that Parma or Spain, or any prince of Europe, should dare to invade the borders of my realm; to which rather than any dishonour shall grow by me, I myself will take up arms, I myself will be your general, judge, and rewarder of every one of your virtues in the field.40

Again and again in speeches, letters, and diplomatic encounters on the national and international political stage, Elizabeth proved able to use to her rhetorical and political advantage not simply her symbolic position as a patrilineal patriarch, a king or prince, as she often called herself, but also the signs of femininity, which were systematically subordinated and even derided as the opposite and underside of father-rule.41 Not the least part of her dis-
cursive success—in a patriarchal patrilineal society in which women were defined as the portals through which external pollution might enter—was her insistence on the twin signifiers of Virgin Queen. So there was a price to pay, or at least sustained cultural work to be done: the relentless, delicately balanced public performance of inviolate celibacy, of marriage to a kingdom not a king, especially a foreign one. But perhaps she enjoyed the challenge.

For ruling women, there was always a gap between presentation of self-as-signifier and the totemic body of the absent king, prince, or other ruler for whom they were substituting, a gap widened by worries about the continuity of the patrilineage, and thus the state, itself. But I want to stress that male as well as female rulers felt the bite of this disjunction between totem and flesh; the gap was always there, albeit to varying degrees. There was some ironic amusement to be had from it when kings or other rulers were posthumous babies, and the contrast between magnificent throne and diminutive occupant a wellspring of humor as well as collective anxiety—but rather more symbolic panic when the men whom the bloodline had produced were physically damaged, weak-willed, or crazy. Part of the ruler’s role was molding the simulacrum of self into a charismatic signifier, and some family incumbents were simply not up to the job of incarnating the sacred center. Furthermore, the role of agent-in-chief of the ruling patrilineages (and God-the-Father) got harder throughout the early-modern era, I think, as people grew to expect rulers to be responsible for political tasks and to perceive that they had the requisite power to execute them. Perhaps this general tendency is a clue to early-modern rulers’ increasing public distance from the ruled, and the greater formality and aristocratic “Frenchification” of the eighteenth-century European elites, of which so many contemporaries bitterly or mockingly complained. As they confronted these difficulties, in any case, ruling families and broader elite groups actively, even consciously, represented themselves to rivals, agents, allies, and subjects, doing culture-work to suture the gap between totem and imperfect mortal representatives. There are interesting variations to be explored: the Habsburgs, for example, may have been particularly adept at manipulating what I would call familial signifiers during their long-term project of dynastic rule. How the familial actors in question would have drawn boundaries around their particular political kin group and regulated the right to signify on its behalf—whether women would have been allowed to stand in as patriarchs in times of need—these things also varied, and with Weber’s revised ideal type in hand, we are better equipped for future explorations into how and why they did.

While men made many claims on others, and on themselves, in their guise as father-rulers in early-modern Europe, only a fraction of these claims won practical support, with flows of men, money, and materiel. These
flows or media included streams of daily and generational labor that reproduced the bodies and souls slotted into various patrimonial apparatuses; cash; marriageable women; political and spiritual allegiance; and the mobilization of military force to back up one’s own and allies’ family lineage claims to territory and monopoly positions in trading networks, the state, or other institutions. Many flows were transitory, a flash in the pan, but in some situations, recognized participants made binding agreements as family heads to circulate chunks of resource-bearing political privilege and to duly police both the flow of recognitions and resources. Let me give two brief examples. In the England of the early seventeenth century, culminating under James I and his successor Charles I, virtually every office could be bought, whether from the Crown, Crown favorites who sold Crown patronage, or officeholders who were entitled to dispose of offices under their jurisdiction. This extravagant handout of politico-economic privilege went to familially linked magnate and gentry groupings in the landed elite and, as Robert Brenner has shown, to the representatives of merchant dynasties encamped in chartered companies, the City of London’s key political positions, and finally the customs farm, the most important branch of what was (nominally) the Crown’s revenue administration, and the largest single source of state revenue. Likewise, the “family-state compact” is Sarah Hanley’s term for a systematic pattern of regulation that emerged in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century France, “designed to bring family formation under parental (that is patriarchal) control in the first instance and under the magisterial control of the Parlement of Paris in the second.” For Hanley, the axis of the deal lay between the king and his household on the one hand—who got perquisites from selling offices and privileges—and the legists on the other, who were able to advance their dynastic holdings in state property. There were thus two key levels to the compact—a set of contractual arrangements between king and individual elite family heads—and arrangements that collectively aggregated and bound those family heads one to another.

This basic genre of contract has been discussed by historians and social scientists, with acumen and learning, but our differentiated modernist theories of social stratification—in fact the modernist map of social life and the related divisions of labor within and among academic disciplines—continue to make its specificity hard to grasp. These pacts were not simply family affairs, as some would have it. They were not merely class coalitions or the fruits of a nascent utilitarian orientation toward property. They were not only temporal or spiritual power made manifest. They were all of these things and more, and thus Weber’s patriarchal patrimonialism is an appropriate multifocal lens through which to view them. These arrangements projected an entire group’s patriarchal property in power into the future, simultaneously broadening and deepening that group as a collective principal
capable of political action. The pacts transcended faction and strengthened elite networks and institutions in a whole series of medieval and early-modern European settings. They set the seal on an enviable degree of political stability—an important foundation for state-building—but also opened up systematic vulnerabilities and developmental possibilities. Yet the extensive scholarly literature on medieval and early-modern European elite pacts is curiously vague. Most works could and should have been much more precise about whether the pacts involved were tacit or explicit, and in describing what difference conscious thematization might have made in the processes and outcomes they examine. This strikes me as crucial for an era in which the actors involved were forging the rules governing contractual arrangements applicable to state office, family, and emergent capitalist enterprise—and reformulating the idea of “contract” itself.

As the elite—or rather elite men and masculinity—was collectively disciplined, state-builders (who included those very men) could put the institutions that they were constructing on an ever keel for decades or more. The elite could now plan for a fantasized future, anticipating possible familial rhythms of reproduction that might shift the order of rotation of sons and sons' sons into positions of politico-economic privilege. Demographic pressures could threaten patrimonial political stability in a number of ways, as Jack Goldstone shows in his analysis of elite demography in the early-modern world. Goldstone convincingly argues that the growth of elites in certain periods, and the associated impact of turnover and displacement on elite positions, made for a relative scarcity of offices in some countries, fueling rivalries and competition among elite patronage networks. This was so even in some areas like the Netherlands that do not figure in Goldstone’s already lengthy roster of cases. But I also think it is crucial to point out that leading representatives of these elites directly confronted problems of the supply and demand of patrimonial privilege, argued among themselves about what to do about them, and invented explicit intergenerational solutions that worked (more or less) well in different institutional settings. The elite family heads may not always have been collectively successful, but neither were they blind victims of demographic forces. And they knew that demographic disasters (and subtler reproductive unevennesses) were just one contingency that could undermine the emergent institutional nexus of elite families, corporations, and states. Some elite pacts included innovative procedures by which other genuinely unforeseen contingencies could be met—paralleling Kreps’s arguments about the role of corporate culture in contemporary capitalism—whereby men tried to contain future shocks, the paradox of the unexpected that could always be expected to erupt into the life of the patriarchal patrimonial system.

An honest Weberian (or a cynic) might point out that rather than doing
themselves untold injuries—for men killed each other less frequently where such agreements were in force—they could now take their collective capacities for violence and begin to project them outward, onto other groups, subject populations, and civilizations. That monopoly of force is after all a sine qua non of Weber’s definition of a modern state. Here, too, in the projection of power, lay a familial seam along which the family heads composing Weber’s collective ruler would stick together or come apart in early-modern Europe. Power tends to diffuse downward in patrimonial arrangements, as rulers hand out bits of monopolistic resource-bearing political privilege, including sovereign rights to make war on foreign powers. Weber gives us some sense of this in Economy and Society, when he comments on the agency problems—the difficulties principals had in controlling their agents or representatives—that he took to be typical of patrimonial states. Add to this a host of agency problems peculiar to early-modern state-building and empire, including huge distances and long timelags in communication, intractable problems of oversight, and an unavoidable need to recruit large numbers of indigenous elites as agents and to accommodate at least some of their demands and desires. This was a major way that state formation gained ground in Europe itself, by aggregating such previously autonomous entities, whether peacefully or by force. No wonder that rulers throughout early-modern Europe hoped that the trust, special allegiance, and frankly, obedience that they took to characterize family ties could be used to counteract endemic political segmentation. The ruling patriarchs devoted much time, energy, and argument to figuring out how to dissolve competing family solidarities and nourish what they saw as appropriate family sentiments among their patrimonial agents at home and abroad.

Family ideals and relationships do not always have this palliative effect on far-flung relationships. Weber referred this effect to the mysterious workings of “tradition,” as we have seen; he also thought that one’s particular father or master merited one’s obedience because of the “mere habituation” of a concrete role relationship. This concrete particularism also derived its force, I have argued, from a general system of signification, in which it made sense for a father-ruler to command obedience, “... as if the ruled had made the content of the command, the maxim of their conduct for its very own sake.” True, the symbolic patriarch might lose this capacity when he had no more resources to give: poverty and powerlessness could make the implicit claims of elite patriarchy seem like so much hot air. Or his agents and subjects might come to resonate to new and competing family ties, a possibility that leaps out in the multiple histories of autonomous family state-building and creole nationalism in the European metropole and colonies. Some men might even abandon family altogether, vibrating to other strings
of sentiment. All these things did happen in patrimonial political systems, and in the linked European and colonial revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century—which await their neo-Weberian comparative historical sociology—they can be said to have exploded full force. Meanwhile, the rulers in the metropolitan centers played on the signs and practices of patriarchy as one way of managing their perennial principal/agent woes.

In general, I would expect fathers' family roles and the meaning of fatherhood itself to have been fortified as intergenerationally extended groups of ruling patriarchs became embedded in the familial states of seventeenth- and especially eighteenth-century Europe. Father-rulers increased what they had to distribute to dependents by appropriating political privileges through the pacts, and their threats of withdrawing favor or even of disinheritance became more meaningful. The very image of the father was enlarged. For some social scientists, this would be a perfect example of a self-reinforcing mechanism, or an early-modern version of "lock-in." For the patrimonial patriarchs themselves, this was a reasonably comfortable position to be in as long as the monopoly niches that they had collectively captured and defended continued to relay the resources and recognition they craved. But note that elite men would also experience some paradoxical effects of their collective empowerment. As the stakes go up, the incentives rise for any such group to strengthen its contractual system, in order to make it harder for any one wayward patriarch to disrupt the intergenerational bargain and by extension the state. The position of the individual paternal family head is thus increasingly disciplined and personally disempowered by these brilliant collective inventions. For example, the Contracts of Correspondence in the eighteenth-century Netherlands—which could, without too big a stretch, be termed a cartel of fifty-some cities—formalized the distribution of city offices in written succession rules, laying out systems by which all eligible elite families would take turns getting mayoralities, East Indies Company directorships, and other top corporate privileges. The contracts regulated the membership in and control over corporate bodies, which were the conditions for capital accumulation, political power, and family honor. The settlements, which were ratified by the Stadholder and States-General, protected specific families' stake in an office and guaranteed that regent families' collective office genealogies would continue unbroken. They also tightened the political vise on each family head accordingly, so that he could do nothing without the permission of his fellows. The apotheosis of regulation of the inheritance of landed (and sometimes mercantile) property entailed to the male line was the procedure of strict settlement, invented in seventeenth-century England and widely diffused in the eighteenth century. Like the French Family-State Compact and the Dutch Contracts of Correspondence, strict settlements were half of a two-tier pact, collectively designed
and administered, whose ultimate court of appeal was the monarch and the elite patriarchs themselves assembled in Parliament. They were the rock on which patriarchal property in power in eighteenth-century England was centralized and consolidated. But they also disadvantaged daughters, shucked off second and third sons, and decisively converted the elite father and family head into a subsidiary agent and administrator of his lineage and a mere tenant-for-life of his own estates and their political accoutrements.66

The heightened centrality of tropes of ruling fatherhood also marked out areas of exceptional macro-political vulnerability. Carole Pateman has argued that chaotic monarchical gender orders destabilized rule in the lead-up to the great revolutions of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, which eventually unseated various father-kings in favor of fractious fraternal male citizens.67 I also suspect that the increased patriarchalism of discourses of rule upped the general expectations of rulers' charisma and performance and was therefore implicated in the perceived "decline" of the French Bourbons, the British Hanoverians, the Dutch House of Orange, and other ruling Houses of eighteenth-century Europe. (This is a hunch, and a topic for future research.)68 The elite pacts created a distinctive form of institutional rigidity.69 Here I am emphasizing the neglected dimension of signification, which made for its own vulnerabilities. When a ruling sovereign was female or when a female regency was created to fill a hiatus in the male lineage; when ruling dynasties were founded by "new men" (dynamically speaking, fatherless sons); when a king failed to enforce the gender hierarchies in his own family-household, or was merely thought to have transgressed them in some way: these were situations in which we would expect the foundations of political order to have been shaken. The biggest earthquakes took place when people did away with the king or equivalent symbolic patriarch before there was a viable counterdiscourse of democracy—England during the English Revolution; the Netherlands in the Stadholderless periods—and tried to do without the father-ruler at the apex of the patrimonial state. This was a recipe for anarchy and eventual restoration.

Perhaps the practices of collective contestation and corporate deliberation among elite men helped them redefine their relations as lateral ties among equals. Historians and social scientists have stressed other sources of democratic discourse and practice in eighteenth-century Europe, including novels and philosophy; participation in coffeehouses, salons, and other nascent public spheres; revulsion against European colonialism; religious doctrine; and the dramatic demonstration effect of the French Revolution.70 As the simpler, sometimes even singular, causal models of second-wave marxian historical sociology have receded, we have been left with multiple genealogies, mechanisms, and other candidate explanations for the emergence of democracy—this is yet one more, as yet rather speculative, possibility. Weber
himself distinguished direct democracy, sometimes practiced by notables and other small so-called rational groups, from modern large-scale democracy, which could not subsist without the spread of market economy and status-leveling, bureaucratization, and for the full-fledged version, effective political parties and techniques of mass mobilization and communication. The patriarchal group, he thought, was alien to both forms, since "governing powers are normally appropriated and action is strictly bound to tradition." Nevertheless, suppressed alternatives always haunt political regimes, and in this case, these alternative visions could be expected to cluster around and take their tone from the patriarchal nucleus in patrimonial politics. There was a language of political opposition from below, but it was still predominantly familial in the old regimes, as many writers have pointed out. Those unhappy with the monarch first called upon him to be a better, more benevolent father, and then, more radically, urged their fellow brothers-in-arms to depose him. "Liberty, equality, fraternity" were the historic watchwords, and not just in revolutionary France. These potent signifiers also took shape within the discourses of the dynastic elite itself, when some courageous men and women of the ruling classes identified themselves with the cause of the oppressed and made themselves its agents. My working hypothesis is that one key to this revolutionary transformation—ultimately to the emergence of the idea of equality and shared fate—lay in the elite pacts and related interactions that took place under the sign of hierarchical paternity. Once this had happened, it opened the discursive door to the possibility of anyone's being considered an equal and a fellow human being—even women, people of other religions, or those who were currently held as slaves.

Not all early-modern elites were infused with a rage for democracy or revolution. There were important countercurrents built into patrimonial systems, including discursive reaffirmations of father-rule and political hierarchy. The elite pacts of eighteenth-century Augustan England, including the patriarchal strict settlements, were evidently compatible with a long period of hegemony and civil peace. But overall, and across Europe and beyond, some bases of elite dissent were likely nourished from within hierarchical states organized around ruler-subject relations. What makes this even more probable—although Weber's typological method makes this hard to see—is that the very men who formed part of Weber's collective ruler were contending with some of the other experiences of symbolic leveling and desacralization that Weber discusses in *Economy and Society*. Some of these men were hammering out new kinds of commercial contract progressively shorn of the family nimbus; within patriarchal patrimonial states, others were actually inventing rational-legal bureaucratic practices where patriarchy had no place. The characteristic contradictions of patriarchal patrimonialism pressed down on actors who were the obvious victims of such systems, to be
sure, but also those who were the greatest beneficiaries. We may thus look for homegrown roots of discourses of fraternal opposition to patrimonial rule, diffused internationally with particular vigor after the French Revolution, in the heart of relations of patriarchal subjection in both the republican/estatist and monarchical contexts. Precisely where we would expect it to be most secure, paternal rule and gendered order were always already unstable—resting on historically elaborated principles and relations that could under certain conditions call them into radical question. Tracing the confluence of these conditions, discursive and practical, European or not—and how men and women reacted to them—is a fascinating and worthwhile collective project.

In his magisterial and moving “Science as a Vocation,” Weber was more than ready to concede that scholars emphasize elements to which our value-orientations direct us. The present essay stands as an example of this interested strategy. It would be reasonable to say that I have a feminist optic, or axe to grind, am intrigued by the explanatory possibilities that present themselves when we highlight the patriarchy in patrimonialism, and hope to broaden academic definitions of the complex of problems surrounding state formation, reproduction, and revolution. All this would be true, and I take tinkering with established ideal types or introducing new ones as one vehicle for enlarging our interpretive and explanatory horizons. But I would not want to say that my version of an ideal type captures any sort of referential “essence” or turns a deliberate spotlight on something called “empirical reality.” Here I strongly disagree with Weber’s own accounts of what he was about, and with many a Weberian exegete. An ideal type can help us represent what we take to be actors’ interpretations, but this is a very different thing than revealing the real and a much more modest claim than Weber was wont to make for his method. All categories are representations, and ideal types are also analytical translations of what we take to be categories of practice. They are subject to all the fundamental indeterminacies of translation, to borrow Quine’s phrase. Does this mean that they are wrong, or that we cannot use them? Not at all. Translation is unavoidable in any case. The ideal type is itself an unstable formation of signs. For those who cannot accept the lack of fundamental foundations, we might say: the arms of the old methodological churches are opened widely and compassionately for them. Others can join me in offering a decidedly irreligious homage to the poststructuralist spirit of Elizabeth I and (whether or not they performed gender in an equivalent site of state power) other early moderns like her. Following their sense of the plasticity of gender categories of practice, I hope I have made “patriarchal patrimonialism” even more explicitly insecure—and by the same token more scientific and less ideological—by saying nay to Weber’s unreflective effort to ground it in biology at its heart.
My second caveat about ideal types concerns the stuff of history. The elite pacts I have discussed simultaneously marked, made possible, and make sense within the historical flowering of the relationships that Weber named with his ideal type “patriarchal patrimonialism.” Certain ideal types, like this one, can be construed as “the end states of a causal process and take on their meaning from that process.” When you choose an ideal type, if one wants a very un-early-modern metaphor, you are hitting the “pause” button on your analytical remote and then fiddling with the camera angle on the historical DVD. You might have picked a different “end state” or stopping point, another camera angle—even a different film. At minimum, to the extent that a type concept is identified with a historical process, especially one that tends toward a more or less likely “end state,” the process and outcome should be signaled as one that historians and social scientists select theoretically rather than unreflectively or merely conventionally. Ideal types can be put to use in just this way: to capture our interpretation of actors’ orientations; suggest likely ways that those actors might come together in social action; lay out plausible tendencies, countertendencies, and points of intersection with other historical processes named, perhaps, by other ideal types. In this chapter I rebuilt the concept of “patriarchal patrimonialism” for these purposes, among other things indicating why elite family heads, including monarchs, might be expected to envision themselves and act in certain ways, and illuminating the interelite pacts that they put together as father-rulers in early-modern Europe. Those pacts intersected with an array of theoretically defined processes and outcomes, some only touched on here, including state-building and breakdown; formations of masculinity and family; European colonialism; the making of ruling classes and elites; and social revolution. This list could—and will—be expanded indefinitely. Scholars influenced by Weber continue to broaden the marxist assumptions about what is historically important that dominated the second-wave historical sociology of the 1970s and 1980s. The future continually recasts our sense of what matters about the past; it recasts the past itself. And any such list is always open to possibilities and formulations that have yet to be imagined.

The newly minted ideal type is now good for further historical comparisons and research questions. We might ask: when was “father” first defined in relation to other signs (like “mother” or “uncle”) in a particular political setting, celebrated, and tied to signs of power and rule? How did these signs take shape in practices that dramatized the political authority of the male progenitor and head of household? Were these interrelated signs and practices politically productive, did they get the job done (secure relations of rule), and/or evoke counterpositions and alternative identities? With respect to signification, we are comparing formations of meaning; the processes by which people assemble and reassemble them; how these formations govern
action; how they disperse. These questions obviously reach far beyond early-modern Europe, extending over the globe and up to the present moment.81

Other Weberian ideal types—all, to my mind, useful materials for sociological bricolage—could benefit from an analogous feminist, poststructuralist overhaul. The definition of “charismatic authority” includes unexamined assumptions about “certain qualities” of individual personality.82 These mysterious qualities are cultural, theatrically performative, and emphatically gendered, and they demand systematic attention in light of what we now know about signification and audience reception. “Rational–legal authority” is an even bigger can of worms. For Weber, as Alan Sica puts it, “to theorize about social action was to bring it within rational reflection, and through ideal-typification to identify anomalies either as explainable minor deviations from the pure type or as irrationalities and therefore irrelevant.”83 Weber often used the “irrational” as “his own explanation in forswearing examination of certain phenomena, as if to say that the irrational was ipso facto impenetrable.”84 Weber went on to link the irrational with the signifier of the feminine—and a whole series of signifiers he took to be associated with the trope of femininity, such as the premodern, the family, the non-Western, the primitive, the sexual—and was therefore flummoxed when what was for him the “irrational” kept surfacing in the core of his neatly opposed categories of rationality, as it was wont to do. Weber was in that sense a man of his time; it is even probable that his particular genius rested on these ordered Apollonian/Dionysian oppositions. But perhaps we who follow after might take disturbing and rearranging them for new uses as part of our calling. In order to understand the things that Weber cared about, including politics and states, and to ask whether, for example, there can be patrimonialism without patriarchy, or a more or less rationalized modernity without a repressed and refused feminine underside, we have first to reexamine—and reject or reconstruct—Weber’s and our own naturalized categories. Only then will we have a Weber, and a historical social science, for the twenty-first century.

Notes

An earlier version of this essay was presented as the keynote address at the November 2, 2002, Conference on Law, Family, and State Organization in the Early Modern Atlantic World, sponsored by the Institute for Legal Studies at the University of Wisconsin Law School. I benefited greatly from the comments I received there, especially Richard Ross’s, and from the papers of the other conference participants. I would also like to thank Rebecca Emigh, Phil Gorski, Edgar Kiser, Richard Lachmann, Ann Orloff, Steve Pfaff, Mayer Zald, two anonymous reviewers for Stanford University Press, the participants in the NYU Sociology Department’s Gender and Inequality Workshop and a Sociology Department colloquium at Rutgers Univer-
sity, and my fellow Russell Sage Scholars for their reactions to various parts of the argument. A series of unresolved argumentative e-mails I had with Art Stinchcombe were especially fun and fruitful. Kari Hodges magically transformed the text into a Sage working paper. Finally, I am grateful to the American Council of Learned Societies, and especially the Russell Sage Foundation, for its marvelous, supportive atmosphere for work on the penultimate draft.


3. Ibid., p. 987.

4. Ibid., pp. 936–38.

5. Ibid., pp. 987–90.

6. Ibid., p. 1013.

7. Ibid., p. 225, 1028–29. “Thus there is a double sphere,” as Weber says, “(a) that of action which is bound to specific traditions; (b) that of action which is free of specific rules” (ibid., p. 227). There is clearly an endemic conceptual and historical tension encoded in the concept of patronialism, right at the point where the notion of personal discretion meets traditional legitimation. Sometimes Weber seems to imagine a utilitarian ruler who is instrumental with respect to tradition as well as his subjects. To wit: “The exercise of power is oriented toward the consideration of how far master and staff can go in view of the subjects’ traditional compliance without arousing their resistance” (ibid., p. 227). Few if any patronial rulers were so Machiavellian, even where Machiavellianism was traditionally legitimated.

8. Ibid., p. 1011.

9. Ibid., p. 1013.

10. Weber uses the concept of patriarchy in different ways in different parts of his work (is there any concept of Weber’s of which this could not be said?). In the first part of Economy and Society Weber defines patriarchalism as “the situation where, within a group (household) which is usually organized on both an economic and a kinship basis, a particular individual governs who is designated by a definite rule of inheritance” (ibid., p. 231). Elsewhere Weber treats patriarchal domination as “the formally most consistent authority structure that is sanctified by tradition” (ibid., p. 1009). Weber worries more about why this “particular individual” should be male (ibid., p. 1007), and tends to cast patriarchy as a core feature of a wider and more motley apparatus of patronial domination, of what he calls, sounding like a systems theorist, “differentiated patriarchal power” (e.g., ibid., pp. 1009–10).

11. Ibid., pp. 1031–32.

12. Ibid., p. 1007.

13. Ibid.

14. Weber himself had duelled while at school, and had the facial scars—and ensuing slap in the face from his horrified mother—to show for it. Arthur Mitzman, The Iron Cage: An Historical Interpretation of Max Weber (New York: Transaction
Books, 1969), pp. 23–24. But Weber acquired his scars in an era in which demonstrated prowess in duels, not to mention jousts and other contests, had been decoupled from the right to rule. Note that the issue here is not whether the biological differences between men and women have some sort of relationship to, and even causal role in, the historically varying taxonomies of gender, if we understand gender (as I do) to mean cultural definitions of masculinities and femininities. The problem is rather that Weber persistently elides gender and biological sex as concepts, reducing the former to the latter, and this hampers his analysis of patrimonial politics.

15. This may seem strange, as it has become more accepted in the disciplines of history, anthropology, and Renaissance and early-modern European studies that there is a gendered core of forms of power that I would call patrimonial (I discuss some of this literature later). It is still true, however, that many historians who write on early-modern European rule fail to register the patriarchal patrilineal dimension in their theoretical discussions, even as it pervades their empirical analyses.


19. Ibid., p. 411.

20. The two citations are drawn from Su Fang Ng's excellent dissertation, "Family Ties, Political Fictions: Metaphorical Communities in Seventeenth-Century England," chapter 1 of which deals with James's writings. Su Fang Ng, "Family Ties, Political Fictions: Metaphorical Communities in Seventeenth-Century England" (Ph.D. diss., English Department, University of Michigan), pp. 1–37. But James's subtle self-presentation availed him not, at least in England. According to Jenny Wormald, James—a dual monarch by dynastic fiat—did better at impersonating the vision of a Scottish "soverane lord" than the more "visually impressive" idea of English "sacred majesty" (Jenny Wormald, "James VI and I: Two Kings or One?" *History* 68 (1983): 204). James's immediate predecessor, Elizabeth I, had the advantage in ceremonial splendor, in spite of her sex (her gender was rather more ambiguous, or perhaps willfully plural, as we shall see below). Contemporaries thought James too "lavish of his presence . . . so common-hackney'd in the eyes of men, so stale and cheap to vulgar company" (Shakespeare, *Henry IV*, 1, scene 2)—though unlike Richard II, he managed to hang onto the crown.


22. Lynn Hunt's *The Family Romance of the French Revolution* is but one of many versions of this now widely diffused cultur alist argument about European kingship.
The Rule of the Father


23. The original authors of the father-ruler couplet are lost to us, but traces of their innovation can be found in the world’s classic religious texts and practices or in the archaeological footprints of ancient civilizations. See, for example, Gerda Lerner, *The Creation of Patriarchy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Once joined, the father-ruler signifiers can be put asunder. They can also be remarried. The linkage or splitting is contingent, although more or less probable in different historical circumstances.

24. For Willem I, known then and to this day as “Father of the Fatherland,” see Herbert Harvey Rowen, *The Princes of Orange: The Stadholders in the Dutch Republic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

25. Sir Robert Filmer, *Patriarcha and Other Writings* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 1–68, esp. 1–2. The 1991 Cambridge edition of Filmer’s *Patriarcha*, which includes a helpful introduction by Johann P. Sommerville, should be read up against Gordon Schochet’s pioneering analysis of Filmer in *Patriarchalism in Political Thought* (pp. 115–58) and two acute analyses of the specifically gendered content of Filmer’s thought: Pateman’s *The Sexual Contract* (pp. 82–89) and Rachel Weil’s *Political Passions: Gender, the Family and Political Argument in England, 1680–1714* (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2000). Filmer borrowed from patriarchal predecessors like Aristotle and Jean Bodin, but his tract is more self-consciously engaged in digesting and countering explicit opposition to patriarchal rule; see Jean Bodin, *On Sovereignty* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). *Patriarcha* was probably written before the English Civil War, but was only published posthumously in 1680.


27. On the prevalence of familial ideology in the governance of the American colonies and early republic, see, for example, Melvin Yazawa, *From Colonies to Com-


30. But how do we know which signs were “weightier” than others in politics? This chapter does not undertake a formal discourse analysis, so skims over this and other admittedly important issues. Barthes provides an exhilarating literary example of such an analysis, penned at the moment at which structuralism tipped over into poststructuralism, and the proliferation of possible codes and readings threatened to swamp the analyse de texte; Roland Barthes, S/Z (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974). John Mohr reviews various approaches to “measuring meaning” current in the social sciences (John Mohr, “Measuring Meaning Structures,” Annual Review of Sociology 24 [1998]: 345–70).


32. Gianfranco Poggi evokes elements of the family–household public theatrics in his delightful description of the seventeenth-century French court:

The king of France was thoroughly, without residue, a “public” personage. His mother gave birth to him in public, and from that moment on his existence, down to its most trivial moments, was acted out before the eyes of attendants who were holders of dignified offices. He ate in public, went to bed in public, woke up and was clothed and groomed in public, urinated and defecated in public. He did not much bathe in public; but then neither did he do so in private. I know of no evidence that he copulated in public; but he came near enough, considering the circumstances under which he was expected to deflower his august bride. When he died (in public), his body was promptly and messily chopped up in public, and its severed parts ceremoniously handed out to the more exalted among the personages who had been attending him throughout his mortal existence. Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of The Modern State: A Sociological Introduction (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1978), pp. 68–69.

See also Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies, an early, still influential work that pursues these arguments.

33. This is not to say that the sign of the patrilineage is or was seamless. Eilberg-Schwartz is a good source on some of the cultural contradictions of the patrilineage in ancient Judaism (Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, ”The Father, the Phallus, and the
Seminal Word: Dilemmas of Patrilineality in Ancient Judaism," in Mary Jo Maynes, Ann Waltner, Birgitte Soland and Ulrike Strasser, eds., *Gender, Kinship, Power: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary History* (New York: Routledge, 1996). The patriarchal patrilineal family model of rule, "typologized in Scripture," as Jeffrey Merrick reminds us, "did not have just one fixed signification" ("Fathers and Kings," pp. 281–84). Perhaps no signifier has "just one"—better to say that the patrilineage was obsessively marked as a privileged signifier, "with a fundamental immobility and reassuring certitude" (Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978], p. 279). When it frayed, whether from outside in or inside out (as a result of its internal contradictions), much anxiety followed. Weber actually contributes to the ideological effect of security and seamlessness, alas, when he installs father-rule as an ultimate given and biologically invariant ground at the core of the concept of patrimonialism.

34. This analytical nodal point is not necessarily one empirical site: it can be a singular space like Versailles, or a whole series of geographically dispersed manorial households, or some networked combination. These differences in the geographic organization of rule had consequences for state formation in Europe and for patriarchal relations in family-households, in part because of the distinctive possibilities they offered for the dramatization of masculine power. This is relatively unexplored territory in social science history or historical social science.

35. Two recent, suggestive approaches to the general issue of how symbols construct groups are provided by Pierre Bourdieu, "What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of Groups," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 32 (1987): 1–17; and Iris Marion Young, "Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social Collective," in Barbara Laslett, Johanna Brenner, and Yesim Arat, eds., *Rethinking the Political: Gender, Resistance, and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); the original text is Durkheim's *Elementary Forms*. It must be said, however, that none of these texts deals with how people use signs to construct groups. People figure as Töger, as mute structural supports for ideologies.

36. It's actually worth an article or book in its own right, of course. However eagerly I would like to engage the more general issues of the historical and theoretical relationship between the order of signs of masculinity and femininity, on the one hand, and the biological dichotomy of sexual difference that they comment on and play with on the other, there is no space to do so here.


38. Those two characters inhabit Shakespeare's *Othello* and Laclos's *Les Liaisons Dangereuses*, respectively and destructively. Scholars such as Wendy Gibson, who explore the elite women of European courts for being too strategic, too much like Laclos's Marquise de Merteuil in their machinations, miss the historical point. See Wendy Gibson, *Women in Seventeenth-Century France* (Basingstoke, England: Macmillan, 1989).


41. The feminine is a not altogether unpromising signifier for male rulers, on the occasions when they want to convey their nurturant care for the ruled. The latter is an ancient trope—the biblical reference is to Isaiah 49:23—"Kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and their Queens thy nursing mothers"; see, for example, Wildavsky on Moses as "nursing father" and political leader. Aaron B. Wildavsky, The Nursing Father: Moses as a Political Leader (University: University of Alabama Press, 1984). Early-modern patriarchal rulers occasionally tried to signal their own love—authoritative parental love, admittedly—of their subjects. As a practice of patriarchal signification, however, playing the Venus instead of the Mars card is risky, since it may also be taken to signify political weakness, even symbolic castration.

42. See Mary Douglas on women, conveyed in marriage, as doors through which pollution might enter a patriarchal patrilineal system. Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (New York: Routledge, 1966), p. 127. Linda Gregerson gives us a vivid picture of the vulnerability of Elizabeth I to this popular preoccupation with pollution, a vulnerability accentuated by fears of foreign—especially French and Catholic—influence and invasion (Linda Gregerson, "Native Tongues: Effeminization, Miscegenation, and the Construction of Tudor Nationalism," Mitteilungen [Frankfurt: Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitat Zentrum zur Erforschung der Frühen Neuzeit, 1995], pp. 18–38). In one sense, then, Elizabeth I is a representative figure: virtually any female ruler in early-modern Europe could have served as an exemplar of these dynamics. But in another sense not: Elizabeth's responses are particularly adroit, in comparison with those of other English rulers and rulers elsewhere: see her 1559 and 1566 Responses to Parliamentary Delegations on Her Marriage and her 1560 Response to Erik of Sweden's Proposal. These dynamics took on an explosive importance in early-modern European sites such as England and the Netherlands, which were being transformed by people's creation of the concepts and discourses of nation and nationalism, entangled, of course, with kingship. See Philip Gorski's analysis of nationalism as a phenomenon of the early modern rather than—as is usually assumed!—modernity. Philip S. Gorski, "The Mosaic Moment: An Early Modernist Critique of the Modernist Theory of Nationalism," American Journal of Sociology 105 (March 2000): 1438–68.


44. The felt need to close the gap between the totem and the mortal man or woman is always there, but people's responses in one or another historical context differ in content if not in form. In Trotsky's account of mass perceptions of (and desire swirling around) the figure of Kerensky during the Russian Revolution, for example, "Kerensky as a person has to be stripped of many of his characteristics, to be reduced from a whole man who puts on his pants one leg at a time to a public sym-
bol whose few psychologically present characteristics are then compared with a model of what a socialist leader should look like” (Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Theoretical Methods in Social History [New York: Academic Press, 1978], p. 73). Indeed, as the expectations of rulers’ performances grew over time in Europe, so did the sophistication of ideological operations, invoked especially when chancy bloodlines turned up rulers who—metaphorically speaking, and even with help—couldn’t put on their pants at all.


46. Women are unthinkable as public patriarchs in the contemporary Saudi ruling family, for example. The possibility of such a cultural translation is barred, ruled out. Whether a (biological) woman can be a (social) man is obsessively debated in other historical forms of patriarchal patrimonalism—witness the French controversies over Salic Law and female succession to the throne. But in some sites, including early-modern England, female substitutes are deemed not only possible but even preferable to more lineally distant or otherwise problematic males. Why can women’s biological femininity be part of a performance of ruling masculinity or fatherhood in only some sites and conjunctures? If specified with care, this question could be as fruitful for present-day world politics as it is for early-modern European states.

47. One might call these flows media, assets, or resources (see, for example, Sewell on schemas and resources and Giddens on rules and resources; William H. Sewell Jr., “A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation,” American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 1 (July 1992): 1–29; Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). It is true that there are theoretical and empirical stakes involved even here, in the most abstract nomenclature for social practices. But because I am mostly intent in this chapter on installing signs at the center of a Weberian ideal type, and thus reconstructing ways to think about a range of early-modern European political practices and institutions, these conceptual differences matter less for the sociological task at hand.


51. Ibid., p. 7.

52. Only metaphorically do the two form a single “compact,” in my view; rather they were functionally interlocked sets of contracts and practices. I have found Ralph Giesey especially helpful in disentangling the complexity of elite lineage property (proprie) and patrimonial politics in early-modern France (Ralph E. Giesey, “Rules of Inheritance and Strategies of Mobility in Prerevolutionary France,” American Historical Review 82 (April 1977): 271–89). On medieval and early-modern family strate-


54. By virtue of their devaluation, ironically, elite women were free from some of the harsher rites prescribed for privileged men, which Norbert Elias limns in his picture of the disciplining of medieval and early-modern European elite men and masculinity on the path to the state’s monopolization of the means of violence. Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998).


56. Under certain associated conditions, Goldstone argues, revolutions ensued (ibid., pp. xxiii–xxiv). I am rudely truncating a complex argument and extracting one element, but philosophical differences authorize this particular intellectual liberty. Demography comes close to being cast as a primary motor of history for the Goldstone of *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*. For me it is but one mechanism among many. That deep disagreement doesn’t make Goldstone’s rich analysis of the demographic mechanism any the less useful for my and others’ neo-Weberian purposes.

57. David M. Kreps, “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,” in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). If I were writing a fully rounded history of elite pacts here, I would say much more about how participants created and demolished them; how they kept competitors and counterfeaters at bay; how they kept track of who was complying and enforced their own collective strictures on one another, and how the implicit and explicit features of contracts were related. On the threat of mimicry, see especially Michael Bacharach and Diego Gambetta on signification and trust games. Michael Bacharach and Diego Gambetta, “Trust in Signs,” in Karen Cook, ed., *Trust and Society* (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001). Also important to underline would be women’s distinctive roles in forwarding (or at times undermining) the men’s pacts, serving as circulating media themselves and, sometimes, playing the parts of male participants. The same dynamics that I outlined above for Elizabeth I and other female rulers also hold here.


59. Kiser does an excellent job of unpacking Weberian agency arguments from a rational-choice perspective. Edgar Kiser, “Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in


61. By this, those rulers meant a sense of binding obligation tying agents to themselves, the superordinate father-rulers of the respective home state. In his comparative analysis of medieval Maghribi trade, Avner Greif models the way that the trust and accountability characteristic of family relations could be used to counteract tendencies toward parcelization (Avner Greif, "Contract Enforceability and the Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition," American Economic Review 83, no. 3 [June 1993]: 525–48). He is dealing with economic relations, but much of his argument would also hold for the multiplex networks of patrimonial elites. These family systems had their limits (of scale among other things), but they did make agency problems more manageable.


63. Ibid., p. 946.


66. See especially Eileen Spring’s work on the development of the English strict settlements, on entailment, and her critical review of historians’ debates about their meaning for patriarchy (Eileen Spring, Law, Land, and Family: Aristocratic Inheritance in England, 1300 and 1800 [Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993], pp. 123–47). Many people who have not broached a single tome of early-modern history will remember Mr. Bennett’s predicament in Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice: no sons, too many daughters, not enough family money, and a pompous idiot of an heir imposed by the entail. It was not Mr. Bennett himself who got to say who inherited his estate—for that had been decided before his birth—much to Mrs. Bennett’s chagrin and our readers’ delight. The disaster of the entail, which threatens to set the daughters of the house adrift upon the world, is absolutely necessary to the plot.


68. In its codified form, the trope of patriarchal roteness and dynastic decline is as old as Suetonius; see his The Lives of the Caesars (c. 110 C.E.), trans. J. C. Rolfe
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). What I am suggesting that we might explore, with a comparative-historical eye, would be the ways in which its specific deployment—including the first stirrings of mass mediation and publicity—affected contemporaries’ response to the authority claims of early-modern father-rulers.

69. See Adams, “Culture in Rational-Choice Theories.”

70. As a sampling of works that may be taken to nominate specifically familial variables and mechanisms for our consideration as causes of rebellion or revolution, see Goldstone on demographic pressures on early-modern states (Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion); Hunt regarding representations of father-son relationships and brotherhood in eighteenth-century French novels and culture (Hunt, The Family Romance); Habermas on the emergent (male) public sphere and the bourgeoisie (Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989]). There are naturally many other candidate variables and nonfamilial dimensions of change not considered here, and in this deconstructive intellectual moment they are still proliferating.


72. Ibid., p. 290.

73. In this vein, Economy and Society has some valuable things to say about the development of the limited-liability company out of the household and the rise of bureaucratic forms within a situation of rule by notables (Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 707–9, 951–52).


75. “Indeterminacy means not that there is no acceptable translation, but that there are many” (W. V. Quine,”Indeterminacy of Translation Again,” Journal of Philosophy 84, no. 1: 9). I realize that this settles nothing; it merely opens the possibility of exploring parallels and differences between translation and ideal type.

76. This is Max Weber with a twist. To wit: “To the person who cannot bear the fate of the times like a man, one must say: may he rather return silently, without the usual publicity build-up of renegades, but simply and plainly. The arms of the old churches are opened widely and compassionately for him.” Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation,” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 155.

77. No doubt “the biological” (itself a complex, lazy signifier in the disciplines of history and the social sciences) plays a role, or many roles, which remain to be worked out and incorporated into historical sociological descriptions and explanations. People build their castles of signification from the materials that they find around them, and the dichotomous fact of sexual difference is a basic part of that cultural landscape. What that fact comprises or entails is far from obvious, but that people take it to exist is crystal clear. But the variable structure of gender signification and the games of meaning that people play with their perceptions of what it is to be male or female cannot simply be referred to, or analytically exhausted by, the dichotomy of sexual difference. It’s what people do with it that counts. That those imaginative practices are subject to further biological selection mechanisms should go without saying.
79. I have found Fritz Ringer's to be a particularly useful summary discussion of ideal types in Weber's thought. Fritz Ringer, *Max Weber's Methodology: The Unification of the Cultural and Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 110–21. Ringer references Weber's 1904 essay "Objectivity" to define ideal types as "pure constructs of relationships that we conceive as 'sufficiently motivated,' 'objectively probable' and thus causally 'adequate' in the light of our 'nomological knowledge.'" He notes further that ideal types are designed with pragmatic purposes in mind: "They are valuable as cognitive means, to the extent that they lead to knowledge of 'concrete cultural phenomena in their interconnections, their causes, and their significance'" (ibid., pp. 111–12).
84. Ibid., p. 228.