CARIBBEAN VISIONS

Ten Presidential Addresses of
Ten Presidents of the
Caribbean Studies Association

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My purpose in this article is to examine the foundations of nationalism in the Caribbean, especially in the new states that have been created since the end of the Second World War. I try to place the new states of the Caribbean in time and space, showing where they fit into the broad trends of nationalism since the middle of the eighteenth century and into the global diffusion of modern nationalism from Europe and North America, to Latin America, to Africa and Asia, and to the Caribbean and the Pacific.

My first thesis is that, for the new nationalist leaders, political independence was the means to achieve the goal of the reduction of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural inequalities. That is, grasping control of the legitimate power of the state was viewed as instrumental to transforming society so as to achieve social justice. Given the obvious inequalities of colonialism and the then-current definitions of the fairness of certain equalities both within the metropole and the colonies, the weight of moral judgment tended to support the historical actions of 20th century nationalist leaders in their struggles for political independence.

My second thesis is that social justice does not inherently mean equality. Depending on the circumstances, many inequalities may be judged as fair by members of society. I give
considerable attention to this point in an effort to clarify the distinctions between the two concepts of equality and equity, because they are so often confused.

The distinctions are key to my main argument, the third thesis, that in the final analysis it is social justice or equity—not equality—that political regimes ought to be seeking if they wish to minimize political alienation among their citizens and to create and maintain their legitimacy. In other words, governmental policies producing or failing to change both unfair equalities and unfair inequalities may bring down a regime.

In the Caribbean today, as elsewhere, threats to the stability of the political and social orders can be found in the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of political regimes. Threats also come from inequities, importantly both from inequalities that are judged by some members of society to be unfair and from efforts to create equalities that are judged by other members of society as unfair. Of course, this fact helps to explain why ideological—as distinct from pragmatic—politics often become confrontations between different groups of true believers, each righteously committed to what they believe to be moral, though opposing, principles.

THE RISE OF THE NEW STATES

The creation of new states must be included among the half dozen or so momentous world-changing events that occurred during the three and a half decades of the mid-twentieth century. At the beginning of World War II there were 70 nation-states. Today, excluding some territories that may be too small to be considered a state, there are about 160, approximately 90 of which have attained the political status of independent sovereign state during the last 35 years. The rapidity of the change is breathtaking. There has been an average of two and one-half new states formed during each year of the last 35.

Today, the state-founding process has nearly run its course. Only a few colonial territories remain from which additional new states can be made, and a few more may be carved from existing states if separatist movements are successful, e.g., Basque Spain or French Canada. For the first time in history, practically all peoples everywhere on earth live under the rule of "their own" nation-state. The zenith of the age of nationalism has been reached, where some state demands and receives the highest loyalty of its people and where the state claims legitimate domination over all other institutions of its society.

Most of the new states were formed out of the former European colonies in Asia and Africa, fewer from the Pacific. But the Caribbean also participated in the process with the creation of ten new states. In August 1962, Jamaica became the first new state in the Western Hemisphere since Panama in 1903. Trinidad and Tobago followed closely, also in August of 1962. Since then, Guyana and Barbados in 1966, the Bahamas in 1973, Grenada in 1974, Suriname in 1975, Dominica in 1978, and St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines in 1979 joined the ranks of the new national political entities. A few others wait hesitantly in the wings, such as the six islands of the Netherlands Antilles and a few remaining British territories. Others, at least for the time being, remain self-governing in association with another state, e.g., Puerto Rico with the United States; and still others moved toward fuller political integration with the metropole rather than seeking independence, as in the case of Guadeloupe and Martinique with France.

The Caribbean colonies generally experienced heavier burdens of political, economic, social and cultural domination than the Asian and African colonies. For example, they
remained under imperialism far longer, indigenous people and cultures were penetrated more fully and often destroyed, and three hundred years of slavery and then indentured labor, based on race and ethnicity, made deeper the wounds of exploitation, deprivation and inequality. The importation of indentured labor to the Caribbean continued until about the first quarter of the twentieth century.

NATIONALISM AND THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

Hayes (1950), Kohn (1957, 1965) and many other writers have demonstrated the importance of the latter half of the eighteenth century as the period and Europe as the place of the rise of modern nationalism. That period coincides, of course, with the rise and initial spread of the democratic revolution throughout Europe and its North American colonies, as is shown by Palmer (1959, 1965). Palmer documents the diffusion through a number of countries of different parts of a single movement with unifying characteristics. It included the increase in the scale of society by the inclusion of an even larger percentage of adults within the borders of the emergent states, with each person sharing a basic equality of national citizenship, an equal expectation of universal loyalty and responsibility to the state, and a commitment to the principle of liberty. Political democracy and modern nationalism were two linked processes in the integration of the masses of people into a common political form.

The first part of the nineteenth century witnessed the diffusion of the democratic revolution into Latin America while the second half of the twentieth saw its spectacular spread into the former colonies of Asia, Africa, the Pacific, and most of the remaining colonies of the Caribbean. Haiti had become independent in 1804 during the first wave, the Dominican Republic in 1844 during the second, and Cuba in 1901, a delayed second wave state, and the new states of the Caribbean listed above during the third wave.

This is not to say that people suffering the oppression of colonial inequalities could not—or did not—invent the ideology of the justice of equality and the liberating acts of their own deliverance. They surely did, hundreds of times. But the links between such ideas across space and time often constituted networks of communication and influence that preserved and activated the conceptions of social justice embodied in the democratic ideal and gave them life through historical action.

During the two hundred years from the latter part of the 18th to the latter part of the 20th century, the implications of Enlightenment and democratic thought were defined, re-defined, and expanded. In pre-revolutionary North America—in what was to become, as Lipset (1963) has called it, the first new nation—most liberal thinkers regarded themselves as republicans, advocated a system of government in which officials derived their authority from an electorate (then of quite limited and varying sizes), and assumed that legitimacy of government rested on the people's will (Alger, 1972: 58). The term “democracy” itself, however, and the idea of people's direct political participation still referred to mob rule or anarchy and were more negatively than positively valued, even though one can recognize the democratic inclinations of the struggle against both tyranny and the ideology of the divine right of kings.

Questions of economic and social equality were simply not much on the scene in pre-revolutionary America, where it was taken for granted that “People of about the same social or economic position ought to pretty much mingle with their own kind.” This was a question that I asked Jamaican leaders in 1958 and that many of them, especially pronationalist
leaders, rejected. But according to Alger even Sam Adams, a
revolutionary American who was accused of preferring the
company of ropewalkers to men of his own station, would
not have agreed with the statement in 18th century America.
Issues at the time dealt primarily with civil and political
equality; for example, the right to worship in a church of
one’s own choosing without negative sanction. Notions of
representation, consent of the governed, constitutionalism,
and individual rights were beginning a long process of speci-
fication and elaboration. It would take later generations to
add universal adult suffrage and the ideas of the justice of
economic and social equality.

Yet Alger’s study of American pre-revolutionary leaders
supports the contention that national movements originat-
ing in colonial settings were inspired by liberal ideals which
had their origin in the European Enlightenment. She finds
(p. 265), for example, that American leaders who believed
that it was more important to preserve liberty rather than
authority in a time of challenge to the established order, who
believed that it was the rules and not the ruled who were the
most likely source of despotism, and who thought the
people and not the leaders displayed the best judgment in
matters of government, were more likely to favor American
independence from Britain than were American leaders who
believed the opposite, by 83 to 14 percent.

THE CAUSES OF NATIONALISM
IN THE 20TH CENTURY

Alger’s findings are consistent with the propositions for-
mulated by myself and my associates in our studies of the
transition to political independence of the new states of the
English-speaking Caribbean.1

under what conditions, we

asked, would a people under foreign rule organize a nation-
alist movement? We defined a nationalist movement as a
collection of people who exhibited organized politico-social
beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and actions aimed at the cre-
a tion of a nation-state, politically independent and auto-
nomous, self-governing, and geographically distinct.

Our studies showed that nationalist movements with sig-
nificant following would form:

1) If clear-cut inequalities (civil, political, economic, social or
cultural) exist between the local or “indigenous” inhabi-
tants, i.e., the people typical of a territory on the one
hand, and the representatives or agents of a foreign
power on the other hand, where such inequalities are
institutionalized, legitimated, and enforced by imperial
political rule and where what is “indigenous” as opposed
to “foreign” may be defined on the basis of race, ethnic-
ity, religion, or emergent nationality.

2) If such inequalities are perceived by a critical number of
local people; that is, if indigenous people become con-
scious of them.

3) If there exists within the value system of the local people
a judgment of such inequalities as unjust; that is, if there
exist values favorable to liberty, equality, and fraternity.

4) If there is an elite among the local people that is both
committed to such values and capable of mobilizing the
material and organizational resources necessary to sus-
tain a social movement.

5) If changes toward a more just society, defined as more
egalitarian, are believed by a sufficient number of local
people to be impossible, too difficult, or too slow in com-
ing under the existing politically dependent status.

6) If political independence is perceived as feasible by at
least a core of local leaders, in the sense both of success-
fully attaining political separation from the imperial
power and of successfully becoming a viable political,
economic, and social unit after independence.
(7) If there exists at least a core of local culture identifiably separate from the culture of the imperial power.

Note that these propositions are "if" statements, not "if and only if" statements. That is, they are sufficient conditions only, not necessary conditions. When they occur, we predict a nationalist movement will occur, i.e., they are sufficient to produce it. For nearly all of the new states, these conditions were met and nationalist movements were formed that were successful in achieving political independence. But other conditions may also produce a nationalist movement, as in the case of the 1965 unilateral declaration of independence on the part of the white settlers of Rhodesia, an exclusive, undemocratic movement of a minority section of the population that faced potential internal democratic reforms forced on it from Britain. It is only now, after the reaction has been negated, that the inclusive, universal democratic forces—in what is now Zimbabwe—have a chance to control the direction of history.

The above propositions concern the outcome of the first of a series of "decisions of nationhood" that we formulated as a framework for understanding the images of the future and the historical actions of colonial and new nationalist leaders, among others, in the former British Caribbean and elsewhere. Other decisions of nationhood concern the desired amount of national sovereignty, location of the geographic boundaries of the emergent state, the consilience of the state in the political sense with the nation in the cultural sense, the form of government—Western democracy or not, the role of the state in the economy and the society, the national character of the people, the nature of the social structure—especially egalitarian or not, the content of the new state national culture, and finally, the external affairs and global alignments of the new state.²

THE RISING DOMINANCE OF THE Egalitarian Revolution

An important shift occurred from the 18th to the 20th century transforming what had been primarily a democratic revolution into an egalitarian revolution. From stressing liberty, the demands changed, increasingly emphasizing equality. This is not so much revealed by the fate of political democracy in the new states, where I note that about four-fifth entered nationhood with Western-style democratic regimes while fewer than half remain democracies in this sense today, as it is by the change in the conception of what inequalities were considered unfair and what inequalities came to be judged as normally expected of a just society.³ Certainly today advanced thinkers of the new states include in their images of the just society:

1. equality of opportunity for nearly all economic, social and cultural goods;
2. minimum levels of economic survival and even comfort below which no one in the society ought to be permitted to fall; and
3. a full set of economic, social, and cultural rights, ranging from the right to work, to the right to family life and free choice of a marriage partner, to the right to express freely one’s religion and cultural preferences. This is not to say that the debate over what equalities or inequalities are fair is over. By no means is that so. It remains an important problem. But what is taken for granted as minimally agreed upon egalitarian expectations today which have been considered at least mildly insane in the latter half of the 18th century.

Nothing struck us more forcibly in our pre-independence research in the English-speaking Caribbean than the pro-
nationalist leaders’ concern over the many hurtful inequalities of race and class under colonialism and their images of a more just, egalitarian future. They wanted to get control of the state, ending British political domination, so that they could use the state as an instrument to lessen inequality. The anti-nationalists, to the contrary, nearly all judged many of the same inequalities to be fair.

Reading V.S. Naipaul and other cynics of modern change in the Caribbean, one might suspect that such pro-nationalist statements were the empty rhetoric of poseurs and look for the truth in the shadows of secret behavior and in the dark corners of hidden, and probably twisted, psyches.

Our re-study of economic and social indicators, social legislation, and elite attitudes in Jamaica twelve years after independence, however, does not sustain such a jaundiced view (Bell, 1977; Bell and Stevenson, 1979; Robinson and Bell, 1978a). True, income inequality has stubbornly remained, unemployment and underemployment rates have stayed high, and poor relief has become barely more adequate than before independence. Yet changes have occurred. Improvements were intended by legislation dealing with minimum wages, workmen’s compensation, pensions, medical services, literacy, egalitarian tax reform, land-lease, and free primary education. More equality was achieved in primary education and school enrollments were up. Of course, where expenditures were necessary, Jamaica’s precarious—and now desperate—financial situation prevented the achievement of many egalitarian reforms without severe reductions in the wealth of others. Yet the sincerity of egalitarian visions of social justice can be seen in those acts of Jamaican leaders that were within their power to perform. An important example is the change of laws reducing inequalities between members of legal and “extra-legal” families and between legitimate and “illegitimate” children. In a country where 70 percent of all children are born out of a legal marriage, the elimination of the legal disabilities of being a “bastard” and the banishment of the term itself from legal documents have been important acts creating more equality. Another example is the extraordinary increase in cultural appreciation of things Jamaican and Caribbean and of the African origins of the majority of the people. The will for egalitarian reforms was—and is—there, even though the economic resources, organizational skills, or good luck for creating more economic equality at acceptable levels of living have not always been forthcoming.

One important methodological consideration should be kept in mind when evaluating the performance of new nationalist elites in bringing about egalitarian reforms. Although less salient than the goal of equality in the rhetoric of nationalist leaders before independence, another obvious goal of political independence was increasing the size of the economic pie, i.e., raising the average level of living of people within the emergent state. Of course, there is no necessary relationship between the average level of a variable and the degree of inequality of a variable, using, for example, the variance as a measure of inequality. Yet there are times in actual situations when they are at odds. For example, in a new state in which there are few university graduates, a reasonable policy aimed at increasing wealth and raising levels of living through increased capacity for development might include expanding opportunities for higher education, building a university, or providing scholar-ships for some students to obtain higher education abroad. Other things being equal, the results of such policies—that is, adding new high levels of education for some people—would increase the average level of education in the country and at the same time increase educational inequality.

A number of important variables involved in development behave in exactly this way. Increasing inequality is often a
byproduct of increasing levels of skill—and of comfort and privilege as well—for some groups and not for others, at least in the early stages of development where resources are limited as, of course, they nearly always are. This is not a matter of debate; it is a statistical fact. Yet, such a process of uneven advantage may be necessary for the sake of development and eventual achievement of more equality at higher levels of living for all. Everyone and everything can seldom be changed overnight. In the example given, if the new and expanded group of university graduates, after their own educations were completed, were deployed as teachers to help raise the minimum levels of education for the least educated sections of society, then, eventually, not only would average educational levels be raised, but also inequality of education would be reduced.

THE WORLD-WIDE TREND TOWARD EQUALITY

The new states came center stage over the last generation. Their leaders entered the international community of states, proclaimed their egalitarian images of a just future, established the nonaligned group of nations, created the Third—and, some say, the Fourth—Worlds, and pursued their hopes for social justice within the international economic order as well as on the domestic scene. Our sight, however, should not be blinded by these events to the point where we fail to see the connections between the images of the future of new nationalist leaders and the guiding images and actions of people who sought social changes in the old states during the same period of time. There has been a worldwide call for more equality. The Welsh and Scottish nationalists in Great Britain; Basques and Catalans in Spain; the Flemish in Belgium; Bretons in France; Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars and Jews in the Soviet Union; Catholics in Northern Ireland; Native Americans and French-Canadians in Canada; Native-Americans, Hispanics, and Blacks in the United States, . . ., the list goes on and on.

We forget, perhaps, both the limitations on civil and other human rights that existed within the older states at the end of World War II and the rather remarkable and rapid changes that have occurred since. Take the United States as one example. During the early 1950s, while Jamaica and Trinidad were preparing the ground for civil and democratic change, the United States was wracked by McCarthyism. Those were the days when in Southern California one could see bumper stickers reading “Kill a Commie for Christ.” They were days of racial discrimination, of black fear, and in the American South of lynchings for which no “perpetrators” would be found or punished.

But change had already begun. On May 17, 1954 the U.S. Supreme Court in the Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas decision held that enforced racial segregation of public education was a denial of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed under the 14th Amendment. One doesn’t know whether to celebrate the event or to feel shame that it came so late in the life of what some people still believe to be one of the greatest democracies of the world. Then, in 1957, the country was electrified by a violent confrontation at Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. Governor Orval Faubus defied the federal government’s order to integrate the school. We watched President Eisenhower on national television where he declared,

The very basis of our individual rights and freedoms rests upon the certainty that the President and the executive branch of government will support and insure the carrying out of the decisions of the federal courts, even, when neces-
sary, with all the means at the President's command. Unless the President did so, anarchy would result (Manchester, 1975: 985).

Secretary of Defense Wilson had earlier placed the Arkansas National Guard in federal service, out of control of Governor Faubus, and, as Ike spoke on television, the first trucks carrying paratroopers of a crack combat outfit, the 327th Battle Group of the 101st Airborne Division, were rolling up in front of Central High. The nine black children over whom the confrontation occurred entered Central High and they stayed. To see these things was to witness the wall of inequality being breached. Although some months later that story was history, a final battle for racial equality in the United States had begun, the antagonists engaged.

Before it ended—and, of course, it has not fully ended even today—other fighters included Atherine Lucy, James Meredith, Medgar Evers and Stokely Carmichael; Martin Luther King and his Southern Christian Leadership Conference; Malcolm X and the Black Nationalist Party; CORE and SNCC; Eldridge Cleaver and James Baldwin; H. Rap Brown and Huey P. Newton; scores of freedom riders, marchers, boycotters, and sit-ins. And, of course, a quiet, then 42-year-old lady named Rosa Parks who, being in tune with the future, simply wouldn't give up her seat to a white man on a Montgomery, Alabama bus. These, too, and the changes they brought forth are now history.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a major victory and the subsequent implementation of affirmative action programs in education and occupation in the 1970s for both American minority group members and women brings us up to date with the trend toward social justice through increasing equality within the United States. And what of Little Rock? By 1974, Central High had a black principal. By 1976, a black student body president was elected by votes both of black and white students who by 1978 were not only fully integrated, but also were in the mood to celebrate their victory over inequality in a documentary motion picture. Black consciousness in America had been aroused and fundamentally changed and it was linked to the decolonization of black Africa which had begun in the late 1950s.

And I hear echoes of other voices: Nanny of the Maroons, Sam Sharpe, Paul Bogle, William George Gordon, Marcus Garvey, Alexander Bustamante, Norman W. Manley, to mention the national heroes of only one new Caribbean state; heroes who, in the present of things past, to use St. Augustine's phrase, are now viewed as having led a struggle for equality.

Thus, some changes in many of the old states, such as illustrated for the United States, have paralleled and were sometimes intertwined with changes in the new states as social justice was redefined in wider and wider terms, prominently including equalities of various kinds, as it was fought for, and as it was achieved. For the new states, including those of the Caribbean, the struggle for egalitarian reforms during the last generation has been fundamental to the meaning of new national sovereignty itself, since it occurred in the context of the transfer of state power from one group to another and since the state was viewed as a chief mechanism for its achievement. Moreover, for the old states, it would be accurate to say something similar: their very meaning is given in their charter myths, such as America's Declaration of Independence, and their grasp of equality came closer to their reach as a result of the egalitarian changes of the last thirty years.

Some readers may find it difficult to rationalize this view of the United States and other old, powerful states with their behavior abroad. For example, the "trashy tactics" of the United States in other countries are well known (Crile, 1974). We now know of the duplicities, briberies, abductions, and
assassinations that official agents of the United States attempted or succeeded in carrying out or arranging. We know of the secret wars and the covert operations that the United States has conducted. We know of the American efforts to prevent Allende from taking power in Chile though he was democratically elected. Many people have reason to believe that the general policy of the United States in the Caribbean was—and still may be—as ex-CIA agent Philip Agee (1975: 7) has said, "to repress the left and prop up those governments which are favorable to U.S. interests . . . which means the penetration, division, weakening and defeat of those groups which indicate economic nationalism and of left-wing groups. Those are the targets in other words, because the CIA sees the local scene as divided between the friendlies and the enemies."

There are contradictions in American official behavior—egalitarian reforms through law at home and reactionary, even illegal, tactics abroad that violate minimum conceptions of human dignity. One can speculate that the egalitarian revolution may continue to spread until it governs the relations among nations as well as the relationships within nations. With respect to may example of the United States in the Caribbean, there is some evidence from my conversations with U.S. State Department officials and from others (Crile, 1974) of a change in U.S. policies under President Carter toward less of a patronizing attitude, less intervention, less concern with the nature of social change internal to the countries involved if it genuinely expresses the will of the people there, and certainly less interest in trying to manage change. Whether or not this change will become a long-term feature of U.S. policy toward the Caribbean remains to be seen.

No doubt, Caribbean and other Third World countries will have reason, once again, to see the professed principles of the old states, such as freedom and equality, disgraced by the old states themselves as they deal with other nations. But this should not discredit the principles themselves. Rather, it discredits the acts of unprincipled leaders and, through them, the nation itself. Furthermore, the struggle for equality has been just that, a struggle. The clash of interests and principles has and does characterize the domestic scene of the old states, as it does the new. But the long-term trend is clear: Many inequalities have been reduced; equality has spread.

**EQUALITY AND EQUITY: TWO DIFFERENT CONCEPTS AND MEANINGS**

The possibility of the continued forward march of equality would be a pleasant place to end a presidential address such as this: Hope for the future; the spread of more justice and equality for all within the national boundaries of our 160 or so states and even, with luck and effort, among them; and the rise of human dignity. That possibility, however, may not be highly probable.

**The Meaning of Inequality.**

One source of confusion and controversy arises over the meaning of the concept of equality and inequality. It is not the same, obviously, as the concept of equity or inequity. Inequality is basically a matter of statistical determination, while inequity is a matter of moral judgment. For example, a common element in all definitions of equality and inequality is the degree of similarity or difference between two or more individuals, groups, populations or other units which are compared with respect some specified characteristics. If the units being compared are the same, then they are equal.
more different they are, the greater the degree of inequality. Thus, the amount of inequality is the degree of heterogeneity in any distribution, maximum equality and inequality being two opposite poles of the same continuum which ranges from perfect similarity to maximum difference. Take income as an example. If everyone in a population has the same income, then there is complete equality of income. If incomes are different, the inequality increases as the average difference of everyone’s income from everyone else’s income increases.

Discourse about the facts of inequality, quite apart from the justice of it, becomes complicated, often seemingly contradictory, since there are so many empirical aspects of inequality one can measure. For example, we can speak of inequality of income within a whole society, such as within the entire Guyanese population. Or we can speak of the inequality of incomes comparing two or more populations, such as that between Guyana and Trinidad, or between two or more sub-populations within a single country, such as blacks and East Indians in Guyana.

In order to make statements about inequality, of course, explicit specification is needed in choosing the populations or groups to be compared. They could be based on gender, age, kinship connection, race and ethnic identity, religion, social class, nationality or region, to mention only a few of the frequently used social categories. The point is that some social unit must be specified within which or between which comparison is to be made and, usually, we expect some explanation as to why the comparison chosen is a meaningful one. Why, for example, should men be compared with women, young to old people, lower to middle and upper social classes, or members of different races with each other?

Furthermore, one must specify the variables on which units are to be compared. If we have a reason—usually some theory or interpretive framework—for comparing different races, for example, then on what characteristics should they be compared? Typically, social scientists have dealt with human rights and duties, such as civil or legal aspects (e.g., treatment by the courts), political aspects (e.g., voting), economic aspects (e.g., income, wealth, or occupation), social aspects (e.g., education), and cultural aspects (life styles and cultural identity).

Even getting the facts straight requires yet another complication. There are important differences among inequalities of (1) condition, (2) opportunity, (3) allocations or treatments, and (4) outcomes. For example, inequality in amount of education (a condition, such as the number of years of school completed) may be great even when there is equality of educational opportunity. In fact, since there are important differences in individual ability, motivation, and purpose, then equality of educational opportunity may imply inequality of educational achievement.

Also, allocation, that is treatments or inputs, can be distinguished from outcomes, that is the resulting condition from some process. For example, if we equate many of the inputs to a school, such as money for physical plant, books, and quality and quantity of teachers, we may find that outcomes such as achievement scores by the end of the twelfth year remain unequal between black and white students. Or to take a different example, through progressive income taxes we can take from high income people what we give to low income people through various welfare programs, thus creating more equal distributions of real income than would have occurred otherwise. In other words, we can treat people unequally in order to achieve the outcome of less inequality of conditions.

One can imagine a series of volumes in which the facts of inequalities of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural characteristics of different genders, ages, kin groups, race
and ethnic groups, religious groups, social classes, and countries throughout the Caribbean were all described for several points in time up to the present according to the amount of inequality between or among them by measurements of conditions, opportunities, allocations, and outcomes. It is an enormous task. Yet it is what some Caribbean social researchers more or less have been working toward.7 Such a comprehensive social mapping and analysis of various inequalities may be in the making. Whatever limited statements about inequality we are able to make inform the meantime result upon the availability of reliable data and the explicit organization and specification of (1) units to be compared, (2) some variables or goods that are distributed over them, and (3) some measure of the inequality of the variables or goods between or among the units. Such a program of research is essential for some current and future social policy decision-making.

The Meaning of Inequity

When we have finished the above program of research and described the inequalities that exist in Caribbean societies, we have not, even then, said anything whatsoever about the justice or fairness of equality or inequality. That is, we have said nothing about equity. The existence of inequality is a factual question. The existence of equity requires a value judgment, a judgment that in this case refers to whether or not a given equality or amount of inequality is fair or just.

Logically, it is a mistake to assume, as some writers have, that equality means equity and inequality means inequity. Actually, the relationship is problematic and requires some explicit logical justification before a scholarly or scientific judgment can be made. Thus, there are equalities and inequalities that are equitable, and there are equalities and ineq-uities that are inequitable. How can we decide when equalities or inequalities are fair and when they are not?

There are at least three basic ways that inequality or equality have been rationalized:

(1) Sacred. One common argument used to justify equality or inequality has been the sacred, that is appeal to “God’s will” or “divine right.”

(2) Natural law. Another argument is that equality or inequality is natural, that it is the consequence of the working out of nature, the result, for example, of some social evolutionary process, such as the survival of the fittest.

(3) Explicitly human constructions. Finally, a third argument is that some human viewpoint, rational argument, or theory justifies equality and inequality, such as, for example, a social contract between rulers and ruled or the idea of the “consent of the governed.” This is not to say, of course, that appeals to the sacred and to nature are not also human constructions—humans created their gods and the “laws” of nature. But some rationalizations or appeals are admittedly and self-consciously human constructions, the deliberate “use of reason.”

All three, for example, were used in the American Declaration of Independence. The first sentence contains an appeal both to nature and God:

When in the Course of human Events it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them . . .

God is again invoked in the following passage: “We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights. . .”

And a consciously human construction can be seen in this phrase: “. . . driving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed. . .”

In the Caribbean today, as in most modern states, it is the explicitly human rationalizations of equality or inequality that interest us most, since these states are secular and stress such rationalizations. Thus, it is worthwhile to elaborate them. They include:

(a) The use of law, which is perhaps the most obvious of the ways in which distributive justice has been defined. Existing law is used and particular notions of distributive justice are codified into law to justify, challenge, or reshape existing social practice. Social legislation dealing with poor relief, social security, education, employment, and health, for example, have implications for equality or inequality and may be the means through which distributional reforms are made.

(b) The use of history, as Menno Boldt (1973) describes for the leaders of the Canadian Indian movement who justify their demands for more equality within Canadian society today in part by recourse to a conception of their traditional tribal past of equality. For old states, equality has been justified by an appeal to charter myths and documents as, for example, it was by John Porter (1965) in his analysis of the contrasting realities of inequalities of class and ethnicity in Canadian society.

(c) The use of logical deduction. Rawls (1971) posits “rational choosers” who are in an “original position” with a “veil of ignorance” covering their knowledge of where in a system of inequality they are or will be placed. By a series of deductions he then demonstrates how such rational choosers will construct a social contract by which inequality will be judged to be just or fair to the extent to which it redounds to the benefit of the most disadvantaged per-
sons in the system. Presumably, some people who receive more than others will work harder and produce more and, thereby, increase the total wealth of the society making everyone better off than they would have been otherwise.

(d) The use of analysis of the collective judgments and behaviors of individuals, either (i) in laboratory or small group settings such as social psychological research on equity (Walster et al., 1978) or (ii) through survey research techniques designed to obtain interviews with specified populations (Bell and Robinson, 1978; Jasso and Rossi, 1977; Robinson and Bell 1978b).

The former has resulted in a convenient equation for thinking about equity.  

\[
\text{Person or Group A's} \quad \frac{\text{Rewards}}{\text{Pers or Grp A's Contributions}} \quad \text{as} \quad \frac{\text{Person or Group B's Rewards}}{\text{Pers or Grp B's Contributions}}
\]

When the ratios are the same, then equity exists. The more different they are, the more inequity exists. Clearly, the ratios can be the same, indicating perfect equity, even when there is great inequality of rewards as long as there is a comparable inequality of contributions. The equation simply says what many—if not most—persons in modern societies believe: There are unfair equalities and unfair inequalities and there are fair equalities and fair inequalities. It’s as simple as that. Some people work harder or make more of a contribution than others and they ought to get more for it.

Corroborating evidence comes from survey research in which respondents have been asked to judge the fairness or unfairness of various inequalities or equalities between or among people, especially among different social classes and races. It is quite clear that ordinary people in their everyday lives do make such judgments. Moreover, not only do privileged persons judge some inequalities to
be fair, but also many persons who are deprived do too. This is so partly because disadvantaged persons sometimes fear unwanted responsibilities; partly because they think they, too, may be privileged someday; and mostly because they judge many of the inequalities of reward within the stratification system of their society to be justly proportional to some sense of a person’s—or class’—contribution to society.

In the sociological sense, it may be argued that the collective judgments of the members of a given society are the final recourse to which a question of social justice can be appealed and, of course, they can be empirically studied. Yet the type of argument defined below competes with it for definitiveness.

(e) The use of analysis of the functions of equality or inequality. A moral judgment of equality or inequality is here seemingly replaced by an empirical analysis of how a given amount of inequality functions for the society: Are certain inequalities and inequalities necessary for society to survive or to get societal jobs done? Are they useful in producing benefits for people that would not exist without them? Of course, there is an underlying judgment that society ought to survive, that societal jobs ought to be done, or that certain effects ought to be judged as beneficial. But given these judgments, then it becomes a research task to determine what effects inequality produces for the society as a whole, for various subgroups of society, and for individuals. That is, how does inequality function? And for whom? In what ways?

The very fact that the social order is a complex network of interrelationships and patterns of routine behaviors that must be controlled and coordinated, guided and directed by some system of authority means that some kinds of inequalities of power are inevitable. The very fact that people must be motivated somehow to play a variety of social roles that vary in difficulty and burdensomeness without which soci-

ety would be impossible implies that some degree of inequality of reward might be necessary. The very fact that most intrasocietal disputes and conflicts must be resolved without recourse to uncontrolled brute force if society is to survive suggests that some people must have the legitimate power to intervene and settle them. The very fact that modern society has a complex division of labor means that intricate social differentiation exists upon which invidious distinctions of power, prestige, property, participation, and privilege can be erected.

It is well known that privileged groups invent ideologies that justify their privileges and that such justifications may take the form of claims of functional necessities or benefits to society. The research task is, first, to explicate such ideologies when they exist, and perhaps formulate them when they don’t. Second, to restate them as problematics. And third, to subject them to empirical test. How much inequality of what kind among what groups is in fact necessary for the survival of society or to get societal tasks accomplished? How much inequality is beneficial for society?

For Marx, of course, the meaning of inequality and inequality were central issues. His class analysis was both a description of the facts of inequality and an explanatory theory of them. And, brilliantly, he moved the concept of equity from purely moral to scientific discourse. His idea of surplus value, for example, permits a calculation of the amount of injustice heaped upon the working class by the capitalists. With the added concept of exploitation, calculable as the difference between wages and surplus value, he provided a justification for the proletariat to hate the bourgeoisie. What could be so starkly modern and emotionally inciting at the same time than a scientific demonstration of the existence of injustice? What better cause for righteous indignation and revolutionary action?

Thus, it is no wonder that it is Marx, although no less
Western than Adam Smith and hardly less a creature of the European Enlightenment than Condorcet, who has become a favorite intellectual forerunner of so many Third World intellectuals. Given the many unjust inequalities of colonialism, it is no wonder that many theorists of persistent poverty, unequal exchange among nations, and dependency have found modifications of Marx's ideas so serviceable.9

Yet Caribbean and other Third World scholars, obviously, have gone their own route—with, without, or beyond Marx—often formulating more sophisticated interpretations, more sensitive to the particular histories and conditions of their own countries. They have gone not one, but several different routes, in fact. Although, if I am correct in my thesis of the linked centrality of equality and social justice as the foundations of nationalism in the Caribbean and the influence on the Caribbean intellectual thought, then perhaps they lead to the same end. For example, M.G. Smith lays a solid groundwork of detailed, scientific analysis by his studies of the plural society which may be defined as concealed inequalities of culture, status, social organization, and race, as does Lloyd Braithwaite, working from a different theoretical tradition, in his study of social stratification in Trinidad; C.L.R. James in The Black Jacobins extends the range of concerns to include not only inequality but also injustice and rebellion; and Walter Rodney, Aimé Césaire and, especially, Frantz Fanon add the energizing forces of identity, consciousness, and the will to prevail as reactions to the oppressive domination of unjust inequalities. Many other examples could be given such as Lloyd Best and the Tapia Group in Trinidad, the histories of Eric Williams, and the Jamaican testament of Michael Manley.

ALIENATION AND THE LOSS OF LEGITIMACY?

Let us now consider the sources of legitimacy of a political regime because planned social change in the Caribbean, directly or indirectly, is largely and increasingly being carried out by the state. Political alienation and the withdrawal of legitimacy by the populace can result in the demise of the ruling group and erode the authority of the state itself. Many writers, including Lipset (1960) and Linz (1978), have discussed the importance of effectiveness and efficiency as cause of legitimacy. We can add equity or social justice to the equation:

Effectiveness + Efficiency + Equity = Legitimacy

and the obverse:

Ineffectiveness + Inefficiency + Inequity = Illegitimacy

By ineffectiveness, I refer to the inability of a political regime to perform the tasks that people regard as necessary to their survival, comfort, and self-realization. Many of the obstacles to effectiveness of course, come from the larger international world within which individual states find themselves inextricably and often interdependently linked. The power of multinational corporations, the uncontrolled—and often for a given state uncontrollable—rates of inflation, potentially hostile and aggressive neighboring states with territorial claims, the unstable prices of key commodities on the world markets, growing debts, crippling racial and cultural conflict, and in the Caribbean, of course, as Errol Barrow said at the 1980 Caribbean Studies Association conference in Curacao, the concept of limited sovereignty for
Caribbean states held by some U.S. leaders (and, therefore, American violation of it)—these and similar forces erode the ability of Caribbean governments to perform effectively. But beyond that are forces of the will and the organizational expertise to get the jobs done—ordinary things like delivering the mail, repairing the roads, keeping the telephone system working and the electricity on. Not to mention the more difficult things like providing jobs, health care, unemployment insurance, old age pensions, and housing; protecting life and limb; maintaining order, and the other aspects of life modern citizens have been taught to expect of government. More and more, in country after country, the situation seems out of control, the burdens of expectation and responsibility seem beyond the capacities of government to carry. Politically become overloaded. Increasingly expected to do everything, political regimes frequently do some thing poorly. Alienation toward the state grows; the legitimacy of the state erodes.

The problem is compounded by the growing loss of efficiency, in part as a result of increasing scale beyond capacity for communication, control, and the number of available trained personnel. Nearly everywhere, in both the new and old states, government continues to grow in size absolutely and relatively: as a proportion of GNP, as a percentage of all workers, and as a separate class with its own emergent interests. In some Caribbean states government and public sector spending may now have reached 50 percent of GNP. Outmoded organizational forms add to the dreadful waste which is multiplied by corruption. The confidence, knowledge, ability, and motivation to produce and maintain the efficient organizational instruments—the tools of human action—that are needed to inspire the trust and faith of the people seem in short supply.

But no regime, no matter how effective and efficient, can secure its legitimacy if it is perceived as unjust. Thus, many of the political regimes of the new states, already struggling to achieve or to maintain effective and efficient functioning, must simultaneously cope with their people’s expanded expectations for social justice. The very meaning of their sovereignty, as we have seen, is tied to the promise of social justice. Furthermore, given the inequalities of colonialism and the ideology of equality available in Western political thought, social justice meant equality. So much was this true that the rhetoric by which political independence was defended by nationalist elites in the British Caribbean, for example, was often entirely in terms of equalities (which were assumed to be fair) and inequalities (which were assumed to be unfair) and no explicit mention of justice or fairness may have been made whatsoever, except insofar as the latter were intended as implicit synonyms for equality. Thus, Caribbean governments face the continued demand for more equality on the part of some deprived citizens who have been told that equality means more for them and who believe it to be just. And such people may withdraw their support as quickly from a regime that permits a privileged “shirt-jac,” bureaucratic, state elite to arise as from one that permits the continuation of privileges of a suit-and-tie, capitalist, entrepreneurial class. Furthermore, in the political realm the principle of equality of participation is violated when elections are rigged, when they are no longer free and fair. A basic claim to legitimacy is thereby lost.

The situation in the new states of the Caribbean today seems to include the following:

(1) Attitudes toward political independence are no longer problematic. Persons who opposed it, fairly numerous even in the early 1960s, have left the countries, died, withdrawn from active political life, or converted to the view that political independence is desirable. This is so despite the fact that the underlying principle of self-determination does not necessarily imply political inde-
dependence. Rather, it means the right of a people to choose their political status, be it independence, self-government within a protective agreement with another country, free associative status, or full integration with another political entity (Alexander and Friedlander, 1980).

(2) Civil and political equalities are generally judged to be fair, but violations of implementation are alleged, for example, in Guyana and elsewhere where charges of rigged elections and bogus voting are widespread. A growing sense of injustice is thereby promoted.

(3) Equality of opportunity in economic life is nearly everywhere considered to be fair, and in social policy it is often the aim. In reality wide inequalities of economic opportunity are the norm.

(4) Equality of citizenship with citizens of other countries largely has been achieved in its psychological and political dimensions. It is, of course, universally considered just.

(5) The battle for agreement that social and cultural equality, both of opportunity and condition, is fair seems to be nearly over. This is not to say that social and cultural equality has been achieved. Rather, some consensus about what is fair has emerged. Few people in the Caribbean new states today will argue that there should be ascribed social barriers separating people on the basis of race or class. Moreover, Anglo-European life styles and identities, so dominant during colonial times in the former British Caribbean, have been largely replaced by local variants of Caribbean creole culture. The African heritage, once despised, now receives wide respect and recognition.

(6) Despite the rhetoric of equality that ushered in the new states in the Caribbean, there still exists gross internal inequalities of condition in the economic sphere, in employment, occupation, income, and wealth. Although some inequalities are holdovers from the past, some are newly created as the new middle class of bureaucrats, technocrats, politicians and civil servants connected with the state apparatus has grown and prospered. Some members of society, especially segments of the lower racial and social-economic classes and some far left intellectuals and leaders, judge the privileges of the new middle class as unjust. Some of these people feel alienation and rage.

(7) Yet alienation and rage toward Caribbean political regimes comes also from the relatively privileged classes as well, especially from the entrepreneurial class, some professionals, some skilled workers, and even from some members of the new state elite. Their privileges in their judgment have been unfairly jeopardized. They are, or so they believe, the victims of injustice, unfair efforts to create equality at their expense or to reward them with less than they deserve. They are joined in their judgment that when it comes to income or wealth, inequality is fair by some members of all social classes and racial groups, probably a majority of people. Thus, political regimes that simply equate social justice with equality of income and wealth across the board may face a sudden setback. And their opponents will be speaking the rhetoric of social justice (fair inequalities), though not the rhetoric of equality of condition. And finally:

(8) Conflict over how much of a role the state should play in the economy has replaced the pre-independence cleavage between pro and con attitudes toward political independence as the major focus of political struggle. Although nearly all Caribbean people may agree that the foreign transnational ox should be gored to their individual and collective national advantage, they vehemently disagree on how much control, regulation, or ownership the state should have over those enterprises in which the national bourgeoisie have major interests. In Jamaica, for example, this question recently completely polarized political activity and the aims of the two major political parties, the People's National Party having pushed for more state
control and ownership and the Jamaica Labour Party having wanted a more limited role for government.

There are dilemmas here, a series of interrelated contradictions. Equality of opportunity is incompatible with some aspects of equality of condition. The demand for justice defined as more equality continues in some parts of the population, while at the same time the demand for justice defined as some degree of inequality (a reward commensurate with skill, talent, extraordinary performance, risk taking, investment in training, or whatever) is strident among some groups, such as entrepreneurial groups in Jamaica. De facto inequality as seen in the rising bureaucratic and state elite occurs in the face of continued use of the idea of equality as justice to validate the very creation and expansion of the state apparatus that itself produces the privileges of the bureaucratic and state elite.

Simple interest theory—that deprived groups want equality and privileged groups want inequality because each group benefits the most that way—does not explain all of the variance of who defines social justice as equality or inequality. This is so because a number of other variables can intervene in the relationship, such as education (which is correlated with economic privilege but can lead to egalitarian values), other values (such as achievement and success, which are compatible with many kinds of inequalities), and fears of responsibilities, religious and other beliefs (Lane, 1962; Robinson and Bell, 1978b).

CONCLUSION

If we have reached the zenith of the age of the nation-state, perhaps we should begin to expect that we may soon arrive at its nadir. Many writers have predicted the demise of the nation-state, one of the latest being Alvin Toffler (1980: 30). The usual threats to the sovereignty of the state that are proposed are supranational organizations of one kind or another, such as larger regional groupings, transnational corporations, and world institutions on the one hand, or fragmenting smaller groups defined by race, ethnicity, or religion on the other.

In this article I suggest an additional source of threat to the state. Along with the oft-cited causes of the loss of legitimacy of a political regime represented by its ineffectiveness and inefficiency, I stress its inequity. Feelings of inequity not only could topple a regime, but they could also erode the legitimacy of the state itself if a regime remained in power by force or fraud and if the state became the manager of most of economic and social life.

The injustices of which I speak are those involving certain equalities and inequalities. Although the assertion that some inequalities, especially of income and wealth, are fair may give solace to the privileged, it also may be an unwelcome truth that political leaders should take seriously if they want to prevent alienation and promote their own legitimacy.

The Caribbean is today a battle field of an intense clash of ideologies, a microcosm of world struggle. Western-style party democracies exist alongside dictatorships of the left and of the right. Capitalist, democratic socialist, and communist ideologies struggle to capture the future. But the debate, as I understand it, often is beside the point. Forgotten is the fact that there may be more variation from a global perspective within than between regimes characterized by the labels these various dogmas have generated. For example, Yugoslavia has more political liberties and popular sovereignty than some other communist countries such as the Soviet Union or Albania. Capitalist Canada is more politically democratic than capitalist Portugal or Honduras. Throughout the
1960s, communist Yugoslavia was more democratic than capitalist countries such as Taiwan and Spain. Socialist countries of Scandinavia score higher on political democracy than a number of capitalist nations (Bollen, 1978). And official Soviet policy long ago denounced “equality mongering.”

Perhaps we should ignore the labels and look at the facts of public liberties, political participation, and, as has been the central theme of this study, social justice as it is manifested in various fair equalities and inequalities. Thus, there is a research agenda underlying this article, an agenda that must be carried out before the performance of the new national leaders and the alternative futures they offer can be adequately assessed. It includes, first, the mapping of the various equalities and inequalities within and among Caribbean societies, and, second, an appraisal, perhaps by some of the procedures purposed here, of their fairness.

Given the central importance of equality and social justice to the creation and meaning of the new Caribbean states and to the continuing legitimacy of their political regimes, economic organizations, social arrangements, and cultural orientations, then such a research agenda seems imperative. Furthermore, such a research agenda—obviously already underway as I have said—is of importance to the current efforts to reduce international inequalities by creating a new international economic order; its results, for example, inform the North-South dialogue. And, perhaps just as urgently needed, is such research from the viewpoints of the new states in order to cross-fertilize that in the old states where, it should not be forgotten, the struggle to control the definitions of what inequalities are fair goes on in the face of many forces dedicated to the maintenance of old inequalities and the creation of new ones.

In conclusion, if my effort to link nationalism, equality, and social justice in the new states with similar phenomena in the old states and with Western traditions is read as mere ethnocentrism, then I have not been properly understood. If Western conceptions and values have been used and abused by European colonial powers to perpetuate conditions of inferiority and infelicity, then it is not the values that should be rejected but their abuse. If a concern with the social justice of inequality is a Western tradition, then it has co-existed, often been dominated by, and struggled over the centuries with a no less Western tradition of social injustice. For example, there may be less hypocrisy in Western colonialism than Césaire or Fanon would have us believe: conquest, domination, plunder, superiority were the unmasked aims, values, and beliefs of many would-be imperial masters. Questioning the justice of existing inequalities has seldom been an endearing quality in the eyes of any Western ruling elite. Controversy over social justice arises in Western history again and again. And it is not that Western ideals have universal validity. It is, rather, that some Western ideals may be one expression of some values that do have universal validity. The search for that validity, however, transcends any particular past of any particular peoples and will be defined, eventually, by its future destination toward which we have all been advanced by the works of many scholars, most recently by Caribbean and other Third World scholars.10

EPILOGUE—1990

It has been ten years since this paper was written. Today, there are over 100 new states, and, since 1980, three additional new states in the Caribbean, Belize and Antigua-and-Barbuda which became independent in 1981 and St. Kitts-Nevis in 1983. Thus, the transition to nationhood has continued. Even fewer colonies remain from which to form
additional independent states than in 1980, so the process
must be coming to an end—unless, of course, existing states
begin to break-up into smaller units.

Some evidence exists that such a break-up is a possibility,
though, no doubt, unlikely to occur on a large scale. Yet the
dramatic fragmentation of Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe
and the reassertion of national sovereignty in Hungary,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and East Ger-
many certainly can be viewed as a resurgence of the global
democratic revolution. Although these countries had been
politically independent states de jure, they had been, as we
all know, de facto more or less under the hegemony of the
Soviet Union. Moreover, their example, if followed by subre-
gional peoples within the borders of the Soviet Union, may
preclude a fourth wave of new state creation, already visible
in Lithuania and the other Baltic states.

The present thaw in the cold war, if it continues—and
there is no reason why it should not, means a totally differ-
ent international environment. As I write, the Soviet Union
is itself undergoing a democratic transition, and the United
States, after the humiliating Iran-Contra scandal and the
misguided and unnecessary invasion of Grenada in 1983
(Bell, 1986), will have little excuse to support corrupt and
antidemocratic armies abroad in the name of fighting Com-
unism, as it has done in El Salvador, Honduras, Guate-
mania, and, before the capture of Manuel Antonio Noriega, in
Panama. Democracies, as my colleague Bruce Russett points
out, do not fight each other.

The "peace dividend" could be enormous, not only for the
Soviets and Americans, but also for the countries of the
Third World. Instead of weapons, proxy wars, and distrust,
we can hope for cooperation, mutual help, and coordinated
development. The creation of a pan-Caribbean community
to coordinate and control economic relations with the rest of
the world may be the way to maximize both Caribbean con-
tributions to and benefits from international trade and
exchange. But such an image of the future is only one among
many. What are the alternative possibilities? How can coop-
eration, human rights, democratic decision-making, social
justice, economic and social well-being, mutual respect, and
cultural dignity be secured? How can the new Caribbean
states achieve the meaning and purpose of their nationhood?
The answer may be to continue the drive for economic and
social development along with the struggle for democracy
and equity, fostering a continuing debate as social change
occurs about which equalities and inequalities are fair and
which are unfair.

NOTES

*This is a revised version of a presidential address delivered at
the annual conference of the Caribbean Studies Association in
Curaçao, Netherlands Antilles, May 7–10, 1980. I wish to thank
Angel Calderón Cruz, Locksley Edmondson, and René Römer
for their comments on an earlier version of this address.
1. One misunderstanding of our work is the erroneous belief that
we only studied leaders. We also studied students and slum
dwellers in Jamaica and sugar workers in Antigua. We did,
however, concentrate much of our effort on elites because of
their importance for the decision-making and design perspec-
tive we adopted.
2. See Bell (1964), Bell (1967), Bell and Oxnaal (1964), Duke (1963),
Mau (1968), Moskos (1967), and Murch (1971).
3. The question of the form of government is related in that there
is evidence to show that countries with democratic regimes,
regardless of level of economic development, have less internal
income inequality than do undemocratic countries (Weede,
1980). But democracy does not need this justification because it
is, of course, its own reward: people who manage to establish
and maintain it enjoy both public liberties and the periodic
opportunity to throw rascal rulers out.
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