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Editor's Introduction

Philip Smith

I am happy to announce the return of the Yale Journal of Sociology (YJS), and its transition to a new stage. For many years the YJS served to showcase some of the best undergraduate senior thesis work in the department, and it will continue to do that. Involving original research and taking over a year to complete, these items are outstanding contributions. The strongest fully match the product found in familiar refereed journals. Historically the YJS has also provided a venue for short papers, research notes, and experimental or speculative work-in-progress by Yale faculty. Notwithstanding the interest of its content, however, the YJS was limited in its reach. The department published it as a hard copy product and it functioned largely as a mechanism of scholarly community building for students and alumni. In effect it remained an in-house publication. High printing costs and lack of substantive reach - and therefore impact - led to the demise of the YJS in 2007. Its excellent content still exists, please note, in virtual form on the Yale Sociology Department server.

The return of the YJS has been made possible by a switch to a digital platform. From a digital base, the YJS can now reach the widest possible scholarly audience. An agreement with EBSCO, the database and content provider, will make the YJS globally available. Our expectation is that the research published here will at last find its way into the global academic community.

Turning to the specifics of content, several superb revised senior theses explore dimensions of the lifeworld in contemporary America. Ariel Franks offers an insight into provider perspectives on maternal health

in a context of racial disparity. Cara McClellan investigates adolescents' understandings of the school-to-prison pipeline. Andrew Udelsman provides an ethnography of an illegal homeless encampment in New Haven. Each of these studies show how inequality is not simply an abstract or statistical reality but also one that is experienced, negotiated and interpreted daily by ordinary people in the course of their lives.

Our other contributions are more panoptic. Anna Jo Smith provides a comprehensive institutional and cultural explanation for the differential spread of pre-school programs in the United States. Continuing the tradition of research notes and commentary, Scott Boorman provides a series of tantalizing and aphoristic reflections on the concept of 'style'. Responding to and arising out of conversations with Harrison White's work, these have an unusually informal Wittgensteinian feel, even as they strive to identify generic dimensions of a notoriously slippery concept. The former Yale Chair August Hollingshead offers our flagship contribution this year. Somewhat unusually, this item became a citation classic before publication. For many years the Yale Sociology Department has found itself bombarded with and bemused by requests for a battered typescript in which Hollingshead sets out a particular way of measuring and classifying social inequality. We might say that the essay has attracted an academic cult following. In the 2011 YJS we publish it for the first time. An accompanying essay by Julia Adams and David L. Weakliem sets this legendary item in its intellectual, biographical and social context.

Finally some words of thanks. I am grateful to the Provost's Office at Yale for supporting student research with various scholarships. Particular thanks go to the Adam R. Rose Sociology Resource Fund that generously helps our students through the Senior Thesis year in so many

August B. Hollingshead's "Four Factor Index of Social Status": From Unpublished Paper to Citation Classic

Julia Adams, Yale University
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August Hollingshead's "Four Factor Index of Social Status" (1975) may well be the most-cited unpublished paper in American sociology. It has amassed about 5,000 citations in the Web of Science database since 1994. The Yale Sociology department received so many requests for the paper in recent years that a past department chair, exhausted by the flow of correspondence, finally posted the paper on the departmental website. The department still fields requests from all over the world for its predecessor, "A Two Factor Index of Social Position" (1957), a privately printed pamphlet held by only a few dozen academic libraries. This issue of YJS marks the first publication of either work.

August de Belmont ("Sandy") Hollingshead was born in Lyman, Wyoming in 1907, and died in 1980. The son of a stockbreeder, he received his bachelor's (1931) and master's (1933) degrees from the University of California-Berkeley. Hollingshead became interested in the social structure of contemporary societies in the summer of 1931 when, he wrote, "I made a field trip to British Columbia, Canada, and observed the behavior of Doukhobors in their relations with one another and with other Canadians." (Hollingshead 1971: 564) After earning his PhD. at the University of Nebraska in 1935, he became an Instructor in Sociology at University of Iowa; he later taught at University of Alabama and Indiana University, and served in World War II. During this peripatetic phase of his career, he conducted a number of community studies of social stratification, relying on W. Lloyd Warner's (Warner et al.) approach of asking people about the

social standing of the members of their community.

Upon moving to Yale in 1947, however, he found these techniques unsuited to New Haven, which was then a busy industrial and port city with a population of 160,000. Hollingshead began to work on a method of social classification that could be readily applied in survey research. He began with a three-factor index based on area of residence, occupation and years of school completed by the head of the household. This project culminated in his pioneering and still important work on social class and mental illness (Hollingshead and Redlich 1958; Pols 2007). Hollingshead gave a paper on this study at the September 1952 American Sociological Association meeting, and it was published, more rapidly than nowadays, in the American Sociological Review in April 1953 (Hollingshead and Redlich 1953). "Shortly afterwards," he recalled, "I began to receive requests from sociologists, social workers, social psychologists, and a few psychiatrists for copies of the detailed procedures we had used to stratify the 5 percent sample of households and the psychiatric patients in the psychiatric census" (Hollingshead 1971: 565). In response to these requests, Hollingshead conducted a more detailed study of his New Haven sample, dropping area of residence as a criterion. His work resulted in the "Two Factor Index of Social Position," which he had privately printed and sold for $1.00 per copy. The Two Factor Index offered a procedure which combined the occupation and education of the head of the household to generate a single measure of social status.

Though you would never have guessed it from the arid title, the Two Factor Index was an immediate hit. Since it was based on a New Haven sample, however, the list of occupations was incomplete and somewhat idiosyncratic, including wine-bottlers, rope-splicers, and other local and regional specialties. In the 1970s Hollingshead developed the

Four Factor Index, which included a detailed list of occupations based on U.S. Census classifications. The occupations were classified into nine groups, ranging from "Higher Executives, Proprietors of Large Businesses, and Major Professionals" at the top to "Farm Laborers/Menial Service Workers" at the bottom. The two additional factors referred to in the paper's title were marital status and sex. At the time, the consensus in sociology was to assume that the male was automatically head of household and to take his status as the informational baseline. Rather than defaulting to the man when both spouses were employed, the Four Factor Index took an average of the occupation and education of husband and wife. In this regard, Hollingshead was unusually egalitarian.

The Four Factor Index in particular was and continues to be widely used, especially in medicine and public health. At least one simplified version still circulates internationally as an aid to students and researchers collecting their own data (Barratt 2006). Nevertheless, the Four Factor Index did not become the most cited index because it was in any straightforward way the best. Its success initially capitalized on the already established position of the Two Factor model, which in turn had the advantage of appearing when large-scale social research was rapidly expanding. After the four-factor index was established, it diffused yet more rapidly, in the manner of the QWERTY keyboard (David 1985). However there were also substantive and methodological reasons for its success. It provided a relatively simple and transparent recipe for combining the standard sociological variables of education and occupation. Some contending indices drew on information about income, material possessions, or living conditions, and could not be used in secondary analysis if the necessary information had not been collected in the original survey. Others, like the

early Gallup Polls, asked the interviewer to make a subjective judgment about the respondent's economic status.

The most important competitor, today more familiar to sociologists, was Otis Dudley Duncan's 1961 Socioeconomic Index or SEI (Duncan 1961). The SEI was and is not intended as a general measure of social status, but as a measure of specifically occupational status. The measure was derived from an attempt to predict average ratings of the "general standing" of different occupations in surveys of the general public. The resulting formula combined the average educational and income levels of the occupation to produce a score ranging from 0 to 100. In the original calculations, osteopaths and dentists tied for the highest score, while laborers in the tobacco industry had the lowest. Duncan's approach of combining average income and education has been refined and updated in subsequent work (see Hauser and Warren 1997 for a review).

Duncan's SEI is a more rigorous measure of social position than the Four Factor Index. Because it requires precise information about the characteristics of the people who hold an occupation, however, an investigator cannot reasonably compute the SEI of a new occupation such as, for example, web designer. In contrast, Hollingshead's Four Factor Index merely requires investigators to place the occupation into a broad group—in this case, web designer might join "computer systems analysts" and "computer specialists, not elsewhere classified" in group 8, "lesser professionals." The Hollingshead index is therefore easier to apply, and has proven especially attractive to researchers who are not specialists in social stratification and simply want a measure that is easy to calculate and explain.

The Four Factor Index is convenient, but is it an adequate measure of social position? One might question the placement of particular occupations.

University administrators, for instance, who are in group 8 ("administrators, lesser professionals, proprietors of medium-sized businesses"), would surely cavil at being placed under university professors, who are in the top group. (On the other hand, Hollingshead had a great deal of experience in universities, so perhaps we should trust his judgment in this case.) The occupational structure has also changed since the 1970s with the appearance of new occupations and some rises or declines in the position of particular occupations. For example, Hollingshead placed "stock/bond salesmen" in the same group as primary school teachers ("minor professionals," for a score of 7). The income, if not the social esteem, of the two groups has certainly diverged in the last thirty-five years.

Despite these cases, on the whole the rankings and classification of occupations seem reasonable—Hollingshead's groups are not optimal in any sense, but they are not grossly wrong. A more substantial problem is that the index combines the two distinct dimensions of education and occupation, which have different relationships to outcomes of interest. First, occupational differences may not follow a "vertical" pattern, but may depend on specific features of that occupation (Weeden and Grusky 2005). Second, the measure of social position does not explicitly take account of income: it assumes that income will follow from occupation and education, which is not necessarily the case. As Magnuson and Duncan (2002) urge, a serious study of social stratification should treat income, education, and occupation as distinct dimensions or variables, rather than attempting to combine them into a single index. As a rough overall measure of social position, however, the Four-Factor Index is probably superior to either education or income by itself.

Haug and Sussman (1971), after pointing to problems in the

Four-Factor Index and other measures of class and status, proposed that the American Sociological Association appoint a commission that would collectively propose a definitive measure. Hollingshead replied that "such a commission would likely take on the aura of an 'Establishment'" and that "the efforts of individual scholars . . . are more likely to result in the development of concepts relative to social differentiation . . . than an institutionalized commission" (Hollingshead 1971: 587). His position seems to be the more plausible one in retrospect. In any case, Hollingshead did not claim that his index was superior to others in terms of its theoretical foundation or empirical support: he simply said that it had served his purposes in a research study.

Sandy Hollingshead himself remains a controversial figure in the discipline. He is justly celebrated for his impressive body of academic work and his foundational organizational activities in social stratification, medical sociology, and their intersection. At Yale, he was an important link between today's department and the days of William Graham Sumner (Jaworsky and Alexander 2011). During his tenure in the Yale Sociology department, however, which he chaired from 1959 to 1965, he upheld the deplorable legacy of anti-Semitic hiring practices. Sociology was one of the last Yale departments to hire Jewish faculty members (Oren 1985; Karabel 2005), and Lionel Lewis recalls that in about 1960, Hollingshead "assured his stunned and incredulous seminar in social stratification that although he resided in a community with restrictive covenants, 'some of my best friends are Jewish'" (Lewis 2008: 85).

Yet the Four Factor Index of Social Status maintains its own academic life, independent of its creator's flaws and achievements. Despite its shortcomings, many people continue to find the Index not

just useful but indispensable, and it is in this spirit that the Yale Journal of Sociology is publishing the paper. We expect to see a bump in August B. Hollingshead's already healthy citation counts – something that he did not have to worry about in his professional lifetime. Perhaps publishing this enduring contribution will also attract new readers to this journal and lead them to sample the wonderful senior theses published therein? We hope so indeed.

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Four Factor Index of Social Status[1]

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I. Introduction

Characterization of the status structure of society is a general problem in sociology. For many years sociologists have discussed the issue of how to determine the positions individuals or nuclear families occupy in the status structure of a given society. Several measures have been devised to solve this problem (Blishen 1958, Duncan 1961, U. S. Bureau of the Census 1963, U. S. Bureau of the Census 1964, Blau and Duncan 1967: 117-132, Pineo and Porter 1967), but consensus has not been reached on the methodological procedures that best estimate the positions individuals or nuclear families occupy in the status structure of complex industrial, urban societies (Haug and Sussman 1971).

In the early 1940s, I made a systematic examination of status in a middle-western community (Hollingshead 1949). In 1948 I began to study the social structure of the New Haven area, a highly urbanized, industrial community. Two years later, I constructed an index designed to measure social status in this community, based on the use of education, occupation, and area of residence taken from a cross-sectional sample of nuclear families living there. The procedures followed in the development of that index are described in *Social Class and Mental Illness* (Hollingshead and Redlich 1958: 387-397).

In the following years I analyzed data from a five percent sample of nuclear families resident in the New Haven community in 1951 and found that area of residence contributed very little to the estimated status position of a nuclear family: the multiple correlation between estimated status and education

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[1] Unpublished Working Paper, 1975

and occupation was .975. This correlation indicated that area of residence could be dropped as an indicator of status (Hollingshead 1971). In 1957 I published privately a pamphlet demonstrating that education and occupation could be used to construct an index of social status (Hollingshead 1957).

The *Two Factor Index of Social Position* has been widely used, but, with the social and cultural changes that have occurred since its publication, it stands in need of revision. The major points of criticism directed toward it are: it is now dated; the range of occupations used is too narrow; and the family's status position is based on data about the head of the household (Haug 1972). The Four Factor Index of Social Status presented here is designed to meet these deficiencies.

II. The New Index

The new index takes into consideration the fact that social status is a multidimensional concept. It is premised upon three basic assumptions: (1) A differentiated, unequal status structure exists in our society. (2) The primary factors indicative of status are the occupation an individual engages in and the years of schooling he or she has completed; other salient factors are sex and marital status. (3) These factors may be combined so that a researcher can quickly, reliably, and meaningfully estimate the status positions individuals and members of nuclear families occupy in our society (Hodge and Treiman 1968).

The four factors used in the new index are: education, occupation, sex, and marital status. Education changes during childhood and youth, but it generally stabilizes in the adult years; the years of schooling an individual has completed are believed to be reflected in acquired knowledge and cultural tastes. Moreover, education is a prerequisite to entry into occupations

that carry higher prestige in the social system. Occupation may change in the early years of adult life, but it too tends to become stable as a person grows into the late twenties and on into the thirties. It is presumed to be indicative of the skill and power individuals possess as they perform the maintenance functions in society. The sex of an individual remains constant throughout the course of the life cycle, but it plays an important part in the roles individuals play in the performance of maintenance functions in the society. Marital status defines the relationship of an adult male or female to the family system; it may or may not be stable from the early adult years on into old age. Both males and females participate in the educational process, mainly during the childhood and adolescent years (Ritter and Hargens 1975). Most adult males enter the labor force and fill occupational roles; in contemporary industrial society, more and more females are entering the labor force. Marital status is important in the calculation of social status because of differences in the ways adult family members participate in the economic system (Watson and Barth 1964). One spouse may be a full-time participant in the labor force while the other is not gainfully employed outside the home. However, as the years pass, the proportion of intact nuclear families with both spouses gainfully employed increases. Other families may be headed by a single, widowed, separated, or divorced male or female who is now or in the past has been gainfully employed. This index takes into consideration the several categories.

III. Estimation of Social Status

Information on each of the four factors is easily gathered in an empirical study. The sex of a respondent is observable directly and is assumed to be what appearances indicate. The other factors require inquiry and evaluation. The use of each factor in the estimation of status is described in the following sections.

A. Marital Status

1. Married and Living with Spouse

a. <u>One spouse, male or female, gainfully employed</u>; other spouse not employed. The estimated social position of this type of nuclear family is calculated on the basis of the employed member's education and occupation.

b. <u>Both spouses gainfully employed</u>. The education and occupation of each spouse is used to estimate the status position of the nuclear family. It is assumed that the education and occupation of each spouse constitutes an equal proportion of the nuclear family's status. In the absence of theoretical and empirical evidence, a rule of thumb is followed, that is, education and occupation scores for the husband and wife are <u>summed and divided by two</u>. Research has indicated that the prestige of occupations is similar for males and females and that education is essentially the same for males and females in the same occupation (Treiman and Terrill 1975, especially p. 176). In accordance with this finding, the combined score for the two spouses is assigned as the status score of the family.

2. Family Without Spouse

Nuclear families or households may be headed by persons who have never married, divorced persons, persons permanently separated from a spouse, or widowed persons. Households falling into this category present the researcher with various alternatives:

a. <u>When the head has never been married</u>, the status score is calculated by the use of the head's occupation and education.

b. <u>When a divorced person is employed full time </u>in a gainful occupation, the occupation and education of the present head of

the household should be used to calculate the status score.

c. <u>When a separated or divorced person is receiving support payments</u> from an absent, present or former, spouse, but is not gainfully employed, the status score should be calculated from the education and occupation of the supporting spouse.

d. <u>When a widow or widower who is not gainfully employed</u> is living on the income from the deceased spouse's estate, the status score should be computed on the education and occupation of the deceased spouse during the time he or she was gainfully employed.

B. Retired Persons

For retired persons, the status score should be calculated from the education and occupation of the person before he, she, or they retired. The factor of marital status should be handled in the same way that it is for nuclear families with one or both spouses active in the labor force.

C. The Educational Factor

The years of school a respondent has completed are scored on a seven-point scale, premised upon the assumption that men and women who possess different levels of education have different tastes and tend to exhibit different behavior patterns. The years of school an individual has completed are grouped in the same way as in the earlier *Two Factor Index of Social Position* (Hollingshead 1957: 9). The amount of formal education a person has completed is scored as follows:

Level of School Completed	Score
Less than seventh grade	1
Junior high school (9th grade)	2
Partial high school (10th or 11th grade)	3
High school graduate (whether private preparatory, parochial, trade, or public school)	4
Partial college (at least one year) or specialized training	5
Standard college or university graduation	6
Graduate professional training (graduate degree)	7

D. The Occupational Factor

The occupation a person ordinarily pursues during gainful employment is graded on a nine-step scale. Wherever possible, the scale has been keyed to the occupational titles used by the United States Census in 1970, and the three-digit code assigned by the census is given (Greene et al. 1969: 77-84)[2]. However, the occupational titles assigned by the census are not precise enough to delineate several occupational categories, especially proprietors of businesses, the military, farmers, and persons dependent upon welfare. Therefore, the occupational scale has departed from the titles and codes used by the census for a number of occupations and occupational groups.

OCCUPATIONAL SCALE

Score 9 Higher Executives, Proprietors of Large Businesses, and Major Professionals

a. Higher executives: chairpersons, presidents, vice-presidents, assistant vice-presidents, secretaries, treasurers;

b. Commissioned officers in the military: majors, lieutenant commanders, and above, or equivalent;

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[2] For detailed instructions, see Bureau of the Census (1971a, 1971b).

c. <u>Government officials, federal, state, and local</u>: members of the United States Congress, members of the state legislature, governors, state officials, mayors, city managers;

d. <u>Proprietors of businesses valued at $250,000 and more</u>;[3]

e. <u>Owners of farms valued at</u>

f. <u>Major professionals</u> (census code list).

Occupational Title	Census Code
Actuaries	034
Aeronautical engineers	006
Architects	002
Astronautical engineers	006
Astronomers	053
Atmospheric scientists	043
Bank officers	202
Biologic scientists	044
Chemical engineers	010
Chemists	045
Civil engineers	010
Dentists	062
Economists	091
Electrical/electronic engineers	012
Engineers, not elsewhere classified[4]	023
Financial managers	202
Geologists	051
Health administrators	212
Judges	030
Lawyers	031
Life scientists, n.e.c.	054
Marine scientists	052

[3] Dun and Bradstreet maintain up-to-date ratings of financial strength of businesses in every community in the United States. These ratings may be obtained from most banks if the researcher explains his need for them.
[4] From here on, the abbreviation, n.e.c., will be used.

Materials engineers	015
Mathematicians	035
Mechanical engineers	014
Metallurgical engineers	015
Mining engineers	020
Optometrists	063
Petroleum engineers	021
Physical scientists, n.e.c.	054
Physicians	065
Physicists	053
Political scientists	092
Psychologists	093
Social scientists, n.e.c.	096
Sociologists	094
Space scientists	043
Teachers, college/university, including coaches	102-140
Urban and regional planners	095
Veterinarians	072

Score 8 Administrators, Lesser Professionals, Proprietors of Medium-Sized Businesses

a. Administrative officers in large concerns: district managers, executive assistants, personnel managers, production managers;

b. Proprietors of businesses valued between $100,000 and $250,000;

c. Owners and operators of farms valued between $100,000 and $250,000;

d. Commissioned officers in the military; lieutenants, captains, lieutenants, s.g., and j.g., or equivalent;

e. Lesser professionals (census code list).

Occupational Title	Census Code
Accountants	001
Administrators, college	235
Administrators, elementary/secondary school	240
Administrators, public administration, n.e.c.	222
Archivists	033
Assessors, local public administration	201
Authors	181
Chiropractors	061
Clergymen	086
Computer specialists, n.e.c.	005
Computer systems analysts	004
Controllers, local public administration	201
Curators	033
Editors	184
Farm management advisors	024
Industrial engineers	013
Labor relations workers	056
Librarians	032
Musicians/composers	185
Nurses, registered	075
Officials, public administration, n.e.c.	222
Personnel workers	056
Pharmacists	064
Pilots, airplane	163
Podiatrists	071
Sales engineers	022
Statisticians	036
Teachers, secondary school	144
Treasurers, local public administration, n.e.c.	201

Score 7   Smaller Business Owners, Farm Owners, Managers, Minor Professionals

a. Owners of smaller businesses valued at $75,000 to $100,000;

b. Farm owners/operators with farms valued at $75,000 to $100,000;

c. <u>Managers</u> (census code list);

d. <u>Minor professionals</u> (census code list);

e. <u>Entertainers and artists</u>.

Occupational Title	Census Code
Actors	175
Agricultural scientists	042
Announcers, radio/television	193
Appraisers, real estate	363
Artists	194
Buyers, wholesale/retail trade	205
Computer programmers	003
Credit persons	210
Designers	183
Entertainers, n.e.c.	194
Funeral directors	211
Health practitioners, n.e.c.	073
Insurance adjusters, examiners, investigators	326
Insurance agents, brokers, underwriters	265
Managers, administration, n.e.c.	245
Managers, residential building	216
Managers, office, n.e.c.	220
Officers, lodges, societies, unions	223
Officers/pilots, pursers, shipping	221
Operations/systems researchers/analysts	055
Painters	190
Postmasters, mail supervisors	224
Public relations persons	192
Publicity writers	192
Purchasing agents, buyers, n.e.c.	225
Real estate brokers/agents	270
Reporters	184
Sales managers, except retail trade	233
Sales representatives, manufacturing industries	281
Sculptors	190

Social workers	100
Stock/bond salesmen	271
Surveyors	161
Teachers, except college/university/secondary school	141-143
Teachers, except college/university, n.e.c.	145
Vocational/educational counsellors	174
Writers, n.e.c.	194

Score 6 Technicians, Semiprofessionals, Small Business Owners

a. <u>Technicians</u> (census code list);

b. <u>Semiprofessionals</u>: army, m/sgt., navy, c.p.o., clergymen (not professionally trained), interpreters (court);

c. <u>Owners of businesses valued at $50,000 to $75,000</u>;

d. <u>Farm owners/operators with farms valued at $50,000 to $75,000</u>.

Occupational Title	Census Code
Administrators, except farm--allocated	246
Advertising agents/salesmen	260
Air traffic controllers	164
Athletes/kindred workers	180
Buyers, farm products	203
Computer/peripheral equipment operators	343
Conservationists	025
Dental hygienists	081
Dental laboratory technicians	426
Department heads, retail trade	231
Dietitians	074
Draftsmen	152
Embalmers	165
Flight engineers	170
Foremen, n.e.c.	441
Foresters	025
Home management advisors	026
Inspectors, construction, public administration	213

Inspectors, except construction, public administration	215
Managers, except farm--allocated	246
Opticians, lens grinders/polishers	506
Payroll/timekeeping clerks	360
Photographers	191
Professional, technical, kindred workers--allocated	196
Religious workers, n.e.c.	090
Research workers, not specified	195
Sales managers, retail trade	231
Sales representatives, wholesale trade	282
Secretaries, legal	370
Secretaries, medical	371
Secretaries, n.e.c.	372
Sheriffs/bailiffs	965
Shippers, farm products	203
Stenographers	376
Teacher aides, except school monitors	382
Technicians	150-162
Therapists	076
Tool programmers, numerical control	172

Score 5 Clerical and Sales Workers, Small Farm and Business Owners

a. Clerical workers (census code list);

b. Sales workers (census code list);

c. Owners of small business valued at $25,000 to $50,000;

d. Owners of small farms valued at $25,000 to $50,000.

Occupational Title	Census Code
Auctioneers	261
Bank tellers	301
Billing clerks	303
Bookkeepers	305
Bookkeeping/billing machine operators	341
Calculating machine operators	342
Cashiers	310
Clerical assistants, social welfare	311
Clerical workers, miscellaneous	394
Clerical/kindred workers---	396
Clerical supervisors, n.e.c.	312
Clerks, statistical	375
Collectors, bill-account	313
Dental assistants	921
Estimators, n.e.c.	321
Health trainees	923
Investigators, n.e.c.	321
Key punch operators	345
Library assistants/attendants	330
Recreation workers	101
Tabulating machine operators	350
Telegraph operators	384
Telephone operators	385
Therapy assistants	084
Typists	391

Score 4 Smaller Business Owners, Skilled Manual Workers, Craftsmen, and Tenant Farmers

a. Owners of small businesses and farms valued at less than $25,000;

b. Tenant farmers owning farm machinery and livestock;

c. Skilled manual workers and craftsmen (census code list);

d. Noncommissioned officers in the military below the rank of master sergeant and C.P.O

Occupational Title	Census Code
Airline cabin attendants	931
Automobile accessories installers	401
Bakers	402
Blacksmiths	403
Boilermakers	404
Bookbinders	405
Brakemen, railroad	712
Brickmasons/stonemasons	410
Brickmason/stonemason apprentices	411
Cabinetmakers	413
Carpenters	415
Carpenter apprentices	416
Carpet installers	420
Cement/concrete finishers	421
Checkers/examiners/inspectors, manufacturing	610
Clerks, shipping/receiving	374
Compositors/typesetters	422
Conductors, railroad	226
Constables	963
Counter clerks, except food	314
Decorators/window dressers	425
Demonstrators	262
Detectives	964
Dispatchers/starters, vehicles	315
Drillers, earth	614
Dry wall installers/lathers	615
Duplicating machine operators, n.e.c.	344
Electricians	430
Electrician apprentices	431
Electric power linemen/cablemen	433
Electrotypers	434
Engineers, locomotive	455
Engineers, stationary	545
Engravers, except photoengravers	435
Enumerators	320

Score 3 Machine Operators and Semiskilled Workers (census code list)

Occupational Title	Census Code
Animal caretakers	740
Asbestos/insulation workers	601
Assemblers	602
Barbers	935
Blasters/powdermen	603
Boardinghouse/lodginghouse keepers	940
Boatmen/canalmen	701
Bottling operatives	604
Bulldozer operators	412
Bus drivers	703
Canning operatives	604
Carding, lapping, combing operatives	670
Chauffeurs	714
Child care workers, except private household	942
Conductors/motormen, urban rail transit	704
Cranemen/derrickmen/hoistmen	424
Cutting operatives	612
Deliverymen	704
Dressmakers/seamstresses, except factory	613
Drill press operatives	650
Dyers	620
Excavating/grading/road machine operators except bulldozer	436
Farm services laborers, self-employed	824
File clerks	325
Filers/polishers/sanders/buffers	621
Fishermen/oystermen	752
Forklift/tow motor operatives	706
Furnacemen/smelters/pourers	622
Furniture/wood finishers	443
Graders/sorters/manufacturing	623
Grinding machine operatives	651
Guards/watchmen	962

Occupational Title	Census Code
Shoemaking machine operatives	664
Shoe repairmen	542
Sign painters/letterers	543
Spinners/twisters/winders	672
Solderers·	665
Stationary firemen	666
Surveying, chainmen/rodmen/axmen	605
Taxicab drivers	714
Textile operatives, n.e.c.	674
Transport equipment operatives---allocated	726
Truck drivers	715
Upholsterers	563
Weavers	673
Welfare service aides	954
Enlisted members of the armed services (other than noncommissioned officers)	---

Score 2 Unskilled Workers (census code list)

Occupational Title	Census Code
Bartenders	910
Busboys	911
Carpenter's helpers	750
Child care workers, private household	980
Construction laborers, except carpenters' helpers	751
Cooks, private household	981
Cooks, except private household	912
Crossing guards/bridge tenders	960
Elevator operators	943
Food service, n.e.c., except private household	916
Freight/materials handlers	753
Garage workers/gas station attendants	623
Garbage collectors	754
Gardeners/groundskeepers, except farm	755
Hucksters/peddlers	264
Laborers, except farm---allocated	796

Laborers, miscellaneous	780
Laborers, not specified	785
Laundry/drycleaning operatives, n.e.c.	630
Lumbermen/raftsmen/woodchoppers	761
Meat wrappers, retail trade	634
Messengers	333
Office boys	333
Packers/wrappers, n.e.c.	643
Parking attendants--	711
School monitors	952
Waiters	915
Warehousemen, n.e.c.	770

Score 1 Farm Laborers/Menial Service Workers (census code list)

Occupational Title	Census Code
Attendants, personal service, n.e.c.	933
Attendants, recreation/amusement	932
Baggage porters/bellhops	934
Bootblacks	941
Chambermaids, maids, except private household	901
Cleaners/charwomen	902
Dishwashers	913
Farm laborers, wage workers	931
Farm laborers/farm foremen/kindred workers---allocated	846
Janitors/sextons	903
Laundresses, private household	983
Maids/servants, private household	984
Newsboys	266
Personal service apprentices	945
Private household workers---allocated	986
Produce graders/sorters, except factory/farm	625
Stockhandlers	762
Teamsters	763
Vehicle washers/equipment cleaners	764
Ushers, recreation/amusement	953

IV. The Estimation of Status

The status score of an individual or a nuclear family unit is estimated by combining information on sex, marital status, education, and occupation. The status score of an individual is calculated by multiplying the scale value for occupation by a weight of five (5) and the scale value for education by a weight of three (3).[5] To calculate the status score for a nuclear family it is necessary to determine the education, occupation, and marital status of its head or heads and their relationship to the labor force in the present, or for retired persons in the past. Two examples illustrate this point:

a. <u>John Smith lives with his spouse who is a housewife</u>.[6] He is the manager of a supermarket. He completed high school and one year of business college. His status score is computed as follows:

Factor	Scale score	Factor weight	Score x Weight
occupation	6	5	30
education	5	3	15
		total score	45

b. The Peter Paul family's score is computed differently because both <u>Peter and his wife are gainfully employed</u>. Peter is an installer for the telephone company. His wife is employed as a clerk in an insurance company office. Peter completed high school. His wife completed high school and one year of business college. The scores for each are calculated as follows:

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[5] The overall factor weight for occupation and evaluation were calculated by the use of multiple regression equations.
[6] I recognize that the housewife performs essential maintenance functions in society, but the occupational role of housewife is not scaled in this index.

Peter Paul

Factor	Scale score	Factor weight	Score x Weight
occupation	4	5	20
education	4	3	12
		total score	32

May Paul

Factor	Scale score	Factor weight	Score x Weight
occupation	5	5	25
education	5	3	15
		total score	40

To determine the Peter Paul family's social status, the scores for each spouse are summed and the total is divided by two:

Peter Paul	32	
Mary Paul	40	
total score	72	divided by 2 = 36.

The total score for the family is higher than that for Peter alone, but lower than for Mary alone. When two spouses are gainfully employed the husband's or the wife's education and occupation may raise or lower the calculated score for the family.

Computed scores range from a high of 66 to a low of 8. This range remains constant whether the computed score is based on the occupation of one or two members of a nuclear family or household. It is assumed that the higher score of a family or nuclear unit, the higher the status its members are accorded by other members of our society. This assumption is derived from the assignment of differential values to the amount and kind of education an adult has received and to the occupational functions individuals perform in society. Values assigned to the amount of education

an adult has received are linked, in turn, to occupational functions. In contemporary American society, differential rewards are assigned to occupational functions. In a diffuse way these values are social; in a specific sense, they are pecuniary. The most highly valued occupations are associated with financial, managerial, legal, and medical functions. Consequently, the banker, the corporation executive, the corporation lawyer, and the medical specialist are most highly rewarded for the functions they perform. Technical, clerical, and sales work carry lower rewards. Such functions as stoop agricultural labor in the fields of factory farms carry the lowest pecuniary and social rewards. There are many gradations between these examples. The important point about occupational function is that the work an individual performs is what is evaluated. The pecuniary and social rewards associated with it are society's way of compensating the individual for the work he performs. Secondly, individuals are identified in society with their occupational pursuits. In this process, the invidious value associated with the occupational function is associated with the individual who performs it. Thirdly, for the mass of individuals, the income earned on the job is translated into goods and services. This is expressed in economic terms as a level of living. The general relationship between occupational pursuits, pecuniary rewards, and level of living results in the socioeconomic divisions so vividly recognized in our society.

V. Validation of the Index

To validate the scales used for education and occupation, we analyzed data gathered in the United States Census in 1970. The linkage between the years of school completed and occupational pursuits is shown in Tables 1 and 2 of the Appendix. The analysis summarized in Table 1 reveals a definite

gradient between the years of school completed and the score assigned to a group of similar occupations. The gradient is similar for males and females in the labor force. The correlation between median years of school completed by sex and occupational score groups is summarized in Table 2. The coefficient of correlation, r, is essentially the same for both males and females.

Although I did not utilize data on income in this index, I have analyzed them for validation purposes. The linkage between the score assigned to occupational groups and earned income is summarized in Table 3. The mean dollars earned by each occupational code group, listed in the 1970 census, traces a distinct gradient from the highest to the lowest scored occupations with one exception: in both sexes persons engaged in skilled occupations, with a score of 4, earned on the average more than persons in the clerical and sales groups with a score of 5. This variation between the prestige scores assigned to the clerical and sales occupations may be attributed to the favorable view of white-collar clerical and sales work, in contrast to blue-collar skilled manual work in our society. Another important component in this variation between prestige scores and earned income is the high percentage of workers with the score of 4 who belong to craft unions. Sex is a factor also, since a high proportion of clerical and sales workers are females, whereas the majority of skilled manual workers are males. However, when sex is controlled, skilled manual workers earn more than clerical and sales workers.

The disparity between the mean earnings in each of the nine occupational groups by sex is a reflection of the differential values assigned to occupational tasks performed by males in contrast to females. This disparity cannot be attributed to differences in years of school completed by the two sexes, as is demonstrated by the figures given in Table 1.

The National Opinion Research Center has been studying evaluation of occupations and occupational groups for some 30 years. As a criterion against which the scores assigned to occupations and occupational groups could be tested, I compared the scores for occupational groups in this index with the prestige scores developed by the NORC for use in its General Social Survey.[7] The occupational titles used by the United States Bureau of the Census for the 1970 census and scored by the present index and the NORC were correlated. The Pearsonian Product Moment Coefficient of Correlation between the nine-step occupational scale and the NORC prestige scores is r = .927. The coefficient of determination is r2 = .860.

The analyses reported here of interrelations between years of school completed, occupational pursuits, and earnings on the job demonstrate the existence of a status system in contemporary American society that is symbolized by the amount of education adults have received, the occupations they pursue, and the sex bestowed on them by the biological lottery we are all enmeshed in. Education tends to condition occupational opportunities, and the pecuniary value assigned to occupations, in turn, conditions the amount of income an individual earns on the job. In sum, the scores computed by the use of this index are a measure of inequality in the social system of the United States.

VI. Two Unfinished Tasks

Further research is indicated to determine the effects of marital status on social status. Preliminary studies indicate that when both spouses

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[7] See *National Data Program for the Social Sciences, Code Book for the Spring 1974*, General Social Survey. July 1974, conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago, data distributed by the Roper Public Opinion Research Center, Williams College, Pp. 117 - 134.

are gainfully employed, instead of just one, there is a distinct effect on the socioeconomic status of the individual and/or the nuclear family. A second uncompleted research problem is the division of the continuum of scores based on education and occupation into meaningful groups. Tentatively, I believe computed scores for individuals or nuclear families can be aggregated into groups of scores that encompass the major strata symbolic of social standing in contemporary American society. I have found that meaningful groups of scores for estimating the position of an individual or a nuclear family in the status structure are as follows:

Social Strata	Range of Computed Scores
Major business and professional	66-55
Medium business, minor professional, technical	54-40
Skilled craftsmen, clerical, sales workers	39-30
Machine operators, semiskilled workers	29-20
Unskilled laborers, menial service workers	19-8

When the scores are aggregated, individuals and nuclear families with scores that fall into a range of scores are presumed to be in the stratum the index assigns to them. The assumption of a meaningful correspondence between a stratum and the social behavior of individuals or nuclear family groups was validated originally by the use of factor analysis (Hollinghead and Redlich 1958: 398-407). The validation study demonstrated significant differences between groups of scores when mass communication data were used as criteria of social behavior. However, a new validation study is indicated for the findings that are likely to be brought out in new research. What is needed is a major study of interrelations between the scores computed from the four factors in this index and social and cultural items forming behavioral

patterns that may be correlated with the major strata in our society.

APPENDIX

Table I. Mean Years of School Completed by Occupational Score and Sex of the Civilian Labor Force, 1970*

	Males		Females	
Occupational Score	Mean+	Standard Deviation	Mean+	Standard Deviation
9	17.2	0.53	16.6	1. 30
8	16.1	1. 26	15.1	1.64
7	14.4	1. 51	13.6	1.49
6	13.0	1.10	13.2	1.21
5	12.7	0.85	12.5	0.49
4	11.5	0.01	11. 9	0.72
3	11.0	1.17	11.0	0.82
2	10.7	1. 01	10.7	0.80
1	10.6	2.27	9.7	1.11
All ranks	12.8	2.45	12.7	2.15

Table 2. Correlation of Median Years of School Completed by Occupational Score and Sex for the Civilian Labor Force, 1970

Item	Males	Females
r=	0.835	0.849
r^2=	0.697	0.722
Intercept (A)	6.648	7.396
Slope (B)	0.797	0.689
Significance	0.00001	0.00001
Standard error of estimate	1. 352	1.133

Table 3. Mean Income Earned (dollars), by Occupational Score and Sex for the Civilian Labor Force, 1970*

Occupational Score	Males		Females	
	Mean+	Standard Deviation	Mean+	Standard Deviation
9	$13,427	$ 3,079	$ 7,275	$ 1,823
8	11,054	2,676	6,654	2,151
7	9,742	1,972	5,428	1,525
6	8,473	2,134	5,013	1,137
5	6,667	2,215	3,780	1,439
4	7,530	1,479	4,915	1,616
3	6,264	1,256	3,578	1,039
2	4,037	1,725	2,568	1,309
1	2,679	1,374	1,612	762
Totals	$ 8,022	$ 3,419	$ 4,720	$ 2,089

Table 4. Correlation of the Median Incomes Earned (dollars), by Occupational Score and Sex for the Civilian Labor Force, 1970*

Item	Males	Females
r=	0.781	0.672
R^2=	0.610	0.452
Intercept (A)	303.241	708.934
Slope (B)	1008.165	524.222
Significance	0.00001	0.00001
Standard error of estimate	2137.643	1549.582

*The data for this table were abstracted from the U. S. Census of Population, 1970, Occupational Characteristics, Vol. 2, Table I, "Summary of Social and Economic Characteristics of the Experienced Civilian Labor Force by Detailed Occupations and Sex," Pp. 1-11. This table gives the median income earned by each occupational category and sex by occupational code.
+In Tables 1 and 3, the mean figure for each occupational rank by sex is the mean of the medians given in Table 1, cited above, from the U. S. Census of Population, 1970.

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Teacher/Police: How Inner-City Students Perceive the Connection Between the Education System and the Criminal Justice System

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I. Purpose

The purpose of this project is to learn how inner-city teenagers perceive the connection between the education system and the criminal justice system. In particular, this study examines how the increased connection between the criminal justice system and school discipline system affects disadvantaged students. Do these students perceive the phenomenon researchers refer to as "the-school-to-prison pipeline" or is this a concept imposed from the outside? In order to interpret the full impact of how criminalizing school discipline affects students, it is essential to understand how students perceive the relationship between these two systems, in particular, whether it expands the vulnerability that disadvantaged communities experience in the criminal justice system to the education system. This project questions: if misbehavior that occurs in school is increasingly categorized as crime, and students are aware that the poor and minorities are disproportionately prosecuted within the criminal justice system, will they perceive this injustice as carrying over to the school setting?

Adolescence is the critical period of identity formation when such perceptions develop, remaining remarkably stable throughout the rest of life (Shedd 2006: 6). This study has important implications for assessing the extent to which young people believe in education as an institution that fosters equal opportunity. If students view themselves as powerless to overcome the discrimination within established rules, they respond

by avoiding authority structures and questioning the legitimacy of mainstream institutions (Kupchik 2009: 312). This study documents how a typical group of disadvantaged inner-city youth perceive the criminal justice and education system to understand whether they believe in a school-to-prison pipeline that precludes equal opportunity in America.

II. Literature Review

The school-to-prison pipeline is a term that describes the process whereby criminalized discipline policies route students out of school and into the justice system. A focus on harsh legal sanctions and exclusion increases the risk that students will disengage or drop out of school and heightens the likelihood that students will become involved in the juvenile justice system (NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Children's Defense Fund 2006).

By excluding students from school, educators limit the future options of misbehaving students and increase the likelihood that they will participate in a life of crime. As Western and Simon document, there is a direct correlation between academic attainment and involvement in the criminal justice system. Nearly all prisoners lack any education beyond high school (Pattillo 2004: 1). Failure to graduate from high school compounds the likelihood that any demographic group will serve time in jail, but for African American males the effects are catastrophic: 32.4% of African American male high school dropouts between fifteen and twenty were in prison. This represents a rate of incarceration that is nearly fifty times the national average (Western 2004: 18).

Moreover, criminal sanctions for misbehavior begin students' involvement with the juvenile tice system. Just as mandatory sentences

may initiate young men into prison and extreme criminal lifestyles, Zero Tolerance policies bring students into the juvenile justice system which can serve as an introductory course in behavior that is, in fact, criminal. Once introduced, students are far more likely to become repeat criminal offenders (Western 2007: Chapter 5; Pattillo 2004: 13).

During the 1990's, major changes in school discipline policy left the public education system more directly tied to the criminal justice system than ever before. States across the country embraced a crime framework for dealing with student misbehavior, incorporating elements of law enforcement once unique to the criminal justice system. They now impose legal consequences for rule violation, exclusionary punishment, and control through police and other surveillance. Today, most public schools include police officers titled School Resource Officers (SROs) and other forms of surveillance that were once unique to the penal system such as video cameras, metal detectors and drug sweeps (Kupchik 2010: 291). As Paul Hirschfield writes, the criminal justice system offers a "useful template and accessible tools" for the quick removal of problem students from the school (Hirschfield 2008: 92).

The tie between the education and justice system developed with the passage of formal laws dictating punishment for behavior within schools. In 1994, the Safe Schools Act passed, mandating that in order to receive federal money, a school must have close cooperation with police and juvenile justice agencies and a written policy detailing criminally enforced results for misbehavior (Simon 2007: 218). Under the Safe Schools Act, many schools created rules that limited teacher discretion and required legally enforced consequences for students who committed categorical acts, regardless of the context of infraction (Simon 2007: 218).

The vast majority of states require schools to refer students to the police for activity including drugs, violence, and weapons violations known collectively as "Zero Tolerance" discipline (Hirschfield 2008: 83). Zero Tolerance Laws formalized the tie between education and the criminal justice system.

At its inception, The Safe Schools Act of 1994 provided funding for non-punitive approaches to school safety, including intervention through conflict resolution and peer mediation (Irby 2009: 8). "The national mandate [of crime punishment], widespread misapplications and increasing scopes of Zero Tolerance approaches eventually shifted the focus beyond keeping schools free of weapons and drugs to 'punishing dangerousness'" (Irby 2008: 9). The understanding that effective discipline requires rehabilitative approaches and not simply punishment was somehow lost. Today, Zero Tolerance policies often privilege looking for student misbehavior over "other school functions, such as helping students with their actual problems – including problems which may be prompting their misbehaviors" (Kupchik 2009: 305). School staff express a desire to want to help misbehaving students, but this help consistently avoids directly dealing with students who are deemed too "dangerous" to risk contact.

Since inception, the use of Zero Tolerance has extended not just to extreme cases of illegal activities, but more common instances of misbehavior such as classroom disruption and failure to follow school rules. Minor incidents compose the bulk of national suspensions and juvenile justice referrals (Hirschfield 2008: 83). According to statewide data on school suspensions in Connecticut in 2008, 60% of reported offenses resulting in an in-school suspension (ISS), out-of-school suspension (OSS), or expulsion resulted from "school policy violations": frequent absences or tardiness from class or "insubordination" such as

disrespect or use of profanity (Suarez 2009: 29). School policy violations resulted in OSS 91% of the time and attendance violations resulted in OSS 95% of the time (Suarez 2009: 29).

Like the phenomenon of mass imprisonment (Western 2007: 29), poor and minority students are disproportionately punished and excluded under Zero Tolerance policies and a crime framework for school discipline. Some argue that the crime framework for school discipline has extended the discriminatory effects that occur law enforcement from the justice system to the education system. Criminalization is more prevalent and intense in schools that are heavily populated by disadvantaged urban minorities (Hirschfield 2007: 81). The U.S. Department of Education Data reports that in public schools in Connecticut during 2006, African American and Latino students accounted for 58.63% of out-of-school suspensions and 62.57% of expulsions (Office for Civil Rights). Within Connecticut, the highest suspension rates occur in districts that serve the highest concentrations of minority, low-income students (Dignity Denied 2008: 23). While much research has studied the disproportionate effects of crime policies in schools, little research has explored how students perceive the relationship between the two systems.

III. Methods

Through intensive interviews and participant observation, this project highlights how 28 East Coast city youth perceive the public school system and criminal justice system. This ethnography focuses on a student-run group entitled Achievement through Expression. I learned about Achievement through Expression (A.E.) during my first interview with two brothers—Justin and Shawn, the group's founders. I worked with the group's founder, Justin,

to coordinate the meetings. The group met twice weekly from November through February. Justin, a charismatic young man and a recent high school graduate, is the main leader of the group who facilitated the activities. I conducted intensive interviews with 13 students: Justin (age 19), Shawn (15), Tammie (15), Dwayne (16), Bridget (16), Tyree (20), Michael (15), Maya (17), Juliet (16), Greg (17), Destiny (16), Arthur (15) and Jared (16). The interviews lasted approximately an hour and were free-form, allowing the participants to talk with little predetermined structure. I began each interview by saying, "please introduce yourself," and then asked students to tell me about their experience at school. From there, I only asked follow-up or clarifying questions. I interviewed the students one-on-one before or after meetings, and, on rare occasions in their homes. The students gave informed consent to participate and were told that the material would be used anonymously. This paper employs pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the students in the data that I collected. Additionally, I changed specific data related to the identity of the youth group and other organizations that the students affiliated with to ensure anonymity. These details do not significantly affect the findings of this study.

There were an additional thirteen students who I observed through the group but who I was not able to interview: Finally, there were approximately five students with whom I met once or twice, but who did not attend meetings consistently enough to be included as participants in this study.

One of the students was Caucasian, seven were Latino, and the remainder identified as African American. In total, there were 16 males and 12 females. All of the students came from neighborhoods of concentrated poverty in a deindustrialized East Coast city of approximately 123,000 inhabitants. While the majority of the students were enrolled in high school,

three were recent high school graduates, two attended community college, and one recently completed vocational training. In addition, one student attended an alternative discipline school and two were high school dropouts. The remaining students were currently enrolled in one of three different high schools. The academic achievement of these teenagers varied; some were honor roll students while others had completely disengaged from school.

In the communities where the participants live, there is a violence epidemic. Between 2006-2008, more than 500 youth were victims of gun violence in the city of East Coast city (Suarez 2: 2010). Of the students I interviewed, everyone knew a young person who had been injured or killed as a result of gun violence. Everyone had at least one close relative or friend who was either currently in prison or had been incarcerated at some time. For approximately half of the students, this person was a father or sibling. At least four of the students, male and female, had personal criminal records or were on probation. One is currently engaged in court proceedings for a school infraction. Although this study lasted less than a year, before its completion the group was interrupted in late February and devastated by an act of extreme gun violence.

Several teenage boys shot Justin. It was early evening and he was walking home from work, accompanied by his younger brother, Shawn and friend/mentee Dwayne. Justin's injuries were near fatal and he remains in recovery. A week after this tragic event, the same teenagers returned during the day, firing shots at his mother's car outside of their home. As research documents, such bold acts of violence rarely occur in communities where there is greater police accountability (Roehl et al. 2008). The police have yet to identify the teenagers responsible for the shooting as of the publication of this paper.

IV. Findings

A. A lack of trust in police and the justice system

All of the teenagers that I interviewed believe the police profile inner-city teenagers as criminals, not as citizens who deserve protection. The students view the police not as a source of help, but as fundamentally against them.

Other teenagers described instances of police abuse that made them feel they are not the beneficiaries of police services, but instead targeted for harassment. Several students described occasions where friends or relatives were beaten up or robbed and police did not intervene. Shawn told of a time where a friend was jumped while police watched and laughed. Many of the teenagers perceive the police as in cahoots with criminals, either because they believe police are aware of drug dealing and other crime but do nothing to stop it, or because they believe police actively participate in illegal activities. Several students describe events where police were the attackers, physically harming teenagers.

> Dwayne: We were coming from playing basketball and some of us weren't even wearing our t-shirts. They started patting us down like we're gonna have a gun in our shorts. One of the police officers actually took the food I just bought and threw it down and was like 'You got an issue with what I just did?' I guess they were trying to start an issue where they could arrest me. I wanted to talk back. I actually started talking back, but then I just got quiet. 'Cause I'm basically falling for their trap. If they want me to be locked up then they want me to say something back or do something.

Students articulate harassment by police in school, titled School Resource Officers (SROs), that mirrors the police profiling they describe outside of school. Shawn tells how the security officer at the entrance to his school taunts him as he enters the building. Justin also describes how some SROs will

egg students on in a way similar to the police on the street. His feelings towards police outside of school carry over to how he views police within school.

> Cops, they just never been a help to me. In school or whatever it just felt like they were making situations worse … They pester you they want you to get mad and if you get mad they suspend you.

Overall, the interviewees believe they are not the beneficiaries of police protection, but a danger from which a wider society is protected. As a result of the lack of police accountability, the students feel they must assert their ability to defend themselves. As Elijah Anderson writes, in inner-city communities, the code of the street emerges as an adaptation to a profound lack of faith in the police and the judicial system. Police are seen as not caring to protect inner-city residents. Without formal law enforcement and other mainstream agencies to "champion one's personal security," citizens must be prepared to take extraordinary measures to defend themselves and their loved ones against transgression (Anderson 2000: 34). "The code of the street thus emerges where the influence of the police ends and where personal responsibility for one's safety is felt to begin" (Anderson 2000: 34). Because police do not enforce civil law, "street justice" fills the void, underscoring the need for street credibility (Stewart and Simmons 2009: 2).

The code of the street mandates behavior of aggression and violence for survival. The rules of the code dictate street credibility through appearance, demeanor and willingness to fight to deter transgression. The person who proves he can take care of himself has street "cred". Credibility then serves to deter advances and establish protection. This leads young people to be especially sensitive to advances and slights, which could serve as a warning of confrontation or danger, and when left unanswered, lead to

the erosion of street credit (Stewart 2009: 3).

The participants described the ways they employ the code of the street as a form of self-preservation because no other form of protection exists. Dwayne describes a situation where limits are tested through slights:

> You'll be walking and someone bumps into you and one of your friends will be like "your just gonna let him bump into you like that? You not gonna hit 'em or say anything."

Dwayne is afraid that if he does not respond aggressively, he will not have the credibility necessary to deter threat. He does not want to have to fight because he will get in trouble at school, but he also does not want to become a target for aggressors to take advantage of him. He admits there are situations "where I felt like I had to fight back to get out of the predicament." Maya describes how she acts in a way that makes others fear her in order to assure her own protection. As she says: "There's times when I have to stand up for myself." She describes how the code of the street requires her to be threatening:

> I want to change, but then, I don't want nobody to think I'm a pushover, and then they start to think that I'm a sweet thing, and I'm not. I just want people to know …don't mess with me to a point that I might have to hit you or stab you.

In most interactions, the code does not require violence so much as a street exterior to deter aggression. Knowledge of the code is defensive (Stewart and Simmons 2009: 2). Appearance and speech can serve as major indicators of who is and is not from the inner city and therefore familiar with the code of the street. Greg believes that failing to display emblems of the street can lead to highly dangerous situations.

> This is my first pea coat ever… It makes me look nice and presentable. [The first time I wore it], somebody thought about robbing me – they were sayin', "Yo look, he probably got money."

In this case, dress operates as a signifier of the street. Failure to present according to the code can lead to the erosion of street credit. Thus, teenagers employ the code of the street as signals for self-defense in the inner-city to make up for the protection law-enforcement does not provide.

C. Disproportionate punishment

Through the code of the street inner city residents signal that they are not to be messed with and deter aggressors. Street credit is maintained through speech, dress, demeanor and aggression that serve to reinforce one's reputation of toughness. The teenagers acknowledge that the code of the street can take different extremes from behavior that is harmless to behavior that is actually dangerous. However, at school any display of the code of the street is punished. Fearful of teenagers they deem threatening of mainstream norms, adults may punish signs of street culture generally.

The participants believe that school staff— teachers, administrators, school officers —consider students who invoke "street" culture to be "bad" students, unfit for school. To determine who is "street," the staff rely upon appearance, demeanor, use of street language and other signifiers within the code of the street. The teenagers describe how teachers and administrators determine who can "make it" at school based on: "What you look like. If you're dressin' in a certain way, if you dress in like baggy clothes, or if you got a mean mug on your face" or "They swag. How they talk." Shawn highlights how school personnel fixate on street emblems. He believes that this leads adults at school to see him as criminally dangerous and unable to be a good student:

It's just like how people perceive me. When I walk through the hall it's like when I be downtown or whatever, people be crossing the street because they think I'm going to rob them. It's just how I look.

Arthur agrees that teachers use "the looks of people" to punish students who come from the streets.

Ironically, the participants believe that the street exterior that leads others to view them as "dangerous" stems directly from a lack of police accountability and the resulting code of the street that mandates a tough demeanor for self-protection. A lack of law-enforcement leads to the code of the street, yet at school the code of the street is harshly punished through suspension and criminal sanctions.

D. Harsh punishment

The teenagers believe that school staff overpunish forms of street dress, speech and demeanor that are actually harmless. Students recounted stories of how school disciplinarians rely upon suspension and expulsion unnecessarily or with the intent of getting rid of students who they consider "street." Every student I interviewed agreed that the majority of suspensions do not represent a real danger, but rather small infractions that are punished harshly. As Destiny says "You get in trouble more, I think, for stupid stuff." The teenagers do believe that misbehavior needs to have consequences, but question the extent of the punishment for what Juliet calls "random little things." Tammie echoes this sentiment as she describes how her sister was suspended for violating the dress code: "It's like they focus on the clothes. I think they should be worried about whether you in school or not. They send a lot of people home or put them in in-school suspension."

Dwayne describes how suspension is overused in his school for

misbehavior that doesn't pose a real danger:

> If you're in the hallways fifteen minutes after the bell rings than that's a suspension. Basically if you're doing anything wrong, then they'll suspend you for it. The reason most people get suspended is hats or doo rags. I think it's dumb. They said they banned hats because of gang violence but they're really no gangs at my school [that]… show it through hfats and stuff....

By interpreting the hats as gang symbols, the school staff view a dress code violation as more dangerous and sinister than simple rule violations. In an attempt to root out the more threatening forms of the code of the street, the teenagers believe that adults at school misread all forms of the street as dangerous. For the students who do not actually engage in dangerous behavior, this punishment feels unduly harsh. Some describe harsh punishment of "street" behavior as discrimination directed uniquely against students who come from the inner-city.

The interviewees described teachers' attempts to suspend, expel or refer "bad" students to juvenile justice as intended to remove the street students, not to reform misbehavior. Justin blames Zero Tolerance Policies for providing the tools for adults to remove unwanted students: "When they say zero tolerance, what they really mean is if we look at you and we think you're a bad kid, we're going to try and get you out as soon as possible."

The teenagers felt that exclusionary punishment usually does not address the root of misbehavior. Destiny pointed out how, without addressing the underlying cause of misbehavior, suspension is a temporary solution "they just back in school a few days later." Additionally, many of the students considered suspension unfair because they believe it interferes with education. As Tammie explains: "Some miss work…I don't think they

learn like that." In both cases, the students emphasize that exclusionary discipline is counterproductive when it is overused because it interferes with academic progress and causes students to disengage with school.

F. Punishment and differential opportunity

As inner-city teenagers come in contact with mainstream institutions, they realize two sometimes diametrically opposed social realities: mainstream society and the street. Within these two realities two opportunity structures operate: work to succeed through mainstream institutions or enter underground economic opportunities associated with street life. The students that I interviewed describe teenage years as vacillating between these two different orientations. Many of the students expressed the necessity of code switching between school and the streets of the inner-city: enacting different codes of behavior in order to meet the requirements of being a good student while maintaining street credit. Shawn describes this as knowing "when to do something and when not to." That is, how to be "decent," but employ the code of the street when necessary.

Code switching does not always occur seamlessly. For inner city students, a challenge arises at the intersection between the "two worlds": the times and spaces where mainstream norms and the code of the street overlap and create contradiction. Teens who want to conform to mainstream norms and avoid punishment in school also depend on the code of the street and these two codes can proscribe irresolvable conflicts in behavior, that force students to make decisions to succeed through one of two competing opportunity structures. Although students acknowledge that the street life is dangerous, its benefits are also clear, particularly when the chance of success through school and employment seems

unlikely. As Suarez points out "School discipline can play a vital role with respect to this difficult choice" (Suarez 2010: 44).

The teenagers that I interviewed believe that adults at school do not have the tools to make sense of the behavior of inner-city teenagers because they do not share the opportunity structure that results from of growing up in the inner-city. While inner city teenagers are forced to interact with mainstream institutions, the dangerousness of the inner-city ghetto maintains a level of isolation. As Justin says:

> Most teachers who work in inner-city don't understand the inner-city. They don't understand what it is like to live in a box.

As Dwayne explains, the disconnect between teachers and students results directly from the failures of the criminal justice system. He believes that adults at school do not understand the experience of inner-city teenagers because they have the benefit of police accountability and therefore do not understand the need for the code of the street.

> Dwayne: Because when they [teachers and administrators] were younger they didn't have to worry about walking in a store and being followed. They're not from the inner-city. Cause you don't see police in the suburbs driving around, you only see them in the hood.
>
> Cara: What would it take for teachers to understand?
> Dwayne: Having them walk into stores and be followed or asking them to leave the store because they're wearing baggy clothes. Or I guess for us to share what we've been through with the teachers. But most of us don't feel comfortable so no one shares anything.

Dwayne believes that adults at school cannot understand the behavior of inner city teenagers because they do not know what it feels like to have an adversarial relationship with police. The adults at school live in mainstream

America and are the beneficiaries of police protection. Therefore, a lack of police accountability leads to the code of the street, different opportunity structures, and the major disconnect between students and adults at school.

G. Punishment and labeling theory

The teenagers believe that by the time a student reaches middle school, staff firmly decide whether a particular student has the potential to be a good student. As Justin describes: "When you first walk into school and they [the school staff] see your face they label you as 'Okay this kid is worth saving. This one is not because he would never be able to do it." The teenagers believe that adults do not waste time encouraging the "unsalvageable" to use school as a pathway to success. They believe that adults at school begin making distinctions about who is and is not able to be successful as early as second grade. As Shawn said: "It's elementary."

The teenagers I interviewed describe how students internalize the expectation that they are not fit to be students. As Destiny put it simply:

> If the administration doesn't believe in you, you can just be like "maybe I'm nothing." So then, that determines where you're gonna be in life.

Shawn describes how early on, teachers told him that he would not be good at school: "I've always been told I was stupid and stuff." It made him feel like he didn't fit in or meet the standards of school. Indeed, he cites this as the main reason he does not like school—the labeling that occurred in fourth grade has caused him to disengage, even at the high school level.

In accordance with labeling theory, the teenagers claim the expectations of school staff are self-fulfilling prophecies (Becker 1997: 33). Justin explains how this occurred amongst his friends in high school. Once

teachers labeled them "bad" students, they began to act out bad behavior that he believes they would not have displayed otherwise:

> Justin: When you're like 6, 7 years old and someone tells you you're going to jail you're going to be a thug subconsciously, indirectly they tell you that, you don't know to think "no, I am going to dream and be the best I can be." I think when you first hear it you become it. You mimic it.

H. Punishment and adult incarceration

Students described suspension not as an attempt to rehabilitate misbehaving kids, but instead as an effort to get rid of students who adults consider destined for crime and prison. Justin describes a situation where administrators at his school openly admitted intent to punish students who they believe do not have a future and protect students who they believe do.

> We all got in trouble. We could all do the same thing, but what teachers used to say to me is, they would pull me away from the group and they would say to me: 'Justin stay away from these guys. These guys are going to jail. These guys will be nothing and you won't.' And they would keep me from getting into trouble.

In this story, it is clear that participants believe there is a connection between who adults label "bad" and who they believe will end up in jail. However, as Justin's story reveals, the distinction between who is a bad student is not based simply upon student action, but influenced by adult beliefs about students' futures. According to students, adults in school make punishing decisions based on whom they believe will be successful in the future.

The teenagers believe that school staff see students' behavior as stagnant. However, the teenagers view the "decent/street" dynamic as much more fluid and therefore not an accurate indicator of future life

chances. Indeed, many of the students who I interviewed believe they have gone through different phases where they behaved as street or "decent" in varying degrees. As Justin points out, all teenagers have a more fluid sense of identity than adults because they are still deciding who they want to become. However, code switching complicates this process as a result of the opportunity structures inner city teenagers face. Inner-city teenagers are uniquely required to navigate difficult contradictions at a very young age.

> It's funny because the people who you wouldn't think are like that [street] are. All of them have come to me with the same things these kids have. Any kid who comes out of East Coast city is pretty much going to be the same thing of course at this age it's like they're gonna be contemplating this. It's only a real small percentage of kids who are going to be like "I am going to be positive." It's like at this age they teeter totter in terms of what side they're going to be on.

For many students, there were times when they acted out before they learned how to conform to mainstream norms in school. They believe that it takes time to learn how to code switch—what behavior is appropriate at a particular place and time. They often sympathized with students who employed the code of the street at school, admitting that they had "been there" at a different point in time.

> Michael: I ain't sayin' kick them out from school. 'Cause I ain't gonna lie, I was one of the kids that would be loud in the classroom and stuff before I realized how to act.

> Jared: To be honest I was about to be one of these people [suspended]. I used to be like "Oh you doing this? You bout to fight? Okay. I wanna see someone get jumped."

As Michael describes, for inner-city youth, growing up is navigating both the

code of the street and mainstream America in order to find a personal identity.

I. Punishment and the pipeline-to-prison

It is clear that the students I interviewed conceive of a direct link between schools and the criminal justice system. The students believe that adults at school including teachers, administrators and SROs, intentionally punish inner-city youth with the understanding that exclusion from school leads almost directly to jail. Greg describes how while punishing him with suspension, a teacher once said to him: "I can't wait for you to be a felon. I can't wait to sign those papers." The students believe that adults at school judge students based upon emblems of the street and "push" students deemed uneducable out of school and into prison. The push occurs through a criminalized discipline system, but also through a psychological toll on students whom adults view as future prisoners.

> Destiny: They just pushed him out of school. It's hard to describe. Like they go through his bags [to repeatedly search him]. And, ok, we all curse, we all say bad things, but they just used to highlight Jordan for the way he talked all the time. … It's like I can say it as loud as I want, but if Jordan were to say that they would like, suspend him. It's ridiculous.

According to Destiny, this student was the victim of a school-to-prison-pipeline. She articulates a direct connection between school discipline and the final fate of her friends saying: "They tried to push him out of school and now he got locked up." The teenagers recognize that getting in trouble at school often translates into a life of crime and incarceration. In a separate interview, other students articulated situations in similar ways saying: "They tried to push him out cause they felt like he was ruining the rest of the school. And they succeed in that goal. Now he's out and he's in jail."

The students believe discrimination within school discipline and the criminal justice systems is inherently tied. Shawn describes this dynamic:

> They do not care. It's like they try to get you in trouble. If not by putting you in the streets, they try to lock you up. It's like streets, or lock you up. There's no in between. That's metaphoric but it's also literal. Cops will literally lock you up. But teachers they won't try to help your problem in a way that is going to do something else. They kind of like cops, too. They come across like cops. It's like they got the same mentality. With cops it's a lot more specific and strong. Teachers do it unintentionally. But both see you as a wrong kind of person

For Shawn the focus on punishment instead of rehabilitation in school discipline is directly related to a larger criminal justice policy that views inner city teenagers as "unsalvageable," destined for incarceration and not success in school (Ferguson 2009). In this way, he believes the work of police and teachers systematically serves a similar purpose. The students view a lack of police protection as the cause of the code of the street. They also observe that within school the code of the street is punished. Thus, indirectly, they feel the failures of the criminal justice system lead inner-city students to violate the rules of school.

K. Punishment and public resources

The teenagers that I interviewed believe adults at school make predictions about students' adult futures and use these predictions to dictate punishment. In contrast, many of the students stressed the importance of having second chances and the ability of young people to change. As Michael says: "Everyone ain't perfect, you may not be as good but [at A.E.] people are there to help you catch on so you won't feel left out."

Justin: We can't try to make a positive change in the community if all we accept is positive people who are already positive… [These are] at-risk children. There is going to be some risky behavior along the way.

Moreover, the participants believe that weeding out certain individuals who exhibit the code of the street does not get at the root of the problem. Even if it does remove the "bad influence" or "danger" in one particular setting, it does not address the fact that this individual is a part of the inner-city community.

Justin: As far as these people influencing them, I don't think that is going to happen because a lot of them know these people already and they live in their neighborhood. It's not like we're not around each other all the time anyway. We come from the same place.

While this individual may be removed from school setting, this individual is still a member of the neighborhood. The teenagers who are labeled dangerous and excluded from school are neighbors, friends and relatives of other students. Teenagers thus develop the sense that school staff are attempting to "protect us from ourselves." Or, the sense that school staff are attempting to protect themselves from what inner city teenagers deal with every day. In reality, street behavior does not exist in a vacuum, but is symptomatic of larger social ills. An attempt to exclude individuals from a particular setting does not truly address the problem.

Dwayne: Organizations, once they open, they didn't really want people from the hood I guess. Like the Y.M.C.A. They open it for like youth and stuff, but once they really see who we are they make it seem bad. They make the groups or programs for certain kids and then they try to push us out and then there's no point in having the program. What's the goal? Then they think we deserve it.

The conversation then turned into different students sharing stories about

people they believe would have turned out differently with some support from school or other public services.

The students believe that the distinction between mainstream norms and the code of the street is too complex to be categorized as purely good or bad. They believe that code of the street can translate into a range of behavior some of which is harmless, but some of which is indeed reprehensible. Students feel by punishing the code of the street generally, teachers deal with student problems in a superficial way that does not acknowledge the difficult circumstances in which behavior occurs. In order to truly address the danger of the code, we must acknowledge the root of the problem: the lack of protection that force inner city residents to provide their own defense. Inner city residents do not have access to traditional forms of help. They rely on the code of the street to fill a void. Punishing street behavior addresses the symptom, but not the root of the problem.

The students' alienation from school discipline comes from the reality that the rules in school only have meeting in a limited setting. Students enter metal detectors to protect them from the weapons that go uncontrolled in their neighborhoods. They face police officers who fail to stop the violence they see happening in their neighborhoods. Thus, students conclude that the school's concern with safety is not a sincere concern about inner city students' lives, but an attempt to protect other members of the school community from the danger of the street that inner-city teenagers deal with everyday. Even if the "problem" individuals are eliminated, the code of the street would still exist. A solution that seeks only to remove individuals without redressing the systematic forces that lead to their behavior is short-sighted. Most important of all, a focus on exclusion denies the "problem" individuals access to the resources that

make change possible: education and communities like A.E. are proven to reduce the likelihood of an individual's involvement with the criminal justice system (Stewart and Simon 2009).

From the teenager's perspective, growing up is balancing competing codes for behavior in different times and setting. Youth in the inner-city must learn how to prioritize in ways that allow self-preservation in a world without police accountability. Because street behavior develops directly from a failure of the state to protect inner city residents, the question of who is and is not deserving of help is much more complex in the minds of the teenagers. As Greg says "Do not judge. People do what they have to to survive."

III. Conclusion
A. Summary of findings

The interviewees believe they are not the beneficiaries of police protection, but profiled for punishment. Because the police are not accountable to them, they feel as if they have to protect themselves and enforce their own law and order. Street justice rules because the state has failed to step in and provide the resources that ensure the safety of impoverished, inner-city youth. The students view a lack of police protection as the cause of the code of the street.

In an attempt to root out the more threatening forms of the code of the street, the teenagers believe that adults at school misread all forms of street culture as dangerous. The teenagers believe that exclusionary discipline is counterproductive because it interferes with academic progress and causes students to disengage with school. Moreover, the categorical labeling of student behavior as dangerous can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy in which teenagers depend on

the street even more. Harsh punishment tremendously increases the likelihood that teenagers will rely on the street opportunity structure and become involved in the criminal justice system. The teenagers describe an interconnected cycle from the justice system, to school, to the justice system: a lack of police protection leads to street justice, leads to punishment in school, leads to criminal involvement.

In contrast with their schools, the students believe that the distinction between mainstream norms and the code of the street is too complex to be categorized as purely good or bad. They believe that code of the street can translate into a range of behavior, some of which is harmless, some of which is indeed dangerous. Because the teenagers believe the division between street and "decent" is complex, they do not believe it can be used as an accurate indicator of future life chances to make decisions about who is and is not worthy of public help. They recognize the potential of teenagers to change through the intervention of a supportive community and mainstream resources.

B. Recommendations

On a micro level, changing student perception of discipline includes engaging students in the discipline process and school community. This would require a focus on inclusion and rehabilitation as opposed to harsh exclusionary punishment. The Superintendent of East Coast city School District recommends many alternatives to suspension and expulsion including: social training, restorative justice, counseling, mediation, mentoring, anger management training, leadership opportunities, effective student governance committees, and a focus on teacher–student relationships (*Unified Code of Conduct* 2009: Appendix 3). Relying on alternative strategies

that allow marginalized students to engage in the discipline process may help schools to understand the specifics of a student's individual experience, instead of relying on generalized assumptions about groups, improving communication and relationships between adults and students. Past studies have shown that effective discipline systems directly engage students (Kupchick 2006) This study confirms those finding: teenagers were highly likely to emphasize the importance of students actively participating in the discipline process through strong relationships with teachers who allow them to express their perspective instead of simply punishing students. They felt that this would allow adults to get at the root of the problem and better address misbehavior.

On a macro level, addressing student perception requires a rejection of mass incarceration and a sincere attempt to provide education and employment for inner-city youth, instead of assuming crime and imprisonment as the default option. This requires increased police accountability and improved relationships between police and inner-city residents. A school-to-prison pipeline facilitates the loss of massive numbers of people, the majority of whom are concentrated in the most marginalized (NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. 2010: 1).

The data in this case demonstrates the dangers of a national policy that fails to address the root causes of crime and violence, systematically viewing disadvantaged teenagers as disposable citizens, doomed to crime, incarceration and early death (Hirschfield 2008: 90). Whether due to exclusion from school, incarceration, or gun violence, the absence of young men and women affects their communities in dramatic ways. If police, school administrators, or other personnel are indeed making predictions about teenager's future potential, their calculations do not consider how an

individual student's future affects those around them and serve as resources to their peers. The story of Justin reveals more. Although he was written off by many as a "bad" student, he is instrumental in his community, a young leader who speaks in a way that engages others and inspires them to believe in a vision of hope. He has played a role in shaping the lives of every single teenager he works with, reminding them to believe in their dreams and in themselves. As Jared said:

> I would've been one of those people who died real soon. I was gonna be one of those people who could just clap [shoot] somebody without even thinking about it. Justin would make me think about the consequences of my actions. A.E. is more than just a movement. It gave me a new lifestyle for me to do good.

Despite the daunting statistics, it is impossible to predict individual futures. Race, class, educational attainment, criminal involvement can tell us little about the effects that presence or absence of an individual can have on an entire community and the potential to create change. A policy that views any young person as disposable misunderstands how the presence or absence of one individual can irreplaceably touch those around him.

Acknowledgements

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Constructing Public Preschool: Women, Poverty, Politics, and the Development of Public Preschool in the United States

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Abstract

Since 1965, government investment in preschool—educational programs for three and four year old children—has risen dramatically in the United States at both the state and federal level. Nearly forty percent of four year-olds attended public preschool programs in 2009 (NIEER 2009:4). The development of public preschool represents a radical transformation of the role of the family and the state in the lives of young children. Yet little research has been done on how public preschool developed and its role in the broader debate on family policy and the welfare state. In this paper, I develop four theoretical frameworks based on theories of labor, race, politics, and the welfare state through which to understand public preschool. I argue that political networks and the ideological framing of women's labor drove the adoption of public preschool in the United States.

Introduction

In a 1983 speech on South Carolina's future, Governor Richard Riley declared, "Education is the cornerstone of a free and productive society. That education begins with a quality preschool, elementary, and secondary education."[1] Sixty years ago, this statement would have been radical: few states had public kindergarten, and none had public preschool

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[1] Unless otherwise cited, governors' quotes and legislative history are from primary archival research done by the author.

(Gilliam 2008). [2] As had been done for centuries, most young children were cared for in the home by their homemaker mothers or by other female relatives. Furthermore, it was debatable whether this care—helping children learn the alphabet, numbers, and manners—was education at all; many thought it was simply mothering. By 1983, however, the concept of extra-familial early education was increasingly conventional. With the Feminist Movement, the number of women working outside the home had dramatically increased, generating a need for preschool (Tossi 2002). Scientific research showed educational and psychological benefits of preschool for children, creating a demand for preschool. In fact, by the mid-1980s, the lack of accessible and affordable preschool was becoming a major public issue (Slotzfus 2003:197-199).

Gradually, state governments, and the United States Congress, began to respond to these demographic shifts and political demands in their educational policy. During the 1960s and the 1970s, many states expanded public kindergarten, and some began public preschool programs. By the time South Carolina enacted its preschool program in 1984 under pressure from Governor Riley, eight states had already developed public preschool programs (NIEER 2009). The federal government also established several early education programs to prepare children from low-income families for school. The policy of public preschool and the belief that preschool was education were becoming mainstream.

Public preschool programs have continued to expand in number and in enrollment. In 2010, thirty-eight states offered state-funded preschool programs, also known as pre-kindergarten, for three and four year olds. Over 1.2 million children—four percent of all three year olds and twenty-

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[2] From 1873 to 1957, Wisconsin had a four-year old kindergarten program, which some considered public preschool (NIEER 2009:148).

five percent of all four year olds—are enrolled in state-funded preschool programs nationwide. An additional 736,000 children—seven percent of all three year olds and eleven percent of all four year olds—were enrolled in the federally-funded Head Start preschool program (NIEER 2009:5).

The development of state and federally-funded preschool represents a radical transformation in the role of the family and the state in the lives of young children. Preschool is an intimate intervention into the family, changing by whom and how young children are educated and socialized. This expansion of public education moves the locus of early learning from the home to the classroom where it can be easily regulated.[3] State governments have curriculum and teacher quality standards for their preschool programs, which exceed those for private childcare centers and family child homes (Ackerman and Sansanelli 2010). In addition to teaching, public preschool teachers play a maternal role—wiping noses, teaching manners, building self-esteem—for children in their care. With the long hours some children spent in preschool, preschool teachers may even supplant mothers in time spent care-giving. By providing public preschool, the state assumes primary responsibility for children's early learning and school readiness.

Given the intimacy of this intervention, we would expect the implementation of public preschool to draw protests from small-government and/or pro-traditional family activists. As in debates over vaccination and sex education, state intervention into something as private and as personal as children's early years would seem enraging (Luker 2006). Furthermore, the expansion of public preschool "confronts a countervailing determination to reduce the reach of state governments in education policy" (Imig and Meyer

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[3] Thirty states provide state preschool funding to both public schools and private child care providers (NIEER 2009).

2007:11). These views are epitomized by evangelist Charles Secrest in his 1971 opposition to federally-funded public preschool:

> Do you want your child's basic character and values to be formed by some bumbling government clerk?

Yet many families seem to accept this state intervention into the private sphere. Public preschool attendance is voluntary (as is kindergarten attendance in most states), but enrollment rates are very high (Gilliam 2008). In Oklahoma, for example, over seventy percent of four year olds are enrolled in public preschool, which is comparable to the percentage of children enrolled in kindergarten there (National Center for Education Statistics 2010; NIEER 2009).

Public acceptance of state preschool is likely related to the political and social factors that shaped its adoption, but little research has been done on why states have adopted public preschool. The most prominent narrative is that the development of public preschool was correlated with the increasing number of women, particularly mothers of young children, in the workforce (Cahan 1989; Morado 1989). When more women enter the workforce, public provision of preschool and childcare becomes economically and politically salient because women need preschool to work, and businesses need women to work. Another common explanation among advocates is that preschool was adopted to improve school readiness (Fuller and Liang 1996; Imig and Meyer 2007). In the era of stressed families and global competition, schools must assume more responsibility for early learning—and improve education overall—in order for children to succeed.

However, these causal narratives fail to account for the crucial role played by politics in the adoption of public preschool. Politics mediates states' recognition of and response to the needs and desires of working

women, children, businesses, and educators, which influences how public preschool is understood. In this paper, I develop four politically-oriented theoretical frameworks for the adoption of public preschool based on theories of labor, race, representation, and the welfare state and historical precedents of preschool adoption. My approach focuses on the political factors that make demographic and economic change salient. I suggest that public preschool is a means of regulating women's labor in the corporate interest; an intervention into minority family "pathologies"; a way to improve public education and future productivity; a political move to attract voters or deepen Party support; or some combination thereof.

The Why and When of Public Preschool

This paper focuses specifically on the adoption of public preschool run and funded by states. Although the movement for public preschool began at the federal level, the majority of recent action has occurred at the state level. In the 1960s, the federal government established several preschool and childcare programs, notably Project Head Start and the Appalachian Regional Development Program, which provide grants to states and local communities for preschool for children from low-income families (Vinovskis 2005). For several years, it looked as if the federal government would expand these programs to serve all children. In one of his first addresses to Congress, President Richard Nixon promised national action on childcare: "so crucial is the matter of early growth that we must make a national commitment to providing all American children an opportunity for healthful and stimulating development during the first five years of life" (Nixon 1969 qtd in Quadagno 1994:149). In 1971, the US Congress passed the Comprehensive Child Development Act, which would have provided preschool for all children

of working mothers. But to the shock of many, Nixon vetoed the bill. The movement for federal public preschool never recovered, and action shifted to the state level where it has remained ever since (Vinovskis 1999:86).

Since state legislatures develop education policy independently, the state preschool programs vary in terms of curricula, goals, and eligibility. In this paper, I consider a program to be state preschool if it satisfies three criteria. First, the program is public—free to eligible families and available to children statewide. Twenty-five states limit public preschool enrollment to children whose families are below a certain income threshold, while thirteen states have universal preschool programs. Second, the program provides early education, offering a group learning experience to children ages three and four at least two days a week (and usually more). Third, the program is primarily state-run and state-funded, though many states combine federal, state, and local funds to support their preschool programs (NIEER 2009:21).[4] Table 1 shows the years in which states adopted public preschool.

Below I describe potential theoretical and historical frameworks for the adoption of public preschool. Within each, I propose socio-demographic and economic variables that shape "politicians' perception of the need for [preschool], the range of possible decisions, and the consequences of their actions or inactions" (Pavalko 1989:593). These variables suggest why the timing of adoption may have varied across states and allow for future quantitative analysis of their influence on adoption.

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[4] Alaska and Rhode Island supplement Head Start and child care subsidy funding, but these are not considered state preschool because the programs themselves are federally administered.

Table 1. Timing of States' Adoption of Public Preschool

Year Law Adopted	States
1965	California
1966	New York
1979	Maryland
1980	Oklahoma
1981	Maine
1983	West Virginia
1984	South Carolina, Texas
1985	Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Washington, Wisconsin
1987	Florida, Oregon, Vermont
1988	Colorado, Iowa, Louisiana
1990	Kentucky, Ohio
1991	Arizona, Arkansas, Minnesota
1992	Nebraska
1993	Georgia
1994	Delaware, Virginia
1996	New Jersey
1997	Connecticut
1998	Kansas, Missouri, Tennessee
2000	Alabama
2001	North Carolina
2002	Nevada
2004	Pennsylvania
2005	New Mexico
No Public Preschool Program	Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming

Preschool in the Corporate Interest: Labor Regulation and Working Women

Over the past sixty years, the percent of women working has doubled from thirty percent in 1950 to nearly sixty percent in 2009 (Goldin 1990:20; US Department of Labor 2009). Women now comprise nearly half—46.8 percent—of the labor force in the United States (US Department of Labor 2009). To some scholars, the expansion of public preschool over the same period suggests an association based on ideals of gender equality. Family responsibilities and the high cost of private childcare hamper women's opportunities to work outside the home when their children are young (Rigby et al. 2007:890). Family policies, such as public preschool, help women achieve full political and economic citizenship (O'Connor 1988:15). Yet given the United States' historically slow adoption of female-friendly policies, it seems unlikely that public preschool would have expanded so quickly if it were a response to recognized gender inequality (O'Connor et al. 1999; Skocpol 1992). I postulate that states adopted public preschool to entice women into the labor force for a different political interest group—private businesses.

Despite nearly equal rates of educational attainment, women's hourly wages remain less than men's at every educational level (McCall 2001:55; US Department of Labor 2005). The reasons for this wage gap are disputed, but its suggestion to profit-maximizing companies is clear. Corporations may prefer to hire women over men because of their relatively cheaper labor (Arizpe and Aranda 1981). Theories of welfare capitalism suggest that the needs of capital for a cheap, reliable labor force would compel governments to implement programs that regulate women's labor force participation (Amenta and Carruthers 1988). Acting on behalf of private business, states may implement public preschool to entice

women into and keep them in the labor force.

During World War II, the federal government established public preschools for exactly this reason. To supply wartime products for the Allied governments, the federal government contracted with private companies. Yet with many men deployed overseas, these companies were losing workers at the same time government demand for goods was increasing. The companies need an alternate workforce and tried to hire women, but too few women were in the labor force to meet demand. To support companies and entice women into the labor force, the government started two programs: the Rosie the Riveter propaganda campaign and public children's centers (Gregory 1974:29-39; Stolzfus 2003).

The Lanham Act of 1941 provided six million dollars to provide preschool and childcare in "war-impact areas," cities with high levels of wartime production (Beatty 1995:188). The employment purpose of the Lanham Act children's centers was explicit: the government withdrew funding for preschools outside of "war-impact areas" to focus on day care for the children of women working in the wartime industries (Cahan 1989:42-43). Providing preschool removed one of the major barriers to women's employment, and in combination with Rosie the Riveter's patriotic call to work, the program helped entice over 5 million women to enter the labor force during World War II (Gregory 1974:192). In 1944, the average daily attendance at the Lanham Act children's centers was over 125,000 children nationwide (Beatty 1995:191).

Once the war ended, the government stopped funding for children's centers to push women out of the labor force (Stolzfus 2003:10). The decline in military production decreased companies' need for labor, and, because of prevailing gender norms, companies preferred to have a male labor

force if possible. The government also wanted to ensure that employment opportunities were available for returning veterans. Working women in many areas tried to mobilize and convince the federal government to continue funding and/or states and localities to maintain public preschool, but only one state, California, maintained its Lanham Act children's centers (Stolzfus 2003:13).[5] With the loss of public preschool and an increased normative emphasis on homemaking, women's labor force participation declined in the 1950s. The federal government used preschool to regulate women's labor force participation for corporate interests during World War II.

Yet corporate and government interests are rarely so aligned at the state level (with the possible exception of states in the South).[6] Political factors, such as public attitudes toward big business, corporate campaign donations, and economic conditions, determine the extent to which governments support corporate interests. The unemployment rate is likely a key mediator of governments' response to corporate interests. When unemployment is high, the public may be angry at corporations and their lay-offs, so governments make welfare programs more generous to absorb excess workers and quell social unrest (Piven and Cloward [1971] 1993:337-338). When unemployment is low, governments decrease the generosity of welfare programs to force more individuals into the workforce, increasing the labor supply and driving down labor costs for corporations' benefit (Piven and Cloward [1971] 1993:123-144). Since public preschool is a means of enticing women into the workforce when labor is needed,

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[5] Congress continued to support children's centers in Washington, DC for a few years, but all federal funding for Lanham's center preschools ended in 1953 (Beatty 1995:192).
[6] For most of the 20th century, wealthy white businessmen controlled Southern political systems, producing a tight link between the needs of corporations and government policy (Quadagno 1988; Woodard 2006).

its expansion should move in the opposite direction of welfare generosity. Given this theoretical framework, adoption should occur in states when unemployment is low and workers are needed and be delayed or non-existent when unemployment is high.

However, Piven and Cloward's theory of welfare generosity and labor regulation is distinctive for its focus on the poor. States may regulate the labor force participation of more highly educated women differently. Increasingly, corporations are concerned about the attrition of educated mothers from the workforce rather than about women's entry into the workforce (Still 2006:63). Corporations invest time and money into training young female workers, but a substantial number of women, particularly married women, decide to leave the labor force or work part-time after having children. This attrition may be particularly problematic when a higher percentage of women are already working; there is a smaller pool of untapped female labor from which to hire. In hopes of recruiting and retaining educated female workers, many corporations established on-site day care centers and family friendly policies in the 1980s and 1990s, but attrition continues (Hochschild 1997:22-23). Some corporations and large non-profits, which face similar labor issues, began to lobby for public preschool (Witt 1989; Imig and Meyer 2007:4). Since state governments lose employees at motherhood as well, they may share corporations' interest in maintaining the labor force participation of educated women. Public preschool is an ideal solution: it can be framed as business-friendly and family-friendly, endearing politicians to both types of interest groups. Accordingly, the adoption of public preschool may coincide with higher levels of female employment and late or non-existent adoption to coincide

with lower levels of female employment. To support production and an educated labor force, states may have adopted public preschool as a means to regulate labor in the corporate interest.

Preschool as the Better Parent: "Mother Blaming" and Cultural Deficiency

While promoting the newly established Georgia Voluntary Pre-Kindergarten program in 1995, Governor Zell Miller highlighted the educational and social deficiencies of children from low-income families in Georgia. He said, "When we started this program, we knew that four out of every ten five-year olds who walked into their kindergarten classes on the first day did not know their numbers, colors or letters and had practically no social skills." Because these children never caught up, they dropped out of school, producing "a cycle of teen pregnancies, unemployment, welfare and crime." The advent of public preschool, however, solves all of these problems, turning poor children into "more productive children with better jobs and brighter futures" (Miller 1995).

Like Governor Miller, advocates in many states have proposed preschool as a panacea for the social problems associated with poverty. Part of this argument is data driven: the High/Scope Perry Preschool project, an oft-cited longitudinal study of 123 African-American children from low-income families, found that individuals who participated in preschool were less likely to be arrested or on welfare at the age of forty and were more likely to have graduated from high school (Belfield et al. 2005). Implicit in this argument, however, is a common racial and socioeconomic stereotype of "mother blaming," the idea that poor and/or non-white mothers are responsible for their children's educational and social deficiencies (Ladd-Taylor and Umansky 1998). To provide a future for these children,

the government must intervene in poor and/or non-white families to socialize their children to mainstream educational and behavioral norms. State preschool is thus conceptualized as a better parent for these marginalized children than their own parents are.

At the federal level, the narrative of preschool as the better parent emerged in the 1960s during a period of rapid social change. The Civil Rights movement emphasized racial disparities and the need for educational and social integration. At the same time, President Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty brought attention to the plight of children and families in poverty (Vinoskis 2005). These political movements spurred research on the origins of poverty, much of which focused on familial causes as exemplified in the work of Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Moynihan argued that matriarchal family structure—unwed or divorced working black mothers, often on public assistance—was partially responsible for the high crime rates, low educational attainment, and economic alienation of black children and communities (1965). With the political push for integration and poverty alleviation, the previously invisible problem of "Bad Black Mothers" and cycle of poverty needed a policy solution, and prominent psychologists proposed preschool (Hill Collins 2005:131-138; Steinberg 1981; Vinovskis 2005). Their "idea of using preschool to boost intelligence" became Project Head Start, the longest running federal preschool program (Beatty 1995:193).

Similarly, the very first state public preschool programs arose during times of social stress as government interventions to correct familial deficiencies. In the 1820s and 1830s, New York, Philadelphia, and several cities in Massachusetts operated large-scale public "infant schools" for three and four year olds within their public school systems. In Massachusetts, for example, nearly forty percent of three year olds were enrolled in public

schools during the 1839 to 1840 school year (Beatty 1995:23). Urbanization and industrialization had brought many rural families and immigrants to Northeastern cities, who political and education leaders feared were not socialized to middle-class (white) American mores. By providing "moral instruction for poor children" as early as possible, infant schools could correct the deficiencies imparted by immigrant parents and prevent the development of deviant behavior for the good of children and society (Beatty 1995:26). Children were even instructed to teach their parents the moral and behavioral lessons they learned in schools, which demonstrates the extent to which infant school advocates saw poor and immigrant parents as inadequate. Due to competing funding needs in elementary education, all infant schools closed in the 1840s, but they set a precedent of conceptualizing public preschool as the better parent.

States may follow this precedent of mother-blaming and state intervention in the latest iteration of public preschool. Politicians likely discover the need for early socialization in times of social stress and demographic change. Accordingly, adoption should coincide either with higher proportions of individuals of color or a higher change in the proportion of individuals of color. Furthermore, with the liberalization of abortion access, the stereotype of the "Bad Black Mother" has been extended to other weak or poorly performing family structures, including teen mothers and low-income mothers of all races. Since motherhood is now perceived as a "choice," any woman who bears a child under non-ideal circumstances is deemed a bad mother (Solinger 2000:169). Thus, adoption should occur in states with higher proportions of teenage mothers and/or children in poverty or higher rates of change in these socio-demographic

measures. Since the immigrant population is now far more diverse in race, education levels, and legal status than in the 1820s, I do not expect an association between adoption and population of immigrant children (Chiswick and DebBurman 2004). States may have adopted public preschool as a solution to the negative family pathologies of poor families and families of color.

Preschool for Future Productivity: Public Education and Global Competition

Historically, public schools have served as a socializing agent not solely for the lower class, but for all children (Bowen 2007:12). States established public education to create productive citizens. Over the past sixty years, emphasis on this goal of education has increased as governments have recognized education's role in building "human capital" and "cultural capital" (Becker 1964 and Bourdieu and Passeron 1977 qtd. in O'Connor 1988:15). Public education not only encourages individual development and economic mobility, but also produces educated workers who will contribute to government revenue. But to ensure a prepared workforce and future productivity, public education must evolve to meet states' changing social and economic demands (Ravitch 2000). Preschool may have been an educational response to the large economic shift of the late twentieth century—globalization.

Due to globalization, many areas of the United States have de-industrialized. With factories moving overseas for cheaper labor, states could no longer depend on industry, and the vast number of low skilled workers employed in it, for their tax base. To stay competitive, states needed a highly trained workforce, and to do so, politicians demanded change in their public education systems (Vinoskis 1999:86). After all, in 1970, only half of American adults over the age of twenty-five had graduated from high

school (US Census 1970). The need for educational reform was particularly pressing in states with lower high school graduation rates. As job opportunities for unskilled workers eroded, continuing to educate children for an obsolete job market would harm the state financially and create high potential for future unemployment and political unrest (Piven and Cloward [1971] 1993:338).

Amid the scramble for effective educational policies that ensued, preschool emerged as a possible solution. Since the 1950s, prominent psychologists like Arnold Gessell at Yale argued that preschool improves the school readiness of children from all socio-economic backgrounds (Beatty 1995:145-168). Research also showed that preschool helps children develop social and communication skills, skills that are increasingly essential to compete in a global marketplace (Lareau 2002; Zigler et al. 2006). Emerging research from the High/Scope Perry Preschool Project and other major longitudinal studies suggested that preschool improved high school graduation and employment rates (Belfield et al. 2005). For states in need of educational innovation, preschool became an appealing new idea because of its "strong scientific evidence" and "well-heeled" advocates, including consultants from the High/Scope Foundation (Imig and Meyer 2007:4; Riley 1982). Some governors used the research to alleviate political opposition and justify their intimate intervention into early learning. As one of South Carolina Governor Riley's aides wrote, "As a warrior chooses the most appropriate weapon for battle, so Governor Riley looked for research data to help state the case for early childhood" (1983).

Other states may have acted similarly, using research to create political momentum for preschool and preschool to produce a more educated workforce. Since the percent of high school graduates differed state to state, states' relative need for educational reform varied and should influence the

timing of enacting public preschool. States with lower high school graduation rates have a greater need for educational reform and will likely seek innovative policy solutions to improve their poor public education systems. Given the theorized role preschool plays in future state productivity, preschool should appear earlier in states with lower levels of high school graduates.

The Politics of Preschool: Children's Constituencies and Institutional Politics

As the above theoretical frameworks indicate, public preschool is not a simple response to socio-demographic or economic indicators, but a politically influenced action. Institutional interests and ideological framing influence the emergence, and the choice, of public preschool as a policy solution. The concept of preschool as a better parent, for example, frames poverty as problem associated with family patterns and represents preschool as a government intervention into these family pathologies. In addition, politics influences the adoption of public preschool directly through voting patterns and political representation. Voters endorse policy solutions through the politicians they elect. Conversely, politicians weight social norms, their own values, and the need for re-election in their dual role as agents of constituents' and/or party interests and as actors in their own right (Skocpol 1992:41). Three factors should shape the political use of preschool: voter support for public preschool, political party ideology, and regional political institutions.

As constituents, both working women and parents of young children have self-interest in public preschool. Working women may vote on behalf of their current or future self as a working mother and support politicians who advocate for public preschool. Nonetheless, the women's movement as a whole has been disinterested in public preschool and childcare policy. The income-eligibility criteria of most public preschool programs excludes

the middle-class women who formed the core of the women's movement from receiving the benefit of public preschool, so their self-interest and thus the movement's political interest in preschool policy has been limited (Quadagno 1989:149). Yet, however small the actual support of female voters, the alignment of working women's and businesses' interests creates a powerful political frame for public preschool and an impetus for politicians to act. Adoption may occur when a higher proportion of women work because of corresponding voter and corporate interests.

Parents of young children, on the other hand, have an immediate economic interest in public preschool (Preston 1984). If the government provided public preschool, parents' expenditure on preschool and childcare would substantially decrease. Even families in which one parent stays at home might support public preschool because of the perceived educational benefit for children. Given this self-interest in public preschool, parents of young children may be more likely to support politicians that endorse public preschool. Adoption of public preschool may occur in states when the percent of child-friendly voters, parents of young children, is high.

The population of child friendly voters may overlap with another constituency likely to support public preschool—Democrats. Since the 1930s, the Democratic Party has been the major advocate for women's rights, welfare generosity, and public education at the national level. In fact, the first federal preschool program was part of the New Deal, the broad economic and welfare reform package that defines the modern Democratic Party. In 1933, Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) established public nursery schools for children aged two to five whose family was on relief (Beatty 1995:177). By the late 1930s, these nursery schools enrolled upwards of 100,000 children a year and employed nearly

8,000 people (Cahan 1989:38; Beatty 1995:184). Although the emergency nurseries were disbanded during World War II, public preschool remains an appealing issue to the Democratic Party and its core constituencies.

In contrast, the Republican Party has strong associations with religious and social conservatives, many of who have ideological objections to government intervention into the family. In 1971, for example, when Congress was considering the Child Development Act, conservative Republicans framed public preschool as socialism (Quadagno 1994:152). Ideological commitment to the traditional family fuels much of this opposition: conservative advocates, such as James Dobson of Focus on the Family, argue that preschool and other public education programs weaken the family and may even harm children (Dobson 1984). Public preschool affronts the ideal of the traditional family because it transforms the educational aspect of motherhood "from a sacred calling to a job"—that of a preschool teacher (Luker 1984:205). If these Party ideologies are consistent in state-level decision-making, states with Democratic governors should be more likely to enact public preschool than states with Republican governors. The effect of political party affiliations on policy may be even greater at the state level because state legislatures have quicker response times and governors more formal power over legislation than at the national level (Amenta 1998).

Political parties also exert normative pressures on public policy. Once one governor adopts public preschool, the idea of preschool as a policy solution circulates through political networks, such as the Democratic Governors' Association. In need of effective education policy, governors may adopt public preschool as a form of educational isomorphism. As Powell and DiMaggio explain, "efforts to deal rationality with uncertainty

and constraint often lead, in the aggregate, to homogeneity in structure" through imitation or development under similar constraints (DiMaggio 1991:64). And once a few governors, likely Democrats, adopted public preschool, preschool becomes a normalized education policy, putting further pressure on the remaining governors of their party to implement public preschool.

The idea of preschool as policy solution may have circulated regionally as well. Each region has its own governors' association—the Southern Governors' Association, the Coalition of Northeastern Governors, the Midwestern Governors Association, and the Western Governors' Association—through which policy ideas are shared. Contiguous states have additional political exchange, regardless of their governor's party affiliation, because physical proximity facilitates communication between legislators and voters and increases the strategic importance of information sharing. Given these political exchange networks, the adoption of public preschool may behave like a political contagion and spread through regional and party networks (James 2007). When a state adopts public preschool, the press coverage and advocacy efforts may spillover to neighboring states, generating a contagion effect. If political contagion did occur, states will adopt public preschool more quickly when other states in a region have public preschool. Political contagion may have enhanced the effect of educational isomorphism within party networks because of the alignment of the regional trends and Party norms. Thus, adoption may have occurred more quickly and more thoroughly in states with Democratic governors. Party ideology, regional political institutions, and voter support likely influenced the adoption of public preschool as an education policy.

Conclusion

Contrary to prominent causal narratives, the historical precedents of public preschool at the state and federal level complicate the idea that preschool is a direct response to the needs of working women or children. The theoretical frameworks developed here illustrate the complex role politics plays in mediating states' adoption of public preschool. As a powerful political interest group, corporations may induce governments to establish public preschool as means of regulating women's labor force participation. Political movements may raise awareness of the social problems associated with poverty and construct preschool as an intervention into family pathologies. Governments' concerns about economic competitiveness may produce educational innovations, including public preschool. Party ideology and density of child-friendly voters may have also influenced politicians' action on public preschool.

To determine the validity of these theoretical frameworks, state-level research on the circumstances of adoption is needed. Yet the trend toward more states implementing public preschool in the past few decades suggests the relevance of political factors. Once a few states adopted public preschool, the public and the politicians had some idea of public preschool's effect on educational outcomes: studies of public preschool programs have shown a positive impact on children's cognitive development and school readiness in most states (Wong et al. 2007). Supported by this additional scientific evidence, legislators have expanded existing public preschool programs, and twelve states have transitioned to universal preschool (NIEER 2009). The continued expansion suggests public and/or Party support for public preschool and continued isomorphism. On the other hand, opposition to the adoption of public preschool increasingly

looks like an ideological stance on either the traditional family or public expenditure in the interest of corporations and working women. Tea Party-endorsed governor-elect of Iowa Terry Branstad, for example, campaigned on the promise to end the state's universal preschool program, arguing that families or the private sector should educate young children (Hupp 2010). Political networks and the ideological framing of women's labor continue to influence the adoption of public preschool in the United States. Governor Riley's progressive notion that "education begins with a quality preschool" has become educationally mainstream, but remains politically contested.

Acknowledgements

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Providers' Perspectives on the Role of Race in Maternal Health

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Abstract

The objective of this project was to build upon the literature on disparities in maternal health. A review of the literature concluded that this field could benefit from interviewing providers about race-related issues. 16 interviews were conducted in a high risk obstetric clinic. Providers were asked about their thoughts on cultural competency, race in the encounter, the cause of the maternal heath disparity as well as potential solutions to it, and the possibility of disparate treatment. After speaking to both doctors and midwives, I concluded that the real issue is lack of access to adequate healthcare as well as lack of community education. However there seems to be a tangible issue of relatability, and I suggest the solution to this could be a different type of cultural competency as well as encouraging providers to become more involved in their patient populations' communities.

Introduction

Maternal health in the United States is a field characterized by severe disparities. African American women are 2.4 times more likely to experience infant mortality than are non-Hispanic white women (Collins and David 2009). Similarly, African American infants are much more likely to be low birth weight; Collins and David (2009) point to statistics indicating that the rate of low birth weight is 14.0% for blacks as opposed to only 7.3% for whites. In *The Starting Gate: Birth Weight and Life Chances* (2003), Dalton Conley, Kate Strully, and Neil G. Bennet explore how

babies born with low birth weights often suffer from a variety of health and developmental issues that can affect them well into their adult lives. The disparity in low birth weight leads to the existence of a wide range of inequalities in other health outcomes, and can be seen as a significant contributor to racial health disparities at large.

The known contributors to poor birth outcomes include maternal smoking, maternal weight (obesity), substance abuse, adolescent pregnancy, poor periodontal care, maternal hypertension, maternal vaginal infections, and preeclampsia (US Department of Health and Human Services 2006). Collins and David (2009) remark that the leading cause of infant mortality in African American infants is short gestation (less than 37 weeks), whereas for white infants the main cause of death is congenital malformations. This indicates that pre-term delivery is a very serious concern for African American women. Pre-term delivery is also the main cause of low birth weight.

The explanation previously given for African American women's high incidence of poor birth outcomes was poverty; in this country blacks are often of lower socioeconomic status, and thus experience all of the known contributors to low birth weight at higher rates. Poverty, however, has not been enough to explain the disparity; numerous studies point to discrepancies. Collins and David (2009) write: "College-graduated African-American women who receive adequate prenatal care still have more than a twofold greater LBW rate than college-educated white women who receive adequate prenatal care."

Physician Camara Phyllis Jones has brought the discourse of racism into the forefront of Public Health. In her provocative article *Levels of Racism: A Theoretic Framework and a Gardner's Tale*, she identifies three types of racism experienced by minorities in the United States:

institutionalized racism, personally mediated racism, and internalized racism (Jones 2000). Dr. Jones notes "the variable 'race' is not a biological construct that reflects innate differences, but a social construct that precisely captures the impacts of racism" (p. 1212). She warns against the conflation of race with socioeconomic status, and argues that race is still significant because it affects how others perceive an individual. It is how minorities are treated and internalize this maltreatment that manifests as poorer outcomes, both in health and level of success.

The Weathering Hypothesis is a compelling explanation of the maternal health disparity. Arline Geronimus' 1992 study showed that the incidence of low birth weight increased as African American women aged, even when they were in their prime birthing years. The opposite was true for white women. In fact, the study indicated that for African Americans being an adolescent potentially led to better outcomes for the mother, a counterintuitive concept as teenage pregnancies are often riddled with health risks. It was concluded this evidenced "the weathering hypothesis," the idea that African Americans experienced advanced maternal age as compared to their white counterparts. Aging typically lowers one's birthing ability and health in general. Something about being African American produced in black mothers the same effects as aging. This deterioration in health overtime was attributed to continued exposure of socioeconomic disadvantage and to the stress of facing racism (Geronimus 1992).

Subsequent empirical research has supported the weathering hypothesis. A study by James W. Collins and Richard David (2004) compared the experiences of perceived racism between African American women who had given birth to very low birth weight babies to black women who had given birth to babies of healthy weight. They found that women

who reported incidences of experiencing racism, especially racism in the workplace, were more likely to have low birth weight infants. Another study by Claudia Holzman et. al (2009), that included 182, 938 subjects from a variety of different cities discovered that African American women, as well as women who smoked and women who lived in "high deprivation" neighborhoods experienced a pre-term delivery tendency that increased in frequency with maternal age. The investigators concluded that this served as evidence for the "weathering" hypothesis, and that these groups perhaps experienced accelerated aging that put them at higher risk for pre-term delivery. This study, however, does not claim to completely disentangle race from SES or wealth of neighborhood, or prove that race alone is fully responsible.

The current sociological discussions on race and racism must be translated into the context of health care. There are two main types of racism: explicit and implicit. Explicit racism exists when racism is institutionalized by law, or it is socially acceptable for people to voice their racist beliefs. In the United States this racism flourished up until the Civil Rights Movement. Scholars agree that the Civil Rights Movement was a pivotal moment when racism in this country immediately switched to the implicit form (Jackson 2008). It was no longer normal to be overtly racist, and obvious segregation de jure was eradicated. Implicit racism, however, meant that whites still viewed blacks as inferior, though this was based on cultural rather than biological attributes (Bonilla-Silva 2006). Eduardo Bonilla-Silva writes "In the eyes of most whites, for instance, evidence of racial disparity in income, wealth, education, and other relevant matters becomes evidence that there is something wrong with minorities themselves" (p. 208). There was not a significant increase of blacks and whites integrating because segregation

de facto still persisted. Implicit racism is also called "color-blind racism" by Bonilla-Silva. The implicit racist includes the person who explains away racial social inequality with meritocracy, the person who thinks that minorities are inferior but keeps these views to his or herself, and even the person who consciously believes that blacks and whites are completely equal, but subconsciously adheres to negative stereotypes.

Disparate treatment is a possibility that has not been fully investigated in maternal health. It is undeniable that there are racial disparities in healthcare. The 2003 book *Unequal Treatment* defines "disparities in healthcare" as "racial or ethnic differences in the quality of healthcare that are not due to access-related factors or clinical needs, preferences, and appropriateness of intervention" (Smedley et al. 2003: 4). Although inequalities in health care due to differences of social class or income level (which often result in differences in health insurance and thus access) exist, this is not the focus of this paper. When two patients present with the same symptoms, one white and one a minority, even equal SES, evidence suggests they will not receive the same medical treatment. Similar data shows that the disparities are not due to the fact that certain ethnic groups are more likely to suffer from particular illnesses; the inequality is due to treatment received (Smedley et al. 2003).

The manner in which health care treatment is delivered is important. A paper by Carol Ashton and associates explores the importance of a positive clinical encounter in administering quality healthcare (Ashton et al. 2003). They point to studies showing that even when controlling for access to care, socioeconomic status, and severity of disease, blacks and Latinos do not receive aggressive medical treatments (requiring a doctor's order) as often as their white counterparts. They explore three potential

causes: bias on the part of the provider, preference on the part of the minority patient, and poor communication between patients and providers of different ethnicities. Although provider bias may play some role, the authors do not believe that it is enough to explain the large disparity in treatment observed. Similarly they argue that the emphasis on patient culpability--the idea that patients are less likely to be compliant if the doctor is of a different race--is erroneous. They point to studies from the 1990's which showed taped medical interactions where informed decision making did not occur. Usually the minority patient did not actively choose the lesser treatment, but a detailed conversation considering the pros and cons of all options did not take place. Thus they conclude the culprit in disparate treatment is poor communication between provider and patient. They build upon the work of Arthur Kleinman, who proposed explanatory models in sickness. Interactions are successful when doctors and patients see eye to eye about the nature of the illness: the explanatory model is an account of what is happening. Kleinman pointed out doctors treat diseases, whereas patients suffer from symptoms which affect their daily lives[1]. Provider and patient may not agree on what is most significant about the ailment. Communication is best when explanatory models match--when patients are of vastly different backgrounds from their providers explanatory models will likely be very different. Ashton et al write "explanatory models are products of national culture, racial and ethnic culture, gender culture, occupational and professional culture, education and knowledge, social class, religious beliefs, and personality traits" (p. 147). Any sort of social difference can contribute to the doctor and patient approaching the

[1] Ashton et al, (2003: 147) referencing Kleinman et al. (1978).

medical issue in a different way. This is not an insurmountable difficulty, but it means that effective communication between the patient and the provider is especially important in these situations. Ashton et al suggest that patients can be proactive by: "providing a health narrative (which reveals the patient's explanatory model), asking questions, expressing concerns, and being assertive" (p. 150). It is also indicated that clinicians must be adept communicators and that there should be workshops available to them to hone their interpersonal skills. They point to a study by Kaplan and Greenfield that demonstrated effective communication between provider and patient is directly correlated to better outcomes for some chronic illnesses[2]. Race and ethnicity could play a role in how comfortable a patient feels in a given interaction. A paper by S. Willems and associates corroborated these findings, focusing rather on differing socioeconomic status as an issue between provider and patient. They similarly emphasized empowering patients by educating them how to be proactive in their encounters (Willems et al. 2005). In these models, it may not be exactly correct to say that racism is directly to blame. Any sort of cultural difference could serve as a factor making effective communication more difficult.

This project aimed to shift the focus back onto the health care provider, and to further investigate what clinicians can do to prevent poor birth outcomes. The authors of *Unequal Treatment* concisely state "it is clear that the health care provider, rather than the patient, is the more powerful actor in clinical encounters. Providers' expectations, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors are therefore likely to be a more important target for intervention efforts" (Smedley et al. 2003: 12). While the discourse on

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[2] Ashton et al. (2003: 150) referencing Greenfield et al. (1985).

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the need to empower disadvantaged individuals to be proactive in their clinical encounters is important, physicians should similarly be working to bridge the gap and accommodate for difficulties that their patients face.

There is, obviously, quite a great deal of literature about the role of race in maternal health disparities as well as the significance of social difference in the clinical encounter. An aspect that is lacking is practitioners' thoughts regarding all of these possibilities. I chose to interview providers to gauge their thoughts on the issues, hoping this would reveal more effective interventions for the maternal health disparity. It would also uncover how providers navigate the complicated notions of race and racism in the social space of the clinical interaction.

Methodology

I interviewed providers at a high risk obstetric clinic in New England. There were a total of 16 in person interviews, conducted over the course of three weeks. Interviews typically lasted between 10 and 20 minutes, though one provider was so engaged in the topic that she spoke with me for nearly 40 minutes. Interviews were tape recorded. The questionnaire (see appendix) was created before conducting interviews, although the exact questions evolved slightly as I learned what types of things yielded more fruitful responses. Some questions were added to ask respondents to elaborate their points whereas other questions were naturally cut depending on the flow of the interview. The list of questions was circulated before and during my interviews, so some clinicians saw them before the interviews, whereas others did not. The interview had four basic sections: background information about the individual, the clinical encounter in general, the role of race in the clinical encounter, and a discussion regarding disparities

seen in maternal health. Audio-recorded interviews were manually transcribed and then analyzed.

Findings

Background:

    I interviewed attending physicians, resident physicians, and nurse midwives. The breakdown of the participants is as follows: by provider type: 4 attendings, 8 residents, 4 nurse midwives; by gender: 12 women, 4 men; by race: 9 Caucasians, 4 Asians, 2 African Americans, and 1 Latino. The providers were perhaps least diverse in where they grew up: 9 came from the Northeast, 4 hailed from other parts of the United States, and 3 were not born in the United States.

Race in the Clinical Encounter:

    The questions regarding race in the clinical encounter yielded very similar responses by race. Almost every white provider indicated that they did not feel that race played any role in their interactions with patients. A fairly typical response to the question asking if race played a role in the encounter was epitomized by an attending. She said "You know I really don't think that it does. I think that as a provider you have to be acutely aware of different people's cultures, and how they approach, especially the female anatomy, I think we are definitely in a sensitive area being in OB/GYNs, but I don't think race itself really plays a huge factor." This was seconded by the Asian providers, although 3 of the 4 made exceptions when the patient was their same race. Many providers seemed put off that I was considering race as a potential issue at all. Their responses are perhaps evidence of the disconnect between academia and real life. Doctors are supposed to be "color-blind," and give all of their patients the same excellent treatment. The interviewees' responses were reflective of this intention.

It became clear, however, that some types of social difference do play a role in the clinical interaction. Providers seemed much more willing to talk about culture rather than race as being a factor in their interactions. For example 8 clinicians made reference to sensitivity and respect of the cultural norms of their Muslim patients, and working around the wish to not be seen by male providers. There were also times when certain immigrant populations had norms different from those practiced in this country, which providers needed to contend with.

More than religious and national differences emerged as being significant, however. Many physicians stated that the greatest difference was "culture," and by this they meant socioeconomic status and sometimes education level. Culture could also refer to a very different world view. One Caucasian provider vacillated back and forth when I asked him if race had played a role in his interactions.

> Physician: I'm sure that it has played a role in my interactions with the patients…I'm not so much so sure about race as it is culture… I don't think it's race, because there are people who are of my own race who I have had terrific difficulty connecting with, because their cultural perspective on things is so different. I've had people of different races whom I've connected with perfectly well, because their cultural perspective is much more similar. So… my experience has not been that race has been a barrier for me with a patient…I think it's much more about, if our cultural perspectives are so different, it's more about that than it is the skin color.
>
> Interviewer: Right, and by cultural perspective, what type of things..?
>
> Physician: I believe that, for example, everyone has the ability to be healthy, and that much of that is based on personal choices about how one lives one's life. So that goes to diet and exercise and drug use and alcohol, and contraception, and adherence to, compliance with medications and treatment regimens and etc. So there are people

who feel that they have no option, no choices. That it's not their fault, and that there is nothing they can do…so when I have those sorts of interactions, I can't really change that cultural perspective.

There is much to disentangle in this interview. In my question about the role of race in the encounter, I did not use the word "barrier," however this physician assumed that I thought race might be a challenge in the interaction. I think that other providers similarly assumed by asking the race question that I was presupposing race was a problem. This might have made them answer the question in a more defensive way. Another interesting aspect about this segment is that the provider seems to not be sympathetic or understanding of why patients might have a disempowered outlook on their health. One might hope that a compassionate provider would try and encourage a patient that healthy behavior was an achievable goal. This physician instead said that this different worldview was an insurmountable challenge at times—some of his patients and he would never see eye to eye.

It was difficult for the providers to articulate what exactly contributed to these different cultural perspectives. One provider who stated that race played no sort of role in the interaction ambiguously tried to describe the type of differences that did cause issue in communication. She stated "But I don't think, I don't think race in itself is a barrier in my practice experiences. I feel that there's a lot of issues that come up that can cause difficult interactions, but most of it is, a lot of it is social or the patient's background, not necessarily the ethnic and racial background." When I pressed her for details she was unable to elaborate.

Interviewer: Right, so like social, like?
Provider: social, like…

Interviewer: education and class stuff?

Provider: Mhm, yeah, that.

There was a pause, and her facial expression indicated she was done discussing this topic. Comments like these strongly suggest that providers do feel some sort of cultural tension in the interaction, however providers refused to attribute this disconnection as being in any way related to race. It is quite likely that providers who are upper or upper middle class have difficulty fully connecting with patients who are of lower SES and education level. It was interesting that there were some types of social difference that could be blamed, but race was not one of them. This may be further evidence of Bonilla-Silva's point that it is no longer socially acceptable to be racist anymore, and so people will speak in ways to indicate that they are not prejudiced. Phenomena such as class or education level will be used as ways to discuss difference in a socially appropriate way, but may in some instances be pseudonyms for race. This is not to say that the physicians are necessarily implicit racists; more it is an interesting observation that they are unwilling to openly refer to race as a point of contention in their interactions.

There were, however, 2 white providers that did directly address race as an issue. Their discussion was hesitant, and they made it clear they did not fully understand what issues were at play, but they at least acknowledge that there was some sort of tension aside from differing socioeconomic status. One resident noted:

> I've said pretty often that I can't really relate to some of the things that my patients go through. I think that being a 30 year old physician who's never been pregnant and caring for patients who are 19 and on their third pregnancy….like based on that factor alone there is a lot of difference. There is probably a racial dimension to that.

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One of the nurses reflected to me kind of an interesting story once where she was already over 40 at a time that she was caring for… a pregnant black woman in labor, and that pregnant woman asked the nurse if she were pregnant, and the nurse was like "no [laughs], I'm well past my child bearing." And the patient's response was "well, I know you people have your babies late." So I was a little bit surprised by that, because clearly that sense that they can't relate to me and I can't relate to them goes both ways. And it's not just based on a race card, I mean it's also based on kind of an expectation of what's a norm in a community. And what's a norm based on socioeconomic status, and what's a norm you know in a particular city.

I found this to be a most insightful and honest observation. I appreciated this resident's willingness to address the issue of relatability. She discusses the questions of intersectionality in the complex way they deserve. Race, class, culture, and geographic location interact in unpredictable ways to create communities with vastly different lifestyles and world views. She does not attribute all of the issues of relatability to race, but at least openly admits that it does contribute in some way that she may not be able to articulate or fully understand. This physician was disheartened that this disconnect existed and desperately wanted to be able to close the divide. It was also interesting that she was able to recognize the bidirectionality of the relatability issue, understanding her patients' inability to relate to her and thus possibly the recommendations she suggested. This resident noted, however, that race did not have to be a barrier in efficacy of her interactions and that she connected with patients of all backgrounds.

I don't think that my trust level with my patients is race related. I would say I have an equivalent number of really excellent patient interactions and equivalent number of babies named after me in any race category, so for me I don't think that it's played as big a role. But I think that the kind of the socioeconomic status does

kind of play a difference in terms of relatability between us.

This provider is similarly voicing the idea suggested by other providers that race in and of itself is not a problem in an interaction. In no way is her treatment of patients influenced by their skin color. Even when there is this lack of relatability of life experiences she is able to make strong connections with patients. It is a gap that can be bridged. I found her word choice, "the kind of socioeconomic status" noteworthy because it indicated that there is something beyond income level that determines culture; there are racial undertones we may not fully comprehend but at least can admit exist. Race is a factor in the interaction, not a challenge.

The Asian providers similarly indicated that for the most part race played little role in their interactions with patients. A very important exception occurred when the patient was of the same ethnicity. The Asian providers stated that in general, their patients seemed much more at ease when they saw that their practitioner was the same race. There was an interesting difference in the way the providers discussed this phenomenon. Three of the four reflected very neutrally, however one provider indicated, that ultimately this sense of ethnic connection could actually be a hindrance in her communication with patients. She commented:

> For me I think for the most part [race] is a nonissue. I think where it does come into play for me is [with] patients who are of the same background as me feel that we relate more and expect me to speak the language. My background is-- I'm a Southeast Asian-- and they expect me to speak Hindi or some of these languages and understand that, their cultural norms. Well I do understand a lot of the cultural norm, I don't speak the language. And that expectation I think can be a barrier. And also not speaking the language fully can be a barrier. So I think in that sense it becomes an issue.

This statement was quite unexpected and further complicates understanding the influence of race and culture in this setting. One would think that being of the same ethnicity would serve only to ease the flow of interactions. Yet this is an account of how social identifiers put in place by society, such as race or ethnic background, can actually force a sense of connection that is not there. This provider's patients are vastly different f rom her, but assume similarity because of the same skin color. When differences do emerge in the interaction it becomes almost more frustrating than had the patients come into the room and seen a provider of a different race. The unfulfilled expectation becomes more troubling than an initial admittance of difference.

The African American providers, on the other hand, did indicate that they had experienced encounters in which their race had been a factor in the interaction. It seemed overall that they were much more aware of their other visible social markers in general, not just race. For example, before I asked about race in the encounter one African American provider stated "I think that in my experience how patients see me and whatever they assume based on what I look like can be a barrier, anything from my sex to my age to my race to my accent or lack thereof, I think people kind of make assessments about how much they think I know, and they treat me accordingly." This provider was self conscious about her appearance; she was aware that her physical characteristics play a significant role in how she is viewed and how willing people will be to listen to her. She assumed that how she was perceived might be a point of contention that she would have to overcome in a given interaction. Although this study's focus is on race, her references to gender and country of origin are similarly very important influence on the nature of

the clinical interaction. This same provider later commented that when things were not going well with a patient she sometimes asked herself if it was her race that was causing the disconnect, as if the patient was less trusting of her because she was black. She stated

> So it's hard for me to get a good sense of it when I don't click for a patient, when I feel a patient doesn't trust me for whatever reason or doesn't respect me or whatever else, I kind of click through potential reasons and race is always high on that list of reasons. But, you know, I'm sure, I hope it's not the highest but it's hard to say with the extent to which it's played a role in my patient interactions.

This provider very much indicated that she could not be sure about the role of race, because as she admitted "[race is] rarely ever explicitly addressed." This is important because she is not blaming tension on race, but rather considers it as a contributing factor. This is contrasted to the white physicians who blamed their disconnect (outside of language) solely on "cultural" or socioeconomic differences. Similarly, she expressed she felt she was adept at helping people of all cultures.

One black clinician indicated that there had been times when patients had directly inquired about her race. In the section of the interview asking about the clinical encounter the provider reflected upon one incident in which a patient had at the outset been recalcitrant. She said

> So yeah, there are times when people have an attitude…One African American woman who was really hostile and angry, and I was like, you know, my goodness. And she said "Are you Indian?" and I said "No, I'm black." And she goes "oh." And her demeanor changed completely after that and I thought, "where did that come from?"

This reflection was very interesting because the provider chose to acknowledge race before I had begun the part of the interview that specifically addressed it. This segment is very revealing. Especially when considered with the responses of the Asian providers, it appears that minority patients may be more comfortable when their provider is of the same race. Whether this bias is something the medical system should try and acquiesce to is debatable, however it should at least be considered as something public health needs to contend with. Examples like these make the issue of effective cultural competence training[3] all the more salient. Providers must learn how to be sensitive to preconceived notions and biases which their patients have about them.

The same provider quoted above also relayed to me times in which patients had demonstrated that they held racist views, but they allowed her to treat them because she offered compassionate care. Their racism was never directly addressed towards her; in one case a patient told her after treatment that she had a strong mistrust of African Americans, but that this changed after this provider guided her through her tragic miscarriage. In another case the provider learned that the patient was racist because she refused the care of a black male provider, even though the patient had allowed her to treat her throughout the pregnancy. This same provider also shared an example when a white patient asked if she was white. When the provider responded "no," the patient seemed surprised. After relaying this story the provider continued:

> It took me a while to sort of piece it together, because, you know Florida is the Deep South. And perhaps in her experience she had not experienced a black person who was actually a health care

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[3] Cultural competency is training providers undergo to learn how to become culturally sensitive practitioners who are able to treat diverse populations. See Franks 2010.

provider, and so I think that, she was a little bit like 'oh,'...there was not synchrony in terms of her thought, well then maybe you're white.

These comments divulge just as much about the confused patient as they do about the provider. It shows that she is very sensitive to racial relations in this country, and has a keen awareness of how others view and understand her. Although the other African American clinician did not provide detailed anecdotes like these, she similarly evinced this awareness of patients having difficulty processing her race. This story is further evidence that race of the provider, or rather bias on the part of the patient, may be a barrier to effective communication with a patient. Though this provider did not indicate having particular difficulty, the system of institutionalized racism that trickles down to an individual level means that some white patients will have difficulty accepting their minority providers. After relaying this anecdote, the interviewee reflected on the role her race played in the interaction:

> It's like the justice system. Supposedly rule of law prevails, but I'm sorry, you know race, because of our society, does play an important part in decisions that are made relative to one's race. And so I know that some people may have preconceived ideas, but usually I think that because I'm not into that stuff, I'm aware of it but, you know, I do what I need to do for everybody regardless. And so overtime I think that people even if they have some negative attitudes about my race, tend to sort of like me for whatever reason.

The provider emphasized that race cannot ever be ignored as a factor in daily interaction. She feels that although people may choose to try and ignore it, race is a significant identifier and carries with it important meanings and preconceptions for different individuals. Her race had been an issue that her bigoted patients had to overcome. However she voiced the same notion indicated by white providers that all patients demanded

the same quality of care. She added that compassionate and excellent care was necessary even when the patient was intolerant or held biased notions. It was through this compassion towards racist individuals that she could actively fight discrimination on an individual level; by her actions, she made these people reconsider their prejudiced worldviews.

Lack of belief in Weathering Hypothesis & lack of awareness of racism in general:

Providers who claimed to be culturally competent seemed unaware of the potential detrimental effects of racism on a patient's health, and in some cases even oblivious to its existence. Of the providers whom I spoke to, only three voiced any sort of acknowledgement of the idea that living in a racist society could contribute to African American women suffering worse birth outcomes. Two of these were the African American clinicians. One provider indicated she was very much a proponent of the Weathering Hypothesis. She commented:

> I suspect that a lot of our sociology/public health counterpart is doing a much better job trying to identify…the nuances of these discrepancies… I'm confident that there's some degree of institutionalized racism that plays into [the disparity] in ways that we can't articulate.

Unlike the majority of her colleagues this provider encouraged more investigation of how social institutions and discrimination influenced health outcomes. She was frustrated by the persistence of the racial disparity in birth outcomes even for women of high SES, and indicated that it would indeed be the experience of racism rather than another factor such as genetics that would contribute to this. Another provider offered keen insight regarding why black women at higher income levels still experienced higher rates of poor birth outcomes. She said:

> Because of the stress you know, racism does not go away as you
> move up the socioeconomic ladder. In fact your exposure to the
> majority culture is probably more increased….probably because
> you are faced with that majority culture on a on a daily basis you're
> likely to experience that stress daily in your life, [in your] work and
> personal life. That stress part of it is really important.

A third provider did admit that the experience of racism could potentially play a role in explaining the adverse outcomes seen in African Americans. However he offered a very compelling critique of the Weathering Hypothesis. If discrimination causes stress and thus poor health outcomes, one would expect to see similar results in other minority groups. He referred to the Latino population which experiences a tremendous amount of discrimination. This group did not have the same rates of poor birth outcomes among their higher SES individuals, and thus supporters of ideas like Weathering Hypothesis needed to find a way to explain this discrepancy.

A few times when I asked providers to explain why African American women at higher SES experienced bad birth outcomes at higher rates they often indicated that genetics must be to blame. One resident commented "well I think that some of this may go to the genetic part of it. If everything else is the same, you know you control for socioeconomic status, for smoking/non smoking for all the other factors that we kind of talk about and then the differences are still there, then you have to start thinking scientifically like what's different..." What is interesting about his viewpoint regarding the potential for a genetic explanation is the cognitive jump he makes from known risk factors to genetics. The differential social experience of blacks was not something that crossed his mind as something being relevant; he believed the answer must be scientific. Two other providers spoke similarly; if class and health habits are explained

away, the only other explanation had to be difference at the genetic level.

There was another instance in which I asked a provider about what causes bad birth outcomes in general, and he began by addressing the racial disparity. However he wanted to discredit the fact that negative outcomes were experienced differentially across races. He emphasized that causation can only be deduced by using a randomized control trial, which he felt could not be done with race.

> I'm personally hesitant to say that somebody's race, just race in and of itself puts them at higher risk of something, because I believe it probably is a series of confounding factors that tend to be associated with race--lower incomes, less education, poorer nutrition, more obesity--things like this that are associated that are harder to tease out all of the possible confounders that end up influencing outcomes.

On one hand it seems that this resident present a subtle argument against the genetic explanations for the disparity. He suggests the need for caution in overestimating the role of race, and it appears that by "race" he is referring to only skin color. It is interesting, though not surprising, that in his list of challenges associated with race he does not include experience of discrimination. This idea of not being able to "tease out" all of the factors was mentioned by three other providers. At the end of her interview, one attending felt the need to inform me

> I just think that race being the only factor is very difficult to point at as being the issue in healthcare disparities. And I think that it encompasses a lot of things, and if you look at a lot of communities where there are predominantly poor whites, I think the outcomes will still be bad… so I do think that race is not the ideal marker in looking at. It's a marker that we always look at, but I think that there's so much that's compounded in that.

This provider, as did many others, felt that I was missing the point by only looking at race. It was almost a call for the appreciation of intersectionality, to look at how all of these disadvantages combined in unexpected ways, as if investigating race ignored the greater problem of poverty and access to care which affects citizens of all ethnicities in this country. My choice to utilize race as a locus of inquiry diverted attention from the real issue of socioeconomic disparities.

Some doctors seemed completely unable to disentangle the issues of race and poverty. One resident, when asked what she thought was the cause of the racial disparity, she responded poverty was to blame. When I pressed her, asking why even black women of high SES still experienced these negative outcomes at higher rates, she responded

> I don't know that it's just race. I really do think it's a combination of everything. It's a combination of the social status…and everything else. And it's just sad because if you if you really look at it in the broader picture really patients who have problems with the pregnancies are the ones who are in the lower class, you know, and what's associated with being poor.

This respondent completely ignored my effort to pick apart the race and class issue. I could not tell whether she didn't understand me, or if she was completely conflating race with class. It seemed that she was implying most African Americans are at lower SES and thus this question was irrelevant. Because of this, I did not directly ask her about the potential role of racism affecting one's health. This same resident spoke after the tape recorder was off, and when I explained to her my interest in the Weathering Hypothesis she was visibly angered, and would not consider that racism could be a significant contributor to bad health outcomes. She emphatically stated "but

there is so much else!" and elaborated that nutrition and lifestyle, e.g. what type of job and the hours one worked, clearly had a more noteworthy effect on outcomes. This reaction was surprising, because earlier in the interview she seemed very able to articulate the subtle problems with poverty, but was unwilling to even consider the possibility of the role of race.

Some other clinicians were openly skeptical at the idea that the experience of racism could be a contributor to poor birth outcomes. When I asked about the potential of the Weathering Hypothesis, one resident admitted that she could not explain for why African American women of high SES still experienced bad birth outcomes at higher rates. This was not the population that she treated at this clinic and so she had no experiential basis to speak from. She added "I have no idea, because you'd assume that other things are taken out of the picture for them, right?" thus acknowledging that it was at least noteworthy that this occurred. However she continued "But do I think race is involved? I don't think so. And especially now people are all of mixed races and it's just so hard to like even, I don't know, pinpoint, like you know…if you wanted to be racist it'd really be kind of difficult. [laughs] you know?" This statement is puzzling. It is unclear here if the resident is implying that it is difficult to distinguish "pure" races because of the trend of interraciality, or if she is denying the existence of racism as being a relevant phenomenon. She referred to different identifiable races at other times during the interview, so it seems unlikely that she meant to say that every individual is mixed. It is certainly no longer socially acceptable to be explicitly racist, and perhaps this is what she meant by the term "difficult." However the fact that she suggests that someone might "want to be racist" but there would be substantial challenges or barriers to acting on this shows a lack of awareness of race relations in this country. Her comment is

ambiguous, and so understanding of its significance is difficult. At the very least, the resident is denying the possibility of the Weathering Hypothesis; at worst she is denying the existence of racial discrimination in the modern era.

When I told one of the African American providers that she was one of the few respondents that had voiced any credence in the Weathering Hypothesis she was not surprised. She responded:

> Well you know sometimes people don't fully appreciate the constant or pervasive sort of racism that exists in our society... they haven't been exposed on a daily or weekly basis to comments and just things that are sort of inappropriate that are really sort of racist…until you walk in someone's shoe I don't think you fully appreciate what they encounter, and so a lot of whites don't realize the level of discrimination that happens and so they're not tuned into the fact... My god, it's like when he went through the Black Like Me[4] experience, there were times when he had to just pull back because it was overwhelming, you know."

Thinking of her personal experiences as an African American, she supported the idea that living in a society with institutionalized racism was stressful. She suggested that teaching awareness of the struggle many minorities experience could perhaps help, but emphasized that experiencing the detrimental effects of oppression was a phenomenon that whites in general would ever truly comprehend. She suggested the focus instead should be on teaching minorities how to deal with the stress they endure in their lives in a productive, healthy way.

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[4] The provider was referencing the book Black Like Me by the Caucasian journalist John Howard Griffin. Published in 1961, this work chronicles Griffin's social experiment of disguising himself to look like a black man and travelling through Southern states in the late 1950's.

Evidence of Racism?:

The discussion of race is a very sensitive subject. Most providers were visibly uncomfortable when discussing these topics, and I was grateful for their willingness to talk to me. However, it was impossible to overlook that some comments seemed to make negative assumptions about African Americans. For example, when I explained the Weathering Hypothesis to one attending, asking if she thought that the stress associated with living in a society characterized by institutionalized racism could lead to the bad birth outcomes seen in African Americans. She responded "I don't know about that. Just cause you've led a stressed out life doesn't mean that your uterus is more stressed out, but you know if you're using cocaine everyday, then obviously that's a more stressed out uterus[5]. But I don't think that's a [very brief pause] race thing that's just an individual thing." This comment struck me because she immediately denied racism experienced by African Americans contributing to bad outcomes and instead chose to mention drug use. Never did this doctor say directly African Americans are more likely to use drugs, in fact she followed up by saying drug use was not a "race thing." However I believe that given the question which was asking specifically about African Americans, a subtle and problematic association had been made. She then continued that living in an urban environment with a limited income was indeed stressful and could have health repercussions that were not the fault of the individual. Similarly she was sympathetic to the fact that relying on public transportation could make one late for appointments. Thus she was able to comprehend the subtleties of the difficulties of living in poverty. However this almost felt like an apology for the hasty association that was made.

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[5] Her usage of the term "stressed out uterus" was appropriating my word choice. This was one of my earlier interviews and I was not yet skilled at being articulate in asking these questions.

This comment regarding drug use was very subtle, and whether there were racial implications I admit is debatable. Another attending openly and directly addressed race as a contributing factor to the disparity in a way that I was not expecting. I asked this doctor to explain what caused bad birth outcomes in general, to not yet delve into why certain groups experienced them at higher rates. She chose however to immediately launch into an explanation of why African Americans in particular experience such unfortunate outcomes.

> Well I think that culture plays a huge role. I think there's acceptance in certain cultures, such as the African American right now, where it's perpetuated. I've seen mothers come in with African American daughters and they're actually happy that this 14 year old is pregnant. For whatever reason, it's perpetuated, whether it's for money, whether it's an accomplished person, I don't know, I'm not really familiar with what really drives that, but it's the same. And in other cultures as well, it seems to be more accepted and actually rewarded. It's amazing to me because how I grew up and in my culture that was not at all, you know, something.

I was very confused by this response, and when I again tried to shift the conversation away from race and back to maternal health outcomes in general she continued:

> Well I think it's along the same lines…For instance I've been asked this a lot, and again I've been asked to look specifically at the African American, that's why I keep targeting it, not because. But you know for instance I think they say "look, my sister, my cousin, they didn't get prenatal care, and they did fine" And we know that Hispanics and especially African Americans have higher pre term labor and pre term delivery but yet they're the ones that come in the latest for prenatal care. And I think it's just not a priority to them, I think it's perpetuated through the generations…They don't see the risk, I don't think it's ingrained in them, and it's just their culture.

There is a lot to be dissected in this response. Without prompting, this interviewee chose to directly address race, which she instead refers to as "culture," as a contributing factor to negative birth outcomes. A startling aspect of her response was the emphasis on placing the responsibility for the disparity on African Americans. Her word choice did not indicate that a lack of education or poverty played a major role—she openly stated "African American culture" was responsible; there was no sort of qualification. The respondent refers to African Americans in general; not "some African Americans", or "African Americans who have not attained as much education." I was similarly surprised by the repeated use of the word "they." Especially when discussing her own culture, there seemed to be an idea undercurrent of the idea "us and them." Approximately three minutes later this same provider stated that she thought race played no role whatsoever in the clinical interaction. She only mentioned the need to be sensitive to cultural differences, such as awareness of many Muslim women's desires to not be seen by a male physician. During this response, the provider's tone seemed fairly unsympathetic. This went beyond the typical literature on noncompliance. She indicated that African Americans simply did not care about prenatal care, and it was because of this apathy that they saw such poor outcomes.

These two sections are examples of unsettling associations made by providers. Although both of these providers indicated that race played little to no role in their clinical interactions, it is difficult to imagine how race is not a factor when they hold these judgments. It is also very interesting that these things were said given the nature of this study. The providers had access to a sort of abstract as well as a list of questions before interviews. One would expect that comments like these would have been screened against,

because the interviewees would have ample time to think about what types of things were socially acceptable to say. Thus their responses are especially startling. There is no shame or embarrassment about having these beliefs. It would be interesting to investigate if people are capable to carry beliefs such as those above and still interact with all of their patients in the same unbiased manner. It is possible that people are able to compartmentalize their personal thoughts separately, and not think about such things on a one on one encounter. It is difficult, however, to imagine that this is likely.

Conclusions

A note on methodology:

This project was defined by what I was permitted to do, rather than by what I originally wanted to investigate. I was interested in disparate treatment. Initially, I hoped to combine clinical observations with clinician and patient interviews. I wanted to see if there was a difference in clinician's behavior with different patients, or if patients of different races had noticeably different evaluations. Both the obstetric visit observations as well as the patient interviews, however, were not permitted.

There were several limitations to this study. I was the only investigator who interviewed 16 clinicians at a single clinic with a very distinct patient population. Timing of the interviews necessarily accommodated the providers' busy schedules, and often ended prematurely. It is likely that another clinical site would have yielded different results. The observations reported here may not be applicable beyond this site, and thus cannot be seen as general trends for obstetrical care.

Reconsideration of Findings:

The intention of this project was to gather input or data from interviews that would identify specific medical or social programs that could effectively target the racial disparity in maternal health outcomes. Unfortunately, this did not happen. The healthcare providers were as unable to explain the disparate phenomena as social scientists. While the clinicians were able to offer some solutions—preconceptional health care and education—it became clear that the racial disparity specifically is not something that they are directly focused on. Most were visibly saddened and concerned that people at lower SES experience increased rates of bad birth outcomes, but many did not conceptualize this problem as a racial one.

An important insight of this study in this study was its ability to uncover how physicians themselves deal with and conceptualize race and cultural difference. It became clear that the understanding of race in the maternal health field is just as complicated and blurred as it is in other institutions in this country. In terms of providing patient care, these clinicians for the most part were unwilling to refer directly to race as an issue in the interaction. However they did refer to SES, amount of educational attainment, as well cultural mindset as factors that can make the encounter more difficult. Although race in this country is often associated with all of these features, few practitioners were willing to voice that it was a dimension of the encounter. Why is it that class or culture are acceptable social differences to blame, but race is not? Frequently during interviews I sensed my questions were perceived as being narrow-minded for suggesting that race could play any role in the delivery of care. The comparison of the experience of providers of different races, however, revealed that race can be a salient factor in the encounter. It is not always predictable how it will play

out—for example, interviews with Asian providers indicated that sharing race with a patient was not always something that made communication easier—but it does affect the quality of the interaction. These interviews subtly hinted at other questions. What is race? Is it merely skin color? Is it a something with genetic implications? Is it a representation of a culture? Is it merely a social construct that affects the way one is perceived by others? Although most of the providers wanted to imply it was a matter of melanin, there were undercurrents in their responses suggesting a social significance they were unwilling to openly acknowledge.

The general lack of belief about the impact that the experience of racism could have on health outcomes was somewhat troubling. Perhaps it was unfair to ask clinicians who serve a lower income population to speculate the reasons why black women at higher socioeconomic status suffer from similarly bad outcomes. Racism, however, is something that minorities at all income levels encounter during their life experiences, and the fact that many providers were unwilling to admit this was problematic. There are many compelling studies providing evidence supporting the deleterious effects of discrimination, and providers had either not heard of them or were unwilling to believe the evidence. There should be more investigation as to why this disbelief in the experience of racism is so pervasive. Interviewees who were able to clearly articulate the woes of poverty would, minutes later in the interview, deny that racism could have any significance. At the very least, denying that racism could play a role shows that some providers are out of touch with the life experiences of their patients. Similarly the undercurrents of bigotry in some responses were undeniable. There are clear issues with the way some of these clinicians conceptualize their patients, and this could very well affect the medical care they provide.

A real issue that did emerge from these interviews is the issue of relatability. Many providers blamed relatability on socioeconomic status or culture, whereas a few admitted that racial dimensions were in play. Ultimately it may not matter if the relatability problem is more connected to class or to culture or to race. The fact is that providers divulged that they have more difficulty connecting with patients whose backgrounds differed vastly from theirs. Other studies have shown that disconnection means that there is poorer communication which can lead to lesser quality treatment. Disparate treatment based on socioeconomic status is just as unacceptable as unequal treatment based on race. Providers must be able to employ effective tools that help bridge the divide between their life experience and that of their patients. As stated in *Unequal Treatment*, in the clinical setting the healthcare provider is the one in the position of power because they have valuable health knowledge to pass onto the vulnerable patient. Thus the provider must be the one who makes the effort to ensure that the patient receives the best care possible. Although patients should be advised about how to be more proactive, it is as important to teach providers how to be more compassionate and open-minded. Ideally better cultural competence training would ameliorate this problem.

Another suggestion is for providers to become more involved in the communities which they serve, even if these populations are of vastly different backgrounds. This might increase trust of both the providers and their services. It is difficult to brainstorm tangible ways that this could be accomplished. One provider suggested simple things like going to the same grocery store as one's patients. Another option could be connecting to the community through health education. The clinicians believed that health education would be more effective when taught by community leaders. However it is possible

that community-provider relationships would improve with actual clinicians leading workshops at neighborhood centers, demonstrated that they are invested in the well being of their patients daily. This might dispel the suspicion claim that clinicians only care if they are going to be paid.

Closing Thoughts

This project speaks to much larger issues, such as questioning the significance of race in modern society. As reiterated several times in this paper, providers were often confused by my focus on race. They felt that this was only one factor about a person, and it had little significance in their social interactions with patients. It begs the question of whether we as social scientists are contributing to racial tensions by continuing to study difference. If the eventual objective is for racial tolerance and full integration, what purpose does continuing to investigate the implications of difference serve? Are we inflating the importance of race as a category by continuing to study it? This project indicated that there are certainly issues of race during the clinical encounter, even if the providers were unwilling to admit to them. Furthermore, racism is still a very real phenomenon with numerous effects. The issue is that people in this country want to believe that race is a non issue. I am not sure what the solution is, other than continued education about the need for awareness of racial injustices. More research on how individuals conceptualize race in their daily lives is needed. We cannot hope to eradicate oppression if we do not understand how individuals make sense of race.

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Appendix

<u>Questionnaire</u>: (sheet that was circulated at clinic before and during the time interviews were conducted)

These interviews would be open-ended, meaning not every single question on this outline would necessarily be asked. I would like to have a conversation with providers that flows naturally depending on their own interests and insights in the subject matter.

1. Background questions:

       -Where did you grow up?

       -Why did you become a doctor/nurse midwife, and why did you choose OB/GYN?

       -Where were you trained?

2. How would you characterize the ideal clinical encounter? In contrast, what is not ideal? What tends to happen in encounters that aren't as effective?

3. What are barriers you face in communicating with your patients? How do you deal with them?

4. What was your cultural competency training like? Was it relevant for the

clinical interactions you have had? Was it sufficient?

5. What role do you think race, either yours or your patient's, has played in clinical encounters? Has different ethnicity ever been a barrier in communication? Have you ever had issues with cross-cultural medical encounters?
Certain groups of society experience higher rates of infant mortality and low birth weight.

6. In general, what leads to negative birth outcomes? Are there specific interventions that can be done to prevent them?

7. According to the New Haven Health Department (2004 data) African American women are 2.5 times more likely to experience infant mortality. Why do think this is? (access to adequate pre-natal care, insurance issues, greater social problems? etc.)

8. The majority of the social science literature on the topic seems to argue that the disparity seen across different ethnicities is not solely a class issue, but a racial one. For example, many African American women at high SES still experience bad outcomes at higher rates. What are your thoughts on this?

9. Do you think that the insights on disparate treatment found in cardiovascular health could play a role in prenatal health?
10. Ideally, what could be done to erase the disparity seen in negative maternal birth outcomes?

11. Do you think there are measures health care providers or the public

health sector can take to alleviate this disparity?

12. What do you see as being a very pressing issue in maternal health? What would you like to see more research done on?

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Surviving the Forest:

Ethnography of New Haven's Tent City

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Introduction

According to the National Coalition for the Homeless, 3.5 million Americans experience homelessness in any given year. Because it is notoriously difficult to count homeless individuals, this number is a gross estimation, but one conclusion should be clear: homelessness remains a persistent reality in the United States.

Thus, is comes as no surprise that the phenomenon is well documented in sociological literature. Eliot Liebow's *Tell Them Who I Am* and Anderson and Snow's *Down on Their Luck* are two particularly striking examples. However, the majority of this literature focuses on homeless individuals that reside in shelters. While such individuals constitute the majority of America's homeless, there is also a considerable, though largely unknown, population of people living independently in squatter communities.

With the onset of the 2007 recession, a few news media reports have appeared focusing on the growth of Tent Cities around the country. A recent MSNBC article ("In Hard Times, Tent Cities Rise Across the Country") declares: "From Seattle to Athens, GA, homeless advocacy groups and city agencies are reporting the most visible rise in homeless encampments in a generation." Though these communities are gaining recognition in the media, they have been the subject of strikingly little sociological literature[1]. While

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[1] One exception is Gwendolyn Dordick's Something Left to Lose (1997), which contains a fascinating section on a Tent City in New York.

every community is undoubtedly unique, I hope that this ethnography will shed some light on the condition of life within such encampments.

Tent City was a loose community of formerly homeless individuals that took up residence in one of New Haven's parks. They were a unique group of people who, for various reasons, were unable to maintain a more conventional lifestyle. Faced with the prospect of long-term homelessness, they set up tents in this forest and withdrew from the lifestyle of mainstream society. In this paper, I investigate the forces that led them to Tent City, how they survived in the forest, and factors that prevented them from leaving. Though all Tent City residents were evicted in August 2010, I have opted to keep this paper in the present tense in order to portray more accurately life within this community.

Locations

Tent City is a secluded community located in a state park on the outskirts of New Haven. Although relatively small, the park is large enough to be truly cut off from the urban environment. It is heavily forested, and boasts a beautiful network of streams, a river, turkeys, and countless birds, squirrels, and other woodland creatures that only Ma (see below) could accurately identify. It also harbors a network of campsites that between 15-50 people call home [2]. The name "Tent City" is somewhat of a misnomer—Tent Suburbs would be more accurate. Instead of one central location, there are at least 7 different campsites, ranging from one to five tents each. Most of the campsites are fairly isolated, but can be

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[2] The number of people sleeping in Tent City varies considerably depending on the weather. During winter months, the community shrinks as people move into public housing. During summer months it expands as camping becomes a more attractive option. On average, there were 20 people sleeping in the Tent City area over the course of my study (November – April).

accessed by an out-of-commission road and small trails that snake around trees in the forest (see figure 1).

The campsites vary in size and level of development. Most consist of at least two tents, a few chairs, and a fire pit. The larger campsites also have other pieces of furniture including tables, clotheslines, propane heaters, shopping carts for storage, and rugs. The tents are always filled with many warm blankets that residents pile on top of themselves to stay warm during cold nights.

Figure 1: Campsites in Tent City

KEY
Maximum Length of Park = .9 miles
Maximum Width of Park = .5 miles
Black Lines = Roads
Blue = Water
Red = Tents

Subjects

The majority of my time was spent at one campsite. Headed by Ro, it also consisted of Ma, Wanda, Ty, Jo, Elaine, and a few other guests that occasionally spent the night. I also had a few in-depth conversations at Celia's campsite, located across the river. The individuals at the other campsites were always friendly with me, but they were somewhat distrustful of my project and did not wish to form a major part of it. I have done my best to respect their privacy and never quote them in this paper. Therefore, while the total Tent City population hovered around 20 during this study, I only formed a trusting relationship with ten individuals.

The residents of Tent City are all middle-aged--- that is, between 30 and 60 years old. They have been living there for varying lengths of time, ranging from a few months to over three years (see table 1). Some individuals, such as Ro, Celia, Beth, and L.A. have spent years sleeping in their respective tents. Others tend to come and go from Tent City, occasionally spending nights at the nearby C Shelter and other locations. They are ethnically diverse—of the ten people I got to know, 6 are considered to be White, 3 are Black, and 1 is Hispanic. Many live as couples in romantic relationships sharing the same tent. For all of these individuals, Tent City constitutes the closest semblance of a home.

Methodology

Due to the highly sensitive nature of this project, I deemed ethnography to be the most appropriate method of investigation. In collecting data, I have relied almost exclusively on the method of "naturalistic fieldwork" (Anderson and Allard 2005) as taught by Robert Park, Howard Becker, David Matza, and Elijah Anderson.

This methodology stresses the importance of developing a close relationship with one's subjects so that the researcher/subject relationship can be transcended. While this type of ethnography may be criticized for its inherent subjectivity, its primary advantage lies in its ability to access detailed, accurate information that would be impossible to obtain through surveys or interviews. For example, the question "Why do you live in Tent City?" may be difficult to answer in a survey.

Table 1: People of Tent City

Individual	Length of Stay in Tent City
Elaine	3 months, intermittently
Jo	3 months
Annie	4 months
Ty	7 months, intermittently
Ma	7 months
Randa	2 years, intermittently
Ro	2 years
L.A.	3 years
Beth	3.5 years
Celia	3.5 years

Trust is a key element of any ethnography, both between subjects and researcher and between the ethnographer and reader. In order to build a relationship with my subjects, I spent many hours with them in the forest, sitting over a fire, gathering wood, and occasionally performing other minor chores at the campsites. I did not use a tape recorder and I rarely took notes at the actual research site, preferring instead to type them up as soon as I returned home. Over the course of this project, I

developed friendships with people in Tent City, and they were generally very willing to answer my many questions. In order to protect their identities, I have used pseudonyms throughout this paper.

Why Not the Shelters?

For the vast majority of New Haven's homeless that cannot afford an apartment and have not yet been admitted to a transitional housing program, the best recourse is the Emergency Shelters that admit anyone on a nightly basis. They vary in quality, but all offer a shower, at least one meal, and a place to sleep (though not necessarily a bed). This is an attractive option for most unsheltered homeless, but for a variety of reasons, Tent City residents have opted to forego shelter life.

The two main reasons Tent City residents gave for wanting to avoid overnight shelters were 1) a lack of freedom and 2) an aversion to other guests. In order to gain insight into shelter life and an understanding of these responses, I spent a considerable amount of time in New Haven's three largest emergency shelters.

Lack of Freedom and mobility

A common complaint of the shelters is the many rules that limit one's mobility. As a total institution (Goffman 1961), the shelters closely regulate the actions of their guests. The rules governing B Shelter are shown in Figure 2. Failure to abide by these rules results in Disciplinary Discharge: expulsion from the shelter for a given number of days. The three New Haven shelters vary in strictness, with the C Shelter being the most stringent, and the Overflow Shelter being most lenient. However, they all deny

Figure 2: Rules and Regulations at the B Shelter

Shelter rules and Regulations	10. Guest will not be allowed up front without being fully clothed
1. Guest will be searched before admittance	11. Smoke breaks will be every hour on the hour
2. All guests must register and shower every night	12. If you come here intoxicated, you will not be permitted in
3. All guests musts have a private and confidential interview with case manager and get an action plan	13. No alcohol, illegal drugs, or weapons allowed
4. Register between 4:00 until 11:00	14. All guests must depart by way of front entrance by 7:45
5. Lights out at 10:00	15. No clothes are to be left on bed, under mattress, or under beds
6. No phone calls permitted or received. (we will not give out any information to anyone inquiring about your stay here)	16. Smoking permitted in designated areas only
7. Open packs of cigarettes will be searched	17. One bag per person
8. Food brought from the outside will be checked. We cannot store food for guest	18. If client does not obtain a case manager in 30 days they will be dismissed for 90 days—per length of stay contract
9. Food to be eaten only in the food service and dining area	19. If client is not working on action plan with case management, client can be dismissed for 90 days—per length of stay contract

Source: Sign above water fountain in the dining area, as transcribed by author.

readmission to anyone who leaves the shelter after registration[3]. In effect, this means that if someone enters the shelter at 4:00 PM to guarantee access to a bed, he cannot leave until 7:30 the following morning. This rule, more than any other, was bemoaned by Tent City residents: *What kind of grown man wants to go to a shelter at 4:30?*

In addition, a myriad of other rules can make the shelters seem like a prison. Guests' activities in the shelters are carefully monitored, and their movements must follow a detailed schedule. At the Overflow Shelter,

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[3] This rule is designed to prevent guests from leaving the shelter to consume drugs or alcohol.

I was admonished multiple times for wearing a hat[4]. At the B Shelter, men are only allowed in the common room at certain times. At all the shelters, guests can only step outside for a few minutes during designated smoke breaks. There are cumbersome registration processes and strict 'lights out' policies. Accordingly, people at Tent City complain that the shelters make them feel confined. Ro expressed this sentiment most clearly: *"When I stay there, I look around and I feel like I'm in a warehouse. They're warehousing me! It's a warehouse for people who don't have homes."*

By comparison, life in the forest becomes liberating. All of the people who live in Tent City told me that they prefer the forest because it is more peaceful, and they feel free to act as they choose. Beth says that she loves living next to the water, and Ma enjoys living among the forest animals.

Aversion to Other Guests

Many Tent City residents spoke of an aversion to "drama" caused by other guests. Nearly everyone agreed that many of the guests at the shelters are thieves, drug addicts, and drug dealers. After telling Ma that I was doing research at the B Shelter, she told me: *"Ya know, to get that place, you really gotta stay overnight. But it's dangerous—you might get in a fight. There's a lot of street people there."* John agreed: *"The times I slept there I slept clutching all my stuff with a blanket on top."*

Indeed, nearly every man I talked to in the shelter warned me of excessive theft. While eating, one man told me a story of how someone stole his keys: *"They can't even use the keys--- why would they steal them?"* The man next to him provided another example: *"One night, I was sleeping*

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[4] This rule exists because headwear can make it difficult to identify individuals. At the Overflow Shelter, there are cameras on the ceilings that are used to determine who is responsible for thefts and violence.

in bed and somebody stole the blanket off me while I was asleep! I woke up shivering!" I received similar advice from other clients-- many sleep wearing their clothes in order to prevent theft during the night. One of the administrators at the shelter explained his interpretation of the cause of this theft: *"Nobody in here cares about his fellow man."* Despite these constant warnings of theft, I did not encounter any problems during visits to B shelter. This can partially be explained by the fact that I never spent the night---according to the guests, the majority of thefts occur early in the morning when most people are asleep.

While most Tent City residents agreed that the Overflow shelter and C shelter were safer, they still all expressed a deep distrust of the other guests. For most, this distrust was rooted in the perception that theft was rampant, but others criticized the other guests' sexual orientations: *"The people… there's too much drama. There's a lotta lesbians and they don't even hide it!"* Similarly, Ma once told me about how Ty felt uncomfortable at the shelters because men were engaging in sexual acts in the showers.

Though I only spent a few days in the shelters, I saw no instances of theft or overt sexual activity. While they probably occur, they seem considerably less common than Tent City people expressed. How can we interpret this discrepancy? On the one hand, this condemnation of the other guests may be a form of associational distancing (Snow and Anderson 1993), a method of managing negative stigma:

> Since a claim to a particular self is partly contingent on the imputed social identities of the person's associates, one way people can substantiate that claim when their associates are negatively evaluated is to distance themselves from those associates (p. 215).

Because homeless people are often "negatively evaluated," i.e., stigmatized,

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they often try to find ways of negating this stigma. One way of doing so is to set oneself apart from the other stigmatized individuals. In this case, Ma, Jo, Elaine, and Ty are distancing themselves from the other homeless people at the shelters, who they claim to be thieves, drug users, and homosexuals. This allows them to counter society's negative assessment of them. It enables them to say "Yes, we are homeless, but we are not like those homeless people."

On the other hand, many Tent City residents simply don't like to be surrounded by many people. Wanda often explained to me that when there are too many people around, she gets anxious and hears voices. Jo explained that he can never relax at the shelters: *"There are too many people, and sometimes I'll sit in a chair and somebody will come up and say 'That's my chair.'"* Celia voiced a similar complaint: *"OK, here's the thing about the shelters: I have a short temper, and at [the C Shelter] there is always drama, there's always somebody yelling at you! They have no respect! Like it's time to go to bed, and then somebody turns on the lights! I don't like that!"*

Based on my experiences at the shelters, this claustrophobic reaction is entirely understandable. In a room of 150 people, privacy does not exist. Constant interaction with other guests can get extremely frustrating, especially when conflicts occur due to limited resources.

After experiencing both Tent City and the shelters, I have come to view Tent City residents' decision to move out in to the forest as completely rational. While some people enjoy the constant presence of many people, others prefer to have more privacy and quiet. Tent City people are not crazy; they are merely the latter type of person, and due to their economic constraints, they were unable to afford a quiet apartment of their own. Their best option was to set up tents and move into the forest.

Life in Tent City

At this point, I have explained why Tent City residents choose to sleep in the forest instead of the shelters. However, this does not explain why they had to make this difficult choice in the first place: why were they unable to afford a more conventional home? While a comprehensive analysis of the many factors that lead to homelessness is beyond the purview of this manuscript, I address the two most common factors as voiced by Tent City residents: substance abuse and unemployment.

Substance Abuse

In 1991, the Cuomo Commision took random urine samples from people staying in general-purpose shelters in New York City. Sixty-six percent tested positive for cocaine (Jencks 1994: 42). Around the same time in New Haven, nearly 70 percent of guests at emergency shelters reported substance abuse as a problem in their lives (Hartwell 2008: 80). Every person I talked to in Tent City admitted to having had problems with drugs or alcohol at one point in their lives.

Based on this strong correlation, it is tempting to assume that substance abuse leads to homelessness. Indeed, this view is often expressed in popular discourse—in a recent article about Tent City in the *New Haven Independent* many of the readers' comments were along these lines: *"Everyone out in the woods is on drugs! I really feel like this would be the best DON'T DO DRUGS message to youth, you'll end up a beaver trapper in the Yukon"* (Tuhus 2009),

Homeless advocates are quick to note that "correlation does not equal causation," and argue that the relationship between homelessness and drug use is more complex. Since crack is often easily available near places where homeless people congregate, it could be that homelessness

is the cause, rather than a symptom, of crack use (Jencks 1994: 43). In this scenario, we imagine an individual who recently lost his job, got kicked out of his apartment, and decides to spend a night in a big-city shelter. Once there, he becomes acquainted with crack users who convince him to take part in their destructive habit. As the drug offers him a temporary escape from his troubles, he becomes a habitual user and eventually becomes addicted.

Which story is more convincing? Is drug addiction leading to homelessness, or is homelessness leading to drug addiction? My ethnographic study has yielded mixed results. Nearly every person I met in Tent City described him/herself as a recovering addict, and many attribute their homelessness to their previous drug addictions. Celia provides one such example: "I was addicted, you understand? But I've been clean for 4 months." She blames her addiction to heroin for her current situation. She is proud that she has been clean for so long, and hopeful that her life will improve now that she is overcoming her addiction.

Celia's heroin addiction was somewhat different from that of other Tent City residents for whom crack was the problem. Though a hit of crack only costs a few dollars, its highly addictive nature and fleeting effects mean that it can take an incredible toll on one's finances. Ty and Ma once explained to me how one crack binge could leave them broke overnight[5]. For this reason, among others, most people at Tent City are trying to abstain from drugs. Ro, Ma, Wanda, Ty, and Celia have all told me with pride that they are "recovering addicts," and think that becoming permanently clean is the first step to improving their situations. In fact, it is partly for this reason that Ma avoids the shelters. At the shelters, the

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[5] In this respect, crack and heroine seem more dangerous than alcohol, since these drugs tend to deplete one's bank account at a much faster rate.

temptation and constant presence of drug users make it very difficult to stay clean. Ro, Ty, and Wanda all confirmed this statement.

Thus, my data could be used to support both causal relationships. On the one hand, some Tent City residents self-reported that drugs were the primary cause of their condition. Others implied that, because of the constant presence and availability of crack, homelessness actually caused their addiction.

Rather than choose a side, I would argue that both drug addiction and homelessness are symptoms of an underlying problem. Whenever I asked Tent City residents when they use crack, they responded that they tended to relapse after a stressful or depressing event. One such example was when Ty was unexpectedly admitted into a rehabilitation program, leaving Ma on her own: "I relapsed 'cuz of that. I didn't have a chance to kiss him goodbye or anything. They just took him away!" Among Tent City residents I found a common consensus that people revert to abusing substances out of weakness. Ty once explained to me why he thinks people use crack: "Cuz they are depressed." According to my subjects, people do not smoke crack out of isolation, but as a response or escape from difficult situations in their lives.

Here we see a spiraling effect: people turn to drug use as a cure for depression during difficult times. But minutes after the drug-induced high, the user finds himself in an even lower low, for which the easiest cure is another hit. Yet the more one smokes, the more depressed he becomes, and a growing part of his resources are spent procuring more drugs. In this way, drug addiction may act as the final push that causes an at-risk person to become homeless. But drug abuse in itself did not lead people to Tent City--- it was more often the combination of drug use and long-term unemployment.

Unemployment

According to New Haven's 2009 survey, only 14% of New Haven's homeless were currently working (CCEH.org). "Rent Problems" was the number one reason given for respondents leaving their last place of residence. The relationship between homelessness and unemployment seems clear: without employment, at risk individuals are unable to pay rent and are forced to give up their apartments.

Of the people I met at Tent City, Jo was the only one who was formally employed, selling newspapers on the street. He wakes up at 4:00 AM, collects the papers from his boss, and goes to his assigned location. This is usually near a stoplight next to a busy road. He waits until the light turns red and then walks up and down the line of cars, stopping when someone opens their window to buy a paper. He remains on location from 6:30 AM to 3:00 PM every day.

This work is neither easy nor lucrative. He makes 35 cents for every paper he sells, except on Sundays when he makes 55 cents. However, weekdays are actually better, because often people will give him a dollar for the 75 cent paper, so he gets to keep the extra quarter, bringing his profit up to 60 cents. The number of papers he sells depends greatly on where he is assigned on a given day. At a good location, he can expect to make $10-$20 over the course of his eight hour day. On other days, however, he is less fortunate:

> *Jo: One day my boss gives me 30 papers for free because he is trying to build up the location. He tells me to go there and sell what I can. 30 papers for free? I knew something was up. So I go to the spot, and the light turns red, and then next thing I know, it turns green! I had nothing to do, so just for fun I counted how long it stayed red: 15*

seconds! How can I sell papers in 15 seconds?
Andrew: Wow, so did you sell any?
Jo: HELL no!

On such days, Jo returns home to his tent with less than $10 profit the entire day. On days when it is cold, raining, or snowing, his job can be downright miserable.

Thus, the first thing to note is that Jo's work ethic is alive and well—he works long hours for very little reward. He told me that *"It's not the best job,"* but he is happy to be working rather than panhandling or stealing. In this way, he was slowly saving up money until he was arrested for an outstanding warrant in late November.

Why did Jo work at such an unrewarding job? Why aren't other Tent City residents employed? Why don't they apply for jobs? These questions can largely be answered by considering New Haven's high unemployment rate and the homeless' lack of social capital.

Stigma

The homeless has always been a stigmatized population, but Tent City residents seem to be even more heavily stigmatized. During my first day at Tent City, Ma and I were walking along the road when a policeman approached us. He was in the area investigating a car nearby that had been broken into. When Ma revealed that she lived in Tent City, he became hostile, asking us if we had anything to do with the crime. Ma acted very friendly and open, and the cop gradually replaced his hostile attitude with a patronizing one. At one point, Ma asked if he had ever been to Tent City. He looked at me and smiled as he answered: *"No, I've never gone down there. I'm afraid to go down there."*

This policeman was not alone in fearing Tent City people. Wanda told me how people she met at the church looked down on her when she revealed that she lived in the forest. *"They pull their children away from me! Everyone thinks that, since we live out here, we must be animals."* Ro described similar situations in which people berated him for his unconventional lifestyle.

This stigma can certainly make acquiring a job more difficult. First, Tent City residents face difficulties when filling out application forms. Under "Address," they are unable to put "Tent City" as their place of residence. In addition, despite the fact that some Tent City residents have no criminal record (and those that do are predominately nonviolent, drug-related offenses), there is a general consensus that Tent City people are dangerous. I heard this sentiment expressed by policemen, citizens that live near the forest, homeless men in the shelters, and my colleagues at the university. Because people know so little about these individuals, they tend to assume the worst. In this light, it is no wonder that Tent City residents are seldom recruited by employers.

Alternative Employment

With little prospect of securing a formal job, Tent City residents must find alternative sources of income. While some occasionally receive money from the state, they all engage in various types of work to support themselves. One such activity is panhandling. Ty, Ma, Ro, and Wanda all depend on panhandling as a primary source of income. They have explained to me that panhandling is more complicated than it looks, and there are various ways of going about it:

Ma & Ty's campsite

Ty: The money he makes, Ro could have been out of Tent City a month after he came.
Andrew: Why?

Ty: Because of the way he panhandles!

Andrew: You don't panhandle?

Ty: I panhandle, but not like him!

Ma: TY's no good…

Ty: I never make money panhandling... the other day I did really good, I made 7 dollars the whole day.
Andrew: So what does Ro do that's different?

Ty: It's the sign!

Andrew: Why don't you make a sign?

Ty: I don't ROLL like that.

Ma: We HUSTLE, we go up to people and ask them.

Different people seem to have varying success at panhandling. Ty and Ma criticize Ro's form of panhandling in which he stands next to a busy road and holds a sign that says *"Homeless and hungry."* Their criticism seems to be that Ro is not working hard enough. Using a sign is too easy--- Ma and Ty seem to think that a panhandler needs to hustle in order to do the job right. However, their form of panhandling seems to be much less effective if on a good day Ty is only able to earn $7.

Again, we see a form of the American work ethic alive and well in Tent City. While most people tend to consider panhandlers as lazy free-riders, Tent City residents view it as a difficult form of labor. It is physically and mentally taxing to stand on the side of the road for hours, breathing car exhaust and taking insults from unsympathetic people.

Another popular source of income is the collection of empty cans. In Connecticut, beverage consumers are charged a 5 cents deposit on each can or bottle. They can earn back this deposit by bringing the container to a redemption center, but most people forego this small reward because it is easier to dispose of the cans elsewhere.

These empty containers have the potential to be a source of income: by collecting a sufficient number of cans and bringing them to the redemption center, one can make a few dollars. Twenty cans equates to $1, 100 cans are worth $5. Celia and Beth frequently make money in this manner. The advantage of "canning" is that it is viewed as an honest form of income, in contrast to panhandling. However, it is somewhat dirty since many of the cans are not completely empty, and is extremely time consuming considering the miniscule profit. In addition, it can be stigmatizing, as people often look down upon people sifting through trash for cans.

A final source of income I noticed at Tent City was door-to-door

salesmanship. On one occasion, Ma and Ty found a used toolkit on the side of the road. I walked with them as they carried the toolkit to the main road and attempted to sell it to various businesses. As we approached a car repair shop, Ma took the toolkit and approached some men talking outside the garage. After a brief conversation, she returned to us, saying *"They won't buy it for $20. I'm not selling it for less than $20!"* They then continued onward to the next business, also without success. In situations such as these, the last resort is always the pawnshop, which will likely offer them a few dollars for the toolkit.

Though these three sources of income (panhandling, canning, finding-and-selling) are not considered formal employment, they generate some income and require a significant amount of time and effort. Anderson and Snow call these sources of income "shadow work":

> The general tendency is that the longer the homeless are on the streets and the more they drive into the world of the outsider, the less salient wage labor becomes as a mode of subsistence for them and the more prominent become one or more forms of shadow work (p. 169).

In this way, shadow work gradually takes the place of formal wage labor as the dominant source of income. Contrary to popular depictions of the lazy homeless, Snow and Anderson adamantly argue that this substitution is not the result of a decline in work ethic:

> It is not a decline in work orientation per se that accounts for the greater prominence of shadow work among outsiders, but a change in orientation from the world of regular work to the world of shadow work. Most outsiders retain the incentive to work—they have no choice if they are to survive—but it is directed to a different order of work (p. 169).

Snow and Anderson are spot on in this argument. The shift away from formal employment is not the result of a decline in the work ethic: it is a

rational response to a system that fails to provide these individuals with jobs. Celia's prospects of finding a job in 2010 are sufficiently low such that picking up cans all day and redeeming them for 5 cents a piece is a more economically efficient use of her time than job searching would be. In sum, Tent City people are not unemployed because they lack the willingness or ability to work—the main thing they lack is opportunity.

Unfortunately, the skills one learns while engaged in shadow work are not easily transferable to a formal job. Panhandling can rarely be listed as "relevant work experience." Anderson and Snow are correct in surmising that the longer an individual remains homeless, the more likely he is to depend on these sources of income. As he becomes more efficient in this type of work, he becomes increasingly reliant on it, and less likely to seek or obtain formal employment. In this way, life in Tent City tends to propagate itself. While writing about *Skid Row* (1968), Samuel Wallace noted that:

> From the point of view of responsible society, the skid rower has become desocialized. From the point of view of skid row society he has become socialized and acculturated. It is in this phase that the individual may be publicly labeled a deviant through arrest, sentence, and incarceration (p. 100).

A similar process occurs in Tent City. As individuals become integrated into Tent City, their ties within that community become stronger while their ties with "normal" society disintegrate. This makes life in Tent City more manageable, but decreases one's chances of leaving.

Inability to Save Money

I have often been surprised by Tent City residents' inability to save money. Many residents wake up in the morning without a dollar to

their name. Because they make very little income, they have learned to be extremely frugal--- Ro and Wanda once explained to me how to get from New Haven to Hartford for under $5 by using a variety of bus transfers.

However, on the few occasions that Ro, Elaine, Ma, or Ty do find themselves with an excess of money, they seem to spend it immediately. For example, Ma and Ty save a few dollars everyday so that, once a month, they can afford to rent a hotel room in which to shower, clean, and relax.

Another example of seemingly irrational spending is on cigarettes. I have often been amazed by the amount of money that Tent City residents, and the homeless in general, spend on cigarettes. Considering the astronomical price of cigarettes (around $7.50 a pack and constantly rising), it is astounding that people with such a small income maintain the habit.

In fact, however, everyone I met in Tent City routinely smokes cigarettes, as do most of the men I met in the shelters. Ma has spent hours panhandling on the street, only to acquire enough money to buy a $7.50 pack of cigarettes. The link between smoking and poverty has been well established, but I have been unable to find a convincing argument for why this occurs. In "Poverty and Smoking," the authors lay out five different hypotheses to explain the high rate of smoking among impoverished individuals. Of these, the only convincing argument is the third: "The adoption of smoking may be a replacement reward, as smoking is often described as one of the few things a poor person can do for himself" (Bobak et al. 2000: 57). According to this argument, a high rate of smoking among the homeless occurs because it is one of their only sources of pleasure. The same logic can be applied to Ma and Ty's monthly hotel vacations: these vacations are some of the few material comforts that they are able to enjoy.

Whatever the reason, few people at Tent City are able to save money. Without money, they will never be able to find conventional housing. However, because of stigma and daily difficulties associated with living in the forest, they are largely unable to find employment until they leave Tent City. This puts them in a double-bind: one needs a job to get conventional housing, but one needs conventional housing to get a job. What is the way out? How can the cycle be broken?

There seem to be two possibilities. Celia and Beth are attempting one: stay clean from drugs and apply for state-assisted housing. They applied a few months ago, and Celia is confident that they will soon be offered a home at an affordable cost. Once they are living in a secure environment, they will be better able to find and hold jobs, eventually becoming financially independent. Unfortunately, this plan of action hinges on state-funded housing assistance, of which there is a relatively low supply. They have yet to hear back from the housing authority.

Jo was pursuing another path out of Tent City. Before he got rearrested for an outstanding warrant, he was slowly saving up money from his job as a newspaper salesman. Since he was only making around $10 - $20 a day, it would have taken painfully long to save enough money to afford a conventional home, but he seemed to be on the right track. The advantage of this path is that it does not rely on state assistance. The disadvantage is that it may be unrealistic to expect to be able to climb out of poverty through such a low-paying job. For his part, Jo seemed to be succeeding until his unexpected reencounter with the police.

Conclusion

In this ethnography, I have attempted to answer the deceptively

simple question: "Why do people live in Tent City?" I found that, in most cases, the combination of drug abuse and long-term unemployment led them to become homeless, and a desire for freedom and solitude led them to prefer the cold forest over the crowded shelters. Finally, I looked at some of the endogenous characteristics of life at Tent City in order to explain why it is so difficult for them to improve their circumstances.

In August 2010, all residents of New Haven's Tent City were evicted by New Haven and West Haven police. Many of the residents were strongly opposed to this turn of events, but were unable to counter charges from outsiders that theirs was a dangerous and harmful community. A similar dismantling occurred in 2008 in Waterbury, CT, when a city crew dismantled a community of tents and shacks that provided shelter for 17 men (Burnell 2008). The same occurred in a squatter community in Toronto, Canada (Bishop-Stall 2004). Sacramento, CA, responded similarly with respect to its 150 member strong Tent City (Hurt 2009).

It is easy to imagine why homeless encampments retain such a negative image in mainstream society. However, over the course of this study, I have come to view New Haven's Tent City as a generally positive force in its former residents' lives. The shelters are not suitable for everyone, and Tent City residents had valid reasons for building their own homes in the forest. Furthermore, considering that the shelters were already operating at maximum capacity, dismantling Tent City could not have made the situation any better. In the future, I would implore city officials to closely examine the condition of people living in similar communities. Many of these people live in homeless encampments because it is their best (or only) option---- eviction only exacerbates the problem of homelessness. Until we can actually help Tent City residents, we should consider following

Ro's advice: *"I wish they would just leave me alone."* A home in the forest is better than no home at all.

Acknowledgements

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A Memo on Style: Reflections on "Style" as a Sociological Concept[1]

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The present notes are a part of an ongoing engagement with the substance of Harrison White's "identity and control" work, as developed in three similarly titled books by him (1992, 2008; French translation with new supporting scholarly apparatus, 2011).

These books center around conceptual development (with many examples) of a dozen or so fundamental sociological concepts derived by White from his decades-long scholarship on social structure and process, and used by him to anchor his identity and control unifying theme.

One of those concepts is the concept of style, in a sociological sense that is important to keep intellectually distinct from its popular usages (e.g., in connection with fashion). Perhaps because I had already independently come upon something like a sociological concept of style (if in a restricted context) while writing my first book (Boorman 1969), White's concept of style has particularly intrigued me as a possible opening to a deeper and clearer understanding of his much larger identity and control vein of work.

Key to motivating this effort is my intuition that White's identity and control framework has major potential for assisting social

observation tasks – in particular, those geared toward clarifying social phenomena which unfold on a larger canvas (and possibly also on a more abstract plane) than most ethnographic subjects. An example would be "bureaucracy-watching": observation engaging with the difficult task of observing bureaucratic dynamics in a complex social environment containing multiple organizations plus complex social networks plus legal structures (and often structures of still other kinds too).

Here a carefully developed concept of style may shed useful light – as it did, implicitly, in my book analyzing the strategy used by the Chinese Communists to win the 1927-49 revolution in terms of the strategy of the game of wei-ch'i (which might reasonably be interpreted as an instance of strategic style). Of course, more than the concept of style alone is needed to rise to the challenge of applying White's identity and control framework to meet complex needs of social observation in 21st century contexts. Analysis of "style" themes is likely to achieve its full potential only in coordination with concurrent applications of relevant social network analysis plus relevant tools of institutional analysis. Adequately exploring this larger topic would, of course, require much more than one short essay – and I am inclined to see this task as one involving a research frontier (cf. John Levi Martin's (2009: 127) lament regarding sociology's failure to develop its social observation capabilities more fully).

What follows are three broad reflections on style as a sociological concept.

Reflection 1. Ten Notes on Style as an Analytical Concept in Sociology

(1) Some of the most productive and insightful applications of the concept of style to understanding social phenomena may be found in legal scholarship.[2]

　　　　One reason for the affinity of stylistic analysis with parts of legal analysis may stem from the fact that legal institutions tend to harbor so many exceptions and complications as to require methodological imagination in formulating general conceptualizations about them having reasonable accuracy, stability, and coherence.[3] A focus on style is one possibly useful analytical move here – as illustrated by Grant Gilmore's concept of an alternation of classical and romantic periods in American law;[4] or Mirjan Damaška's (1973) use of the concept of style in comparative analysis of criminal procedure.[5]

(2) Stylistic analysis tends to be particularistic, a type of thinking much of whose richness derives from (and is limited by) the concrete examples on which it builds.

　　　　An example would be imperial control styles across the dynasties in Chinese history. A contrast case illustrating a type of analysis that is not particularistic in spirit would be neoclassical economic analysis, perhaps

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[2] Themes of Karl Llewellyn are particularly relevant here. See White (1992: 170-171). Further developments of law-oriented themes of style (or closely related analytical constructs) appear in various Yale Law School faculty writings (see also below).

[3] A flavor of the underlying analytical challenge is well-captured, in a special case, by S.F.C. Milsom (1981: 6), "The life of the common law has been in the abuse of its elementary ideas."

[4] See Grant Gilmore's evocatively titled *The Death of Contract* (1974: 102-103). See also his *The Ages of American Law* (1977: 10ff., 107ff.).

[5] Mirjan Damaška (1973) refers to "two evidentiary styles, that of the common and that of the civil law" (p. 508). Interestingly – in light of Harrison White's intuition that style and stochastic social process are related analytical constructs (see Note 23 below) – a little further on Damaška invokes a stochastic process theme, alluding to Brownian motion (see p. 509).

especially its general equilibrium strand.

(3) Styles tend to run in "families of styles," so that stylistic analysis is almost always most effective when approached in a comparative research spirit.[6]

(4) Style may often be productively approached as an extension of concepts of "heuristics" and "doctrine" into broader, more amorphous settings. While style may exist in areas remote from doctrine, there are many areas – e.g., strategic, administrative, legal – where style abuts doctrine and doctrinal problems. In such areas, analysis of style may be regarded as kind of growing point, or creative frontier, for analysis of doctrine.[7]

　　　　More concretely, it may also be productive to explore operationalizing style as a population of heuristics – one that is often still evolving and whose boundaries (i.e., which heuristics are "in," which "out" of that population) are frequently fuzzy. Yet a stable style will have

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[6] Below, a list of a few families of styles is offered as grist for possible sociological follow-up. Each style family is presented in an open-ended way ("…"), highlighting the potential for recognizing further members of that family – a task often calling for imagination and analogical thinking, pushing received stylistic distinctions beyond their original contexts of application.
Cultural and intellectual styles:
Styles in Western music, literature – or law: {classical, romantic, … }
Intellectual styles (Sir Isaiah Berlin): {hedgehog, fox, … }
Stylistic aspects of game-theoretic analysis: {classical, evolutionary, experimental, … }

Style related to "everyday life in stochastic networks" (=title of a Harrison White paper):
Stylistic aspects of roles: {intellectual, scholar, scientist, engineer, … }
Stylistic aspects of networks and their connectivity: {scale-free, broad-scale, single-scale, … }

Legal-political-economic styles:
Stylistic aspects of conflict resolution: {force, non-forcible self-help, negotiation, arbitration, litigation, … }
Stylistic aspects of legal systems: {Anglo-American common law, civil law, … }
Stylistic aspects of political-economic systems: {capitalism(s), socialism (s), "third way," … }
[7] In the context of warfare, a suggestion here is that the traditional Principles of War are better analyzed as expressions of strategic or tactical "style" than as embodiments of "doctrine." (For a useful roundup of statements of these principles see Appendix B of Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. (1986).

mechanisms (even if not highly visible ones) that establish limits and hold sprawl in check.[8]

(5) Where indeterminacies are present, style may play a central role as tie-breaker.

For example, more commonly than is usually recognized (or admitted!) by their practitioners and fans, "rational choice" models widely encounter situations where there is, taking into account all sources of uncertainty, measurement error, etc., a de facto tie between two (or often more) distinct yet similarly advantageous courses of action. In such settings, "rational choice" cannot provide a complete account of decision making, creating analytical space for style in shaping choice outcomes.

(6) Styles exhibit natural dynamics having at least the following aspects: birth, development, competition (or clash), migration, death. [9]

Those dynamics may support interesting systematic propositions. For example, picking up on an idea in Harrison White's 1992 book, "birth" of a new style may come about because two distinct styles temporarily blend – and then subsequently diverge leaving as residue a third, new, style that goes on to differentiate itself from both of its precursors (White 1992: 320; White 2008: 163-164).

One concrete example of this kind of dynamic, which invites analytical development in a context of genetic algorithms (in a software

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[8] See White (2008: 112): "whatever the scope, two basic aspects of style come intertwined: (a) the interpretive tone along with (b) the feedback dynamics."

[9] Illustrating themes of stylistic evolution, centering on the post-Cold-War shift of the German government from Bonn back to Berlin, see White (2008: 161-162, citing work of Sophie Muetzel). It might be interesting to use a stylistic perspective to analyze effects of shifts of capital cities in other times and places – such as the Safavid move of capital from Qazvin to Isfahan in the late 1500s.

sense), might be found in certain new intellectual styles which emerge out of the temporary convergence of two distinct pre-existing styles – and then, as their own literatures expand and mature, gradually cease alluding to the literature of either of the progenitor areas.

(7) Styles often masquerade as something else altogether.[10]

     "Professionalism" is a telling example. In many ways, it is better seen as a style than as what it is more usually equated to, namely, a definite body of knowledge or doctrine (White 1992: 222-223). For historians, this point may invite reflection on the meaning and manifestations of "professionalism" in the historian's craft. Echoing the idea that styles run in families of styles, an interesting contrast case to historian-as-professional is historian-as-amateur. At least in the recent past (viz. Barbara Tuchman's *The Guns of August* (1962)), the latter has vitality as an alternative stylistic choice to historian-as-professional.

(8) "Rationality" itself is as much a style as it is a tangible problem-solving or decision making approach.[11]

     It is worth stressing that, because of the almost hegemonic role of rational choice models in so much contemporary social science, this application of the style concept holds out the promise of especially productive insights.[12]

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[10] A leading example emphasized by White involves "personhood" (see, e.g., White, 2008: 129 -130). An extended treatment is given in White (1992: Chapter 5, "Styles and Person").

[11] Cf. themes from Max Weber, notably Weber's emphasis on "calculative" aspects of rationality. In the 21st century, there may also be analytical traction from pairing the analysis of style with the analysis (and comparison) of algorithms – a highly developed area which did not exist, or barely so, in Weber's time.

[12] A foil for further exploration of rationality-as-style is Kenneth J. Arrow (1986) (in particular, underscoring tendencies in economics to impute ever more computational power to economic agents). It may at times be useful to approach the concept of style as a generalization of the concept of rationality.

(9) Another facet of "masquerading" in a context of style has to do with authenticity: is a particular concrete manifestation of a style appropriately regarded as "authentic" – or as "fake"?

Given the fluidity of style itself, by what criteria of judgment can we "know" this? Much noted in art worlds, this question invites sociological probing. As White notes (2008: 160), "A style does not come easily."

(10) Social theory has a need for a broadly-based concept of style in a sociological sense.[13]

In particular, an important and frequently underestimated part of competence in social observation consists in "style watching," i.e., the ability to recognize and describe styles operating in complex social contexts, as well as consequences of those styles.

To give just one example, a major contribution of Nathan Leites was his pioneering recognition that much Soviet behavior – e.g., political, military, other strategic, managerial – could be productively analyzed in terms of a set of observations, not just of the Soviet Union's institutional

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[13] Broadly-based support for the need for a sociological concept of style is suggested by scrutiny of JSTOR counts of search results (from a set of JSTOR searches covering the full JSTOR database, carried out August 17, 2011 by the present author):

"personal style" or "personal styles"	… 8,155 search results;
"management style" or "management styles" or "managerial style" or "managerial styles"	… 6,802 search results;
"leadership style" or "leadership styles"	… 5,833 search results;
"political style" or "political styles"	… 3,939 search results;
"artistic style" or "artistic styles"	… 3,835 search results;
"cultural style" or "cultural styles"	… 2,119 search results;
"scientific style" or "scientific styles"	… 1,790 search results;
"religious style" or "religious styles"	… 591 search results;
"legal style" or "legal styles"	… 374 search results;
"judicial style" or "judicial styles"	… 308 search results;
"economic style" or "economic styles"	… 164 search results;
"legislative style" or "legislative styles"	… 153 search results;
"command style" or "command styles"	… 126 search results.

dynamics, but of what could be framed as Soviet style.[14]

A frequently useful source of observational leverage regarding styles is that major styles commonly require substantial, if at times low visibility, logistical support of many kinds (e.g., raw talent, training, materiel, time, audience support, etc.). A major shift of style may then entail a switch in the relevant logistical constraints, jettisoning some while introducing new ones. This switch should be grist for style-watchers.

Style watching may be especially important – and analytically productive – in the sociological vicinity of major institutional or other innovation.

Reflection 2. Style in Relation to Other Categories of White's Identity and Control Framework

A useful way of engaging with Harrison White's identity and control framework involves conceptualizing White's basic analytical scheme, not as a simple list of key concepts, but rather as a qualitative <u>matrix</u> of pairwise relations between those concepts. Social network analysts will instantly recognize this move as a generalization of moves common in the social network analysis area, in which Harrison White is, of course, one of the great pioneers.

Specifically, envision a 9 x 9 matrix of fundamental relations between the basic categories of identity and control. For working purposes (building in particular on White's original formulation in his 1992 book), I take those categories to be: <u>identity</u>, <u>control</u>, <u>interface discipline</u>, <u>mobilizer discipline</u>, <u>arena discipline</u>, <u>institution</u>, <u>network</u>, <u>style</u>, <u>story & story-set</u>.

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[14] Relevant books by Nathan Leites include *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (1951), *A Study of Bolshevism* (1953), *Soviet Style in War* (1982), and *Soviet Style in Management* (1985).

Adequately introducing all these categories as White has developed them outruns the scope of the present memo. It may, however, be helpful to note that a "discipline" in White's sense is, to a working approximation, a particular social context whose social dynamics characteristically keep participant actors (or "identities") on their toes – indeed often dancing as fast as they can (whence the motivation for the word "discipline"). It is also important to recognize that White's concept of "institution" is best understood in context of his overall identity and control framework (see, e.g., White 1992: 116-117; 2008: 171-172).

In order to flesh out the concept of style, I supply below in thumbnail summary content for this fundamental relations matrix, which is limited to the "style" row/column of that matrix.

Identities may exhibit styles. Examples might be strategic or imperial – or family – styles.[15] Conversely, a freestanding style may itself come to operate as an identity.[16]

I conjecture that this is less common than institutions operating in this way, because the nature of the "control" exercised by a style is more diffuse. Style may be both a means and an object of the control identities strive to assert.[17] Regarding the former, consult a strategist. Regarding the latter, talk to an artist.

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[15] On one level, Thomas Mann's novel *Buddenbrooks* (1901) is an analysis of style in a family firm context.

[16] Cf. White (1992: 180, note 9): "The stochastic profiles become ghost players in the social arena, ones which are hard to beat by changes in policy."

[17] An interesting possibility, showing White's identity-and-control framework in action, is that identities may possess imperfect control over their own styles. Such imperfect control may have real, major – and potentially exploitable – consequences for control dynamics. See, e.g., Boorman (1969: 179-182), suggesting that, when encirclement of a foe's position is complete, an encircler imprisoned by a encirclement-focused wei-ch'i strategic style may run out of further ideas – other than a militarily costly frontal assault. Cf. Bernard Fall's (1967) account of Dienbienphu (cited in Boorman, 1969: 232-233).

Identities may have operating styles specific to particular disciplines in which those identities take part (in White's framework (White 1992: Chapter 2; 2008: Chapter 3), disciplines can be of <u>interface discipline</u>, <u>mobilizer discipline</u>, or <u>arena discipline</u> type). Note that those operating styles aren't necessarily the same across different disciplines in which a given identity participates. Conversely, a discipline itself may come to exhibit a style – which I suggest may be early warning that this discipline is itself emerging as an identity.

In a manner reminiscent of phase transition themes in the physical sciences, styles may sometimes "congeal" into <u>institutions</u> (cf. the classic Weberian theme of "routinization of charisma"). Conversely, <u>institutions</u>, especially strong ones, commonly give rise to styles.[18] By so doing, they may generate two distinct identities out of one, an interesting "bifurcation" phenomenon that merits further analysis.[19] In particular, styles may at times be spun off from a parent institution and have "freestanding" exemplars.[20]

Social <u>networks</u> operate as conduits for the spread of styles. While they are not the only means by which styles diffuse, they are among the most effective, since style of any complexity is often more readily transmitted through networks than by more impersonal means. Conversely, styles may

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[18] Within U.S. law, Federal income taxation is an institution, or set of interlocking institutions, that is also a source of style – indeed, perhaps two styles (one centering on a distinctive way of formulating and solving substantive problems, whether in tax law or the wider world beyond; the second more language-focused, centering on what has been called the "language of taxation").
[19] Consider Yale Law School as a style. In many contexts, the tangibility of institutions is a natural magnet for observer attention, leading a style identity spun off an institutional identity to be elided or missed – to the detriment of effective social observation of both.
[20] At times a style may long outlive the institution that produced it. In a limiting case an institution might barely exist at all – or be vestigial – yet a derived style might be relatively stable and even strong (e.g., in the waning era or afterglow of an empire). Twentieth-century literature offers many excellent examples of powerful literary vestiges of the waning British empire (e.g., Graham Greene; Isak Dinesen; Evelyn Waugh).

shape social networks,[21] starting with the manner in which some styles encourage, while others frown on, overt reliance on informal networks.

As a conjecture, even in the Internet age styles often propagate faster than bodies of detailed information (particularly if one allows for bottlenecks in putting that information to effective use). Styles may also tend to propagate more reliably than stories and with greater consequences than attitudes. Speed of propagation of certain new styles may hold clues to the surprisingly rapid demise of certain empires.

As vehicles of social cognition, stories & story-sets may exhibit or embody styles – as may perceptions more broadly. Such embodiment commonly ranges beyond form to the substance of stories. As the subjects of the world's traditions of epic poetry powerfully illustrate,[22] styles themselves are also enduring objects of fascination for story-telling. Conversely, style shapes the framework for the interpretation and evaluation of stories. More broadly, the interplay of style and story often produces folk theory that confuses external observers who attempt to build their own analyses on it.

Reflection 3. Analysis of Style as a Research Frontier

A useful perspective is that the analysis of style is in many ways different from the analysis of institutions. As an empirical conjecture, individual analysts who excel at one of these tasks may often be less effective at the other. This comment may be generalized to skill-sets pertinent to

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[21] There may be a tie-in here to small-world research themes of Duncan Watts (1999). At a very micro level it is also important here that a conversation can exhibit a style – a truth that all great trial lawyers intuitively know and exploit.
[22] An avenue for exploration here is suggested by Wolfram Eberhard (1980: 390): "we find among the Mongols probably more epics than in any other society."

other identity-and-control categories, thus underscoring both the need for, and the difficulty of, communicating this framework as a whole.

Social theory tends to lack a fully developed concept of "open question" or "unsolved problem," which I think is an intellectual danger sign. In the spirit of countering such a tendency, I note here three aspects of the concept of style which are in need of further analytical development. The first relates to Harrison White's suggestion of a close natural relationship between styles and stochastic processes arising in social contexts.[23] This may be a pathway to far more sophisticated model-building than the concept of style has yet seen – model-building that could help provide a valuable buffer against potential charges of essentialization or reification lurking in White's use of the style concept. White's stochastic process idea, however, needs pinning down.

Second, even though the study of style in the arts is a highly developed area, there has so far been limited cross-fertilization between studies of style there and studies of style in a sociological sense.

Finally, to avoid overusing the concept, there needs to be clarification of "what is not a style."[24]

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[23] See White (1992: 175ff), citing William Feller's classic *An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications*.
[24] A related analytical question is posed in Damaška's paper (1973: 510, note 8) querying: "Do distinct common and civil law evidentiary styles in fact exist, or are they merely an invention of scholars? As I see it, they do exist …"

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