# 5 | *Ideological Foundations of Development in the West Indies*

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Charles Moskos and Wendell Bell do not view the increasing internal inclusive-
ess of a society as a "working out of blind forces." Instead, they see it as a
continuation and extension of man's ability to make his society and thus himself.

From an intensive study of the elite in the British West Indies, they conclude
that the elite's acceptance of the masses is a critical condition for democracy. The
ideological complex emphasizing freedom, equality, and increasing economic
security for all is viewed as a global tendency in human thought.

For other aspects of the relation between ideology and political structure, see
Greer and Minar on urban redevelopment in the United States (16), Long on
the movement for metropolitan government (20), Barringer on rural-urban cul-
tural differences (3), and Gilbert on community power structure (12). Bell, in
7, deals with the complex interrelations of ideology and political structure and
their reciprocal effects on social science.

$M$ODERNIZATION HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED BY
many recent writers as inextricably intertwined with the long-term
trends that have resulted in more and more people becoming participants
in a political community, the spread of economic interdependence, and
the widening of social and cultural boundaries through both space and
time. The political, economic, social, and cultural transformation under-
lying modernization are not, however, for the most part, blind forces of

nature or technology working on man and society from some independent point of origin. They are, in today's world, a basic part of man himself, an aspect of his goal-seeking behavior as an individual and especially as a member of a collectivity.

Of course, such goal-seeking behavior is to be understood largely as a manifestation of the ideologies held by the individuals involved, for when men do things—especially when they join together to do things— they usually have reasons for their behavior. Here we use the term "ideology" in the sense suggested by Garstin to include a philosophy of history, a view of man's present place in it, some estimate of probable lines of future development, and a set of prescriptions regarding how to hasten, retard, or modify that developmental direction. It includes a set of values that are more or less coherent and it links particular patterns of action to the achievement of a future desired state of affairs. As an ideology modernization is both a moral vision of a future that is presumed to be better than the present and a set of conscious policies and actions, more or less known and agreed upon, that are intended to bring that better future into reality.

Perhaps no more dramatic illustration of this can be found than in the transformation of former colonies into new nations during the past two decades. The colonial independence movements generated a drive toward political independence, economic progress, social reform, and cultural autonomy, and new national leaders dedicated to the reconstruction of their societies along modern lines came to power. Such leaders adopted a rational decision-making model as part of their definition of the situation and set about "deciding" how to shape developments in their new nations to conform to their images of the future (Bell and Oxaal). Of course, they faced practical difficulties and limitations as well as sometimes surprising unanticipated consequences, but they nonetheless became significant agents of directed change pushing and pulling their countries into the modern world, a world whose dominant characteristics were largely formed by the fact that it was increasingly and predominantly urban.

Although the colonial independence movements since World War II were anti-western to the extent to which they were directed against domination by the European powers, it is our thesis that they were motivated by some of the highest ideals of western civilization and reflected visions of a good society that were largely western in origin. Most specifically, the ideology of equality, learned by young colonials abroad in the capitals of Europe, was a key element in the images of the future held by the leaders of the emerging nations. A commitment

to the ideal of equality was evident both in the general dimensions of modernization as envisioned by the new national leaders and in the particular and detailed daily decisions that helped to determine the direction and tempo of political, economic, social, and cultural development in the new nations. Thus, our hypothesis is that egalitarianism, and, as we shall see, related values of the eighteenth-century European enlightenment, represent the ideological foundations of directed change in the new nations.

We propose to illustrate this hypothesis by reporting data from an empirical study of four new nations in the British West Indies. First, we shall briefly review the trend toward equality throughout the history of these countries, and we suggest that West Indian political independence itself may be rightly viewed as just one step among many taken on the long road toward equality, and equality of opportunity, the end of which, however, has certainly not been reached. This interpretation of West Indian history highlights the continuity between past achievements that have resulted in increasing equality and the present struggle for more equality in the future.

Second, based on personal interviews with top West Indian leaders, we describe and analyze attitudes toward equality during the transition to political independence. Such attitudes represent an important part of the ideology of West Indian leaders, persons with the power to accelerate, delay, or even reverse the trend toward equality through their formulation and implementation of policy. The analysis of these data is of practical significance in revealing some of the sources of support or opposition to the trend toward equality; and it is of theoretical significance in showing the ways in which the distribution of attitudes toward equality are related systematically to the social differentiation of West Indian leaders.

Third, and most important, we examine the relationships between egalitarian attitudes and attitudes toward political, economic, social, and cultural development. We ask: what are the implications of attitudes toward equality for images of the future? what are the implications for the emergent polity, economy, society, and culture that West Indian leaders are in the process of creating? how will egalitarianism alter the patterns of life and the organization of society? The answers to these questions permit us to make some preliminary observations on the meaning and character of these emergent Caribbean nations, and by cautious generalization perhaps on the future prospects of some of the other new states as well.

## Emergent Caribbean Nations

Four of the British Caribbean nations studied have already become fully independent: Jamaica with a population of about 1.7 million; Trinidad and Tobago with a population over 800,000; Guyana, on the South American continent, with 600,000 people; and Barbados with about 250,000 inhabitants. There are also seven smaller island-units in the Leeward and Windward chains occupying a midposition between full independence and colonial status.

The modern political history of the British West Indies begins in the late 1930s when outbreaks of strikes and riots engulfed most of the poverty-struck area. The economic discontent of the populace, which was soon given voice by new leaders, led to a series of constitutional advances that began in the mid-1940s. Although delayed by the outbreak of World War II, the transformation of the old crown colony system into a modified ministerial form of government with local leaders was started at that time, and by the early 1950s, each of the territories had achieved large measures of local autonomy under a democratic system based on universal adult suffrage. Although there have been several attempts to unify the area, the most recent being the West Indies Federation, the various territories have followed different roads toward political independence.

Nearly all West Indians are descended from people brought over in previous times to meet the demands of an economy based on the sugar plantation, and the bulk of the population is of African descent whose ancestors were slaves. After the emancipation of the slaves in the 1830s, indentured laborers were brought over for agricultural labor. Of these later arrivals, the most numerous were from India (East Indians), who today represent the largest ethnic group in British Guiana and constitute a sizable minority in Trinidad. Also contributing to the West Indies' demographic mosaic are small numbers of English, Irish, Scots, Welsh, Portuguese, Levantines, Chinese, and Amerindians. Although the West Indies are still heavily dependent upon sugar exports, such tropical products as bananas, coconuts, spices, rice, and citrus fruits are also marketed abroad. The major extractive industries, all foreign owned, are bauxite in Jamaica and British Guiana, and petroleum in Trinidad. Some small-scale manufacturing is done locally in Jamaica and Trinidad, and tourism has also become an important source of income.

## The Trend Toward Equality

Anyone who argues that gross inequalities of status and opportunities do not exist in the West Indies today would be flying in the face of facts (Bell, 1964). Although it is true that there is equality of civil and political rights, as these are expressed in law, such equality is partly irrelevant and partly only nominal when actual practice is considered.

Equality of political rights is undoubtedly more fully achieved in fact than equality of civil rights, but the inequalities of social and economic stratification in the West Indies result in some reduction of real equality in the political arena. And economic and social inequalities in the West Indies are even greater than civil and political inequalities. Analyses of the social structures of Jamaica, Trinidad, and Guyana by social scientists point out the inequalities in those territories (M. G. Smith, R. T. Smith, Braithwaite). In somewhat oversimplified terms, the stratification system consists of a small white or nearly white upper class, a middle class that is mostly colored with some Chinese, Portuguese, and East Indian representation, and the predominantly black or East Indian lower classes. In recent times, however, the correlation between ethnicity and status does not possess the sharpness of the past as there has been increasing overlap between class and color.

The inequalities that exist in the present-day West Indies are striking, and their potential for instability and conflict should not be underestimated. Their significance may be further understood by viewing them from the perspective of the long-term trends that have affected the changing distributions of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. From the point of view of the historical extension of these rights, it is accurate to describe much of the history of the West Indies in terms of the changing, i.e., rising, status of the lower classes—be they white, brown, East Indian or black; be they slaves, bond servants, indentured workers, urban workers, unemployed poor people, or whatever, depending on the period of West Indian history one is discussing. As striking as present-day inequalities—rather more striking in fact—is the emergence of the West Indian lower classes as participants in the society on the basis of more equality than they have in the past enjoyed. The gradual extension of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights —rights embedded in law and not simply benefits deriving from benevolent paternalism that may be granted in exchange for personal subservience and submissive gratitude—to the lower classes in the West Indies can be easily documented.

The present inequalities in West Indian society, then, have a past

during which there were far greater inequalities than now exist, and during which the trends have been in the direction of less inequality and more equality. But the present inequalities also have a future. What that future will be is problematic, although we know that the identification of a long-term trend does not mean that its continuation is inevitable, or that it will continue automatically without definite action being taken, or that it will occur without agitation and violence. Having identified a long-term trend toward equality, however, one can attempt to find the dynamic mechanism underlying change or preventing change, and, so doing, then to assess the present situation with respect to such mechanism. Thus the future of the trend toward equality may be somewhat less problematic than at first it seems, and simple extrapolation of the time series can be replaced by some insight into the processes involved in change.

Having special importance for assessing the processes of change are the ideologies, attitudes, and beliefs of those who occupy positions of power and authority; those elites who make important decisions, and often take, or refuse to take, actions that result in structural change. Attitudes of elites toward equality at any given time are important indicators of their willingness to *lead,* rather than be dragged by lower class demands, threats, and violence, into a more egalitarian future.

There has been ample evidence of lower class discontent, disaffection, and alienation in the West Indies in recent years. These recent dissatisfactions and demands have been primarily economic, although some complaints concerning lack of practical equality with respect to civil rights (e.g., actions of police and courts) and social rights (e.g., racialism) have also been voiced. The future extension of equality in the West Indies, the meeting of or failure to meet these further demands for equality with structural changes toward more equality, depends in part on the attitudes of the modern-day West Indian leaders toward equality. If the leaders generally favor the extension of equality, if they believe that the present structures that give rise to and maintain the present inequalities are no longer legitimate viewed from the perspective of the ideology and morality of equality, then structural changes may be achieved extending equality still further without violence and other debilitating disruptive effects. That is, if the leaders accept the doctrine of equality and if they are courageous enough to act on it, then the trend toward equality may continue while social integration is increased. But if the West Indian leaders feel that the present inequalities are right and fair, if they feel that the trend toward equality has already gone far enough, if they believe present inequalities should remain, then the trend toward equality may not continue at all or it may continue only at

the expense of social integration and with violence and force. Further-more, if the elites view institutions giving rise to and maintaining the present inequalities as legitimate, then they can be persuaded only by playing on their fears or compelled by force to accept structural changes producing greater equality with the consequences of increasing mal-integration and creating disruptive and debilitating structural effects at least during the transition period.

With this discussion in mind, we now turn to a consideration of attitudes toward equality held by West Indian leaders.

## Basic Data

The data reported here are from interviews with 112 top leaders in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Barbados, and Grenada and Dominica, the last two smaller West Indian territories. These leaders were interviewed from August 1961 through April 1962 and included in each territory were the premier, the most influential cabinet members, top leaders of the opposition party(ies), heads of labor unions, wealthy merchants, large plantation owners, and newspaper editors. Also interviewed were leading members of the clergy, ethnic leaders, top educationists, leaders of voluntary organizations, prominent professionals, and high-ranking civil servants. In each of the territories, the leaders who were interviewed constituted, with a few exceptions, a systematically defined *universe* of the top national decision-makers.[1]

To locate such national leaders, a modified "snowball" technique was used. Initially, persons in a cross-section of institutional sectors were selected who, on the basis of their formal roles or institutional positions, were likely to be top leaders. They were asked to identify individuals whom they considered to wield national influence. As the nominations of the national leaders accumulated, the most frequently mentioned persons were in turn asked to identify other influentials. In this way the original positional approach gave way to a reputational approach, and the list of reputed leaders was increasingly refined. The same procedure was used in each of the territories, so that comparability between the units was insured. No leaders so selected refused to be interviewed, and when the field research had been completed, each leader had been questioned at some length about, among other things, the issues discussed in this study.

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[1] A detailed description of the selection of the top West Indian leaders along with their names, but not the particular data analysis reported here, is available in Moskos. A revised version of this study along with other studies conducted by the West Indies Study Program appear in Bell, 1967.

Although the data formally presented in this paper are limited to the interviews with the 112 top leaders, our interpretation has been informed by observation, discussions with informants, additional and less systematic interviews, and reading a wide range of local newspapers and periodicals throughout several periods of field work and shorter trips to the West Indies from as early as 1956 to 1966.

## An Indicator of Egalitarian Attitudes

In the view of West Indian leaders equality means primarily equality of opportunity, egalitarians wanting a situation in which ascribed barriers to individual advancement will be practically non-existent. Some leaders thought in terms of minimum sets of rights consistent with the way in which we have discussed the trend toward equality, and others went so far as to stress equal rewards for all individuals in a society. A classic and succinct definition of the philosophy of egalitarianism that is generally reflected in the attitudes of West Indian leaders has been given by Tawney:

> It is to hold that while (man's) natural endowments differ profoundly, it is the mark of a civilized society to aim at eliminating such inequalities as have their source, not in individual difference, but in its own organization, and that individual differences, which are a source of social energy, are more likely to ripen and find expression if social inequalities as far as practicable, are diminished.

The measurement of egalitarian attitudes among the West Indian leaders was based on their responses to an open-ended question. Immediately before the item in the interview dealing with egalitarian attitudes, the respondent was asked what he considered the best form of government for his territory. Persons who favored political democracy were asked what they considered the essence of democracy. Persons who did not favor political democracy were asked what they considered the best alternative form of government. In either case, if features such as equality of opportunity, the classless society, or related notions were mentioned, the leaders were called "egalitarians." This is a rather stringent test with the egalitarians being highly egalitarian and the remainder including both highly and mildly inegalitarian attitudes. Of the 112 interviewed West Indian leaders, 39 per cent were classified as egalitarian, the remaining 61 per cent—those who did not explicitly affirm egalitarianism as part and parcel of their ideology—being termed "inegalitarians."

Although we are dealing with four emergent Caribbean nations, between which the *incidence* of egalitarian attitudes varied, a similar pattern runs through all of them with respect to the correlates of egalitarian attitudes among their leaders. From partial cross tabulations not presented here, we found that individual correlations of attitudes, activities, and personal background characteristics relating to attitudes toward equality were markedly similar regardless of territory. Thus we treat the West Indies as a whole and group the various territories together in the presentation of the following data.[2]

## Elite Differentiation and Egalitaran Attitudes

Obviously, some elites are more strategically placed than others to articulate and aggregate economic and social interests and some are more strategically placed to make and execute policies designed to bring about economic and social change. Thus, the relationships between structural variables and attitudes toward equality are of practical significance. Also, the locus of structural support for, or against, the spread of economic and social equality is of theoretical interest.

Table 1 shows the percentage of West Indian leaders who were egalitarians by selected social characteristics. Starting with the first characteristic given, one can see that egalitarianism decreased with age. oung leaders are more than three times as likely to have egalitarian attitudes than the oldest group of leaders, with the middle age group falling in between. Perhaps this merely reflects the increasing "conservatism" that develops with increasing age, or perhaps new and more liberal generations are being added to the age distribution at the bottom, each generation retaining certain characteristic habits of belief and attitude throughout its life. In any event, this correlation between age and egalitarianism may augur well for the continued spread of equality.

Looking at the relationship between attitudes toward equality and amount of formal education, we find egalitarian sentiments most typical of the highest and lowest levels. Leaders with intermediate education levels were the least likely to be egalitarian. Two different factors may account for this "U" shaped distribution. On the one hand, the percentage of persons with low educational levels who are egalitarian is evidence of a general finding: greater relative support for equality among West Indian leaders of lower socioeconomic origins (which is corroborated by findings reported below dealing with wealth, color and

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[2] A discussion of the attitudes of the West Indian leaders as differentiated by territory is given in Moskos, 1967.

ethnicity, and institutional sector). On the other hand, the most highly educated leaders, who favored equality relatively more than the middling-educated leaders, often seemed inconsistent with their class interest, as narrowly conceived, and reflected in their attitudes the enlightenment of western humanitarian philosophy. They had usually been exposed to the latter during their higher education which, until recent years, meant an extended stay abroad, most often in the United Kingdom, the United States, or Canada.

*Table 1. Percentage of West Indian Leaders Who Are Egalitarians by Selected Social Characteristics*

| SELECTED SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS | EGALITARIANS | NUMBER OF CASES |
|---|---|---|
| *Age* | | |
| 55 and over | 19% | (37) |
| 40 to 54 | 45 | (58) |
| 39 and under | 65 | (17) |
| *Education* | | |
| College or higher | 49 | (37) |
| Secondary school | 30 | (57) |
| Elementary only | 50 | (18) |
| *Personal Wealth* | | |
| Wealthy | 13 | (39) |
| Not wealthy | 53 | (73) |
| *Color and Ethnicity* | | |
| White | 18 | (39) |
| Light-brown | 30 | (20) |
| East Indian or Chinese | 25 | (12) |
| Dark-brown or black | 68 | (41) |
| *Institutional Sector* | | |
| Political or labor | 69 | (48) |
| Economic | 6 | (34) |
| Mass media | 25 | (8) |
| Civil service | 37 | (8) |
| Other[a] | 28 | (14) |

[a] Includes religious personages, ethnic group leaders, heads of voluntary organizations, free professionals, and educationists.

Wealth, an important variable in any society, also served to demarcate the West Indian leaders' views toward equality. In this study, a person was termed wealthy if he owned a large home with a permanent household staff and had an income of such an amount and nature that he would probably be able to live close to his current standard of living even if he became incapacitated. Such individuals would be considered

wealthy by American standards as well. As reported in Table 1, non-wealthy leaders were four times more likely to be egalitarians than wealthy persons.[3]

There was a strong correlation between darkness of skin and favorable attitudes toward equality among the West Indian leaders. Over two-thirds of the dark brown or black leaders were egalitarians as compared to 18 per cent of the whites. Falling between these two groups, but somewhat closer to the white leaders, were East Indians, Chinese, and persons of light-brown complexion. As pointed out earlier, the vast majority of the darker skinned people in the West Indies were low in economic and social status while the lighter skinned were generally much more favorably placed in the socioeconomic system.

Because wealth and color are to some extent confounded in the West Indies, it is important to clarify their independent effects on egalitarianism. From a table not shown here, wealth appears to be more important than color. Nonwealthy whites were twice as likely to be egalitarian as the wealthy nonwhites. In fact, wealthy nonwhites were even less egalitarian than wealthy whites. The often-heard expression in the West Indies that it is "class not color" that underlies differences in many attitudes and behaviors is supported by this finding.

The final social characteristic presented in Table 1 is the institutional sector in which the leaders exercised their national influence. Although some leaders engaged in several spheres of activity each leader was classified just once according to his primary activity. Egalitarian attitudes were much more frequent among political and labor leaders than any other group, and least typical of economic dominants. More egalitarian than the economic dominants, but much less so than the political and labor leaders, were persons involved in the mass media, civil service, and "other areas of activity," e.g., religious personages, ethnic group leaders, heads of voluntary organizations, free professionals, and educationists.

In general, then, egalitarians were characteristically leaders of secular, mass-based organizations that were outgrowths of the modern West Indian awakening, and these were the individuals who held legitimate change most directly in their hands and who were committed to modernization. Inegalitarians tended to be leaders who represented the established vested interests of West Indian society. Most West Indian

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[3] The relatively high number of inegalitarians with a completion of secondary school education only may reflect the typical academic pattern of most West Indian economic elites. Of the 39 leaders who were termed wealthy in this study, 12 were college graduates, 26 had an education terminating at the secondary school level, and one had not gone beyond elementary school.

economic dominants also thought—probably erroneously, in the long run—that they had most to lose by the spread of economic and social equality. Yet it must be emphasized that the correlates between the institutional sectors and egalitarianism, as with the other social background variables, were not perfect and there were many exceptions to the general patterns.

## Implications for Political Development

Within the new nations, policy questions that were formerly dealt with by imperial officials are now being answered by local leaders representing new national citizenries and new collective purposes. Because it is the transition from colonial to independent status that has posed these policy questions, we have called such questions the "decisions of nationhood." Whether by reasoned planning or by random drifting, some outcome or "decision" with respect to these policy questions must take place. The following sections are a modest effort to bring some empirical data to bear on the implications of equality for a few of the major political, economic, social, and cultural issues concerning the four emergent nations under discussion; in other words, for some of the items on the modernizers' agenda.

*Political Independence.* One obvious example of a decision of nationhood that involves the reorganization of the polity is the choice of individuals to seek political independence for their home territories. What are some of the factors that lead some members of a colonial society to question the old order and eventually take steps to bring about a dismantlement of an empire, others to look with alarm on this course of events, and still others to accept the changing order without being personally committed to it? On the basis of both attitudes and activities the West Indian leaders were classified into three nationalist types: *true nationalists,* those who favored independence immediately; *acquiescing nationalists,* those who temporized with respect to independence but were not firm supporters of the colonial system; and *colonialists,* those who favored the indefinite continuation of the colonial system.

Of the West Indian leaders 44 were egalitarians, and from Table 2 we note that all of them were true nationalists; also all of the true nationalists were egalitarians. None of the egalitarians were either acquiescing nationalists nor colonialists. Although there is often some interaction and circularity of causation between some attitudes and activities and others, or perhaps a joint antecedent cause, it is frequently possible to determine the most likely direction of causation. The weight

of our knowledge of the modern history of ideas, the recent history of
the West Indies, and the personal statements of all the West Indian
leaders lead to the conclusion that support of political independence was
fostered by an egalitarian ethic, and opposition to it by inegalitarian
values. Thus, one of the most far-reaching implications of attitudes

Table 2. Percentage of West Indian Leaders Having Certain Political
Attitudes by Egalitarianism

| POLITICAL ATTITUDES | EGALITARIAN | INEGALITARIAN |
|---|---|---|
| Attitudes toward Political Independence | | |
| True nationalist | 100% | 0% |
| Acquiescing nationalist | 0 | 41 |
| Colonialist | 0 | 59 |
| Total | 100% | 100% |
| Number of Cases | (44) | (68) |
| Attitudes toward Political Democracy | | |
| Democrat | 44% | 7% |
| Authoritarian idealist | 16 | 0 |
| Cynical parliamentarian | 30 | 27 |
| Authoritarian | 10 | 66 |
| Total | 100% | 100% |
| Number of Cases | (43) | (68) |

toward equality was that it engendered the West Indian nationalist
movements. Historically, the attainment of political independence was
one step, albeit a crucial one, toward the political power thought neces-
sary by some leaders to transform the West Indies into new, more
egalitarian societies.

Political Democracy. It was no accident that the arguments invoked
to justify claims for political independence in colonial nationalist move-
ments were heavily larded with the rhetoric of the theory of political
democracy as well as equality. Yet to the dismay of many persons, it
has become increasingly clear that the apparently heartfelt appeals to
democracy to justify the demands for independence have done little
to insure the establishment and continuation of democratic political
systems in many of the new nations. In fact, once the imperial power has
withdrawn, the new national leaders and citizenries can raise the question,
"What form of government should the new nation have?" And they
have considerable freedom of choice in reaching a decision. Among the
several factors relevant to a decision on this issue are the attitudes of the
leaders toward equality.

A political typology was constructed based on attitudes toward the suitability of parliamentary democracy for one's home territory (the referent being a representative system with guarantees for the mainte- nance of civil and minority rights); and judgments on the competency of the average West Indian voter, i.e., whether a leader was cynical or idealistic with regard to the electorate, an important facet of personal political philosophy. *Democrats* were those leaders who thought that parliamentary democracy was very suitable for their home territories *and* that the voters were competent. Those who had qualifications about the parliamentary form or believed it was unsuitable but held favorable attitudes toward the competency of the typical West Indian voter were termed *authoritarian idealists*. Another type, the *cynical parliamen- tarians*, while favoring a parliamentary system, thought that the average voter was incompetent; and *authoritarians* were those who neither be- lieved in the suitability of the parliamentary form nor thought the typical voter was competent.

For the top West Indian leaders as a whole, the percentage dis- tribution in attitudes toward democracy according to these political types was as follows: democrats, 22 per cent; authoritarian idealists, 6 per cent; cynical parliamentarians, 28 per cent; authoritarians, 44 per cent. The number of cases was 111.

Even though these emergent nations presently have British-type representative systems functioning within them, we must conclude from this distribution of attitudes that the foundations of democracy may be shaky. We know from public opinion surveys, however, that attitudes favorable to democracy are far from unanimous even in the most mature democracies.

Reported in Table 2 are the relationships between egalitarianism and attitudes toward political democracy. In general, egalitarians were more likely to be democrats, and less likely to be authoritarians, than were the inegalitarians. The correlation between attitudes toward political democracy and attitudes toward equality, however, is less than that dis- cussed earlier between nationalist types and egalitarianism: there is some disagreement—especially among the egalitarians—concerning the most desirable political system. A warning signal may be found in the fact that all of the authoritarian idealists were egalitarians. This group regarded the parliamentary process as it was currently operating as thwarting the egalitarian desires of the masses. (That this view may not be entirely unfounded is reflected in the fact that so many, 58 per cent, of all cynical parliamentarians were inegalitarian in their attitudes.) We predict that the authoritarian idealists represent a type that is more numerous among leaders in many new states other than in the Caribbean

countries considered here; but even though they constitute only a small group among West Indian leaders, they are significant in that they tend to be among the youngest leaders engaged in political activity and they may be increasing in numbers. Furthermore, still more egalitarians may fill the ranks of the authoritarian idealists unless the democratic system in these countries can effectively realize the egalitarian promise of West Indian nationalism—a promise which, rather than being in conflict with democracy, is part of the same web of basic values.

Unlike our conclusion that commitment to the value of equality in some sense caused the desire for political independence, we regard attitudes toward equality and political democracy as operating in tandem. Equality and political democracy (or liberty, as it might be considered) have a common origin in the movement emanating around the Enlightenment and the "Rights of Man." Not only is it difficult causally to relate equality to democracy in any unilinear fashion in the history of ideas, but there is also no evidence of temporal priority of one or the other in the intellectual development of the West Indian leaders. Rather, the West Indian political awakening seems to parallel the same driving ideals of liberty and equality (and fraternity—or social inclusivism—as we show later) that earlier led to the American and French revolutions; and which are at the core of the democratic revolution now spreading throughout the world.

## Implications for Economic Development

A major justification for political independence in the British Caribbean, as elsewhere, was that it would bring an end to economic exploitation resulting from colonial imperialism, and would permit economic growth and a more equal distribution of economic benefits to the citizenry. Thus, nationhood was viewed not only as being consistent with democratic theory, but also as conferring new and proper economic rights on the general population. The drive toward economic development, under the conditions of the underdeveloped new states, required many changes in the old economic system and led, among other things, to another decision of nationhood, "How large a role should the government play in the economy?"

To bring documentation to this decision of nationhood, we examine here the relationship between egalitarianism and the economic ideologies of the West Indian leaders, one important aspect to the outcome of this decision. We classified the leaders into five types according to their views on the proper role of the government in the economy of their

territories: *reactionaries*—those who thought the state's role should be about what it was before the rise of the nationalist movements and should not extend beyond providing basic services such as a postal system, roads, police and fire protection; *conservatives*—those who wanted roughly to maintain the present situation, with the state in addition to providing the basic services also being partly responsible for welfare schemes for the ill, aged, and unemployed, for public works, and for a general education system, but with the reservations that taxation should be less discriminatory against the entrepreneurial class and that government should be less protective of labor union interests; *populists*—those who lacked long-term economic policies, and who were pragmatically concerned with immediate bread-and-butter issues, although accepting a belief in a market economy geared to the demands of labor unions or mass-based political organizations; *liberals*—those who wanted greater intervention of the government in the economy, but who did not foresee changes beyond the achievement of modern welfare capitalism; and *radicals*—those who advocated fundamental changes in the present system so that the state would become the major factor in determining local economic life, with the extreme radicals seeking the abolition of all private property.

One might expect the egalitarians to be more left in their ideologies, that is, more committed to greater government intervention in the economy, than the inegalitarians. This is precisely what the data in Table 3 show. Forty-eight per cent of the egalitarians were radical compared to none of the inegalitarians; 41 per cent were liberal compared to 10; 11 per cent were populist compared to 9; and none of the egalitarians were either conservative or reactionary compared to 81 per cent of the inegalitarians.

This evidence strongly suggests that most egalitarians perceived a reordering of the economy as a prerequisite for the attainment of equality of opportunity. It must be noted, however, that egalitarian attitudes were not an exclusive preserve of radical economic ideologists. In fact, slightly over half of all the egalitarians were either liberals or populists. The data reported in Table 3 are consistent with findings we have reported elsewhere, which show that opponents of the democratic revolution in the West Indies were those persons most out of step with the nationalist movements whose progressive policies were, in contrast to the rigidly stratified social system which then existed, supportive of political, economic, and social egalitarian principles.

Like the desire for political independence, we regard a left economic ideology—what we will now loosely refer to as socialist values—as a "dependent" variable, while equality has more of an "independent"

nature. One reason for viewing socialist attitudes as an effect of egalitar-
ianism is because this was the description given by the West Indian
leaders of their personal ideological development. In addition, with
regard to its theoretical meaning as well as its role in the history of
ideas, socialism concerns instrumentalities dealing with structuring the
economy in a way that facilitates the establishment of a certain kind
of classless society. In other words, socialism is an economic means to
attain more general social consequences, and it is egalitarianism, con-
ceptually, which leads to a socialist economic ideology, not the other
way around.

Table 3. Percentage of West Indian Leaders Having Certain Economic
Ideologies by Egalitarianism

| ECONOMIC IDEOLOGIES | EGALITARIAN | INEGALITARIAN |
|---|---|---|
| Radical | 48% | 0% |
| Liberal | 41 | 10 |
| Populist | 11 | 9 |
| Conservative | 0 | 49 |
| Reactionary | 0 | 32 |
| Total | 100% | 100% |
| Number of Cases | (44) | (68) |

## Implications for Social and Cultural Development

Along with the problems of political modernization and economic
growth facing the new states, there are also decisions to be made setting
the direction and tempo of social and cultural development. Our
hypothesis is that the distribution of egalitarian attitudes is consequential
in this decision-making process. It is tested below by relating attitudes
toward equality to a sample of three attitudes toward social and cultural
development.

Complementing the ideals of liberty and equality in the triad of the
Rights of Man is the desire for fraternity—the reduction of racial,
religious, and class distinctions among groups and individuals within a
society. With fraternity, like political democracy, we again are dealing
with an associative trait or correlate of egalitarianism rather than one
of its effects. To obtain an indicator of fraternalism, we constructed a
measure of social inclusivism—or conversely social distance—from atti-
tudes of West Indian leaders toward reducing social barriers within their
own countries as compared to their attitudes toward increasing their
contact with persons outside of the West Indies. Leaders who place

highest priority on eliminating internal social barriers were termed "social inclusivists"; conversely, persons who placed secondary emphasis on reducing internal social barriers or who favored the perpetuation of such social distinctions within their societies were designated "social exclusivists." Within the West Indies, of course, as in other colonies, there has been a tendency, especially among the upper socioeconomic sectors, to view the imperial power as home and to prefer contact with "home" rather than with the subordinate groups in the colony.

Table 4. Percentage of West Indian Leaders Having Certain Attitudes Toward Social and Cultural Development by Egalitarianism

| ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT | EGALITARIAN | INEGALITARIAN |
|---|---|---|
| Priority of Concern with Social Inclusiveness | | |
| Greatest need for reducing social barriers at home (inclusivist) | 89% | 13% |
| Greatest need for increasing social contact abroad (exclusivist) | 11 | 87 |
| Total | 100% | 100% |
| Number of Cases | (44) | (68) |
| Teaching of West Indian History | | |
| Favors more emphasis | 95% | 16% |
| Opposes more emphasis | 5 | 84 |
| Total | 100% | 100% |
| Number of Cases | (44) | (68) |
| Desired Direction of Future Cultural Development | | |
| Uniquely West Indian | 82% | 31% |
| Basically Anglo-European | 18 | 69 |
| Total | 100% | 100% |
| Number of Cases | (44) | (68) |

As shown in Table 4, the correlation between favorable attitudes toward equality and social inclusivism is very high. Eighty-nine per cent of the egalitarians are social inclusivists compared to only 13 per cent of the inegalitarians.

The interviews revealed that the exclusivists were acutely conscious of the institutionalized color and class distinctions of West Indian society and saw the reduction of such distinctions as a peril to their own social

status. The inclusivists, on the other hand, thought the realization of the West Indian democratic revolution required an equal access to and equal treatment within public facilities and institutions for all West Indians.

Related to the issue of social inclusivism, with its leitmotiv of popular participation in all aspects of the new society, is the question of the cultural development of the West Indies. A popular theme of West Indian fiction and social commentary deals with the question of cultural identity, and in recent years this has taken the form of a growing consciousness of the unique qualities of the West Indian people. This reflects a mood in which the proper credentials of nationhood are seen as including an impressive indigenous cultural tradition.

Two items in this study measure the leaders' views toward West Indian cultural development. The first deals with attitudes toward teaching the African and slave history of the West Indies in the schools. This was modified to include the history of indentured laborers from India in Trinidad and British Guiana. Emphasis on these aspects of the West Indian past would have contrasted greatly with the prevailing manner in which history was usually taught in the colonial school system, with its almost exclusive concern with the "mother country," the United Kingdom, British cultural contributions, and the world seen through British eyes. Answers were categorized into those favoring or opposing the emphasis of West Indian history.

A second item measuring attitudes toward future cultural development concerned a rather direct question about the leaders' preferences for Anglo-European as opposed to West Indian cultural forms. The answers were simply dichotomized as being uniquely West Indian or basically Anglo-European.

Another implication of equality, as indicated in Table 4, is shown in the distribution of attitudes toward the teaching of West Indian history and future cultural development. Ninety-five per cent of the egalitarians compared to only 16 per cent of the inegalitarians favored more emphasis on teaching West Indian history; and 82 compared to 31 per cent desired an uniquely West Indian future cultural development.

In the wake of the West Indian political independence movements, which were engendered by egalitarian beliefs and supported by democratic and social inclusivist principles, our findings indicate there has arisen a new pride in the region's background and local qualities. That is, this new consciousness of West Indian history and culture—what we have called the West Indian romantic movement—although a consequence of the independence movements has in turn become another aspect of West Indian nationalism alongside the original Enlighten-

ment—especially egalitarian—values. In brief, the early political nationalism has begun to merge with a later cultural nationalism.

For West Indians, such a cultural nationalism may become an honest and accurate counterbalance to the imperial versions of history and cultural forms with their implicit denigration of the backgrounds of the vast majority of West Indians. But if carried to extreme, it may lapse into another kind of chauvinism, or into what Moore has termed "nativistic egalitarianism." This would be a perversion of the doctrine of equality. It would start by denying an out-group's claim to superiority by emphasizing similarities within the in-group, and would end with the in-group regarding itself as superior to everyone else and a rejection of everything—no matter how intrinsically worthy—that was not "indigenous." For example, some aspects of incipient West Indian romanticism stress common racial identity as a source of social cohesion, and this leads to invidious comparisons with nations of predominantly fair-skinned peoples and to a heightening of ethnic and racial cleavages within the emergent Caribbean nations themselves. Nonetheless, we wish to emphasize, although notice must be paid to potentially deleterious strains in the modern West Indian awakening, that the major current of West Indian nationalism at the time of this field research was definitely within the humanitarian tradition and strongly motivated by its egalitarian underpinnings.

## Conclusion

In this paper, we have described and analyzed attitudes of top national leaders toward equality, and we have shown some of the implications of these attitudes for preferred directions of political, economic, social, and cultural developments in four emergent Caribbean nations. Furthermore, we have attempted to place these findings within a broad framework of the long-term trend toward equality in West Indian society. These developments and trends constitute an important part of the modernization of these territories under the guidance of new national leaders. The distribution and interrelationships of attitudes of modern-day West Indian leaders, the new national elites, are important indicators of the chances for future structural changes toward more equality, and the manner—planned change or revolution or static oligarchy—of their accomplishment or retardation.

The overall level of egalitarianism among West Indian leaders was not as high as it could be, but 39 per cent, on a rather stringent test, were definitely favorable to the spread of equality. Some of the varia-

tion in egalitarian attitudes was explained by the social differentiation of elites: egalitarians tended to be young; either highly (college or higher) or lowly (elementary only) educated, but not middling (secondary school only) educated; dark-brown or black in skin color; not wealthy; and leaders of secular, mass-based organizations—specifically political parties or labor unions. But these correlations were not perfect and there were exceptions to the general pattern—exceptions that the self-interest hypothesis could not explain.

The implications of attitudes toward equality for political, economic, social, and cultural development appear to be far-reaching and highly significant. For political development the egalitarian ideal fostered the independence movements as a necessary means to achieve the image of a new, egalitarian society, and it tended to work along with the ideal of political democracy in doing so. Also, egalitarianism generally supports democratic values, and even more clearly inegalitarianism supports authoritarian values. Should the inegalitarians be successful in stalling the trend toward equality by manipulation of the democratic process, however, then the egalitarians may be forced to recommend nondemocratic methods—such as the authoritarian idealists already do.

For economic development, favorable attitudes toward equality result in left economic ideologies and unfavorable attitudes toward equality result in conservative or reactionary economic ideologies. The egalitarians generally favor a large role of government in the affairs of the economy for the purpose of reordering the economy for the benefit of the masses of the people.

For social and cultural development egalitarianism is linked with the desire to create a socially inclusive society, to break down ascribed social barriers. Furthermore, it produces a drive toward the West Indianization of cultural traditions and of the teaching of West Indian social and cultural history from a West Indian point of view in the schools. The latter could be an important corrective to some of the deleterious aspects of cultural domination by the imperial power, but it contains the danger of being perverted into an exclusivist movement in contradiction to the underlying egalitarian drive.

Finally, if these findings can be generalized, we can conclude that egalitarianism is an important part of the ideological foundations of the drive toward modernization in the new states. Decisions involving political, economic, social, and cultural change are being influenced by the master value of equality, and the emergent polities, economies, societies, and cultures that the new national elites are trying to create are intended to be more egalitarian in the future than in the past or present. Few, if any, of the new nationalist leaders are urging their

peoples to migrate from country to city, in fact many of them are urging them to stay in the rural parts of their countries since they face enormous problems of growing urban slums. Yet, as we have seen in the case of the British Caribbean, the implications of the ideology of equality to which the new nationalist leaders are committed tend to transform these societies into modern ones, to make them into large-scale bureaucratic and industrial societies, to change them so that they will have many of the features of today's advanced urban societies. This is the meaning of the ideology of equality for the "new urbanization" of the emergent nations of the twentieth century.

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